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© SUMMARY 
The  subject  of  this  thesis  is  the  nature  and  form  of  gambling  in  western  society.  Unlike 
other  academic  studies,  which  approach  the  subject  in  piecemeal  fashion  and  treat  it  as 
essentially  problematic,  this  research  aims  to  provide  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the 
activity  by  situating  the  phenomenological  experience  of  modem  gambling  within  a  formal 
and  historical  framework,  and  examining  it  from  a  variety  of  theoretical  perspectives. 
The  thesis  is  divided  into  five  Chapters. 
The  first  describes  the  historical  development  of  the  concept  of  chance  and  argues  that, 
after  a  lengthy  period  in  which  it  existed  first  as  a  sacred  and  later  as  an  epistemological 
category,  in  the  twentieth  century  chance  was  secularised  and  ascribed  ontological  status 
as  an  explanatory  feature  of  the  modem  world. 
In  Chapter  Two,  a  study  of  the  historical  development  of  gambling  forms,  and  the  social 
affiliation  of  the  various  groups  associated  with  them  complements  the  outline  of  chance 
given  in  Chapter  One.  Here  it  is  argued  that  the  nature  of  these  games  reflected  wider 
social  attitudes  towards  the  perception  of  randomness,  and  also  the  general  configuration 
of  the  society  in  which  they  were  played.  The  development  of  games  from  their  genesis  in 
divination  ritual  to  their  formation  into  a  recognisably  modem  gambling  economy,  is  also 
traced,  and  the  historical  specificity  of  their  various  forms  examined. 
The  formal  parameters  and  phenomenological  experience  of  the  gambling  economy  -  the 
4  phenomenological  sites'-  is  the  subject  of  Chapter  Three.  It  is  argued  that  the  commercial 
organisation  of  games  of  chance  in  the  late  twentieth  century  is  beginning  to  overcome  the 
traditional  stratification  that  for  years  has  determined  the  social  formation  of  gambling 
forins. In  the  third  Chapter  an  attempt  is  made  to  outline  what  is  unique  to  the  experience  of  each 
type  of  gambling,  so  that,  having  established  the  varieties  of  gambling  experience,  the 
fourth  Chapter  can  go  on  to  examine  what  is  common  to  them  all.  In  essence,  this  is an 
attempt  to  describe  what  it  is  actually  like  to  play  at  games  of  chance.  The  subject  of  this 
part  of  the  thesis  is  the  nature  of  the  experience  of  play  and  the  creation  of  meaning  within 
that  experience.  In  Chapter  Four,  play  is  presented  as  a  'thing-in-itself,  within  which 
perceptions  of  time,  space  and  causation  are  altered.  The  understanding  of  these 
categories,  as  well  as  the  medium  of  play  -  money  -  are  analysed  here,  while  the  perception 
of  cause  forms  the  subject  of  Chapter  Five. 
In  the  final  Chapter  it  is  argued  that  the  rejection  of  probability  theory  and  the 
entertainment  of  magical-religious  notions  of  causation  in  gambling  create  order  and 
meaning  in  an  environment  of  uncertainty,  and  so  resolve  the  experiential  chaos  of  play 
itself  It  is  here  that  the  dynamic  of  the  gambling  situation  -  the  tension  between 
uncertainty  and  order,  chance  and  meaning  -  becomes  apparant. CONTENTS 
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Georges  de  la  Tour;  early  sixteenth  century 'Those  iron  hands  of  necessity  which  shake  the  dice-box  of  chance  play  their  game  for 
an  infinite  lengh  of  time:  so  that  there  have  to  be  throws  which  exactly  resemble 
purposiveness  and  rationality  of  every  degree.  Perhaps  our  acts  of  will  and  our 
purposes  are  nothing  but  just  such  throws  .... 
1) 
Friedrich  Nietzshe:  Daybreak;  Book  11-  130 INTRODUCTION 
One  of  the  most  striking  features  to  emerge  from  a  cursory  glance  at  the  phenomenon  of 
gambling  is  its  almost  universal  prevalence  throughout  history  and  across  cultures.  Despite 
its  apparent  insignificance  as  'mere'  games,  it  can  be  said  to  constitute  a  fundamental 
feature,  in  some  form  or  another,  of  human  society.  Drawing  attention  to  the  expression  of 
the  totality  within  the  fi7agment,  Sartre  wrote  that  'man  is  a  totality  and  not  a  collection' 
and  that  'consequently  he  expresses  himself  as  a  whole  in  even  his  most  insignificant  and 
his  most  superficial  behaviour'.  In  other  words  'there  is  not  a  taste,  a  mannerism,  or  a 
human  act  that  is  not  revealing'  (Sartre  1957,  p68).  Drawing  on  an  insight  of  Pascal, 
Sartre  wrtites  that  'there  exist  activities  like  hunting  or  tennis  which,  while  absurd  if 
reduced  to  themselves,  nevertheless  contain  meanings  which  transcend  them'  (Sartre  1957, 
p60).  Gambfing  is  one  such  activity. 
This  thesis,,  then,  wfll  examine  the  phenomenon  of  gambling  in  both  its  historical  and 
contemporary  forms;  in  relation  to  social  structure  and  to  individual  consciousness,  and, 
from  the  analysis  of  its  many  separate  fragments,  attempt  to  arrive  at  a  picture  of  it  that  is 
a  'totality  not  a  collection'  and  which,  in  its  essential  form.,  reveals  something  fundamental 
about  western  society.  From  this  it  will  become  apparent  that,  along  with  the  image  of 
homo  ludens,  homo  faber  and  homo  economicus,  the  sphere  of  human  activity  also 
embraces  homo  aleator  -  man  the  gambler.  First  however,  the  activity  of  gambling  itself 
must  be  defined. 
A  gambling  event  can  loosely  be  described  as  the  unproductive  redistribution  of  wealth, 
where  the  redistributive  mechanism  is  governed  to  a  greater  or  lesser  extent  by  the 
operation  of  chance  and  the  medium  of  participation  is  something  of  value;  in  the  modem 
west,  money.  Further,  in  contemporary  gambling  games  these  revolutions  of  money  and 
chance  occur  within  the  parameters  of  a  strict  set  of  rules  and  within  certain  limitations  of time  and  space  which  make  such  games  separate  and  distinct  from  the  flux  of  e,,.  -er-vdav  life 
going  on  around  them. 
The  ubiquity  of  gambling  does  not  imply  a  corresponding  homogeneity  of  form,  howeý,  er, 
for  both  its  historical  occurrence  and  modem  individual  preferences  exist  in  a  determined 
relation  to  social  structures9  social  roles  and  cultural  conditions.  In  this,  gambling  is 
revealed  as  a  complex  phenomenon,  although  one  which  has  often  been  oversimplified  in 
the  rhetorical  response  of  much  of  the  contemporary  literature  which  claims  to  explain  its 
essential  character.  It  is  to  a  review  of  this  literature  -  which  has  defined  the  academic 
study  of  gambling  -  that  we  now  turn. 
In  the  late  twentieth  century,  a  proliferation  of  academic  monographs  and  specialised 
journals  have  given  birth  to  the  discipline  of'gambling  studies'.  The  activity  has  suddenly 
become  of  interdisciplinary  interest,  researched  in  fields  as  diverse  as  psychology  and 
history,  sociology  and  mathematics,  law  and  economics.  This  diversity  of  approach  has  at 
the  same  time  fragmented  the  phenomenon:  gambling  is  reflected  from  so  many  different 
perspectives  that  any  broader  image  is  lost  in  a  myriad  of  narrow  specialisms.  It  occupies  a 
portion  of  many  larger  fields  without  establishing  a  paradigm  of  its  own.  To  date,  no 
comprehensive  framework  for  discussion  and  no  demarcated  area  of  analysis  exists. 
This  leads  us  to  the  peculiarly  ambivalent  position  of  gambling  in  the  late  twentieth 
century:  on  the  one  hand,  strongly  condoned  and  encouraged  by  commercial  interests  and 
state  authorities  as  a  'harmless  flutter',  on  the  other,  denounced  most  vehemently  by 
treatment  agencies  and  academic  researchers  as  a  morally  corrupt  trade  in  human  hope  and 
credulity. 
In  order  to  pick  through  the  myriad  of  approaches  that  constitute  the  contemporary 
literature,  it  is  useful  to  look  first  at  their  historical  predecessors,  and  so  outline  their 
intellectual  hentage.  Out  of  this  morass,  two  separate  traditions  gradually  emerge.  ftorn 
which  our  modem  perspectives  can  be  traced.  One  'tradition  of  license'  generally 
condones  all  forms  of  play  as  manifestations  of  theviblime  element  of  human  nature,  while 
the  other  regards  play  in  general  and  gambling  in  particular  as  inimical  to  a  healthy  society 3 
Within  a  changing  terminology  of  criticism,  the  latter  regards  gambling  as  fundamentalk, 
problematic  and  condemns  it  as  variously  sinful,  wasteful,  crirrunal  and  pathological. 
In  the  first  and,  from  our  perspective,  less  influential  tradition  onginally  propounded  by 
Plato,  afl  fonns  of  play  are  viewed  as  noble,  life-enhancing  activities.  Systematised  in  the 
Laws  as  part  of  his  general  theory  of  education,  Plato  regarded  the  natural  instinct  of 
children  to  'leap  and  bound  -  and  dance  and  frolic...  with  glee'  (Plato  1934,  p30)  as  a 
divine  attribute  which  should  be  cultivated  in  adult  forms  of  play.  Play  is  fundamental,  for, 
since  the  Divine  is  the  only  true  object  of  serious  endeavour,  'man's  life  is  a  business  which 
does  not  deserve  to  be  taken  too  seriously...  '.  Indeed,  man,  'has  been  constructed  as  a  toy 
for  God,  and  this  is  the  finest  thing  about  him'  (Plato  1934,  p187).  The  faculty  of  play  is 
the  highest  attribute  of  humanity,  and  man  has  a  duty  to  live  by  its  precepts*  'All  of  us 
then,  men  and  women  alike,  must  fall  in  with  our  role  and  spend  life  in  making  our  play  as 
perfect  as  possible'.  This  is  the  'fight  course'  for  life  to  take,  and  VAll  ensure  a  happy  and 
peaceful  existence,  for  in  Plato,  the  notion  of  play  also  has  a  sacred  character.  If  we  'pass 
our  lives  in  the  playing  of  games',  the  result  will  be  'an  ability  to  gain  Heaven's  grace,  and 
to  repel  and  vanquish  an  enemy  when  we  have  to  fight  him'  (Plato  1934,  p  18  8). 
The  equation  of  play  with  the  noblest  virtues  of  humanity  found  renewed  expression  in 
German  romantic  writers  when,  in  the  late  eighteenth  century,  Schiller  lamented  the  effects 
of  commerce  and  rationalisation.  on  creativity,  and  on  the  'wholeness'  of  the  human 
personality  (Clayre  1974,  p15).  However,  at  the  same  time  he  recognised  the  need  for 
restrictions  and  for  rules:  Rousseau's  noble  savage,  free  of  all  conventional  constraint,  was 
not  for  him.  In  modem  life,  Spieltrieb  -  the  play  impulse  -  satisfied  these  demands.  As 
detached  enjoyment  free  from  purpose,  it  represented  the  Kantian  ideal,  and  it  also 
embodied  man's  need  for  restraint  without  denying  him  freedom,  thus  realising  the 
essential  'harmony'  of  mankind.  In  hisFourteenth  Letter,  Schiller  describes  this  Spelltrleb- 
(as  it  abolishes  all  accident,  it  will  also  abolish  compulsion,  and  place  man,  both  morally 
and  physically  in  freedom'  (Schiller  1845,  p105).  Play  is here  the  highest  manifestation  of 
humanity:  in  it  the  true  nature  of  the  individual  can  be  reallsed  and  expressed.  Schiller 
continues:  'in  every  condition  of  man  it  is  play  and  only  play  that  makes  him  complete,  and 4 
unfolds  at  once  his  twofold  nature'  (Schiller  1845,  pI  10).  Ultimatelý,  man  -  1.5  onk  elIfIrell- 
a  man  wheii  he  plays'  (Schiller  1845,  pI  11). 
In  the  twentieth  century,  the  continuing  relevance  of  this  perspective  has  been  stressed  by 
Johan  Huizinga  with  his  ground-breaking  Homo  Ludetis,  by  Roger  Caillois  WithAfan,  Play 
and  Games,  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  an  unacknowledged  debt  by  Erving  Goffiman. 
Huizinga  makes  play  the  basis  of  culture:  ciVilisation  does  not  come  ftom  play,  rather  'it 
arises  in  and  as  play,  and  never  leaves  it'  (Huizinga  1949,  p  173),  for  all  forms  of  human 
expression  -  law,  art,  science,  commerce,  language  and  even  war  -  are  rooted  in  the 
(primeval  soil  of  play'  (Huizinga  1949,  p5).  Huizinga's  definition  of  play  has  been  used  as  a 
working  model,  or  at  the  very  least,  dutifully  acknowledged  as  standard,  by  generations  of 
subsequent  writers,  and  in  it  we  can  clearly  see  the  influence  of  the  Platonic  notion  of 
sacred  play,  and  the  romantic  regard  for  its  life-affirming  tendencies  outwith  the  sphere  of 
material  utility.  For  Huizinga,  play  'is  an  activity  which  proceeds  within  certain  limits  of 
time  and  space,  in  a  visible  order,  according  to  rules  fteely  accepted,  and  outside  the 
sphere  of  necessity  or  material  utility'  (Huizinga  1949,  p132).  It  thus  reconciles  the 
contrary  impulses  of  sensuousness  and  form  outlined  by  Schiller.  The  sensation  of  play  is 
like  that  described  by  Plato  when  the  latter  writes  that  men  and  women  should  play  the 
noblest  games  'and  be  of  another  mind  from  what  they  are  at  present'  (Plato  193  4,  p  19). 
Despite  his  argument  for  the  centrality  of  play  in  human  culture,  Huizinga  is  surprisingly 
dismissive  of  games  of  chance  themselves,  devoting  less  than  two  pages  to  their  discussion 
and  refusing  to  consider  the  applicability  of  his  criteria  of  play  to  the  specific  instance  of 
gambling.  In  two  sentences,  he  dismisses  them  from  his  study:  'In  themselves,  gambling 
games  are  very  curious  subjects  for  cultural  research,  but  for  the  development  of  culture  as 
such  we  must  call  them  unproductive.  They  are  sterile,  adding  nothing  to  fife  or  the  mind' 
(48). 
It  is  this  omission  that  Caillois  attempts  to  rectify.  In  a  study  that  is  perhaps  as  indebted  to 
Schiller's  comments  on  play  as  it  is  to  Huizinga,  Caillois  draws  attention  to  the  latter's 
omission  of  games  of  chance  and  includes  it  in  a  four-fold  classification  of  his  own.  This C, 
taxonomy  rests  on  a  formal  definition  of  play  as  that  which  is  materially  unproductive,  free 
and  voluntary,  uncertain,  isolated  in  space  and  time,  and  bound  by  fixed  rules  (Caillois 
1962,  p6-10).  The  four  fundamental  characteristics  of  play  described  by  Caillois  are  agon 
(competition)  alea  (chance),  simulation  (mimicry),  and  vertigo  (ilinx).  Games  of  I'linx  are 
based  on  the  creation  of  physical  vertigo  or  disorientation  (Caillois  1962,  p23),  while 
mimicry  involves  the  players'  escaping  from  himself  and  becoming  an  'Illusory  character' 
(Caillois  1962,  p19).  Agon  involves  competitive  games  which  presuppose  training,  skill 
and  discipline  (Caillois  1962,  p14)  while  in  games  of  alea,  or  chance,  work,  skill  and 
experience  are  negated  and  'winning  is  the  result  of  fate  rather  than  triumphing  over  an 
adversary'  (Caillois  1962,  p17).  In  conjunction  with  money,  Caillois  points  out,  these 
games  include  gambling  games,  and  in  fact,  as  we  shall  see  later,  traces  of  all  of  these 
characteristics  can  be  found  in  gambling.  Caiflois  posits  a  broad  interdependence  between 
games  and  culture,  writing  that  the  favourite  games  of  a  society  reflect,  'on  the  one  hand, 
the  tendencies,  tastes,  and  ways  of  thought  that  are  prevalent,  while  at  the  same  time,  in 
educating  and  training  the  players  in  these  very  virtues  or  eccentricities,  they  subtly 
confirm  them  in  their  habits  or  preferences'  (Caiflois  1962,  p82).  He  goes  on  to  draw  a 
similar  conclusion  to  Schiller  on  the  reciprocity  between  games  and  society,  speculating 
that  'perhaps...  Sparta's  destiny  could  be  read  in  the  military  rigour  of  the  games  in  the 
palaestra,  that  of  Athens  in  the  aphorisms  of  the  sophists,  that  of  Rome  in  the  combats  of 
the  gladiators,  and  the  decadence  of  Byzantium  in  the  conflicts  in  the  hippodrome' 
(Caillois  1962,  p83). 
Caillois  argues  that  the  evolution  of  these  forms  begins  with  the  historical  transition  from 
'Dionysian'  societies  based  on  the  principles  of  simulation  and  vertigo  to  modem  rational 
ones  governed  by  agon  and  alea.  The  displacement  of  what  he  calls  the  world  of  the  mask 
and  ecstasy  by  that  of  merit  and  chance  is  testimony  to  the  'progress'  of  civilisation,  a 
progress  encapsulated  in  the  games  that  culture  plays.  The  social  forms  of  Dionysian 
society  do  not  disappear  in  modem  times  however,  but  continue  to  exist  in  the  sphere  of 
play.  In  rational  society,  the  'chaotic  original'  forces  of  vertigo  and  simulation  are 
'relegated  to  the  limited  and  regulated  domain  of  games  and  function  where  they  afford 
men  the  same  etemal  satisfaction,  but  in  sublimated  form,  serving  merely  as  an  escape 
from  boredom  or  work  and  entailing  neither  madness  nor  delirium'  (Caillois  1962,  p97). 6 
According  to  Caillois,  civilisation  can  only  flounsh  when  the  principles  of  agon  and  alet, 
displace  those  of  simulation  and  vern  . go  as  the  basis  of  social  organisation.  This  ensures 
the  primacy  of  equality  in  social  fife,  for  in  their  different  ways,  both  stress  the  equality  of 
the  contestants  under  the  rules. 
The  broad  scope  of  Caillois'  argument  situates  play  at  the  centre  of  human  culture,  and, 
despite  its  obvious  evolutionism,  provides  a  formal  definition  of  the  principles,  and  outlines 
the  importance  of,  games  of  chance  in  modem  society.  It  suffers  however,  as  Downes  et 
a].  point  out,  from  a  failure  to  convey  the  meanings  as  distinct  from  the  formal  essences  of 
different  types  of  game:  'He  analyses  games  in  terms  of  their  formal  properties  With  great 
assurance,  but  we  are  left  wondering  why  people  really  play  them'  (Downes  et  al.  1976, 
pl4).  For  illumination,  the  authors  turn  (somewhat  optimistically)  to  Goff-man  whose  long 
essay  on  risk  taking  -  Where  the  Action  Is  -  has  made  a  not  whofly  justified  impact  on  the 
literature  on  gambling.  Goffinan  does  however,  sit  (albeit  uneasily)  within  the  tradition  that 
recognises  the  centrality  of  play  in  human  life-  his  unacknowledged  debt  to  writers  like 
Huizinga  and  Caillois  is  apparent  in  his  description  of  the  creation  and  reallsation  of 
character  in  risky  -  and  especially  gambling  -  situations.  The  'action'  of  the  title  refers  to 
'activities  that  are  consequential,  problematic  and  undertaken  for  what  is  felt  to  be  their 
own  sake'  (Goffinan  1969b,  p136).  In  modem  life,  such  activities  are  'sharply  curtailed' 
(Goffman  1969b,  p143),  (rather  like  Caillois's  simulation  and  vertigo  in  modem  society), 
so  that  opportunities  to  display  bravery,  heroism  and  character  have  to  be  deliberately 
sought  out  in  separate  spheres,  such  as  games  of  chance.  The  'maintenance  of  the  self  in 
such  situations  displays  evidence  of  character.  courage,  gameness,  integrity,  gallantry  and 
composure  emerge  in  stressful  or  risky  occasions,  and  the  individual  becomes  more  fully 
human  for  them.  As  Goffinan  puts  it  'These  naked  little  spasms  of  the  self  occur  at  the  end 
of  the  world,  but  there  at  the  end  is  action  and  character'  (Goffinan  1969b,  p206). 
Goffimds  subsequent  attempt  to  document  the  inner  fife  of  the  gambler  falls  prey  to  the 
shortcomings  of  an  elaborate  exegetical  gloss-  in  the  description  of  the  temporal  sequence 
of  play,  characterised  by  what  he  calls  'squaring-off,  determination,  disclosure  and 
settlement  phases  (Goffinan  1969b,  pIII-  113),  the  modesty  of  his  observation  is  masked 
by  the  gratuitous  complexity  of  the  language  in  which  it  is  expressed. In  the  second  -  and  dominant  -  of  the  two  traditions  outlined  earlier,  gambling  is  perceived 
as  essentially  problematic.  Although  the  terms  of  the  invective  directed  against  it  have 
changed,  the  persistence  of  the  condemnation  of  gambling  has  continued  more  or  less 
throughout  history.  While  Plato  was  writing  of  man  as  'God's  plaything',  Aristotle  could 
see  nothing  but  idleness  in  the  pursuit  of  games,  and  particularly  games  of  chance, 
condemning  those  who  played  them  as  'robbers  and  thieves'  (in  Ashton  1898,  p1O). 
Throughout  the  middle  ages,  prohibition  of  gambling  on  account  of  its  unproductive 
nature  and  disorderly  effects  on  the  population  was  widespread,  although  games  of  chance 
were  not  specifically  regarded  as  sinful.  The  Catholic  church  never  expressly  forbade 
gambling  per  se  and,  despite  its  regulation  of  the  activity,  always  allowed  it  at  Christmas. 
The  statutes  of  the  middle  ages  were  rather  directed  against  a  pastime  that  diverted  efforts 
from  activities  more  important  to  warfare  -  such  as  archery  -  and  that  dissipated  the 
energies  of  labourers  and  the  wealth  of  the  aristocracy.  It  was  not  until  the  Reformation 
that  a  strong  moral  stance  against  gaming  was  adopted  by  the  Church,  and  not  until  the 
emergence  of  the  bourgeoisie  that  a  group  with  a  real  antipathy  towards  the  activity  really 
appeared.  Together,  these  groups  fronted  a  massive  assault  on  games  of  chance,  the 
residue  of  which  is  stiR  visible  today.  A  stream  of  invective  poured  fi7om  the  pulpits  of  the 
Reformed  Church,  damning  gamblers  for  their  idleness,  greed,  blasphemy  and  superstition. 
Games  of  chance  forced  God's  intervention  to  'decide  the  lot'  on  trivial  matters,  flouting 
the  values  of  the  Protestant  by  divorcing  the  creation  of  wealth  from  the  efforts  of  labour, 
and  reducing  it  instead  to  the  vicissitudes  of  chance. 
In  the  Enlightenment  climate  of  moderation  and  reason,  the  idea  of  the  sinful  nature  of  play 
was  replaced  with  an  emphasis  on  its  embodiment  of  irrationality.  At  the  end  of  the 
seventeenth  century  and  throughout  the  eighteenth,  the  mania  associated  with  games  of 
chance  appeared  as  the  epitome  of  irrationality,  and,  if  the  mark  of  humanity  was  reason, 
what  was  left  of  man  once  he  voluntarily  forfeit  his  rationality?  In  this  formulation,  the 
gambler  was  not  a  sinner,  but  nor  was  he  altogether  human  either. 
By  the  nineteenth  century  the  essential  irrationality  of  the  gambler  was  irrelevant  so  long  as 
he  possessed  that  other  attribute  of  humanity  -  the  ability  to  work.  The  industrialising  west 
needed  labour  power;  time  became  a  commodity  only  slightly  less  precious  than  money, K 
and  gambling  squandered  them  both.  The  problems  of  the  orgamisation  of  labour  'Aere 
encapsulated  in  the  figure  of  the  (working  class)  gambler  -  an  individual  "'ho  refused  to 
acknowledge  the  unportance  of  time,  money  or  disciplined  labour.  The  imperati,,  'e  of  the 
Protestant  ethic  now  became  institutionalised  in  laws  forbidding  games  of  chance  along 
with  other'vices'  such  as  alcohofism  and  prostitution-  the  gambler  became  a  crin-ýnal. 
This  historical  overview  serves  to  highlight  approaches  to  gambling  which,  far  from  fading 
into  obscurity  as  their  era  passes,  continue  to  be  reflected  in  twentieth  century 
perspectives.  Despite  its  own  unique  response  to  what  it  perceives  as  'the  problem',  a 
complex  of  historical  continuities  can  be  traced  in  what  can  be  cafled  the  'therapeutic' 
tradition  of  contemporary  gambling  literature.  Conservative  observers  no  longer  seek  to 
punish  and  outlaw  what  they  regard  as  immoral,  unreasonable  or  crin-final  behaviour. 
Instead,  their  more  liberal  descendants  attempt  to  understand  what  is  regarded  as  a 
manifestation  of  illness  which,  crucially,  can  be  cured.  The  moralistic  tone  of  previous 
centuries  has  been  replaced  by  a  clinical  one.  gambling  is  still  problematic,  but  in  a  medical 
rather  than  an  ethical  sense.  In  the  literature  that  is  reviewed  next,  gambling  is  treated 
broadly  as  a  sickness  or  defect;  in  psychology,  in  the  individual,  and  sociology,  in  the 
social  order  itself 
For  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  framework  for  discussion  was  set  by  Freud's 
short  essay  on  Dostoevsky  and  Parricide,  in  which  the  gambler  as  a  compulsive  neurotic 
was  bom.  Freud  traced  the  descent  of  the  gambling  addiction  from  the  primal  addiction  to 
masturbation:  'the  "vice"  of  masturbation  is  replaced  by  the  mania  for  gambling,  and  the 
emphasis  laid  upon  the  passionate  activity  of  the  hands  betrays  this  derivation'  (Freud 
1950,  p241).  Further,  the  guilt  that  was  experienced  afterwards  was  related  to  the  Oedipus 
complex  of  the  players'  youth:  the  desire  to  Ul  the  father  and  possess  the  mother  (Freud 
1950,  p229).  At  this  point,  Freud  referred  specifically  to  Dostoevsky's  ambivalent  relations 
with  his  father  and  his  subsequent  'mania'  for  gambling:  'if  the  father  was  hard,  violent  and 
cruel'  he  writes,  'the  super-ego  takes  over  these  attributes  from  him'  (Freud  1950,  p23  1). 
The  super-ego  thus  becomes  sadistic,  the  ego  masochistic,  and  'A  great  need  for 
punislunent  develops  in  the  ego,  which  in  part  offers  itself  as  a  victim  to  fate,  and  m  part 
finds  satisfaction  in  ill-treatment  by  the  super-ego'  (Freud  1950,  p23  1).  The  guilt 9 
Dostoevsky  felt  for  his  hatred  of  his  father  was  assuaged  in  gambling,  vk-here  in  exposing 
himself  to  fate  he  symbolically  confronted  his  father,  so  that  'for  him,  gambling  was 
another  method  of  self-punishment'  (Freud  1950,  p238). 
This  analysis  initiated  the  description  of  the  gambler  in  the  psychoanalytic  tradition  as  a 
masochist.,  who,  because  of  various  unresolved  conflicts  in  his  past,  was  compelled  to 
repeat  an  endless  cycle  of  punishment,  Bergler  developed  the  theme  of  psychic  masochism, 
describing  the  gambler  as  'a  neurotic  with  an  unconscious  wish  to  lose'  (Bergler  1970,  , ii). 
Traces  of  the  Puritan  abhorrence  of  gambling  are  manifest  in  Bergler's  research-  his  book  is 
an  exercise  in  moral  contempt,  an  outburst  of  disapproval  thinly  disguised  by  medical 
imperatives,  Gambling,  he  tells  us,  is  a  'dangerous  neurosis',  and  the  gambler,  an 
'objectively  sick'  individual,  who,  having  failed  to  renounce  the  efficacy  of  the  pleasure 
principle,  fives  in  a  'fiction  of  omnipotence'  (Bergler  1970,  p16).  Gambling  activates  the 
megalomania  and  grandiosity  of  childhood.  thus  the  gambler  is  convinced  he  will  win. 
However,  his  aggression  towards  the  reality  principle  is  paid  for  by  feelings  of  guilt  and 
fi7om  this  is  derived  the  need  for  self-punishment.  Losing  is  such  a  punishment,  and  so,  to 
maintain  his  physic  equilibrium,  the  gambler  must  play  to  win,  but  always  lose.  Continued 
by  writers  such  as  Greenson  and  Lindner,  the  psychoanalytic  tradition  persistently 
portrayed  the  gambler  as  an  unbalanced,  disturbed  individual:  'an  obsessional  neurotic' 
plagued  by  'an  illness  of  the  mind'  (Lindner  1974,  p237)  and  victim  to  'the  severely 
regressive  character  of  disease'  of  gambling  (Greenson  1974,  p214). 
By  the  late  1970s  cracks  began  to  appear  in  the  hegemony  of  the  psychoanalytic  approach 
and  new  perspectives  became  prominent.  Despite  changes  in  terminology,  however,  the 
gambler  remained  a  sick  individuaL  and  research  became  increasingly  oriented  towards 
'therapeutic'  models  which  abounded  in  programmes  and  policies  that  might  'cure'  him.  In 
1980,  compulsive  gambling  was  formafly  accepted  as  a  mental  disorder  by  the  American 
Psychiatric  Association,  and  as  a  result  was  included  in  the  3rd  edition  of  the  Diagnostic 
and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental  Disorders  (DSM  III)  under  the  new  title  'patholopcal 
gambling'.  The  move  from  'compulsive'  to  'pathological'  shifted  attention  from  the 
activities  that  the  individual  became  compulsive  about,  to  the  physiological  presence  of  a 
disease  (Walker  1992,  p  172).  In  this  climate,  a  range  of  theoretical  perspectives  flourished. 10 
Not  all  agreed  with  the  label  'pathological',  but  the  overwhelming  majority  of  academic 
studies  considered  the  gambler  aberrant  in  some  way,  and  sought  to  exp  ain  why  anyone 
would  voluntarily  gamble  to  'excess':  that  notion  of  something  to  one  side  of  a  balanced 
ideal  bequeathed  to  us  from  the  Enlightenment.  Of  these,  the  soclocognitive  model 
attempted  to  explain  the  perseverance  of  gambling  behaviour  in  terms  of  the  I  irrational 
cognitions'  of  the  gambler.  Such  irrational  cognitions  include  the  'illusion  of  control' 
(Langer  1975,  Gadboury  and  Ladouceur  1988,  Griffiths  1990a,  1994c,  1995),  the  'belief 
in  luck'  (Wagenaar  1988,  Li  and  Smith  1974,  Oldman  1974),  the  'biased  evaluation  of 
outcomes'  (Gilovich,  1983,  Gilovich  and  Douglas  1986)  and  the  notion  of  'near  n-ýsses' 
(Kahneman  and  Tversky  1982).  These  models  present  an  image  of  the  gambler  as  a 
hopelessly  confused  individual,  bewildered  in  an  environment  of  chance  and  prey  to  the 
vicissitudes  of  wildly  'irrational'  impulses.  The  level  of  analysis  of  these  studies  is  at  times 
breathtakingly  shallow.  In  the  paper  that  passed  the  term  'irrational  thinking'  into  common 
analytical  parlance,  Gadboury  and  Ladoceur  present  us  with  the  banal  conclusion  that,  in 
an  environment  governed  by  chance-  'AH  things  considered,  it  is  hardly  surpnsing  that 
gamblers  show  signs  of  irrationality'  (Gadboury  and  Ladoceur  1988). 
Arousal  theories  posit  excitement  as  the  motivation  for  continued  play  and  frequently 
attempt  to  measure  'scientifically'  such  excitement  to  support  their  claims.  It  has  been 
suggested  that  such  arousal  may  be  automatic  and/or  cortical  (Brown,  1987a),  or  oplod 
mediated  (Pratt  et  al.  1982),  and  reversal  theory's  telic  and  paratelic  states  put  forward  to 
explain  it  (Anderson  and  Brown  1987).  Ultimately,  arousal  theories  are  reducible  to  the 
search  for  a  physiological  dimension  of  addiction,  and  to  this  end,  gamblers'  brainwaves 
have  been  measured  (and  found  wanting),  in  studies  of  EEG  activation  and  hemispheric 
dysregulation  (Carlton  and  Manowitz]  1987,  Goldstein  and  Carlton  1988).  The  search  for 
a  'gambling  gene'  has  become  respectable  in  such  study,  with  Comings  et  al  (1994) 
reporting  that  variants  on  the  DR02  gene  are  found  in  certain  addictions,  including 
alcoholism  and  pathological  gambling. 
Before  going  on  to  review  the  therapeutic  sociological  literature,  some  methodological 
problems  with  these  models  should  be  noted.  Firstly,  many  researchers  conduct 
expenments  using  non-gamblers  in  non-gambling  situations.  Research  canied  out  in laboratories  and  clinical  settings  loses  the  "ecological  validity'  of  genuine  locations 
(Anderson  and  Brown  1984),  and  the  use  of  students  by  some  academics  (e.  g  Ladouceur 
1995),  in  the  opinion  of  this  writer,  seriously  compromises  the  research.  Secondly,  the 
criteria  for  pathology  tends  to  be  defined  partly  in  terms  of  the  percentage  of  gambling 
losses  to  income.  The  problem  with  such  a  definition  is  simply  that  some  gamblers  have 
more  money  than  others  and  can  fiterally  buy  their  way  out  of  the  pathological  label.  As 
Dickerson  points  out  there  are  only  regular  gamblers,  some  of  whom  encounter  financial 
difficulties.  The  status  of  pathology  is  only  a  function  of  their  seeking  help  (Dickerson 
1985). 
Despite  -  or  perhaps  because  -  of  its  unproductive  nature, sociological  accounts  of 
gambling  invariably  attempt  to  endow  it  With  some  kind  of  utilitarian  function.  These 
accounts  have  never  really  recovered  from  Edward  Devereaux's  seminal  study,  GamblIlIg 
and  the  Social  Structure;  a  functionalist,  quasi-Durkheimian  model  of  social  dysfunction 
which  rationalised  gambling  in  terms  of  its  latent  social  function.  According  to  Devereaux, 
the  tensions  and  conflicts  in  the  capitalist  economic  system  produce  ambivalent  feelings  of 
anxiety  and  hostility  in  the  individual  (Devereaux  1949,  p947).  Entire  societies  can  be 
(sick':  'The  conflicting  and  potentlafly  disruptive  psychological  forces  generated  by  this 
peculiar  economic  system  thus  represent  a  serious  threat  to  the  equilibrium  of  the 
personality,  and,  by  impfication,  of  society  as  well'  (Devereaux  1949,  p947).  Society  tends 
to  select  psychological  solutions  to  this  conflict  and  institutionalise  them,  thereby  resolving 
or  at  least  accommodating  them.  These  'solutions'  function  as  'shock  absorbers'  or  'safety 
valves'  which  can  channel  dangerous  effects  into  the  service  of  the  dominant  system,  or 
discharge  them  harmlessly  'either  vicariously  or  overtly  in  carefully  segregated,  controlled 
and  disguised  contexts'  (Devereaux  1949,  p949).  Gambling  is  one  such  institutional,  sed 
solution:  'a  particularly  convenient  mechanism  in  which  the  psychological  consequences  of 
economic  fiustration,  strain,  conflict  and  ambivalence  may  be  worked  out  Without 
upsetting  the  social  order'  (Devereaux  1949,  p955). 
This  theme  of  displacement  and  catharsis  ran  as  a  leitmotif  through  the  mainly  American 
sociology  of  gambling  of  the  1950's,  '60's  and  '70's  with  the  addition  of  a  'depfivat,  on' 
dimension  in  studies  by  Zola,  Herman,  Bloch  and  Newman.  Here,  gambling  emerged  as  a 12 
social  safety  valve  for  frustrated  (mainly  working  class)  citizens.  providing  a  conteNt  in 
which  the  deprivations  of  the  outside  world  could  be  compensated  for  by  symbolic  actINItN" 
It  is  in  those  terms  that  Newman  described  gambling  as  'a  structurally  positive-functional 
component  of  the  social  system'  (Newman  1972,  p230).  For  those  deruied  access  to 
socially  legitimate  modes  of  the  pursuit  of  wealth,  gambfing  'provides  the  perfect  shadow 
system,  within  which  the  retreat  from  the  external  failure  situation  is  achieved  and  where, 
in  a  circumscribed  and  regulated  setting,  a  "miniature  version"  of  the  external  value  system 
can  effectively  be...  acted  out  and  can  be  made...  to  serve  as  a  sublimation  of  the  "real 
thing"'  (Newman  1972,  p160). 
In  all  these  studies,  gambling  serves  as  a  compensation  for  a  social  deficit.  In  Zola,  games 
of  chance  'can  help  deny  [the]  futility'  of  lives  over  which  the  working  class  have  no 
control,  and  can  also  act  as  'a  way  of  harnessing  or  channelling  their  otherwise  destructive 
fiustrations'  (Zola  1967,  p3  1).  According  to  Herman,  horse  betting  'fills  a  decision- 
making  void'  (Herman  1967,  p  102),  while  for  Bloch  it  is  'an  escape  from  routine  and 
boredom'  (Bloch  195  1,  p217).  Functionalism  and  deprivation  models  are  combined  in  Tec 
to  form  a  kind  of  functional-deprivation  hybrid.  She  writes  that  'instead  of  turning  against 
the  original  source  of  their  deprivations  and  unfulfilled  aspirations,  bettors  are  relieved 
through  gambling  of  some  of  their  frustrations  and  hence  are  less  likely  to  attack  the 
existing  class  structure'  (Tec  1967,  p  103). 
In  the  idealised  working  class  communities  where  these  compensatory  games  of  chance  go 
on,  the  surrounding  society  is  generally  portrayed  as  dysfunctional.  In  these  models,  the 
only  motivation  for  play  can  be  frustration,  the  only  reward,  release. 
Of  the  two  traditions  outlined  earlier,  it  is  this  'pathological'  one  that  is  dominant  in 
contemporary  gambling  literature,  and  so  it  is  within  the  ideology  of  sickness  and 
dysfunction  that  the  terms  of  reference  and  parameters  of  discussion  are  set.  In  such  a 
climate,  we  can  hear  distinct  echoes  of  puritanical  and  rational  disapproval:  in  the 
proselytising  zeal  of  writers  trying  to  'cure'  gamblers,  we  can  see  the  figure  of  the  Puritan 
damning  them  fi7om  the  pulpit.  The  focus  of  this  tradition  is  concentrated  solely  on  a I  -S 
minority  of  gamblers'  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.  Such  a  narrow  focus,  intentionalk,  or 
otherwise,  tends  graduafly  to  obscure  the  majonty  of  the  gambling  population  ftom  %le" 
With  this  loss  of  perspective,  the  problem  area  inevitably  assumes  massive  proportionsý 
there  is  no  'healthy'  state  with  which  to  compare  the  'diseased'  one.  This  begs  the 
question  whether  such  'pathological'  researchers  believe  a  normal  gambling  habit  that  is 
not  a  manifestation  of  addiction  or  a  compensation  for  a  deprived  lifestyle  exists  at  all.  One 
gets  the  impression  that  for  themý  the  only  'healthy'  gambling  state  is  one  which  is never 
played! 
It  is  with  the  neglected  majority  that  this  thesis  is  concerned,  and  as  such  it  is  situated 
firmly  in  the  former  of  our  two  traditions  -  'the  tradition  of  license'  -  in  which  Plato  first 
condoned  play  as  the  best  part  of  human  nature.  Assuming  the  fundamentally  non- 
problematic  nature  of  the  activity,  it  will  attempt  to  situate  the  modem  experience  of 
gambling  in  an  appropriate  philosophical-historical  framework.  It  will  present  a  broad 
picture  of  gambling  as  a  ubiquitous  feature  of  human  society,  and  also  describe  it  as  a 
'thing-in-itself  with  meaning  for  the  player.  Against  the  trend  towards  increasing 
specialisation  in  the  social  sciences,  this  study  will  offer  a  more  eclectic  approach,  intended 
to  transcend  the  narrow  preoccupations  of  individual  authors.  In  order  to  do  this,  empirical 
research,  including  participant  observation  and  informal  interviews  with  gamblers  in 
Glasgow  and  Las  Vegas,  has  been  incorporated  into  a  diverse  theoretical  framework 
which  combines  a  formal  historical  survey  of  gambling  with  a  phenomenological  inquiry 
into  the  experience  of  the  modem  gambler.  The  five  separate  Chapters  represent  five 
different  approaches  to  the  phenomenon,  each  one  chosen  for  its  ability  to  illuminate  a 
particular  facet  of  gambling  so  that  together  they  shed  light  on  the  varied  aspects  of  a 
complex  and  multifarious  phenomenon. 
The  first  two  Chapters  of  the  thesis  consist  of  a  historical  survey  of  the  relation  of  chance 
and  gambling  to  each  other  and  to  the  social  structure,  while  Chapters  three,  four  and  five 
deal  with  the  experience  of  play  and  the  beliefs  held  by  gamblers  themselves. 
'  Estimates  range  from  0.25%  of  the  adult  population  (Dickerson  and  Hinchy  1988),  to  2.8%  (Volberg 
and  Steadman  1988). 14 
Chapter  one  examines  the  place  and  historical  contingency  of  chance  in  modern  thought 
After  noting  its  ancient  conjunction  with  notions  of  fate  and  divine  pro"dence,  it  traces 
their  separation  and  the  emergence  of  probability  theory  in  the  seventeenth  century.  It  is 
argued  that  after  a  lengthy  period  in  which  the  operation  of  chance  was  derued  and 
condemned  as  irreligious,  this  period  of  increasing  secularisation  saw  its  gradual 
acceptance  as  a  category  in  its  own  fight.  This  was  the  beginning  of  a  movement  which 
culminated  in  the  twentieth  century,  when  ontological  status  was  granted  to  chance  as  a 
constituent  part  of  the  universe.  This  development  was  coeval  with  wider  socio-econornic 
changes  which  saw  the  emergence  of  a  mercantile  form  of  capitalism  and  culminated  in  a 
metaphysical  state  of  'ontological  insecurity'  in  the  twentieth  century. 
The  second  Chapter  goes  on  to  examine  the  social  history  of  gambling  forms:  the  nature  of 
the  games  themselves  and  the  various  groups  who  played  them.  It  is  found  that,  typical  of 
their  status  as  microcosms  of  society,  the  commercialisation  of  these  games  converged 
with  the  commercialisation  of  economic  life  and  with  the  emergence  of  probability  theory  - 
the  science  that  'tamed'  chance. 
A  formal  analysis  of  the  resultant  modem  gambling  economy  is  the  subject  of  the  third 
Chapter.  The  econon&  and  social  constitution  of  each  of  the  'phenomenological  sites'  of 
the  lottery,  casino,  slot  arcade,  bingo  hall  and  racetrack  is  defineated  and  an  attempt  made 
to  outline  the  experience  of  play  unique  to  each. 
The  next  two  Chapters  are  concerned  with  what  is  common  to  the  experience  of  gambling 
in  all  these  sites:  what  it  is  actually  like  to  play  at  games  of  chance.  An  attempt  to 
penetrate  the  inner  world  of  the  gambler  presents  obvious  methodological  difficulties,  and 
was  recognised  by  Huizinga  when  he  declared  'the  fun  of  playing'  resistant  to  rational 
analysis;  play  being  ta  thing  on  its  own'  (Huizinga  1949,  p3).  The  difficulties  encountered 
in  describing  what  Rudolf  Otto  refers  to  as  'wholly  other'  can,  however,  be  at  least 
partially  overcome  through  a  phenomenological  approach.  Whatever  the  firnitations  of 
phenomenology,  which  are  most  obvious  when  it  is  employed  to  describe  a  general  mode 
of  perceiving  reality,  it  is  ideally  suited  to  describing  the  inner  world  of  the  gambler,  for 
this  world  is  comprised  of  its  own  separate  universe,  set  apart  fi7om  the  flux  of  everyday 15 
existence  and  bound  by  its  own  rules  and  conventions.  In  this  realm  'normal'  standards  of 
behaviour  and  modes  of  consciousness  do  not  apply.  So,  specIfically  as  a  method  of 
penetrating  that  which  is  otherwise  inaccessible  to  us,  phenomenology  can  be  used  as  an 
effective  means  of  describing  the  peculiarities  of  the  experience  of  gamblung. 
Using  t  is  approach,  the  fourth  Chapter  looks  at  the  experience  of  play  itself  the  various 
psychological  and  affective  states  the  gambler  goes  through  during  the  course  of  a  game, 
as  wel-I  as  his  perception  of  the  fundamental  categories  of  time,  space,  and,  in  the  gambling 
world,  money.  Together,  these  elements  constitute  the  experience  of  chaos  -  the  'thnll'  of 
play. 
In  the  course  of  this  Chapter,  and  throughout  the  next,  we  begin  to  build  up  a  picture  of 
gambling  as  a  unique  mode  of  experience,  for  while  at  play,  the  gambler  is  subject  to  a 
peculiar  form  of  consciousness  that  prevails  under  certain  conditions  of  modem  life.  Using 
a  similar  approach  to  that  of  Chapter  Four,  Chapter  Five  continues  the  pursuit  of  the 
gamblers'  inner  world,  this  time  focusing  on  the  perception  of  causation  and  the  existence 
of  wider  belief  systems.  In  describing  the  creation  of  meaning  in  unusual  environments, 
anthropologists  such  as  Lucien  Levy-Bruhl  and  Marcel  Mauss,  psychologists  such  as  Jean 
Piaget  and  Sigmund  Freud  and  phenomenologists  of  religion  such  as  Gerardus  van  der 
Leeuw  have  been  drawn  on.  Often  these  writers  have  been  used,  not  so  much  for  what 
they  purport  to  tefl  us  about  their  own  explicit  subject  matter,  but  more  for  what  they 
inadvertently  reveal  about  the  existence  of  alternate  forms  of  thought  and  modes  of 
experiencing  the  world. 
Having  established  a  methodology,  the  fifth  Chapter  examines  the  creation  of  order  and 
meaning  in  the  world  of  play.  The  subject  of  this  part  of  the  thesis  is  the  dynamic  of 
gambling:  the  precarious  tension  between  the  maintenance  of  chaos  (the  plunge  into 
chance),  and  the  resolution  of  that  chaos  (the  creation  of  order). 
Each  Chapter,  then,  is  concerned  with  a  different  facet  of  gambling,  and  each  one  takes  a 
different  methodological  approach  to  its  subject  matter,  resulting  in  a  composition  that  at 
times  may  appear  to  be  made  up  of  antithetical  elements.  This  eclecticism  however,  is 16 
deliberately  chosen  as  the  means  best  suited  to  reflect  the  multifarious  nature  of  the 
phenomenon  itself  That  certain  facets  of  gambling  often  stubbornly  refuse  to  sit  neatly 
together  is  only  a  theoretical  reflection  of  the  true  diversity  of  social  life.  Any  studY  which 
attempts  to  force  such  diversity  into  a  neat  'package'  is  guilty  of  a  procrustean  assault  on 
reality,  and  can  never  hope  to  do  justice  to  the  genuine  complexity  of  its  subject. 
Furthermore,  despite  their  superficial  disparity,  the  Chapters  are  coherently  inter-related. 
Each  one  stands  on  its  own  but  also  highlights  aspects  of  the  phenomena  analysed 
differently  elsewhere.  For  example,  the  history  of  chance  finds  parallels  in  the  history  of 
gambling,  while  the  historical  specificity  of  certain  gambling  forms  helps  explain  the 
modem  equivalents  of  those  forms  and  also  highlights  continuities  in  the  experience  of 
both. 
Note  on  the  text 
Where  possible,  information  taken  from  fieldwork  and  quotations  taken  from  interviews 
have  been  designated  as  being  from  'punters'  in  order  to  distinguish  them  from  literature- 
based  material  taken  from  'gamblers'  or  'players'. 
With  the  exception  of  the  section  on  bingo,  a  predonunantly  female  site  of  gambling,  I 
have  used  the  third  person  pronouns  'he',  'him'  and  'his'  throughout  the  text  to  avoid 
stylistic  clumsiness.  This  is  not  intended  to  imply  that  gambling  is  a  male  preserve 
however,  and  is  a  decision  forced  on  me  by  the  lack  of  a  suitable  neutral  alternative  in 
English. CIIAPTER  ONE:  THE  IDEA  OF  CHANC  'E 
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THE  IDEA  OF  CHANCE 
In  the  twentieth  century,  chance  is  understood  as  a  constituent  part  of  the  world,  codified 
in  the  rules  of  probability  theory.  However,  this  theoretical  perspective  is  a  recent 
development,  and  represents  the  apogee  of  a  long  historical  process  that  culminated  in  the 
separation  of  the  unexplained  event  from  notions  of  divine  providence  and  fate. 
In  its  symbiotic  relation  with  fate  and/or  divine  providence,  chance  was  first  interpreted  as 
a  sign  of  the  gods;  the  random  event  was  regarded  as  a  hierophany  of  divine  will.  Until  the 
notion  of  chance  was  disengaged  from  these  beliefs,  its  existence  was  persistently  obscured 
by  man's  more  inu-nediate  concern  with  his  relation  to  the  transcendent  'beyond'. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  the  separation  finally  began.  During  this  period  of  mercantile 
capitalisrrý  a  system  of  enumeration  and  a  secular  appreciation  of  risk  flounished,  creating 
both  new  ways  of  looking  at  the  world  and  new  ways  of  expressing  such  viewpoints.  In  a 
climate  favourable  to  the  scientific  calculation  of  probabi-lity,  chance  came  to  indicate,  not 
the  favour  of  the  gods,  but  an  absence  of  knowledge.  From  being  a  sacred,  it  now  became 
an  epistemological,  category.  However,  as  we  shall  see,  it  was  a  long  time  even  after  it 
had  emerged  as  a  distinct  secular  category  before  it  finally  shed  the  last  vestiges  of  its 
earlier  religious  meaning,  and  it  was  only  when  it  was  thoroughly  secularised  into  a 
I meaningless'  determinism  in  the  nineteenth  century  that  a  path  was  cleared  for  its 
emergence  as  a  genuine  part  of  the  world.  By  the  twentieth  century,  chance  had  been 
stripped  of  its  sacred  and  metaphysical  attributes  to  become  a  secular  tool  of  scientific 
explanation,  so  that  what  were  once  regarded  as  divine  laws  came  to  be  understood  as 
statistical  probabilities.  For  the  first  time,  chance  became  radically  autonomous,  an 
ontological  category  in  its  own  right. Is 
This  process  can  be  regarded  as  a  wculari.  vahoti  of  chance.  and  it  is  this.  as  %kell  as  its 
implications  for  the  removal  of  metaphysical  meaning  from  the  world,  that  are  the  subject 
of  this  Chapter. 
THE  ORIGINS  OF  CHANCE 
The  prevalence  of  chance  in  creation  myths  is  indicative  of  its  essential  contingency,  in  an 
anthropomorphic  universe,  on  the  idea  of  the  sacred,  on  notions  of  the  NVIRI  of  the  gods  and 
of  divine  providence. 
In  these  myths,  the  world  exists  in  a  primal  state  of  chaos,  ftorn  the  Greek  'Yaos:  'the  first 
state  of  the  universe,  a  vast  gulf  or  chasm,  the  nether  abyss,  empty  space'  (1he  Oxford 
English  Dictionary  1961  vol  2,  p273).  In  this  time  of  formlessness  and  darkness-  'the  sun 
grows  dark,  the  earth  is  swallowed  up  by  the  sea,  fire  destroys  even  the  stars'  (Ekeland 
1993,  pl).  This  is  the  state  of  'primal  nature',  'full  of  disorder'  that  is  imagined  by  Plato  in 
the  Statesman.  In  it,  God  feared  that  'all  might  be  dissolved  in  the  storm  and  disappear  in 
an  infinite  chaos",  whereupon  he  'brought  back  the  elements  which  had  fallen  into 
dissolution  and  disorder',  so  creating  order  and  the  world  as  we  know  it  (Plato  1987,  p 
588-9). 
The  image  that  continually  reappears  in  these  world-creating  transformations  is  one  of 
gambling.  In  Greek  mythology,  Poseidon,  Zeus  and  Hades  divided  the  world  between 
them  by  throwing  dice.  The  outcome  of  the  throw  was  not  mere  chance,  for,  the  lots  and 
the  vessel  they  were  shaken  in  'were  either  credited  with  a  will  of  their  own...  or  thought 
to  be  controlled  by  higher  powers  who  thus  revealed  their  will'  (Onians  1988,  p393). 
According  to  legend,  possession  of  the  land  of  Norway  was  determined  by  a  dicing  match 
between  two  Kings,  and  backed  by  the  hand  of  God  (Ekeland  1993,  p3).  The  Ases  of 
Scandinavian  mythology,  like  the  Hindu  Siva,  also  determined  the  fate  of  mankind  by 
throwing  dice.  When  the  world  was  ordained,  the  gods  assembled  for  dicing  on  a  golden 
playing  board  and,  in  this  tale,  when  it  is  reborn,  the  rejuvenated  Ases  VAII  be  the 19 
instigators  of  the  new  order,  dicing  once  again  on  their  mNihic  board  (Hui7inga  1949, 
p57), 
We  see,  in  these  myths,  an  image  of  chance  as  a  thing  intimately  connected  with  the  falling 
of  dice  or  lots';  an  image  which  befits  its  derivation  from  the  Latin  cadere,  to  fall.  The  noun 
cadentia  means  'the  failing  out  or  happening  of  events,  the  way  in  which  things  fall  out.  - 
fortune;  case'  (1he  Oxford  Englivh  Dictionary  1961  vol  3,  p263).  The  word  'chance' 
then,  literally  refers  to  that  which  falls  to  us;  a  sense  which  is  still  evident  today  when  ýý.  e 
speak  of  good  or  bad  fortune  befalling  an  individual. 
Chance  and  Divination 
From  the  symbiotic  relation  of  chance  to  notions  of  fate  and  the  will  of  the  gods  derives 
the  efficacy  of  divination  as  a  means  of  communicating  with  the  transcendent  'beyond'. 
Regarded  as  meaningless  in  it.  velf,  in  divination  ritual,  chance  operates  as  a  cypher  for  the 
expression  of  the  will  of  the  gods,  and  it  is  in  this  crucial  relationship  that  the  earliest 
conceptions  of  chance  are  to  be  understood.  Because  'alea  signifies  and  reveals  the  favour 
of  destiny'  (Cafllois  1962,  p17),  in  divination,  chance  becomes  a  vehicle  for  sacred 
meaning.  The  word  itself,  from  the  Latin  divinatio,  clearly  highlights  the  derivation  of  the 
activity  from  the  divine.  Flaceliere  emphasises  the  relation,  writing  that  'it  is  also  an 
essential  part  of  religion,  for  the  etymology  of  the  word  makes  it  applicable  to  all  aspects 
of  religion'  (Flaceliere  1965,  p2).  In  divination,  the  expressive  function  of  the  chance  event 
was  deliberately  courted  so  that  the  gods  might  intercede  and  determine  an  outcome, 
which  was  then  interpreted  as  a  divine  pronouncement.  In  this  way,  divination,  consisted 
of  the  'attempt  to  elicit  from  some  higher  power  or  supernatural  being  the  answers  to 
questions  beyond  the  range  of  ordinary  human  understanding'  (Loewe  and  Blacker  198  1, 
pl).  Above  all,  it  assumed  belief  in  'a  providence  that  is  concerned  with  the  lot  of 
humanity  and  is  prepared  to  help  man  by  revealing  what  would  otherwise  be  unknown  to 
them'  (Flaceliere  1965,  p2). 
AIS  an  expression  of  thewrill  of  the  gods,  divination  indicated  the  future  course  of  events  as 
well  as  the  approval  or  disapproval  of  destiny  with  regard  to  human  actions.  Before  being 20 
undertaken  all  enterprises  of  importance  were  referred  to  a  di\iner  or  prophet,  who  A-ould 
establish  whether  or  not  they  would  succeed,  and  if  so,  which  times  were  most  propitious 
for  such  success. 
The  practise  was  universal  and  pervasive,  occurring  in  societies  as  diverse  as  monotheistic 
Israel  and  polytheistic  Athens.  This  ubiquity  was  recognised  by  Cicero  In  his  De 
Divinaloire.  'I  am  aware  of  no  people,  however  refined  and  learned  or  however  savage 
and  ignorant,  which  does  not  think  that  signs  are  given  of  future  events,  and  that  certain 
persons  can  recognise  those  signs  and  foretell  events  before  they  occur'  (Cicerol971, 
p223). 
Paralleling  its  widespread  occurrence  was  a  broad  range  of  divinatory  techniques,  of  which 
two  fundamental  types  existed.  These  corresponded  to  Plato's  distinction  between 
inductive  or  artificial  divination,  and  intuffive  or  natural  divination.  The  former  i7v'as  based 
on  the  study  of  natural  phenomena,  such  as  clouds  and  birds,  which  were  regarded  as  signs 
and  omens,  while  the  latter  consisted  of  a  kind  of  madness;  a  prophetic  ecstasy  of  divine 
inspiration.  For  Plato,  this  latter  was  the  superior  form  of  divination,  for  it  was  directly 
inspired  by  the  gods  without  the  need  of  any  perceptible  intermediary  '. 
The  variety  of  natural  phenomena  which  could  be  interpreted  as  divine  signs  was  almost 
unlimited,  ranging  from  the  flight  of  birds,  regarded  by  Euripidis  as  the  'messengers  of  the 
gods',  to  the  formation  of  clouds,  known  by  the  f1indus  as  'castles  in  the  air'.  The 
unconscious  or  involuntary  expression  of  a  word  could  also  indicate  a  supernatural 
meaning.  For  the  hearer,  such  an  utterance  would  be  a  prophetic  sign,  known  as  a  cledon 
to  the  Greeks, 
)  and  was  all  the  more  refiable  when  uttered  'by  those  least  capable  of 
calculating  their  effect',  for  example,  children  (Flaceliere  1965,  p6).  The  appearance  of 
unexpected  phenomena  were  regarded  as  omens,  and  as  such  were  both  cause  and  sign  of 
the  event  they  foretold.  As  Flaceliere  explains  '...  the  marvellous  omen  was  not  merely  a 
sign  of  what  was  going  to  happen,  essentially  it  was  its  cause;  the  omen  and  its  fulfilments 
were  fatally  connected  by  a  bond  that  could  not  be  dissolved  by  prayer  or  any  other 
religious  rite'  (Flacellere  1965,  p6). 
1  See  Plato's  Phaedrus  (1987.  p123)  and  Ion  (1987,  p144)  for  his,  %-iex%-s  on  divination  and  dnine  mdness 21 
The  pallertzv  into  which  apparently  uncontrolled  phenomena  fell  could  also  be  interpreted 
for  hidden  significance-  divination  by  an  animal's  liver  was  believed  to  be  a  particularly 
efficacious  ritual  by  the  ancient  Baby  lonians,  while  the  Germans,  who,  Tacitus  tells  us,  had 
'the  highest  regard'  for  lots  and  omens,  utilised  strips  of  bark  and  even  horses  in  their 
divination  rituals  (Tacitus  1982,  p109).  Meanwhile,  in  China,  the  cracks  in  turtle  shells 
were  interpreted  as  manifestations  of  'eternal,  universal  truths  that  transcend  the 
ephemeral  attainments  or  mundane  purposes  of  the  human  intellect'  (Loewe  and  Blacker 
198  1,  p3  8). 
In  every  instance  of  inductive  divination,  chance  events  are  possessed  of  a  sacred 
significance  and  nowhere  is  this  more  evident  than  in  the  practise  of  cleromancy  -  the 
drawing  or  casting  of  lots.  As  a  mechanism  for  the  articulation  of  the  Divine  Voice,  the  lot 
was  the  earliest  and  most  basic  application  of  the  random  event  for  divinatory  purposes-  A 
simple  action,  such  as  the  tossing  of  sticks,  arrows  or  animal  bones  would  be  carried  out 
by  a  suitably  qualified  individual  -a  priest  or  Shaman  -  and  a  question  addressed  to  a  deity 
or  fate.  The  formation  of  the  falling  objects  would  then  be  interpreted  as  the  'answer'  of 
the  god,  for  the  disposal  of  the  lot  was  al'Kays  recognised  as  divine  intervention. 
Cleromancy  was  widespread  throughout  the  ancient  world  and,  despite  the  strident 
criticism  that  it  would  later  direct  at  all  blasphemous,  'pagan'  practices  as  lot-casting, 
Christianity  was  not  initially  opposed  to  the  activity.  References  to  it  appear  regularly 
throughout  the  New  Testament;  for  example,  in  Numbers  26.55  the  allocation  of  the  lands 
of  Canaan  among  the  Israelites  is  decided  by  lot:  'And  the  Lord  spoke  unto  Moses 
saying...  the  land  shall  be  divided  by  lot...  According  to  the  lot  shall  the  possession  thereof 
be  divided  by  many  and  few  7.2  The  validity  of  the  lot  is  explained  in  Proverbs  16-33:  'The 
lot  is  cast  into  the  lap,  but  the  whole  disposing  thereof  is  of  the  Lord' 
,  indicating  that 
divination  is  never  a  resort  to  meaningless  chance,  but  an  appeal  directed  at  transcendental 
powers,  which,  in  the  Judeao-Christian  tradition,  happens  to  be  God. 
2  References  to  such  practices  are  also  found  in  I  Chronicles  24-26,  when  David  distributed  offices  among 
the  Le%ite  princes  by  lot.  Mathias  was  selected  as  an  apostle  In  the  same  fashion  In  Acts  L  24-26,  VkhIle  in 
LeNiticus  16:  8,  Aaron  cast  lots  on  two  goats  to  decide  which  one  would  be  for  God  and  which  a  scapegoat. I) 
The  highest  form  of  divination  however,  at  least  for  the  Greeks,  was  the  MmInve  form, 
whereby  specially  gifted  individuals  such  as  seers  and  mediums  afforded  a  direct  link  With 
the  supernatural  world.  Their  inspiration,  or  divine  madness  -  mainike  -  was  a  result  of  the 
literal  presence  of  the  deity  in  their  souls.  When  possessed  in  this  way,  they  would  receiý-e 
prophetic  revelation  directly  from  heaven  and  in  this  state,  were  able  to  transmit  the 
utterances  of  the  oracle,  as  did  the  Gi-eek  Pythia  and  the  Japanese  miko,  or  'see'  the  answer 
to  a  question,  as  did  those  Tibetan  prophets  possessing  the  faculty  of  Tra  (Loewe  and 
Blacker  1981,  pl). 
At  the  beginning  of  De  Divinaloire,  Cicero  describes  the  ubiquity  of  what  he  calls  this 
'human  faculty  of  divination":  'There  is  an  ancient  belief..  that  divination  of  some  kind 
exists  among  men;  this  the  Greeks  call  manfike,  that  is  the  foresight  and  knowledge  of 
future  events  ... 
[by  which  means]  men  may  approach  very  near  to  the  power  of  gods  ... 
We  Romans  have  excelled  [the  Greeks]  in  giving  to  this  most  extraordinary  gift  a  name, 
which  we  have  derived  from  divi,  a  word  meaning  "gods",  whereas,  according  to  Plato's 
interpretation,  they  have  derived  it  from  furor,  a  word  meaning  "frenzy"'  (Cicero  197  1, 
p223).  Cicero's  denigration  of  the  Greek  term  was  a  little  presumptuous,  however,  for 
inductive  divination  contained  elements  of  both  frenzy  mid  divinity.  Plato  had  regarded  this 
type  of  divination  as  synonyrnous  with  madness;  but  it  was  a  &Wne  form  of  madness,  and 
so  'a  noble  thing",  and  in  the  Phae&-us  is  described  as  being  superior  to  a  sane  mind,  'for 
the  one  is  only  of  human,  but  the  other  of  divine  origin'  (Plato  1987,  p  123).  The  origin  of 
the  insight  bestowed  by  prophetic  madness  is God  himself.  In  lon,  Plato  tells  us  that  God 
'takes  away  the  minds  of  poets  and  diviners  and  holy  prophets  in  order  that  we  who  hear 
them  may  know  them  to  be  speaking  not  of  themselves  who  utter  these  words  in  a  state  of 
unconsciousness,  but  that  God  himself  is  the  speaker,  and  that  through  them  he  is 
conversing  with  us'  (Plato  198  7,  p  144). 
Dreams  played  an  important  role  in  the  prophesy  of  inspired  individuals,  for  when  the  body 
relaxed  in  sleep,  'the  reasoning  portion  of  the  soul  was  languid  and  inert'  (Cicero  197  1, 
p291),  and  so  was  open  to  communication  with  the  world  of  the  supernatural.  Any 
involuntary  word,  thought  or  act  could  be  regarded  as  a  supernatural  sign,  'and  what  could 
be  more  involuntary,  more  unconscious,  than  dreams,  which  occur  when  both  v.  111  and 2-, 
consciousness  are  overcome  by  sleepT  (Flacefiere  1965,  p2l).  OneiromancN,  -  the 
interpretation  of  dreams  -  thus  found  widespread  acceptance  as  a  means  of  divination 
Plato  suggested  the  stimulation  of  the  part  of  the  soul  responsible  for  wisdom  in  order  to 
learn  the  truth  from  dreams,  while  the  followers  of  Pythagoras  attempted  to  calm  their 
minds  before  sleep  and  so  avoid  demonic  visitations.  Consequently,  both  the  Platonists  and 
the  Pythagoreans  prepared  themselves  for  the  occurrence  of  prophetic  dreams  through 
ascetic  practises  before  sleep. 
The  state  of  ecstatic  possession  was  a  prerequisite  of  divination  ritual,  and  the  ability  to 
enter  it  was  one  of  the  diviner's  most  sacred  qualities.  Before  any  divination  could  take 
place,  the  diviner  first  had  to  establish  contact  with  the  world  of  unseen  powers.  'Thus  he 
enters  into  the  realm  of  what  is  'sacred'.  Then  and  only  then,  may  he  put  the  question 
which  is  occupying  his  mind  and  hope  for  an  answer'  (Levy-Bruh]  1966,  p  196).  In  order  to 
enter  the  realm  of  the  sacred  in  this  way,  the  occurrence  of  the  ritual  was  strictly 
proscribed  by  rules  determining  when  and  where  it  would  be  held.  An  area  was  usually 
marked  out:  'In  the  absence  of  any  other  locus,  the  magician  sketches  out  a  magic  circle  or 
square,  a  templum,  around  himself  and  it  is  there  that  he  performs  his  task'  (Hubert  and 
Mauss,  in  Cryer  1994,  p56). 
To  further  assist  his  passage  into  the  sacred,  the  diviner  would  attempt  to  enter  an  altered 
state  of  consciousness.  Adoming  himself  with  elaborate  robes,  bells  and  feathers,  he  would 
dance  to  a  rhythm  of  gongs  and  the  chanting  of  singers,  whirling  around  in  a  frenzied  state 
of  semi-consciousness,  into  a  condition  'bordering  on  dissociation'"'.  Such  preparation 
demonstrates  that  'magical  rites  take  place  in  a  differentiated  magical  milieu'  which  is 
marked  off  and  circumscribed  from  the  'normal'  outside  world  (Mauss  1972,  p49).  A 
distinct  demarcation  takes  place,  both  in  the  physical  space  for  the  ritual,  and  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  diviner,  for  during  such  ceremonies,  diviners  experience  trances, 
hysteria,  cataleptic  fits  and  ecstasy,  which  indicate  that  they  have  left  their  normal 
consciousness  behind,  become  another  person  and  entered  the  realm  of  the  divine.  In  this 
state  of  temporary  madness,  Mauss  observes,  the  diviner  becomes  one  of  the  elect  and 
Evans-Pritchard  (1991,  p72-88)  proNides  a  full  description  of  the  furious  and  grotesque  ritual  that  in 
some  societies  acts  as  a  prerequisite  for  communication  with  the  supernatural- " 
communicates  with  sacred  powers.  The  Azande  WItchdoctor  talks  'as  though  in  a  trance. 
his  speech  laborious  and  disconnected',  while  the  Esquirnaux  aiigekok  lapses  into  *a  state 
of  hypnotic  slumber  or  cataleptic  or  ecstatic  trance  experiencing  a  'dream  which  has  been 
induced  -a  privileged  and  infallible  vision'  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p216). 
Divination  played  an  important  role  in  ancient  society  and  was  used  primarily  as  a  means 
of  making  -  or  at  least  consolidating  -  decisions.  van  der  Leeuw  draws  attention  to  the 
important  (but  often  overlooked)  point  that  in  consulting  the  gods,  the  enquirer  wants  to 
know  not  necessarily  what  will  happen  next,  but  whether  what  he  u,  was  to  happen  xvill 
occur.  He  thus  repeats  his  questioning  until  he  gets  the  desired  result  (van  der  Leeuw 
1938,  p379).  Levy-Bruhl  also  records  that  when  an  unfavourable  omen  appears,  pfii-nitrý-es 
try  to  solicit  a  favourable  one,  and  'when  at  length  the  good  omen  desired  does  present 
itselý  it  nullifies  those  which  have  gone  before'  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p  142). 
Here  we  see  an  essentially  practical,  even  irreverent  orientation,  towards  the  still  very 
serious  matter  of  man's  relation  with  destiny.  It  is  an  attitude  recognised  by  Flacellere  in 
the  'genuine  wisdom'  and  'credulity'  shown  by  the  Greeks  towards  their  divinatory 
practices.  He  points  to  the  strand  of  scepticism  which  ridiculed  the  efficacy  of  divination 
and  which  existed  within  a  society  which,  while  considered  the  womb  of  enlightenment  and 
reason,  still  had  widespread  recourse  to  such  practices.  Such  ambiguity  is  typical  of  human 
life,  for,  whilst  propitiating  the  gods  on  the  one  hand,  individuals  were  under  no  obligation 
to  take  their  advice,  and  in  fact  often  used  them  as  an  excuse  if  a  suggested  course  of 
action  went  wrong! 
Within  the  seriousness  of  divine  ritual  then,  there  was  also  room  for  some  ffivolity  and 
equivocation,  an  attitude  which  must  be  borne  in  mind  throughout  our  further  discussion 
of  divination,  and  especially  in  the  next  section  when  we  consider  the  development  of 
games  within  religious  rituals. 
Social  life  is  seldom  demarcated  into  clear  cut  areas,  and  this  is  no  bad  thing,  for  it  is  out 
of  these  ambiguous  crevices  that  the  most  fertile  insights  can  be  found.  The  Greek  attitude 
to  divination  is  typical  of  this  duality.  Flaceliere  quotes  Alain,  who  writes  'These  tvvists and  turns,  this  subtle  interplay  of  naivete  and  discretion,  of  reason  and  absurdity,  are  much 
closer  to  human  reality  than  the  prophecies  we  read  about  in  books,  clearly  expressed, 
abstract,  inflexible  and  humourless.  There  was  very  great  maturity,  genuine  XýIsdom,  in  this 
Greek  credulity,  which  always  and  everywhere,  was  accompanied  by  its  shadow,  doubt' 
(Alain,  in  Flaceliere  1965,  p87). 
Divination  and  Gambling 
The  concurrence  between  the  formal  properties  of  divinatory  ritual  and  gambling 
behaviour  has  been  commented  on  by  many  authors  (Levy-Bruhl,  Caillois,  Cohen,  Barrow, 
David,  Tylor)  and  will  be  examined  further  in  Chapter  Two. 
Many  writers  draw  attention  to  the  similarity  of  the  implements  and  ritual  in  both  practices. 
For  example,  Caillois  cites  the  use  of  cards  and  dice  (astragali)  by  gamblers  in  games  of 
chance  and  prophets  M  the  prediction  of  the  future  as  one  of  the  most  'conspicuous 
examples'  of  this  association  (Caillois  1962,  p48).  In  a  similar  vein,  Levy-Bruhl  describes 
the  use  of  the  astragali  in  the  Ba-N-kouma's  prayers  to  their  ancestors-  'the  tribe  make 
sacrifices  and  mutter  incantations  naming  the  god  to  whom  the  offering  must  be  addressed, 
according  to  the  order  given  by  the  astragali...  '  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p88).  However,  we 
find  this  concurrence  most  often  employed  in  an  evolutionary  argument  for  the 
development  of  one  form  out  of  another.  According  to  Tylor,  the  gambling  of  pnmitive 
man  probably  originated  in  the  practice  of  divination,  since  the  same  devices  were  used  in 
both  activities  (Tylor  1913,78);  while  David  holds  that  the  wager,  and  hence  gambling, 
grew  out  of  the  drawing  of  lots  and  interrogation  of  oracles  'which  have  their  roots  deep 
in  religious  rituals  1)  (David  1969,  p7).  Far  from  presenting  itself  as  evidence  for 
evolutionary  progression,  it  can  be  argued  that  this  concurrence  supports  the  far  more 
complex  and  subtle  conflation  of  game  and  ritual  which  exist  in  the  same  'instance  as  part 
of  the  irreverent  attitude  discussed  by  Flaceliere.  The  frivolity  and  equivocation  that 
existed  alongside  serious  divination  provides  a  space  in  which  other,  less  serious  states  of 
mind  could  grow.  The  'subtle  interplay'  of  'reason  and  absurdity'  that  charactenses  all 
human  endeavour  is  manifest  in  the  intrusion  of  the  play  spirit  into  serious  matters  of 
ritual,  and  means  that  gambling  and  divination  were  never  entirely  separate.  It  is  not  a  caw 26 
of  one  'growing  out'  of  the  other,  as  the  evolutionists  haN-e  suggested,  for  the  mo  ýkere 
conjoined  from  the  very  start,  each  part  ofthe  same  outlook.  There  existed  a  plaýful  aspect 
to  divination,  and  a  sacred  aspect  to  gambling.  The  latter  did  not  simply  emerge,  as  a 
seculafised  version,  out  of  the  former,  and  in  any  case,  the  prophetic  connotations  of 
gambling  have  never  been  completely  extinguished,  either  formally,  for  example  in 
fortune-tellingVAth  cards,  or  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler  whose  beliefs  Will  be  studied  in 
Chapter  Five. 
The  process  of  institutionalisation  which  encouraged  the  separation  of  recreational  play 
and  sacred  ritual,  and  gave  us  our  modem  forms  of  gambling,  will  be  examined  in  Chapter 
Two 
Chance,  Fate  and  Necessity 
Nowhere  in  ancient  or  primitive  cosmology  do  we  find  systematic  consideration  of  chance 
as  a  phenomenon  in  its  own  fight.  Instead,  its  occurrence  is  consistently  conflated  vAth 
notions  of  destiny  and  the  wifl  of  the  gods. 
Roberts  et  al.  state  categorically  that  'explicit  theories  of  chance  do  not  appear  in  pnnutive 
cultures'  (Robert5et  al.  1959,  p602),  where  the  unexpected  instead  has  a  meaningful  place 
as  part  of  an  anthropomorphic  universe  of  spirits  and  powers.  Levy-Bruhl  describes  this 
outlook.  'Every  accident  is  a  revelation,  for  there  is  nothing  fortuitous  and  the  slightest 
departure  from  ordinary  occurrence  shows  that  occult  forces  are  at  work'  (Levy-Bruhl 
1966,  p  123). 
It  is  in  classical  Greek  philosophy  that  we  first  find  anything  approximating  a  consideration 
of  chance,  but  here,  as  in  primitive  thought,  the  approach  is  never  entirely  divorced  from 
religious  ideas  of  the  existence  of  the  gods.  From  Socrates  and  Plato,  through  to  the  Stoics 
and  Boethius.,  the  existence  of  chance  is  consistently  subsumed  under  more  important 
questions  of  divine  providence,  determiMsm  and  the  role  of  free  Will. 27 
Nussbaum  describes  the  sense  of  exposure  to  fortune  that  existed  in  the  Greek  mind  as 
'the  fragility  of  goodness'  the  contingency  of  happiness  and  virtue  on  the  forces  of  luck 
and  destiny.  This  perception  of  luck  -  luche  -  was  of  a  thing  which  just  happelled  to  an 
individual,  without  being  the  result  of  his  own  agency.  It  did  not,  however,  Imply  that 
events  were  random  or  uncaused;  'its  basic  meaning  is  'what  just  happens';  it  is  the  element 
of  human  existence  that  humans  do  not  control'  (Nussbaum  1986,  p89). 
The  notion  of  chance  -  tyche  -  is  intimately  connected  to  this  idea  of  luck,  and  also  to  the 
notion  of  timeliness  -  kairos.  An  individual  is  lucky  because  circumstances  make  it  so.  'In 
other  words',  Pfefferkorn  explains,  'it  is  the  fight  time  and  place  for  whatever  happens  to 
happen.  It  is  the  proper  opportunity,  the  favourable  or  fit  time  for  an  event...  to  occur'. 
This  'active  time'  is  known  as  kairos,  and  is  part  of  the  operation  of  chance.  'For  in  the 
concept  of  tyche  the  temper  of  the  moment  is  an  active  ingredient,  and  time  is  understood 
as  a  dynamic  power'  (Pferrerkom  1986,  p39).  Far  from  denoting  contingency,  both 
notions  refer  to  thefate&iess  of  human  life.  Kairos,  as  the  'qualitative  nature  of  time  in 
general',  serves  as  the  foundation  for  the  different  aspects  of  destiny  -  moiri,  ty,  che,  potmos 
or  daimon.  Pfefferkom  emphasises  that  'never  is  tyche,  in  this  sense,  simply  blind  chance. 
As  navigator  she  is  handmaiden  to  the  telos  and  determines  the  outcome  of  all  conflicts  in 
agreement  with  the  divine  will  and  plan'  (Pferrerkom  1986,  p50).  Hence,  the  fatedness  of 
divine  providence  can  be  seen  to  underlie  all  things,  and  determine  the  roles  of  tyche  and 
kairos. 
In  the  Laws  Plato  articulates  this  notion  of  God  as  the  final  telos,  to  which  all  so-cafled 
'contingency'  is  subservient:  'One  might  be  moved  to  say...  that  no  law  is  ever  made  by  a 
man,  and  that  human  history  is  afl  an  affair  of  chance...  and  yet  there  is  something  else 
which  also  may  also  be  said  with  no  less  plausibility...  Mat  God  is  all,  while  chance  and 
circumstance,  under  God,  set  the  whole  cmirse  of  life  for  us...  '(Plato  1969,  p  13  00  ). 
Greek  philosophy  resonates  with  the  notions  of  fate  and  necessity,  as  Cicero  puts  it, 
'applying  forcibly  to  all  things'  (Cicero  1991,  p9l).  In  his  learned  work,  Me  Origins  of 
European  1hought,  Onians  describes  how  this  notion  of  fate  is  surrounded  by  the 
metaphors  for  spinning  and  weaving,  for  in  the  classical  world,  fate  was  conceived  as  a 28 
bond,  spun  by  the  gods  on  the  'spindle  of  necessity',  encircling  the  world  and  bindin,  (,; 
every  individual  to  a  preordained  destiny.  Its  subtle  pressure  often  went  unnoticed  on  the 
individuals  it  effected,  for,  as  the  author  writes:  'Ever  so  invisible  to  men  are  the  mN,  stic 
bonds  of  fate,  the  threads  divinely  spun'  (Omans  1988,  p337). 
The  binding  metaphor  is  apparent  in  Stoic  philosophy,  that  school  which,  of  all  the  Greeks, 
was  perhaps  the  most  deterministic,  and  which  did  most  to  encourage  the  belief  in 
divination.  Their'chief  philosopher'  -  Chrysippus  -  defined  fate  as  a  'certain  everlasting  and 
unalterable  sequence  and  chaining  of  things,  involving  and  entwining  itself  with  itself 
througb  the  external  laws  of  sequence  from  which  it  is  fitted  and  bound  together' 
(Chrysippus,  in  Cicero  1991,  p  97).  For  the  Stoics,  the  contents  of  the  universe  were 
united  byuniversal  cosmic  sympathy',  so  that  every  fact  was  connected  with  the  totality  of 
facts,  past,  present  and  future.  'The  function  of  providence  in  this  scheme  was  to  reveal 
these  relationships,  these  tensions  connecting  threads  that  ordinary  reason  was  powerless 
to  grasp'  (Flaceliere  1965,  p79).  The  Stoics  reasoned  that  since  fate  governs  the  universe, 
and  the  gods  know  everything,  then  the  latter  necessarily  reveal  the  future  which  can 
therefore  be  revealed  by  divination 
.4 
Their  belief  in  divine  foreknowledge  was  thus  an 
argument  for  universal  determinism,  and  within  this  strict  determinism  the  existence  of  the 
gods  was  synonymous  with  the  efficacy  of  divination.  Cicero  thus  descnibed  how  'it  is 
appropriate  for  the  Stoics,  who  say  that  all  things  come  about  by  fate,  to  accept  oracles... 
and  the  other  things  which  are  derived  fi7om  divination'  (Cicero  199  1,  p8  I). 
There  was  no  room  for  chance  in  this  radical  determinism  for  in  a  world  in  which  'nothing 
happens  that  [is]  not  necessary'  (Cicero  1991,  p  69),  the  very  conception  of  it  as  an 
independent  entity  could  have  little  real  meaning. 
In  Aristotle  however,  we  do  find  a  specific  consideration  of  chance  as  part  of  the  doctrine 
of  final  causes.  In  a  teleological  system  in  which  nature  exhibits  purposeful  processes, 
chance  for  Aristotle  is  not  an  absence  of  causality,  but  rather  an  instance  of  coincidence.  In 
the  Phjsics  he  distinguishes  luck  from  chance,  stating  that  luck  concerns  what  is 
achievable  by  action  and  so  is  confined  to  rational  agents,  while  chance  is  a  broader 
Fudlerexanunation  of  this  argumcnt  can  be  found  in  Flaceliere  (1965,  p79)  and  Sharples  (1991,  p25-7). 29 
category,  relating  to  non-rational  agents,  such  as  animals  and  inanimate  objects  Here, 
chance  is  pnmanly  an  absence  of  purpose  'an  event  happens  by  chance  ýý-henever  it  Is 
pointless.  For  the  stone  did  not  fall  in  order  to  hit  someone,  it  fell  then  by  chance,  because 
it  might  have  fallen,  because  someone  threw  it  to  hit  someone'  (Aristotle  1977,  p210).  For 
rational  agents,  chance  as  well  as  luck,  is  a  'coincidental  cause'.  It  is  'something  contrary 
to  reason.  For  rational  judgement  tell  us  what  is  always  or  usually  the  case,  but  luck  [and 
chance]  is found  in  events  that  are  neither'  (Aristotle  1977,  p209).  As  an  example,  he  cites 
a  case  where  A  wants  to  collect  a  debt  from  B  and  one  day  meets  him  unexpectedly  at  a 
market  on  the  very  day  when  B  is  collecting  subscriptions  (Aristotle  1990,  p209).  This  is 
not  chance,  but  merely  a  case  of  the  coincidental  intersection  of  two  separate  causes, 
which,  as  Sharples  points  out,  is  not  incompatible  with  determinism  (Sharples  1983,  p5). 
As  the  link  between  ancient  and  medieval  thought,  Boethius  attempted  to  resolve  the 
problem  of  divine  foreknowledge  and  human  freedom.  In  his  Consolation  of  Phllosop4y, 
we  see  an  explication  of  the  harmony  of  divine  providence,  as  well  as  an  explanation  of 
chance  in  essentially  Aristotelian  terms.  Once  again,  there  is  no  room  for  chance,  for  all 
things  are  linked  in  a  great  cosmic  design.  Thus  'a  certain  ordering  embraces  all  things  so 
that  what  departs  from  itsplace  in  that  order  falls  back  into  an  order...  so  that  in  the 
kingdom  of  providence,  nothing  should  be  permitted  to  random  chance'  (Boethius  1991, 
pl  15).  What  appears  as  chance  is  only  a  manifestation  of  limited  human  understanding,  for 
things  only  appear  'random  and  confused'  when  the  principle  governing  their  order  is not 
known.  However,  there  is  an  order,  even  if  it  is  opaque  to  our  understanding-  'although 
you  do  not  know  the  reason  in  so  great  a  design,  nevertheless  do  not  doubt  that  all  things 
come  about  rightly,  since  a  good  ruler  governs  the  world'  (Boethius  1991,  p  103).  It  is  only 
as  an  epistemological  category,  then,  that  chance  can  be  said  to  exist,  for  if  it  is  defined 
some  other  way,  for  example  as  an  outcome  produced  by  random  events,  without  cause, 
'then  chance  does  not  exist  at  all'  and  in  fact  nor  can  miything  exist  -  'the  world  is,  I  judge, 
completely  empty.  For  when  God  directs  all  things  into  an  ordered  pattern,  what  place  at 
all  can  there  be  left  for  randomness?  '  (Boethius  1991,  p125).  Having  said  this,  Boethius 
goes  on  to  give  his  own  Aristotelian  example  of  the  appearance  of  chance  as  coincidence. 
A  man  who  digs  to  cultivate  a  field  but  finds  gold  is  not  subject  to  chance,  but  to 
'unforeseen  and  unexpected  coincidence'  for  there  are  cmives  of  fortuitous  gain  which  are not  dependent  on  the  intentions  of  the  agent.  Neither  the  man  who  burled  the 
-2old  nor  the 
one  who  tilled  the  field  expected  the  gold  to  be  found,  its  finding  is  simply  an  intersection 
of  causes.  Here,  chance  is  described  as  'an  unexpected  outcome,  as  the  result  of  causes 
&t 
come  together,  in  these  things  that  are  being  done  for  the  sake  of  something'.  This 
coincidence  is  ultimately  explicable  in  terms  of  pattem  and  design.  It  is  'brought  about  by 
that  order,  advancing  by  unavoidable  connections,  which  descends  ftorn  providence  as  its 
source  and  arranges  all  things  in  their  proper  times  and  places'  (Boethius  199  1,  p  129). 
In  all  these  philosophers  we  see  a  strict  determinism  which  encompasses  notions  of  fate, 
divine  providence,  order  and  cause,  and  which  resonates  throughout  the  classical  world, 
consistently  obscuring,  or  at  best  marginalising,  the  study  of  chance  as  pure  randomness. 
These  issues  were  carried  over  into  the  middle  ages,  a  period  in  which,  despite  the 
subsumption  of  philosophy  to  theology,  the  heritage  of  classical  thinkers  excited  'fervent 
curiosity'  and  frequently  'deep  respect'  (Marenbon  1983,  p3).  The  medieval  concept  of 
chance  was  derived  from  the  Aristotelian  notion  of  an  absence  of  purpose  or  design,  and 
was  profoundly  influenced  by  Boethius  for  whom  chance  as  an  absence  of  cause  simply 
could  not  exist.  However,  monotheistic  Christianity  added  elements  of  its  own;  most 
importantly  a  Church  that  railed  against  all  forms  of  secular  knowledge  and  saw  evidence 
of  the  hand  of  God  in  every  earthly  phenomenon.  In  such  a  climate,  the  concept  of  the 
random  event  was  rejected  as  pagan.  Many  Christians  sought  to  explain  chance  events  on 
earth  with  reference  to  notions  of  fate,  astrology  or  'some  created  superpower  short  of 
divine  providence  itself  (James  and  Weisheipl  1982,  p526)  and  although  such  fatalism 
posed  problems  for  the  existence  of  free  will,  medieval  scholastics  remained  deeply  imbued 
with  the  idea  of  the  influences  of  celestial  bodies  and  intelligences  on  terrestrial 
phenomena. 
St  Augustine  anticipated  the  domýinant  medieval  response  to  chance,  explaining  that  it  was 
the  ignorance  of  man  and  not  the  nature  of  events  themselves  that  caused  the  latter  to 
appear  to  occur  at  random.  Attacking  Cicero's  denial  of  determýinism  and  hence  of  dione 
foreknowledge,  Augustine  argued  that  man's  true  endeavour  was  to  submit  himself  to  the 
Divine  Will  and  not  to  question  its  workings  by  searching  for  the  exceptional  or  unusual. In  monotheistic  Christianity,  chance  was  insignificant  in  itself  being  viewed  instead  as  an 
epiphenomenon  of  a  single,  all-embracing  Divine  order.  Such  order  implied  'limitation, 
restraint,  control'  as  part  of  God's  'foreknowledge  of  the  order  of  things'  (Kirwan  1989, 
plOO).  This  order  was  seen  by  Augustine  as  determining  all  aspects  of  human  action. 
'However  they  behave  it  cannot  fall  out  otherwise  for  them  than  God  has  determined 
...  so 
all  effort  is  abolished,  all  virtues  destroyed,  if  God's  arrangements  precede  human  "ills, 
and  under  the  name  of  predestination  a  kind  of  fated  necessity  is  introduced'  (Augustine, 
in  Kirwan  1989,  pI  12).  In  h=is  discussion  of  divine  foreknowledge,  we  see  in  Augustine 
traces  of  Boethius'  all-seeing,  a-temporal  divinity.  Foreknowledge,  to  this  God,  was  not 
strictly  foreknowledge  at  all,  but  simply  an  absolute  kind  of  1wowledge-  'For  what  is 
foreknowledge  but  knowledge  of  future  things?  And  what  is  future  to  God  who  spans  all 
times?  For  if  God's knowledge  grasps  things  themselves  they  are  not  future  to  him  but 
present,  so  that  he  cannot  be  said  now  to  have  foreknowledge  but  only  knowledge' 
(Augustine,  in  Kirwan  1989,  p  172). 
The  existence  of  such  an  all-powerful  deity  left  no  place  in  the  medieval  world  for  chance-, 
rather,  every  event  was  divinely  caused  and  the  fate  of  every  individual  was  divinely 
predestined.  For  Aquinus,  the  fact  that  something  was  contingent  made  it  no  less  a  result 
of  divine  providence  than  if  it  were  necessary-  'The  effect  of  divine  providence  is  not 
merely  that  a  thing  should  result  somehow,  but  that  it  should  result  either  contingently  or 
necessarily.  Therefore  what  divine  providence  disposes  to  result  infallibly  and  necessarily 
results  infallibly  and  necessarily,  and  what  divine  providence  has  reason  should  result 
I 
contingently  results  contingently'  (Augustine,  in  Kirwan  1989.  p120). 
In  two  important  strands  of  later  medieval  thought,  the  principle  of  causation  was  replaced 
with  that  of  direct  divine  intervention.  William  of  OcIcharn,  the  principal  exponent  of 
nominalism,  and  the  Israeli  Mutakaflinums  developed  the  theory  of  metaphysical 
occasionalism.,  and  so  protected  the  historicity  of  nuracles  in  a  deterministic  universe 
(Courtney  1984,  p78).  This  was  a  philosophy  in  which  there  existed  no  natural,  only 
divine  causality,  and  which  posited  'exclusive  divine  actiVity  in  every  change  and  motion  of the  universe'.  Such  an  orderly  world  was  absolutely  iMMUtable.  for  God  did  not  alter  his 
design  'by  whim  or  caprice'  (Courtney  1984,  p87). 
Ockham  explained  the  incidence  of  miracles  by  reference  to  a  dual  notion  of  causalltv 
Events,  he  said,  are  always  the  result  of  God's  primary  causality  and  also  of  a  secondary 
cause.  The  only  exceptions  are  miracles,  which  are  a  result  of  God's  primary  causality,  and 
'far  from  upsetting  or  undermining  the  natural  order,  they  reveal  the  benevolence  and  the 
dependability  of  the  God  that  upholds  that  order'  (Courtney  1984,  p92). 
In  such  a  scheme,  the  entire  universe  was  a  harmonious,  orderly  manifestation  of  the  divine 
will  of  God  -  even  the  apparent  exception  of  miracles  could  not  disrupt  the  orderly 
unfolding  of  causes,  for  they,  like  every  other  natural  event,  came  about  by  divine  action. 
Anselm's  insistence  on  the  consistency  of  God  was  thus  a  fundamental  tenet  of  medieval 
thought.  Order  was  everywhere,  and  it  revealed  that:  'The  will  of  God  is  never  Irrational' 
(in  Courtney  1984,  p60). 
CHANCE  AND  DETERMINISM 
The  most  prolific  and  fertile  analyses  of  shifting  historical  perspectives  on  chance  have 
been  annexed  to  the  study  of  probability  -  'the  mathematics  of  uncertainty',  whose 
development  in  Hacking's  evocative  phrase,  engendered  the  'tarning  of  chance'  (Hacking 
1990).  The  creation  of  an  'empire  of  chance'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989)  and  the  ambivalent 
erdighteru-nent  attitude  towards  the  'shadows  of  chance'  (Kavanagh  1993)  have  provided 
the  subject  matter  for  a  series  of  studies  on  the  place  of  the  aleatory  in  human 
consciousness.  Backed  by  a  profusion  of  vivid  metaphors,  these  authors'  interest  in  chance 
is  thus  mediated  by  their  focus  on  its  codification  in  probabifity  theory. 
The  eventual  birth  of  probabdity  theory  in  the  mid  seventeenth  century  was  an  intellectual 
development  long  overdue.  However,  once  granted  scientific  status  it  developed  rapidly 
and  matured  into  an  important  independent  discipline  over  the  course  of  the  nexl  t%vo 
hundred  years.  In  the  course  of  its  maturation  from  the  'doctrine  of  chances'  to  the  science -3.3 
of  calculations,  the  problem  of  chance  was  tackled  in  more  and  more  diVerse 
epistemological  fields  until  finally  it  stood  victonous  at  the  helm  of  an  empire  of  chance  It 
was  the  development  of  probability  theory  itself  which  facilitated  the  formation  of  such  an 
empire,  for  dunng  its  growth,  chance  began  to  emerge  as  a  distinct  entity  in  lksvýf  separate 
from  notions  of  fate  and  the  gods.  This  separation  was  vital,  for  before  probabllltý-  could 
'tame'  chance,  chance  had  to  exist  as  an  independent  phenomenon  to  he  tamed.  Parallel  to 
the  emergence  of  probability,  then,  was  the  emergence  of  chance,  which,  between  the  rnid 
seventeenth  and  nineteenth  centuries,  became  visible  for  the  first  time. 
An  Absent  Family  of  Ideas 
In  the  previous  section  we  saw  how  the  utilisation  of  chance  in  divinatory  practice  was 
widespread  in  ancient,  primitive  and  Christian  societies,  and  how  the  history  of  gambling 
itself  appears  as  a  record  of  the  recreational  pursuit  of  the  random.  For  Hacking,  this 
ancient  practical  interest  in  chance  is  'ubiquitous  enough  to  be  positively  primeval' 
(Hacking  1975,  pl),  )  while  David  is  aware  that  the  proliferation  of  early  references  to 
gaming  and  divination  is  an  indication  that  'the  random  element...  was  pursued  with 
assiduous  fanaticism'  (David  1969,  p2l).  Interest  in  chance  through  garruing,  religious 
ritual  and  the  observations  of  everyday  life  was  intense,  yet  paradoxicafly,  no 
corresponding  analysis  of  it  existed.  The  study  and  observation  of  randomness,  frequency, 
betting  and  probabifity  lagged  well  behind  everyday  involvement  in  the  practicalities  of 
such  pursuits.  It  was  1500  years  after  the  idealisation  of  the  first  solid  figure  before  the 
emergent  stirrings  of  probabilistic  thinking  were  felt,  and  450  years  after  that  before  the 
study  of  chance  was  suitably  abstract  to  be  divorced  from  its  practical  application  in 
divination.  The  word  'probability'  only  appeared  in  its  modem  form  implying  a  numerical 
idea  of  randomness  in  the  seventeenth  century,  finding  its  way  into  print  for  the  first  time 
in  1661.  Until  the  decade  around  the  1660s,  such  notions  as  the  abstract  quantification  of 
chance  were  simply  not  found,  and  comprised  what  Hacking  calls  'an  absent  family  of 
ideas'  (Hacking  1975). 1 14 
An  Ancient  Family  of  Ideas 
Despite  the  essentially  deterministic  nature  of  the  classical  universe,  strands  of  scepticism 
towards  the  primacy  of  fate  and  divine  providence  had  existed  in  Greek  thought.  Although 
the  practice  of  divination  was  generally  held  in  high  esteern,  voices  of  dissent  A-ere 
frequently  heard,  most  notably  those  of  the  cynical  Epicureans,  and  Cicero.  For  Epicurus, 
it  was  not  fate  but  chance  that  ruled  the  world.  No  design  or  providence  was  recognised  in 
the  universe,  and  everything  that  existed  could  be  explained  by  the  motions  of  atoms  in 
empty  space  (Epicurus  1977,  p314).  The  role  of  such  chance  could  be  minimised  by  the 
rational  action  of  the  wise  man.  Such  an  individual  'thinks  it  better  to  be  unlucky  in  a 
rational  way  than  lucky  in  a  senseless  way;  for  it  is  better  for  a  good  decision  not  to  turn 
out  right  in  action  than  for  a  bad  decision  to  turn  our  fight  because  of  chance'  (Epicurus 
1977,  p317). 
In  Roman  philosophy,  Cicero  rejected  the  view  of  chance  as  an  aspect  of  divine 
providence,  and  wrote  On  Fate,  On  Divination  and  On  the  Nature  of  the  Gods  to  deny  the 
efficacy  of  divination  and  detern-ýnisrn,  which  he  could  not  reconcile  with  his  "'iews  of 
human  freedom.  In  Book  11  of  De  Divinatiore,  an  understanding  of  what  would  later  be 
known  as  the  law  of  large  numbers  is  evident:  'Nothing  is  so  uncertain  as  the  cast  of  dice, 
and  yet  there  is  no  one  who  plays  often  who  does  not  sometimes  make  a  Venus-throw' 
and  occasionally  twice  or  thrice  in  succession.  Then  are  we,  like  fools,  to  prefer  to  say 
that  it  happened  by  the  direction  of  Venus  rather  than  by  chanceT  (Cicero  197  1,  p507).  In 
this  pracficaL  eminently  secular  understanding  of  the  world,  Cicero  regards  lot-casting 
firstly,  as  synonymous  with  games  of  chance,  and  secondly  -  and  more  cynically  -  as  the 
deliberate  encouragement  of  superstition.  The  practice,  he  says,  'is  much  like  playing  at 
moffa,  dice  or  knucklebones,  in  which  recklessness  and  luck  prevail',  and  which  has  been 
'fraudulently  contrived  fi7om  mercenary  motives,  as  a  means  of  encouraging  superstition 
and  error'  (Cicero  197  1,  p467). 
Such  scepticism  about  the  diVIne  function  of  the  lot  and  the  proVidential  nature  of  chance 
is  at  its  most  scathing  in  Cicero,  who  gave  voice  to  a  strand  of  thought  in  the  classical 
5A  throw  in  which  each  of  four  dice  fell  with  a  different  number  on  its  upper  face. world  that  could  imagine  the  outcome  of  a  chance  event  to  be  an  expression  of  something 
other  than  godly  will.  Together  w-ith  a  highly  developed  system  of  scientific  10  ic  and  _V- 
mathematics,  this  current  amounted  to  the  existence  of  what  David  calls  an  incipient 
'instinctive  feeling  for  probability'  (David  1969,  p24).  The  antithesis  between  tuche  -  luck 
and  fechtie  -  human  art  or  science,  prevalent  in  Greek  thought  since  Plato's  ý'outh,  must  be 
regarded  as  contributing  to  this  'instinctive  feeling'.  The  contrast,  Nussbaum  tens  us,  is 
between  fiving  at  the  mercy  of  luche,  and  having  fife  made  safer  and  more  controlled  by 
techne.  In  this  sense,  techne  is  associated  with  practical  judgement  and  forethought,  and 
concerris  the  management  of  need  and  the  prediction  and  control  of  future  contingencies 
(Nussbaum  1986,  p94-5).  The  individual  who  fives  by  techne  'possesses  some  sort  of 
systematic  grasp,  some  way  of  ordering  the  subject  matter,  that  v611  take  him  to  the  new 
situation  well  prepared,  removed  ftom  bfind  dependence  on  what  happens'  (Nussbaum 
1986,  p95). 
Within  the  realm  of  mathematics  and  logic  -  the  realm  of  certain  knowledge  -  issues  such 
as  the  enumeration  of  possibilities  and  causes  were  being  tackled,  and  the  suggestion  that 
the  likelihood  of  an  events'  occurrence  was  not  merely  a  matter  of  subjective  interpretation 
being  discussed.  David  points  to  the  first  stirrings  of  combinatory  theory  in  Chrysippus, 
who  tried  to  calculate  the  correct  diagnosis  of  an  illness  by  discussing  the  number  of 
'molecular  propositions'  which  arose  from  all  possible  combinations  of  'atomic 
propositions'.  Early  combinatorics  can  also  be  found  in  Xenocrates,  who  absorbed  himself 
in  the  calculation  of  the  number  of  syllables  produced  by  re-arranging  the  letters  of  the 
alphabet  up  to  1002000  million  times!  (David  1969,  p23). 
Alongside  a  strict,  providential  determinism  we  find  in  the  classical  world  an  understanding 
and  codification  of  chance  which  led  to  the  beginnings  of  a  full-blown  theory  of 
probability.  In  philosophy  and  mathematics,  the  Greeks  showed  themselves  to  have 
sufficient  acumen  to  develop  further  from  these  promising  beginnings.  Yet  such  a 
development  never  happened;  the  precocious  understanding  of  combinations  and 
randomness  did  not  lead  to  what  we  now  know  as  modem  probability. 36 
In  me  ieval  Europe,  chance  was  regarded  as  an  epiphenomenon  of  the  Diýlne  Will,  "  hich 
in  itself  was  nothing,  and  could  not  be  the  objw  of  serious  study.  The  existence  and 
manifestation  of  randomness  was  simply  not  an  issue  vAth  which  the  medieval  mind  ýýas 
engaged.  Rather,  what  consideration  of'the  random'  did  exist  was  formulated  around  the 
more  immediate  question  of  knowledge  and  opimon.  Medieval  natural  philosophy  did 
recognise  the  existence  of  events  that  happened  'by  chance'  -  ut  in  pwicioribus  -  but  these 
were  considered  outside  the  range  of  true  'scientific'  knowledge  and  could  only  be  referred 
to  as  likehhood's,  not  certainties  (James  and  WeisheipI  1982,  p526).  These  twin  axes  of 
interest  can  be  seen  to  constitute  a  medieval  form  of  'probability',  not  in  its  modem  sense, 
but  as  a  concern  with  the  notions  of  opinio  and  scientia,  from  which  the  dualistic  notion  of 
probability  that  emerged  in  the  seventeenth  century  can  be  traced. 
The  medieval  distinction  between  knowledge  and  opinion  contrasts  strongly  with  all 
modem  epistemology  and  can  be  traced  back  to  Plato.  In  Thomist  doctrine  scientia  is 
knowledge,  and  is  concerned  with  universal  truths  which  are  true  of  necessity.  Knowledge 
can  be  of  first  truths  which  are  beyond  disputation  because  of  their  simple  and  fundamental 
nature,  and  can  also  be  acquired  through  demonstration.  Aquinus'  opinio  refers  to  beliefs 
not  attained  by  demonstration  and  may  also  include  propositions  which  result  from 
reflection,  argument  and  disputation  and  cannot  be  demonstrated.  The  objects  of  such 
opinion  are  therefore  not  the  kinds  of  proposition  that  can  be  objects  of  knowledge.  In 
scholastic  doctrine,  probability  -  probibilitas  -stemmed  from  this  sense  of  opiln-0,  and 
indicated  acceptability  of  approval  by  authoritative,  respected  sources.  According  to 
Aquinus,  the  dialectician  should  proceed  'on  the  basis  of  best  opinions,  namely  what  is 
held  by  the  many  or  especially  by  the  wise'  (Aquinus,  in  Hacking  1975,  p22).  Medieval 
probability  then,  was  based  on  tradition  and  authoritative  opinion,  and  as  such  was  not 
concerned  with  the  discovery  of  new  knowledge  of  the  world.  It  also  contained  pejorative 
connotations  insofar  as  a  proposition  was  merely  probable  and  therefore  not  demonstrable, 
as  were  scientific  propositions.  For  both  reasons  probability  would  not  be  the  focus  of 
interest  of  scholars  seeking  knowledge  and  scientific  facts.  Furthermore,  since  truths  about 
the  world  were  not  considered  the  proper  subject  of  opinio,  probability  was  not  viewed  as 
a  realm  in  which  real  knowledge  would  be  found. 3 
Hacking  sees  in  Galileo's  failure  to  develop  probabilistic  ideas  from  gaming  problems  the 
restrictive  influence  of  this  notion  of  opinion  which  was  not  the  focus  of  a  senous  scientist 
(Hacking  1975,  p26).  Galileo  called  the  opin-ion  of  Copernicus  improbable  because  of  the 
experiences  which  contradict  the  notion  of  earthly  movement,  and,  more  importantly  here, 
because  of  the  strength  of  the  Ptolemaic  and  Aristotelian  debate  around  it.  That  is, 
Copemicus'  opinion  was  improbable  and  still  the  one  best  supported  by  argument.  In 
contrast,  less  than  a  century  later  a  more  modem  notion  of  probability  propagated  by 
Leibinz  defined  the  same  situation  quite  differently.  For  the  latter,  despite  all  evidence  to 
the  contrary,  the  Copernican  hypothesis  was  'incomparably  the  most  probable'.  Thus  in 
Leibinz's  era  probabifity  was  determined  by  evidence  and  reason  while  for  Galileo  it  rested 
on  approval. 
Reasons  For  the  Absent  Family 
We  can  see  how  the  nature  of  medieval  epistemology  precluded  the  serious  consideration 
of  probabilistic  ideas.  As  'mere  opinion,  such  a  topic  was  not  worthy  of  systematic 
academic  pursuit.  However,  a  tradition  favourable  to  the  recognition  of  randomness  did 
exist  in  classical  thought:  why  did  it  never  develop  to  become  anything  more  than  an 
'instinctive  feeling'  for  probability? 
In  answering  this  question,  authors  have  frequently  drawn  attention  to  relatively 
unsophisticated  Greek  numerical  systems  (e.  g  David,  Hacking,  Girgenzer  et  al.  ).  Despite 
their  mastery  of  logic  and  geometry,  the  Greeks  had  not  made  corresponding  advances  in 
arithmetical  computations  -  especially  the  writing  down  of  numbers.  The  symbolism  that 
facifitates  multiplication  and  addition  is  a  prerequisite  for  the  expression  of  a  theory  of 
probability,  and  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  whose  notation,  being  rather  cumbersome,  did 
not  lend  itself  to  arithmetical  operations,  'lacked  a  perspicuous  notation  for  numerals' 
(Hacking  1975,  p6).  Furthermore,  the  manipulation  of  numbers  as  though  they  were 
objects  was  unknown  in  Pythagorean  mathematics,  for  in  this  tradition,  numbers  were 
regarded  as  bearers  of  magical  and  mysterious  powers.  Number  was  seen  to  express  divine 
harmony  and  order  and,  thus  mystified  and  hypostatised,  was  unable  to  simply  represent 
the  mundane,  secular  implications  of  individual  quantities  or  occurrences.  Until  number could  be  released  from  Pythagorean  mysticisR  and  until  a  workable  notation  for  it  existed. 
the  arithmetical  and  algebraic  level  necessary  for  the  full  development  of  probabilitv  theorY 
could  not  appear  (David  1969,  p23).  Nor  was  scientific  method  conducive  to  the  testing  of 
chance  that  the  calculation  of  probabilities  relies  on.  In  the  classical  world,  a  gap  existed 
between  the  construction  of  theoretical  hypotheses  and  the  observation  of  empirical  data, 
and  until  this  gap  was  closed  in  the  Renaissance,  the  extensive,  repeated  testing  and 
observation  of  large  groups  of  numbers  was  impossible  (David  1969,  p23). 
Amongst  all  this  speculation,  Kandell  utters  a  word  of  warning-  'Mathematics'  he  says 
tnever  leads  thought,  but  only  expresses  it'  (Kandell  1970,  p30).  There  are  more 
fundamental  reasons  for  the  absence  of  probability  theory  than  an  insufficiently  advanced 
number  system.  Rather,  the  absence  of  probability  is  to  be  found  in  an  entire  worlthl",,, 
'the  very  notion  of  chance  itself,  the  idea  of  natural  law,  the  possibility  that  a  proposition 
may  be  true  and  false  in  fixed  relative  proportions...  all  comprise  a  cosmology  in  which 
there  is  no  place  for  probabilistic  thinking'  (Kandell  1970,  p30). 
In  the  medieval  as  well  as  the  classical  worlds,  neither  religious  nor  deterministic 
providential  worldviews  recognised  the  independent  existence  of  chance.  As  secular 
signifiers  of  the  Divine  Will,  chance  events  were  regarded  as  meaningless  on  their  own.  As 
long  as  random  phenomena  were  viewed  as  theophanies  of  sacred  meaning,  the 
phenomena  themselves  were  deemed  insignificant  and  ignored.  The  consideration  of  such 
random  events  was  not  only  worthless,  it  could  even  be  considered  an  impious  act  of 
human  presumption  interfering  with  the  will  of  God.  In  such  a  climate,  the  calculation  of 
chances  was  best  left  alone. 
The  Renaissance 
The  first  steps  towards  the  taming  of  chance  were  taken  in  late  fifteenth  century  Italy, 
when  mathematicians  like  Fra  Luca  Pacioli  and  Geronimo  Cardano  raised  some  of  the 
basic  problems  of  the  calculation  of  chances  and  even  made  'some  small  progress  towards 
solving  them'  (Kandell  1970,  p29). 9 
The  impetus  behind  these  anticipations  of  probability  theory  was  commercial  in  nature.  for 
the  probabilistic  reasoning  that  was  concerned  N,  "th  the  di,,  ision  of  spoils  in  an  incompleted 
game  was  similar  to  a  host  of  problems,  such  as  the  distnbution  of  goods  in  trade,  that 
'beset  the  new  merchant  class'  at  the  time  (Hacking  1975,  p49).  Paciolis'  Summa  de 
arithmetica,  geometria,  proportioni  et  proportionalita  (1494),  famous  as  the  ongin  of 
double  entry  book-keeping  was  a  part  of  this  commercial  milieu,  and  was  used  by 
merchants  in  the  calculations  of  profits  and  losses  and  the  recording  of  commercial 
transactions  (Hacking  1975,  p4-5). 
The  new  commerce  acted  as  an  incentive  to  statistical  development  too.  The  trade  and 
manufacture  of  fifteenth  century  Italy  became  a  subject  for  accountancy  and  mathematics 
as  the  need  for  numerical  assessment  paralleled  the  growth  of  commercial  enterprise. 
Kendall  writes  that  'the  commercial  requirements  of  the  age  alone  necessitated  the 
collection  of  a  great  deal  of  material  that  would  now  be  called  descriptive  statistics' 
(Kendall  1970,  p46).  The  enumeration  and  quantification  of  the  world  in  this  early 
statistics  went  some  way  towards  creating  the  arithmetical  basis  that  was  vital  for  the 
further  growth  of  probabifity  and  which  had  been  absent  in  its  earlier,  classical  appearance. 
It  was  into  this  milieu  that  Geronimo  Cardano's  Liber  de  Ludo  Alea  (1550)  appeared.  This 
seminal  work  benefited  from  its  author's  vast  knowledge  of  randomness,  for  Cardano  was 
an  avid  gambler  who  used  his  experience  of  gaming  in  the  calculation  of  dice  throws.  For 
the  first  time  in  the  consideration  of  chance,  the  abstraction  from  empirical  evidence  to 
theoretical  concept  was  made,  and,  also  for  the  first  time,  the  equal  possibility  of  throwing 
any  number  on  a  die  on  each  subsequent  throw,  was  stated:  'I  am  as  able  to  throw  1,3  or 
5  as  2.4  or  6.  The  wagers  are  therefore  laid  in  accordance  with  this  equality  if  the  die  is 
honest...  '  (Cardano  1953,  p193).  Even  now,  Cardano's  reputation  is  disputed  between 
those  who  consider  him  a  probabilist  of  unequivocal  importance  (e.  g  Ore,  Da,  6d),  and 
those  who  find  his  deficiencies  typical  of  the  intellectual  limitations  of  the  time  (e.  g 
Girgenzer  et  al.,  Hacking).  Girgenzer  et  al.  are  concerned  with  the  implications  of 
Cardano's  calculations,,  which  'mathematically  obliged'  him  to  assert  that  each  face  of  the 
die  should  occur  once  every  six  throws.  He  resolved  the  problem  with  an  appeal  to  luck,  a 
phenomenon  whose  intervention  disrupted  the  realisation  of  mathematical  probabdities  and 40 
re-introduced  the  ancient  idea  of  supematural  guidance.  Cardano  thus  relinquished  his 
claim  to  the  founding  of  the  mathematical  theory  of  probability,  for  classical  probability 
could  only  arrive  when  factors  like  luck  were  banished  (Cardano  1953,  p215) 
The  importance  of  Cardano  as  well  as  Pacioll  derived  as  much  from  the  problems  they  got 
wrong  as  from  those  they  solved.  They  were  aware  of  the  significance  of  issues  relating  to 
C;  F_  - 
games  of  chance,  but  were  quite  unable  to  solve  the  dilemmas  they  set.  For  Hacking,  what 
is  most  striking  about  these  early  works  I  is  not  that  problems  on  chance  [were]  chiefly 
aimed  at  the  new  commerce,  but  that  these  books  were  quite  unable  to  solve  the  problems. 
No-one  could  solve  them  until  about  1660  and  then  everyone  could'  (Hacking  1975,  p5). 
The  solution  to  these  problems  would  have  to  wait  another  century,  time  for  an  intellectual 
climate  change  in  which  the  concepts  of  numbers,  averages  and  signs  as  evidence  would 
clear  the  way  for  probabilistic  reasoning.  The  concept  of  the  average  -  vital  for  the 
development  of  the  notion  of  expectation  -  was  developed  by  Pascal  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  and  in  it  the  solutions  to  Cardano's  puzzles  were  eventually  found. 
THE  BIRTH  OF  PROBABMITY 
The  story  of  probability  is  one  of  the  reconciliation  of  the  ancient  arch  rivals  of  Fortuna 
and  Scientia  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p292).  The  hero  of  the  story  is  probability  -  'the 
mathematics  of  uncertainty"  -  whose  development  ftorn  the  seventeenth  century  onwards 
'tamed'  or  'cleared  a  space'  for  chance  (Hacking  1990,  p  182)  resulting  in  the  creation  of  an 
empire  of  chance  which  now  'sprawls  over  whole  conceptual  continents'  (Girgenzer  et  al. 
1989,  p271). 
Pascal 
The  inexorable  march  towards  the  empire  of  chance  began,  ironically  enough,  i&-ith  a 
chance  encounter.  In  Poisson's  famous  sentence:  'A  problem  about  games  of  chance 
proposed  to  an  austere  Jansenist  by  a  man  of  the  wofld'  (Hacking  1975,  p37).  The'austere 41 
Jansenist  was  Pascal,  the  'man  of  the  world'  the  Chev,  aller  de  Mere.  a  philosopher  and 
gambler  who  wanted  to  know  how  much  a  stake  in  a  game  would  be  vvorth  If  the  game 
were  interrupted.  The  question  created  a  surge  of  interest  in  proportions  and  chance  and 
led  to  Huygens  De  Alea  and  Pascal's  correspondence  with  Fermat.  The  surrounding  debate 
marked  the  birth  of  classical  probability,  a  concept  which  was'Janus  faced'  -  the  legacy  of 
the  medieval  distinction  between  vcientia  and  opinio  -  on  the  one  hand,  statistical,  on  the 
other,  epistemological  (Girgenzer  et  a].  1989,  p274).  The  former  was  concerned  with 
stochastic  processes,  the  latter  with  assessing  degrees  of  belief,  a  duality  of  which  Pascal 
was  quite  representative.  In  his  1654  essay  on  the  arithmetical  triangle,  he  introduced  the 
notion  of  expectation  into  games  of  chance,  and  in  so  doing  was  able  to  solve  problems 
which  had  baffled  his  predecessors  for  centuries.  Cardano,  Pacioll  and  other  writers  had 
thought  the  best  way  to  divide  the  stakes  of  an  interrupted  game  was  to  assume  the  game 
played  so  far  was  representative  or  proportionate  to  what  would  happen  next.  In  other 
words,  they  assumed  chance  would  behave  in  the  future  as  it  had  in  the  past.  Pascal 
however  looked  at  the  game  as  an  unfinished  story;  crucially,  the  future  of  it  was  not  yet 
resolved  by  previous  play.  Any  provisional  division  of  the  stakes  should  be  made  M  such  a 
way  that  each  player  saw  it  as  in  his  interest  to  continue  playing.  For  Kavanagh,  this 
change  of  perspective  was  of  seminal  importance.  Pascal's  innovation  was  the  enlargement 
of  the  narrative  frame-  'the  moment  of  the  game's  interruption  had  to  be  approached,  not 
as  the  end  of  the  story,  but  as  one  point  in  an  ongoing  narrative  -  as  a  present  moment  to 
be  understood  through  its  relations  to  future  expectation  as  well  as  past  performance.  An 
adequate  resolution  of  the  problem  had  to  involve  not  only  a  memory  of  the  past  but  an 
anticipation  of  the  future,  an  assurance  that  both  players  would  be  motivated  to  complete 
the  scenario  as  originally  written'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p  117). 
Pascal's  essay  on  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  is  typical  of  the  epistemological  strand  of 
probability.  His  wager  demonstrates  that  reasoning  on  games  of  chance  can  be  transferred 
to  uncertain  situations  in  general,  and  applied  as  a  method  of  reasoning.  The  argument 
concerns  the  utifity  of  the  belief  in  God:  either  God  exists  or  he  does  not  -  'God  is  or  he  is 
not'  -  which  way  should  we  incline?  We  must  incline  one  way  or  the  other,  for  simply  by 
living,  we  are  involved  in  the  'game',  and  demonstrate  our  belief  or  disbefief  in  our  actions. 
Pascal  argued  that  belief  -  the  wager  that  'God  exists  I  is  a  more  rational  course  of  action 42 
than  disbelief  -  the  wager  that  he  does  not.  For  Pascal,  the  uncertaint-y  faced  by  the  doubter 
is  like  that  faced  by  the  gambler,  and  so  he  used  the  reasoning  behind  a  gamble  as  a 
template  for  the  reasoning  of  the  doubter.  'Does  God  existT,  he  asked,  and  ans,  -kere& 
'Reason  cannot  decide  this  question.  Infinite  chaos  separates  us.  At  the  far  end  of  this 
infinite  distance  a  coin  is being  spun  which  will  come  down  heads  of  tails.  Ho%'V,  'ýklll  you 
wager?  Reason  cannot  make  you  choose  either,  reason  cannot  prove  either  wrong'  (Pascal 
1987,  p150).  If  you  act  as  though  God  does  exist  and  you  'win',  then-  'you  win  everything, 
if  you  lose  you  lose  nothing'  (Pascal  1987,  p151).  In  this  way,  the  doubter  acts  like  the 
gambler,  for  'Every  gambler  takes  a  certain  risk  for  an  uncertain  gain,  and  yet  he  is  taking 
a  certain  finite  risk  for  an  uncertain  finite  gain  without  sinning  against  reason'  (Pascal 
1987,  p  15  1).  If  God  'is  not'  neither  befief  nor  disbelief  will  have  any  effect  on  us.  However, 
if  he  exists,  wagering  that  he  does  not  will  bring  damnation,  whereas  wagering  that  he  does 
could  bring  salvation.  Since  damnation  is  the  worst  possible  outcome,  and  salvation  the 
best,  we  should  act  as  though  we  believe  God  does  exist.  Even  if  the  chances  of  this  are 
infinitesimally  small,  the  payoff  if  God  exists,  is  infinitesimally  great  -  far  outstripping  the 
potential  reward  if  we  opt  for  non-existence  and  he  turns  out  not  to  exist.  No  matter  how 
great  the  daily  pleasures  of  the  libertine,  they  are  finite;  salvation  however  is  infinitely 
blessed,  and  although  we  have  no  idea  of  the  chance  that  God  exists,  it  is  not  zero. 
Pascal's  wager  was  an  argument  from  expectation  with  an  equal  probability  distribution.  Its 
conclusion,  that  salvation  if  God  exists  is  more  valuable  than  earthly  pleasures  if  he  does 
not,  provided  a  strategy  for  behaviour  based  on  belief  It  placed  the  interlocutor  in  the 
same  epistemological  position  as  someone  gambling  on  a  coin  whose  aleatory  properties 
are  unknown.  The  existence  of  God  was  not,  then,  a  matter  of  chance,  but  a  question  of 
reasonable  belief,  and  the  wager  provided  an  outline  for  the  action  of  rational  man. 
For  Girgenzer  et  al.,  the  wager  was  an  example  of  how  'reasoning  by  expectations  had 
become  almost  synonymous  with  a  new  brand  of  rationality  by  the  mid  seventeenth 
century'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p4).  Pascal's  'libertine  interlocutor'  was  to  be  persuaded  by 
'uncertain  wagers  rather  than  theological  certainties'.  At  the  same  time  that  the  intellectual 
climate  had  changed  as  a  result  of  Reformation  controversies  between  Catholics  and 
Protestants,  the  revival  of  sceptical  philosophy  undemuned  the  ideal  of  certain  knowledge, 43 
dominant  in  intellectual  inquiry  since  Aristotle  (Girp-enzer  et  a].  1989,  p4).  . -\t  the  forefront 
of  this  revival  was  Descartes,  whose  attempt  to  elinunate  doubt  by  disregarding  all 
previously  held  certaMities  actually  served  to  put  it  on  a  firmer  footing  by  establishing  it  as 
a  method  of  philosophical  pursuit  in  its  own  fight.  In  Descartes'  rational  scepticism,  inquin, 
had  to  begin  with  douht  -  how  can  I  know  anything?  -  to  proceed  to  certainty  (Descartes 
1985). 
The  result  of  these  movements  radically  reshaped  the  intellectual  landscape,  setting  the 
scene  for  the  next  three  hundred  years  and  laying  the  foundations  for  the  empire  of  chance. 
Girgenzer  et  al.  described  this  period  of  unbounded  Enlightenment  optimýism  in  the 
potential  of  reason  as  a  time  when:  'all  of  the  traditional  sources  of  uncertainty,  religious 
and  philosophicat,  came  simultaneously  under  attack.  Confronted  with  a  choice  between 
fideist  dogmatism  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  most  corrosive  scepticism  on  the  other,  an 
increasing  number  of  seventeenth  century  writers  attempted  to  carve  out  an  intermediate 
position  that  abandoned  aU  hope  of  certainty  except  in  mathematics  and  perhaps 
metaphysics,  and  yet  still  insisted  that  man  could  obtain  probable  knowledge.  Or  rather 
they  insisted  that  probable  knowledge  was  indeed  knowledge'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p5). 
These  intellectual  developments  influenced,  and  were  influenced  by,  a  process  of  radical 
economic  change,  for  in  the  seventeenth  century,  Europe  was  entering a  period  of 
mercantile  capitalism.  This  momentous  period  saw  the  birth  of  what  is  now  modem 
science,  of  individualisn-ý  and  of  many  of  our  contemporary  institutions  and  ideas.  In  short, 
it  gave  us  the  birth  of  modem  society  itself 
The  eminently  speculative  nature  of  this  period  of  merchant  capitalism  branched  out  in  two 
major  directions,  both  of  which  encouraged  the  development  of  a  numerical,  probabilistic 
worldview.  On  the  one  hand,  trading  in  stocks  and  shares  created  an  international 
stockmarket  in  which  companies  and  individuals  alike  competed  with  each  other  to  amass 
vast  fortunes  through  speculation  in  the  new  global  economy.  At  the  same  time,  the 
speculative  mania  extended  in  more  conservative  directions,  in  the  creation  of  insurance 
and  annuities  (Hacking  1975,  p4,  also  Douglas  1992,  p23).  Originally  intended  for  the 
assurances  of  marine  risks,  such  insurance  calculated  the  chances  of  a  ship  coming  home 44 
against  the  chances  of  its  being  lost  at  sea.  This  practise  had  been  around  since  the  four-th 
millennium  B.  C.  in  what  were  known  as  'bottomly  contracts'  -  loans  to  ship  o%kners,  the 
repayment  of  which  was  contingent  on  the  safe  completion  of  the  voyage  (L*ncyclopedla 
Britannica  1992  vol  6,  p336)  -  but  in  the  seventeenth  century,  a  form  of  marine  insurance 
which  dealt  specifically  in  risk-v,  and  which  took  account  of  the  probability  of  losses  and 
gains  emerged.  This  insurance  was  directly  linked  to  the  emergence  of  capitalism, 
developing  'as  a  consequence  of  and  spur  to  the  expansion  of  long  distance  trading',  and 
paralleling  the  spread  of  commercial  innovations  like  bills  of  exchange  and  various  credit 
mechanisms  (Encyclopedia  Britannica  1992  vol  6,  p3  3  6). 
It  was  also  during  this  period  of  general  socio-econornic  upheaval  that  the  meaning  of 
securitas  changed  from  the  expression  of  a  subjective  state  of  freedom  ftom  care  to  an 
objective  sense  of  surW,  later  securile,  in  French  (Luhmann  1993,  p  13).  Luhmann  writes  - 
'It  is  as  if,  in  the  face  of  an  increasingly  uncertain  future,  a  secure  basis  for  the  making  of 
decisions  had  to  be  found'  (Luhmann  1993,  p  13).  The  idea  that  fate  or  providence  would 
oversee  the  unfolding  of  events  could  no  longer  provide  sufficient  assurance  to  those 
whose  goods  might  be  at  stake  in  trading  situations.  Individuals  were  beginning  to  feel  the 
need  to  take  matters  into  their  own  hands,  and  to  make  practical,  objective  efforts  to 
ensure  their  security.  Thus,  'the  old  cosmological  limitations,  the  constraints  of  being  and 
the  secrets  of  nature  were  replaced  by  distinctions  falling  within  the  domain  of  rational 
calculation...  '  (Luhmann  1993,  pl.  3).  In  other  words,  a  practical,  rational  orientation  to 
action  was  developing  around  the  newly  recognised  concepts  of  risk  and  insurance.  A 
dictionary  of  1665  defined  insurance  specifically  in  terms  of  commercial  risk  -  'The 
Covenant  of  preventing  Danger  (commonly  called  Insurance)  frequent  among  Merchants, 
added  a  Shadow  of  Law;  whereby  the  Uncertainty  of  the  Event  is  usually  transferred  to 
another  with  some  certain  Reward'  (in  The  Oxford  English  Dictionary  1961  vol  5,  p3  63). 
It  is  at  this  point  that  we  also  see  the  emergence  of  the  notion  of  risk,  in  both  its  senses  of 
'danger,  exposure  to  peril'  and  the  more  specific  'chance  or  hazard  of  commercial  loss  in 
case  of  insured  property.  Both  these  connotations  appeared  in  the  seventeenth  century, 
from  the  Anglo-French  risque;  the  first  instance  of  the  term  being  cited  in  1661  as  'Risquý 
-  peril,  jeopardy,  danger,  hazard,  chance'  (in  Me  Oxford  English  Dichofuu),  1961  vol  8, 
p363).  Slightly  later,  the  sense  of  risk  as  something  linked  with  commercial  exploits,  was 4S 
made  explicit.  The  1728  edition  of  Chambers  warns  'There  is  a  great  Rýsk  run  in  letting 
Goods  go  upon  Credit  to  great  Lords'.  And  later  still,  we  find  it  linked  (as  it  ofien  Is 
today)  specifically  with  insurance  against  commercial  loss.  In  1750,  it  is  described  a,  'A 
Contract  or  Agreement  by  which  one  or  more  Particulars...  take  on  them  the  Risque  of  the 
Value  of  the  things  insured'  (in  Me  Oxford  E.  11glish  Dictioizary  1961  vol  8,  p714).  From 
its  first  documented  instance  in  the  Lloyds  company  In  1613,  marine  insurance  rapidly 
expanded  into  a  multitude  of  smaller  companies  throughout  the  seventeenth  century.  Its 
objective  also  expanded,  so  that  by  the  end  of  the  century,  marine  risks  had  been  left 
behind  by  ambitious  companies  organising  a  form  of  speculative  irisurance  which  could  be 
purchased  on  anything,  including  lives. 
In  this  new  capitalising  economy,  as  trade  expanded  into  a  system  of  intemational 
exchange,  enumeration  and  accountancy  became  vital.  The  tentative,  numerical 
development  which  had  seen  the  beginnings  of  a  form  of  Renaissance  statistics  continued 
with  renewed  vigour  under  the  dynamic  of  nascent  capitalist  enterprise.  At  the  same  time, 
the  expansion  of  a  money  economy  created  a  standardised,  universal  measure  of  value. 
Unlike  the  gold  and  land  of  the  feudal  economy,  money  existed  as  a  'universal  equivalento, 
a  convenient  abstraction,  in  whose  international  language  the  most  distant  and  disparate 
groups  could  communicate.  This  spirit  of  enumeration  is  apparent  in  the  transition,  during 
the  seventeenth  century,  from  the  Renaissance  concept  of  'measure'  in  the  sense  of 
moderation  and  balance,  to  the  modem  concept  of  measurement  as  quantification,  a  move 
that  is  philogically  visible  in  the  German  shift  fforn  MaB  to  Messen  (Guttman  1978,  p85). 
Significantly  for  our  study  of  probability,  it  is  to  this  period  Of  mercantilism  that  the 
widespread  enumeration  of  society  took  place.  The  uti-lisation  of  number  in  rational 
accountancy  is,  for  Weber,  a  precondition  for  the  development  of  the  spirit  of  capitalist 
enterprise,  and  it  was  in  the  seventeenth  century  that  the  need  to  quantify  and  compare 
individual  events  and  phenomena  according  to  a  universal,  numerical  standard  reached  its 
apogee.  This  was  a  time  when  the  mystical  connotations  of  Pythagoreanism  had  been 
abandoned,  and  an  image  of  number  as  the  basis  of  all  objective  knowledge  revived. 
Knowledge  of  number  implied  control  over  nature,  for:  'A  grasp  of  the  numerical  structure 41) 
in  things  conferred  on  man  new  powers  over  his  surroundings  In  a  ýýav.  it  made  him  more 
like  God'  (Bertrand  Russell,  in  Birren  1961,  p  11) 
The  abstract  representation  of  numerical  data  in  the  form  of  graphs  was  a  part  of  this  spirit 
of  accountancy,  and  it  too  was  born  in  the  womb  of  commerce.  In  the  eighteenth  centur-y,, 
A.  F.  W.  Crome  was  the  first  to  present  information  in  this  way,  basing  his  calculations  on 
the  international  balance  of  trade  and  on  the  import  and  export  figures  of  Britain's  foreign 
markets.  At  the  same  time  and  with  a  similar  impetus,  Playfair  applied  geometry  to 
accountancy,  boasting  'I  was  the  first  who  apphed  the  principles  of  geometry  to  mat-ters  of 
finance'  (in  Royston  1970,  p  180). 
Such  a  practical  application  of  mathematics  to  the  highly  numerical  world  of  commerce 
and  accountancy  was  what  had  been  missing  in  early  Greek  attempts  to  develop  a  theory 
of  probability.  When  geometry  was  drawn  into  the  problems  of  commerce  in  this  way  - 
and,  more  importantly,  backed  up  by  an  advanced  system  of  enumeration  -  the  methods  for 
solving  problems  of  chances  could  finafly  begin  to  emerge.  The  growth  of  a  speculative, 
arithmetical  Weltanschmiung  created  a  chmate  in  which  events  whose  outcomes  were 
uncertain  could  be  observed  and  their  natures  calculated  in  terms  of  a  scientific  'doctrine  of 
chances'.  The  level  of  numeracy  necessary  for  the  'arithmetical  juggling'  required  by 
probability  theory  was  thus  attained  in  the  developing  mercantile  markets  of  the 
seventeenth  century. 
The  newly-acquired  calculative  attitude  extended  over  all  avenues  of  life,  and  its  symbiotic 
relation  with  games  of  chance  was  noted  by  one  eighteenth  century  commentator  on 
English  customs  :  'The  probability  of  life  and  the  return  of  ships,  are  the  objects  of  their 
arithmetic.  The  same  habit  of  calculating  they  extend  to  games,  wagers,  and  everything  in 
which  there  is  any  hazard'  (  Le  Blanc,  in  Guttman  1978,  p60). 
At  the  same  time,  the  intellectual  changes  outlined  earlier  were  indicative  of  a  mIlleu  in 
which  the  study  of  a  theory  of  chances  could  take  place.  The  pursuit  of  the  random  was  no 
longer  considered  an  aberration,  but  had  come  into  its  own  as  a  serious  object  of  study 4- 
'Chance  is  Nothing' 
'Chance  is  nothing.  It  is  fiction,  a  chimera  bereft  of  possibility  and  existence,  People 
attribute  to  chance  effects  whose  causes  they  do  not  understand.  But  for  God,  kno%king  ail 
causes  and  all  effects,  actual  as  well  as  potential,  in  the  clearest  detail,  nothing  can  be  an 
effect  of  chance'  (Diderot,  in  Kavanagh  1993,  p  164). 
Diderot's  entry  for  chance  -  le  hasard  -  in  the  Encyclopedia  reflects  the  spirit  of  the 
Enlightenment  and  the  direction  of  the  thought  of  the  early  probabilists.  After  Pascal's 
wager  and  his  correspondence  with  Fermat,  a  burst  of  interest  and  activity  was  Initiated 
and  in  the  ensuing  debate,  several  writers  excited  responses  to  each  others'  advances 
marked  out  the  parameters  of  the  new  discipline  of  probability.  Between  the  mid 
seventeenth  and  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  'classical'  European  probabilists  - 
Huygens,  Bernoulli,  Laplace,  Montmort  and  de  Moivre  -  turned  their  attention  to  gambling 
as  the  paradigmatic  aleatory  contract.  In  the  analysis  of  popular  games  they  found 
empirical  examples  or  randomness  in  action,  and  from  the  conclusions  they  drew  and 
apphed  to  the  world  in  general  we  can  see  the  embodiment  of  the  domýinant  Enlighterument 
attitude  to  chance.  Just  as  in  earlier  times  games  of  chance  had  functioned  as  a  stage  upon 
which  the  favours  of  the  gods  were  enacted,  in  the  seventeenth  century  gambling  games 
once  again  acted  as  a  stage  upon  which  this  time  scientific,  rather  than  sacred,  dramas 
were  played  out.  Probability  theory,  then,  made  its  d6but  on  the  stage  of  gambling  games. 
The  early  probabilists  were  imbued  with  deep  religious  conviction  and  unbounded 
optimism  in  the  infinite  potential  of  human  abilities,  -  an  alliance  that  resulted  in  an 
epistemological  determinism  from  which  only  a  specifically  stibjectivisl  notion  of 
probability  could  develop.  For  Girgenzer  et  al.,  this  position  'maintained  that  all  e,.,  ents 
were  in  principle  predictable  and  that  probabilities  were  therefore  relative  to  our 
knowledge'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p  11).  Uncertainty  was  fundamentally  a  state  of  mind, 
not  a  state  of  the  world. 
The  denial  of  the  very  possibility  of  chance  or  accident  had  stood  at  the  heart  of  post- 
Reformation  teaching  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p79)  and  contributed  to  the  perception  of 48 
chance  as  a  function  of  ignorance  in  Enlightenment  thought.  Since  God  "as  all-kno%ýInv- 
the  reformed  Church  reasoned,  'chance'  could  have  no  mean-ing  for  him,  and  since  nothing 
happened  without  his  permission,  it  could  have  no  real  meaning  in  the  NN'orld  either  In 
literature,  Voltaire's  Zadig  expressed  this  eighteenth  century  belief  in  meaning  and 
purpose,  with  Providence  declaring:  'But  there  is  no  such  th-ing  as  chance.  Everything  is 
either  a  test  or  a  punishment,  a  reward  or  a  precaution'  (Voltaire  1990,  p  19  1  ). 
The  belief  in  purposefulness  dominated  all  Enlightenment  thought;  the  agnostic 
mainstream  as  well  as  religious,  post-Reformation  currents:  'only  the  identity  of  the 
knowing  and  therefore  chance-banishing  subject  changed'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p  164).  Rather 
than  an  omniscient  God  being  the  holder  of  all  truth,  it  fell  to  the  rational  endeavour  of 
man  to  extend  the  limits  of  knowledge  and  uncover  the  real  nature  of  our  existence.  'If 
there  was  one  point  in  which  the  otherwise  warring  factions  of  church  and  Enlightenment 
agreed,  it  was  on  the  absurdity  of  chance  as  an  equal  aff-ront  to  the  glory  of  God  and  the 
glory  of  man'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p164).  In  this  relegation  of  chance  to  an  epistemological 
category,  we  can  see  in  the  seventeenth  century  the  recurrence  of  the  classical  concern 
with  providential  purpose  and  harmony.  Representative  of  this  preoccupation  was  Spinoza, 
in  whose  determined  universe,  world  order  was  subject  to  an  abstract  and  all-pervasive 
God.  In  Proposition  29  of  the  Ethics,  he  expressed  this  determinism-  'Nothing  in  nature  is 
contingent  but  all  things  are  from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  determined  to  exist  and 
to  act  in  a  definite  way'  (Spinoza  1977,  p528). 
For  Leibniz  too,  the  structure  of  nature  was  animated  by  a  providential  order-  'God  does 
nothing  which  is  not  orderly...  for  everything  is  in  confonnity  with  respect  to  the  universal 
order'  (Leibniz  1977,  p578).  These  ideas  were  central  to  the  writing  of  the  classical 
probabilists  whose  conception  of  a  Cartesian  'prime  mover'  who  fully  determined  nature 
meant  that  everything  had  a  cause,  however  hidden.  In  this  scheme  of  things,  the  concept 
of  probability  functioned  as  a  makeshift  tool  for  human  intellects  too  feeble  to  penetrate 
the  real  nature  of  the  divine  handiwork. 
Huygens'  exegesis  of  the  notion  of  expectation  in  lk  Rationis  in  Alea  Ludo  (1657)  was 
the  first  systematisation  of  earlier  work  by  Pascal,  and  was  further  developed  in  1708  by 49 
Montmort's  k.  v.  vai  D'Am4vse.  In  the  latter,  Montmort  defined  le  hasard  as  an  index  of  our 
ignorance  and  through  the  analysis  of  contemporary  card  games  demonstrated  the 
workings  of  the  Creator:  'To  speak  exactly,  nothing  depends  on  chance,  kk  hen  one  studies 
nature  one  is  soon  convinced  that  its  CREATOR  moves  in  a  smooth  uniform  way  which 
bears  the  stamp  of  infinite  wisdom  and  prescience'  (Montmort,  in  David  1969,  p  150).  For 
Montmort,  as  for  the  other  classicists,  the  world  is  basically  deterministic-  '...  it  would  be 
useful  not  only  to  gamesters  but  to  all  men  in  general  to  know  that  chance  has  rules  which 
can  be  known...  '  Chance  thus  fits  into  a  larger  worldview  where  'all  things  are  regulated 
according  to  certain  laws,  those  which  we  think  dependent  on  chance  being  those  for 
which  the  natural  cause  is  hidden  from  us'  (Montmort,  in  David  1969,  p  15  0). 
Bernoulli's  Ars  Conjectandi  (1713)  saw  the  articulation  of  an  even  stncter  belief  in 
efficient  causes  in  a  treatise  whose  principles  were  broadened  to  apply  to  civil,  economic 
and  moral  affairs.  In  the  following  excerpt,  Bernoulli  articulated  what  would  later  be 
developed  by  Poisson  as  the  law  of  large  numbers';  a  means  for  deri-ving  cerlainly,  from 
repetition.  'If  thus  all  events  through  all  eternity  could  be  repeated,  by  which  we  could  go 
from  probability  to  certainty,  one  would  find  that  everything  in  the  world  happens  ftom 
definite  causes  and  according  to  definite  rules,  and  that  we  would  be  forced  to  assume 
amongst  the  most  apparently  fortuitous  things  a  certain  necessity  or,  so  to  say,  FATE' 
(Bernoulli,  in  David  1969,  p137).  Bernoulli's  strict  determinism  is  here  conflated  with  the 
notion  of  fate.  For  him,  both  epistemological  positions  would  provide  absolute  certainty, 
although  this  type  of  appeal  to  fate  was  not  popular  by  1713  in  either  the  religious  or 
determinist  camps. 
More  standard  at  that  time  was  a  statement  like  de  Moivre's,  who,  in  his  Doctrine  of 
Chances  (1718),  put  forward  a  similar  argument  for  certainty  out  of  repetition,  but  one 
expressed  in  more  conventionally  religious  language:  '...  in  all  Cases,  it  will  be  found  that, 
Vt  Ifi  great,  that  11,  altho'  chance  produces  irregularities,  still  the  Od&  111  be  in  nitely 
process  of  lime,  lhose  Irregularities  ivill  bear  no  proportion  to  the  recurrency,  of  that 
Order  Ahich  natural4y  resultsfirom  ORIGINAL  DESIGAP  (deMOINTe,  in  David  1969, 
p264).  Of  all  the  writers  considered  so  far,  de  Moivre  most  clearly  expresses  the  goal  and 
direction  of  the  new  science.  Everything  has  a  design  and  a  purpose  given  to  it  by  the io 
Creator,  and  it  is  possible  for  man  both  to  understand  the  design  of  earthlv  phenomena, 
and  the  intention  of  God  who  made  them.  It  can  be  shown  that  there  exist  'certain  laws 
according  to  which  Events  happen...  those  laws  serve  to  wise,  useful  and  beneficent 
purposes  ... 
'  amongst  other  things  'to  preserve  the  Steadfast  Order  of  the  Universe..., 
The  study  of  random  phenomenon  has  a  glorious  reward:  'And  hence  if  we  blind  not 
ourselves  with  metaphysical  dust,  we  shall  be  led,  by  a  short  and  obvious  way,  to  the 
acknowledgement  of  the  great  MAKER  and  GOVERNOUR  of  all,  Him.  5eýf  all-Hi5e,  all- 
powerful  and  good  (de  Molvre,  in  David  1969,  p265). 
The  result  of  these  early  studies  of  the  Divine  determination  of  all  things  was  the  swift 
removal  of  chance  from  the  real  world  and  its  location  firmly  within  the  human  mind.  In 
the  Age  of  Reason,  everything  had  a  cause,  whether  material  or  transcendental,  and  so 
chance  had  no  place  in  the  world.  What  the  devout  de  Moivre  condemned  as  atheistic, 
Hume  dismissed  as  'a  mere  word'-  'Chance,  when  strictly  examined  is  a  mere  negative 
word  and  means  not  any  real  power  which  has  anywhere  a  being  in  nature'  (Hume,  in 
Hacking  1990,  p  13).  Chance  thus  had  no  real  being,  and  existed  only  in  an  epistemological 
sense  as  a  deficit,  a  lack  of  knowledge.  The  presence  of  'so-called'  chance  was  sigru*ficant 
only  insofar  as  it  was  a  misunderstood  sign  of  metaphysical  meaning.  Diligent  observation 
of  random  phenomena  would  reveal  its  illusory  nature,  for  in  collections  of  disparate 
events,  the  classical  probabilists  saw  patterns  indicative  of  order  and  purpose.  In  his  Essay 
on  Man,,  Pope  expressed  the  widespread  acceptance  of  the  belief  in  universal  order  during 
this  time: 
'All  Nature  is  but  Art,  unknown  to  thee; 
All  Chance,  Direction  which  thou  canst  not  see; 
All  Discord,  Harmony  not  understood' 
(Pope  1963,  p5O) 
The  ability  to  perceive  such  regularity  in  randomness  was  a  recent  development.  Before 
the  seventeenth  century  each  event  was  seen  as  an  exceptional  case;  a  perspective  which 
had  ffustrated  early  attempts  at  probabilistic  reasoning.  Now  the  perception  of  pattems, 
aggregates  and  similar  cases  meant  writers  like  Pascal  and  de  IYIoIvre  could  compare iI 
e,  ý,  ents,  and  with  the  assimilation  of  such  comparisons,  grow  to  expect  ceriain  outcomes  in 
certain  situations.  This  intellectual  development,  new  to  the  sex.,  enteenth  century,  "ould 
gather  momentum  until  a  ventable  obsession  wth  averages  and  regularities  reached  its 
apotheosis  in  the  nineteenth  century  discipline  of  statistics. 
4 
Chance  in  an  Age  of  Reason 
The  works  of  the  classical  probabilists  have  been  described  as  'the  most  important 
mutation  in  human  thought  since  Aristotle',  providing  a  'mathematical  protocol'  for  the 
action  of  the  rational  individuals  it  assumed  as  its  audience  (Kavanagh  1993,  p2l). 
Probability  theory  was  an  important  contributor  to  the  Enlightenment  ideal  of  rational  man, 
for  by  providing  the  tools  necessary  for  the  evaluation  and  measurement  of  altematives,  it 
facilitated  the  ultimate  rationality  of  action.  As  the  epitome  of  rationality,  then,  probability 
was  the  'great  success'  of  the  Age  of  Reason,  and  the  confidence  of  its  bearers,  who 
looked  to  the  day  when  ignorance,  chance  and  superstition  would  be  banished  from  the 
world,  was  unbounded.  'The  rational  man,  averting  his  eyes,  could  cover  chaos  with  a  veil 
of  inexorable  laws"  and  so  convince  himself  that  although  the  world  may  appear 
haphazard,  a  more  profound  and  orderly  structure  lay  underneath  it  (Hacking  1990,  pl).  In 
this  climate,  epistemologies  which  excluded  the  very  consideration  of  'irrationality'  were 
appearing.  For  Spinoza,  the  rational  being  could  not  even  contemplate  the  existence  of 
chance,  for  'it  is  not  in  the  nature  of  reason  to  regard  things  as  contingent,  but  as 
necessary'  (Spinoza  1977,  p564). 
According  to  Kavanagh,  the  'evacuation  of  chance"  within  the  formulae  of  probability 
theory  was  at  the  vanguard  of  an  emergent,  modernising  force  in  society,  based  on  a  vision 
of  the  individual  as  a  consciousness  freed  from  prejudice,  superstition  and  the  'unexamined 
ballast'  of  tradition.  Probability  implied  the  existence  of  a  new  rational  consciousness  In 
which  the  self  was  located  entirely  within  the  present,  in  contrast  to  a  self  whose 
orientation  derived  from  its  links  with  tradition  and  the  past.  This  shift  of  consciousness 
was  paralleled  in  the  social  world  by  the  emergence  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  their  gradual 
ascendance  over  a  declining  feudal  nobility  (Kavanagh  1993,  p2l-2).  In  the  midst  of  this 
sea  of  reason  stood  the  figure  of  the  gambler,  the  personification  of  the  subject  of probability  theory  and  a  maverick  whose  existence  was  an  affront  to  the  procrustean  force 
of  probability,  a  doctnne  which  had  promised  to  tame  all  such  free-ranging  disorder  in  the 
semce  of  Reason. 
It  was  not  that  the  Enlightenment  condemned  gambling  per  se,  but  rather  that  it  feared  the 
disequilibrium  that  could  be  brought  about  by  excessive  gambling.  This  attitude  should  be 
seen  in  the  context  of  broader  eighteenth  century  ideas  about  rational  recreation.  The 
valuation  of  productive  work,  often  associated  with  the  Protestant  ethic,  was  also  an 
important  Enlightenment  ideology,  condoned  by  moralists  and  enshrined  in  the  legislation 
of  the  period.  However,  the  need  for  'reasonable'  rest  and  recreation  was  also  recognised, 
and  the  balance  between  this  and  productive  work  admired  as  rational  and  godly  (Dunkleý 
1985,  p64,5).  As  legitimate  recreation  then,  games  were  not  bad  in  themselves,  but  only 
when  pursued  to  excess,  and  as  an  activity  which  could  easily  spill  over  into  such  excess, 
gambling  represented  a  potential  danger.  Although  it  was  deemed  acceptable  in 
moderation,  the  difficulty  lay  in  avoiding  the  inflammation  of  passion  which  almost 
inevitably  accompanied  the  pursuit  of  play.  When  this  happened,  the  gambler's  reason  was 
eclipsed  by  extremes  of  emotion  and  he  became,  in  a  sense,  dehumanised.  According  to 
medical  opinion,  such  excitation  disruputed  the  player's  health  by  upsetting  the  balance  of 
the  humours  and  heating  the  blood  (Dunkley  1985,  p85).  More  importantly,  it  disrupted 
the  social  order,  for  by  removing  the  principles  of  moderation  and  balance  on  which  it  was 
built,  the  entire  edifice  of  ordered  society  was  threatened  by  chaos.  The  catalyst  of  this 
collapse,  embodied  in  the  gambler's  refusal  to  submit  to  the  order  of  probability  theory,  is 
eloquently  described  by  Kavanagh:  'To  gamble  was  to  render  the  self  equally  as 
unpredictable  as  the  cards  and  the  numbers  on  which  one  bet.  Absorbed  entirely  within  the 
impassioned  present  of  the  wager,  the  gambler  lost  all  sense  of  past  and  future.  Abstracted 
from  the  prevailing  laws  of  cause  and  effect,  beyond  prudence,  uninterested  in  foresight, 
the  gambler  became  a  figure  of  solipsistic  idiosyncracity,  closed  to  everything  beyond  the 
immediate  present,  That  state,  measured  against  the  ideal  of  a  rationality  shared  by  all, 
could  only  be  a  self-inflicted  madness  which  men  of  reason  must  refuse,  condemn  and 
extirpate  from  themselves  and  all  around  them'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p62). S.; 
Chance  in  Britain 
In  Britain,  the  approach  to  chance  ý,,  ia  mathematical  quantification  was  taken  from  a 
different  angle  to  that  of  the  puzzles  of  aleatory,  games  which  so  fascinated  the  rest  of 
Europe.  David  declares  that  the  English  made  no  significant  contribution  to  probabilltv 
theory  largely  because  a  utilitarian  view  of  mathematics  and  a  lack  of  interest  from  Newton 
resulted  in  an  orientation  which  saw  little  profit  in  discussing  the  falls  of  dice  (David  1969, 
p125).  However,  Britons  were  not  unaware  of  chance  and  their  efforts  to  tabulate  it  took 
them  in  another  direction,  out  of  which  the  discipline  of  statistics  arose.  At  the  same  time 
that  thinkers  in  Europe  were  finding  order  and  regularity  in  games  of  chance,  British 
writers  such  as  Graunt,  Petty  and  de  Witt  were  discovering  it  in  the  more  mundane  realm 
of  births,  marriages  and  deaths.  According  to  Hacking  'Pans  and  London,  in  their  very 
different  ways  were  simultaneously  starting  the  discipline  we  now  cafl  probability  and 
statistics.  Whether  motivated  by  God,  or  by  gaming,  or  by  the  law,  the  same  kind  of  idea 
emerged  simultaneously  in  many  minds'  (Hacking  1975,  p  103).  John  Graunt's  Ncaural  and 
Political  Observations  on  the  Bills  of  Mortality  (1662)  catalogued  the  causes  of  deaths 
from  the  parish  records  of  individual  county  boroughs.  Graunt  constructed  tables  and 
calculated  averages,  listing  the  number  of  children  christened  each  week,  the  course  of 
various  diseases  across  decades,  and  the  number  of  inhabitants  of  vanious  towns  (Hacking 
1975,  p  106),  and,  as  his  ingenious  arithmetic  was  advanced  enough  to  be  able  to  cope  with 
several  variables  at  once,  made  the  first  reasoned  estimate  of  the  population  of  London 
(Hacking  1975,  p106-7).  The  calculative  outlook  of  Graunt,  like  that  of  the  early 
probabilists,  was  rooted  in  commercial  experience,  for  Graunt  himself  was  described  as  a 
'city  tradesman'  who  became  an  copulent  merchant'  (Greenwood  1970  p48-9).  Graunt's 
material  was  equivalent  to  the  results  of  the  dice  throwers  of  the  continental 
mathematicians  and  was  an  illustration  that  'the  empirical  approach  of  the  English  to 
probability  was  not  through  the  gaming  table  but  through  the  raw  material  of  experience' 
(David  1969,  p109).  Still,  the  conclusions  drawn  from  study  on  either  side  of  the  Channel 
supported  that  overriding  0  seventeenth  century  theme  of  order  and  coherence  in  the 
universe,  evident  in-the  ultimately  meaningfW  nature  of  irregularity.  One  theologian  was  in 
no  doubt  as  to  the  role  of  statistics  in  Britain-  'The  true  foundation  of  theology  is  to 
ascertain  the  character  of  God.  It  is  by  the  aid  of  statistics  that  law  in  the  social  sphere  can ý4 
be  ascertained  and  codified,  and  certain  aspects  of  the  character  of  God  therebv  revealed 
The  study  of  statistics  is  thus  a  religious  service'  (in  Da,.  Ad  1969,  p  103). 
This  British  development  of  statistics  is important  (and  largely  underrated)  for  its  role  as 
the  direct  precursor  of  the  subject  of  probability  theory  after  the  dramatic  'epistemological 
shift'  of  the  nineteenth  century.  This  shift  changed  the  subject  and  direction  of  probabdity 
theory  and  consequently  revolutionised  the  understanding  of  chance. 
Caveat:  The  Paradox  of  Probability 
Although  probability  is  described  as  the  victorious  tamer  of  chance,  in  a  sense  it  represents 
a  hollow  victory,  for  as  Kavanagh  points  out,  it  did  not  tackle  the  pure  form  of  chance  but 
instead  redefined  the  parameters  of  the  debate  into  a  form  which  could  be  made  sense  of 
by  rational  mathematics. 
Probability  dealt  with  chance  by  abstracting  reality  to  such  an  extent  that  it  no  longer  had 
c  pertinence  to  any  specific  moment  or  situation'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p  15).  In  the  law  of  large 
numbers  it  could  safely  make  pronouncements  as  to  what  should  happen  in  the  long  term, 
but  never  what  would  happen  next.  The  outcome  of  a  single  event  could  never  disprove 
such  a  level  of  generalisation,  and  in  this  way  probability  offered  no  new  knowledge  of  any 
specific  event.  As  Kavanagh,  points  out,  the  coup  of  probability  was  to  change  the  focus 
of  the  debate  altogether:  "To  the  question,  what  w1/1  happen  it  offer[ed]  an  exquisitely 
refined  understanding  of  what  may  happen'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p  15). 
The  law  of  large  numbers,  articulated  first  by  Bernouilli  and  later  by  Poisson  was 
'endowed  with  the  convenient  power  to  guarantee  that,  properly  understood,  the 
pronouncements  of  probability  theory  would  always  be  correct'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p  16),  If 
the  number  of  occurrences  in  a  sample  was  sufficiently  large,  the  frequency  of  events  -  in 
the  long  term  -  would  always  conform  to  the  mean  of  their  probabilities,  and  so  the 
theorems  of  probability  were  necessarily  true.  It  was  impossible  to  predict  what  the 
outcome  of  a  single  event  in  a  specific  instance  would  be  -  whether  the  result  of  tossing  a 
coin  would  be  heads  or  tails,  or  whether  a  roulette  ball  would  land  on  black  or  red  -  but, sý 
as  the  number  of  tosses  and  spins  were  increased  towards  infinity.  the  laýk  of'  larize 
numbers  would  spring  into  action  and  predict  that  the  outcome  over  the  long  run  would 
be  spread  evenly  -  50-50.  In  this  way,  probability  was  extremely  vocal  with  respect  to  the 
general  and  the  long  term,  but  had  nothing  at  all  to  say  about  what  -vas  most  crucialý  the 
specific  instance.  As  to  what  would  actually  happen  next,  it  remained  'forever  mute' 
(Kavanagh  1993,  p  15).  Kavanagh's  criticism  of  probability  theory  is  mitigated  only  by  his 
reluctant  admiration,  for,  as  he  explains-  'Probability  theory  has  in  fact  carried  off  an 
enormously  seductive  sleight  of  hand...  There  where  we  feel  most  acutely  the  limits  of  our 
knowledge...  the  calculus  of  probabilities  offers  a  demanding  and  ngorously  mathematised 
discourse  bfistling  with  apparent  proofs  of  our  mastery  over  a  situation  that  in  fact  escapes 
completely'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p  16). 
Outside  the  large  number  and  the  extended  pefiod  of  time,  probability  theory  dared  not 
venture.  The  specific  could  only  be  considered  at  all  as  an  average,  as  an  instance  of  a 
more  valid,  generalised  whole,  a  limitation  which  meant  that  probabifity  tamed  chance  only 
insofar  as  it  excluded  it  from  its  models. 
As  an  abstraction,  probability  had  internal  logic  and  predictive  power,  but  applied  to  the 
real  world,  it  fiustrated  the  real  person  with  its  inability  to  speak  of  this  event  at  this 
moment.  These  limitations  were  most  evident  the  field  of  the  aleatory  and  in  the  figure  of 
the  gambler,  the  individual  to  whom  the  particular  event,  the  specific  moment,  mattered 
most.  The  theory  could  only  speak  to  him  if  he  submitted  himself  to  an  average.  'When  the 
players  forget  themselves  as  individuals  subject  to  the  unpredictable  present  of  the  wager 
and  instead  imagine  themselves  as  interchangeable  instances  of  the  game's  mathematical 
structure,  the  average  can  and  will  tell  them  everything  they  need  to  know'  (Kavanagh 
1993,  p65).  But  the  gambler  could  not  do  this,  for  it  opposed  the  very  nature  of  play.  He 
entered  the  game,  above  all,  as  an  individual  concerned  at  every  instance  with  the  specific 
event  occurring  at  that  moment.  Probabdity  theory  replaced  the  individual  with  the 
average,  the  unique  with  the  general  and  the  present  with  the  long  term.  In  this  way  it 
transformed  chance  into  predictability,  but  only  by  changing  its  subject  to  such  an  extent 
that  it  was  rendered  unrecognisable  to  the  gambler. io 
CHANCE  AND  MODERNITY 
In  the  nineteenth  century,  an  'epistemoloDcal  shift'  no  less  momentous  than  the  birth  of 
probability  two  centuries  earlier  radically  altered  human  understanding  of  chance  and 
resulted  in  the  erosion  of  determinism,  the  clearing  of  a  'space  for  chance'  (Hacking 
1990). 
The  Birth  of  the  Average 
In  the  early  part  of  the  century,  the  intellectual  and  social  hegemony  that  had  made  the 
classical  interpretation  of  probability  possible  dissolved.  Contemporary  observers  watched 
the  breakdown  of  a  sense  of  cosmic  order  and  social  'wholeness'  and  the  replacement  of 
stability  and  meanimg  With  what  was  to  become  the  distinctive  feature  of  the  modem  age, 
what  de  Jong  calls  the  state  of  'ontological  insecurity'  (de  Jong  1975,  p14).  The  French 
Revolution  and  its  surrounding  social  tensions  'shook  the  confidence  of  the  probabil-ists  in 
the  existence  of  a  single,  shared  standard  of  reasonableness...  The  reasonable  man 
fragmented  and  disappeared  altogether...  The  classical  interpretation  had  lost  its  subject 
matter'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p35).  The  focus  of  probability  changed  from  Phomme 
eclaire  to  Phomme  moyeti  as  probabilists  'turned  from  the  rationality  of  the  few  to  the 
irrationality  of  the  many'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p36).  The  object  of  their  analysis  was 
mean  values;  its  most  important  field  of  application,  statistics. 
As  a  nineteenth  philosopher  poised  on  the  brink  of  the  twentieth  century,  Nietzsche 
expressed  the  ontological  insecurity  of  the  age  in  his  celebration  of  a  world  devoid  of  God 
and  meaning.  I-1is  assault  on  rationalism  is  articulated  by  Zarathustra,  who  described  the 
(I  celestial  cheerfulness  that  came  over  all  things  when  I  told  them  that  no  eternal  will  acts 
over  them  and  through  them'  (Nietzsche  1969,  p186).  Nietzsche  provided  perhaps  the 
most  radical  articulation  of  the  nineteenth  century  disaffection  with  rationality-  'In  the 
great  whirlpool  of  forces  man  stands  With  the  conceit  that  this  whirlpool  is  rational  and  has 
a  rational  aim;  an  error!  The  only  rational  thing  we  know  is  what  little  reason  man  has 
therefore'  (Nietzsche  1968,  p50). i- 
For  Hacking,  the  nineteenth  century  was  characterised  by  an  'avalanche  of  numbers',  an 
expression  of  industrial  nation  states'  desire  to  classify,  count  and  tabulate  their  subjects 
(Hacking  1990,  p2).  Although  statistical  data  had  been  collected  pnor  to  the  nineteenth 
century,  such  activity  had  been  linuted  and  unsystematic.  After  the  Napoleonic  wars, 
however,  the  European  states  established  offices  to  collect  and  publish  statistics  about  'all 
manner  of  life  and  administration'  and  it  was  these  that  made  possible  the  avalanche  of 
printed  numbers  between  1820  and  1840.  The  realm  of  statistics  became  ever  more 
ambitious  -  from  births  and  deaths  it  moved  on  to  count  diseases,  suicides  and  deviance, 
and  so  formulate  statistical  laws  of  human  behaviour.  These  applications  brought  new 
objects  of  study  into  being,  established  new  claims  to  authority  and  new  standards  of 
rationality.  Girgenzer  et  al.  point  out  that  it  was  'part  of  the  Pythagorean  creed'  to  believe 
that  with  numbers  came  certainty,  and  so  in  the  nineteenth  century,  the  enumeration  and 
tabulation  of  the  world,  whilst  creating  a  space  for  chance,  also  tamed  it  by  anchoring  it  to 
statistical  laws  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p270).  Kavanagh  believes  the  'mutation'  of 
probability  theory  into  statistics  inevitable  given  the  reliance  of  the  former  on  the  doctnne 
of  large  numbers.  The  necessity  of  large  samples  meant  that  probability,  in  the  service  of  a 
cprogressively  more  centralised  state...  found  its  most  ambitious  application  in  the 
development  of  statistics'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p20) 
In  1835,  Poisson  proved  an  important  limiting  theorem  which,  by  providing  a  basis  for  the 
application  of  probability  to  social  matters,  explained  how  there  could  be  statistical 
stability  in  social  affairs:  'Paris,  16  November,  1835.  Things  of  every  kind  are  subject  to  a 
universal  law  that  we  may  call  the  law  of  large  numbers.  It  consists  in  this.  if  one  observes 
a  very  considerable  number  of  events  of  the  same  kind,  depending  on  causes  that  vary 
irregularly,  that  is  to  say,  without  any  systematic  variation  in  one  direction,  then  one  finds 
that  the  ratios  between  the  numbers  of  events  are  very  nearly  constant'  (in  Hacking  1990, 
p95).  The  law  was  a  mathematical  demonstration  that  the  indefiruite  repetition  of  events  led 
to  stable,  mean  values  and  made  statisticians  exalt  in  their  ability  to  find  order  wherever 
they  looked.  If  individuals  appeared  too  variable  and  inconstant  to  pin  down,  the  law  of 
large  numbers  advised  they  look  to  the  aggregate  instead  -  to  society  -  'for  chance 
disappeared  in  large  numbers'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p38). rA 
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For  Kavanagh,  the  shifting  orientation  of  probability  theory  into  statistics  created  a  ne%k 
consciousness  of  the  self,  away  from  the  Enlightenment  ideal  of  a  'single  rational 
consciousness  confronting  and  mastering  the  uncertainties  of  the  present'  to  a  measuring  of 
the  self'against  a  potentially  infinite  series  of  averages  and  means'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p23) 
The  growth  of  concepts  such  as  'normal'  and  'average'  created  an  in&-idual  in  no  wa-y 
privileged  above  any  other  whose  self  knowledge  came  fi7om  comparison  and  valuation 
against  others.  The  duty  of  the  statisticians'  average  man  was  to  compare  himself  to  the 
universal  standard.  Thus  was  one  of  the  fundamental  paradoxes  of  modem  democracy 
consolidated,  for  'all  could  now  be  equal  because  all  nsked  an  equal  insignificance  should 
they  cease  to  refer  themselves  to  an  exalted  average  that  could,  at  the  same  time,  claim  to 
be  nothing  other  than  the  mathematical  summation  of  each  as  an  individual'  (Kavanagh 
1993,  p24).  In  this  climate,  the  consciousness  implied  by  statistical  thinking  was  no  longer 
the  'practical  applied  rationality  of  the  early  doctrine  of  chances'  but  the  new  thinking  of  a 
4  mass  man  1,  engaged  in  the  constant  averaging  of  the  one  with  the  many.  Put  more 
succinctly,  Kavanagh  describes  the  change:  'Probability  theory  offered  the  paradise  of  a 
purely  present  rationality  freeing  us  from  the  burdens  of  history,  family  and  class.  Its 
mutation  into  the  imperial  discipline  of  statistics  redefined  the  individual  as  one  uni't 
cosubstantial  with  and  quantifiable  in  terms  of  all  others'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p24). 
Even  God  could  not  avoid  redefinition  in  the  midst  of  this  new  perception  of  regularity  and 
uniformity.  By  the  nineteenth  century,  the  culmination  of  post-Reformation  unease  at  a 
miracle-working  Divinity  finally  gave  way  to  'a  new  vision  of  a  God  more  revered  for  rules 
than  for  exceptions'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p27).  A  growing  body  of  Protestants  declared 
the  age  of  miracles  past,  articulating  an  opinion  that  had  begun  to  emerge  a  century 
earlier.  In  his  Philosophical  Dictionary  (1764)  Voltaire  had  written  that  a  miracle  was  a 
'violation  of  divine  and  eternal  laws'.  Because  the  world  God  made  was  perfect,  he  could 
have  no  reason  to  disturb  it  by  altering  any  part  of  his  divine  plan.  Therefore,  it  would  be 
an  insult  to  attribute  miracles  to  God,  for  it  would  be  to  say,  in  effect.  'You  are  a  weak 
and  inconsistent  being'  (Voltaire  1971,  p313).  In  the  nineteenth  century  this  nascent 
conception  of  God  developed  into  an  image  of  a  great  statistclan  who  dealt  in  averages 
and  regularities,  the  earthly  observance  of  which  provided  proof  of  his  working.  The  very 59 
notion  that  he  would  resort  to  a  singular  or  exceptional  instance  to  announce  his  intentions 
-  so  popular  in  less  probabilistic  times  -  now  appeared  utterly  ridiculous. 
The  Mutation  of  Determinism 
The  regularities  of  statistics  at  least  for  a  time  supported  a  stnict  brand  of  determinism, 
providing  evidence  that  history  is  subject  to  deterministic  causality.  They  proved  that  the 
regular,  lawlike  course  of  social  affairs  is  interrupted  neither  by  the  intervention  of  God 
nor  by  inexplicable  individual  acts  of  human  free  will.  For  Quetelet,  statistics  was  the 
ultimate  explanatory  device.  Its  laws  showed  'that  order  was  universal,  that  irrationality 
had  its  reasons,  that  even  crime  was  subject  to  law'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p4l).  A 
Laplacian-style  determinism  could  prevail  (and  even  find  support)  in  this  age  of  statistical 
reasoning  and  could  continue  to  explain  away  unpredictability  and  chance  in  terms  of 
relevant  conditions.  However,  despite  the  apparent  continuity  of  this  influential  idea,  an 
important  change  had  dramatically  altered  the  meaning  and  implications  of  determinism. 
The  classical  probabilists  had  viewed  their  science  as  a  'new  apologetics',  a  defence  of  their 
Christian  and  providential  world-views.  Rational  laws  patterned  all  earthly  phenomena  and 
every  event  -  however  insignificant  or  misunderstood  -  was  imbued  with  intention  and 
meaning  as  was  that  thing  called  chance  which,  as  a  fragment  of  a  meaningful  whole,  was  a 
mere  word.  But  a  'profound  mutation'  occurred  in  the  course  of  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries.  In  the  heavens,  what  had  been  a  great,  divine  Newtonian  prime 
mover  was  now  referred  to  as  a  more  modest  'primitive  cause'  (Laplace  1830  p327).  For 
Laplace,  Quetelet  and  a  plethora  of  statisticians,  economists  and  criminologists, 
determinism  was  now  'cut  off  from  any  cause  or  principle  of  coherence  beyond  its  material 
substance'.  In  effect,  'the  world  had  become  deterryfined  but  meaningless'  (Kavanagh 
1993,  p25). 
The  continued  use  of  the  lot  can  be  seen  as  an  illustration  of  this  new  orientation  to 
chance.  From  being  a  hierophany  of  divine  will,  In  the  nineteenth  century  the  outcome  of 
the  lot  cw-ne  to  be  regarded  as  efficacious  precisely  because  it  signified  nothing.  When 
viewed  in  a  secular  light,  the  arbitrary  nature  of  the  lot  made  it  a  suitably  democratic  tool 
for  the  resolution  of  dilemmas,  one  whose  selection  would  guarantee,  not  an  indkidual 0) 
who  was  special  or  'chosen'  in  any  way,  but  on  the  contrary,  one  who  was  particulariv 
average. 
The  most  important  facet  of  the  nineteenth  century  epistemological  shift  was  this 
evacuation  of  meaning  from  determinism  and  the  consequent  development  of  the 
contological  insecurity'  of  the  age.  Once  God's  presence  had  retreated,  and  determinism 
was  secularised,  a  hiatus  appeared,  in  which  chance  a  meaningf  ul  entity  could  flourish.  For 
the  first  time,  an  opportunity  existed  for  chance  to  appear,  not  as  a  figment  of  our 
ignorance  which  nevertheless  signified  higher  meaning,  but  as  a  neutral  phenomenon  in  its 
own  right. 
AS,  a  consequence  of  its  loss  of  religious  meaning,  the  parameters  of  determinism  opened 
up  to  encompass  contributions  from  all  avenues  of  knowledge  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
notion  of  indeterminism  itself  was  considered.  The  possibility  that  the  world  might  not  be 
subject  to  universal  laws  would  lead  to  the  most  decisive  conceptual  event  of  twentieth 
century  physics  -  the  discovery  that  the  world  was  not  deterministic.  Precipitating  this 
great  event,  the  debate  around  indeterminism  in  the  nineteenth  century  in  Hacking's  phrase, 
'cleared  a  space  for  chance'  (Hacking  1990,  pl). 
Chance  is  First 
Girgenzer  et  al.  describe  the  'remarkable  shift  of  perspective'  that  occurred  when  James 
Clerk  Maxwell  identified  statistics  with  imperfect  knowledge.  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p62). 
Until  this  time,  it  had  always  been  associated  with  certainty-  however,  when  Maxwell 
argued  that  most  of  our  knowledge  of  the  world  was  statistical,  what  he  meant  was  that  it 
was  incomplete  and  liable  to  fluctuation  and  uncertainty.  In  other  spheres  similar  ideas 
were  being  developed:  Renouvier,  for  example,  undermined  determinism  by  declaring  that 
historical  change  was  the  result  of  free  individual  decisions  and  not  great  historical  laws 
(Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p64). 
Perhaps  the  most  famous  expfication  of  the  new  status  afforded  to  chance  in  the  nineteenth 
century  came  from  Darwin.  In  his  mechanical  account  of  the  forms  and  patterns  of  nature, ()  I 
Darwin  evoked  chance  to  explain  the  origin  of  variation.  In  opposition  to  the  then 
dominant  'use  and  disuse'  theory  propounded  by  Lamarck,  Darwin  stated  that  biological 
variation  was  a  matter  of  chance,  not  adaptive  necessity.  It  was  thus  a  matter  of  chance 
that  an  organism  was  bom  with  a  variation  that  promoted  survival.  The  evolutionar),  fate 
of  that  variation,  on  the  other  hand,  depended  on  whether  it  served  survival  needs,  on  %k  hat 
he  called  natural  selection.  Thus:  'Evolution  by  natural  selection  absolutely  depends  on 
what  we  in  our  ignorance  call  spontaneous  or  accidental  vanability...  the  variations  of  each 
creature  are  determined  by  fixed  innumerable  laws;  but  these  bear  no  relation  to  the  living 
structure  which  is  slowly  built  up  through  the  power  of  selection'  (Darwin,  in  Girgenzer  et 
al.  1989,  p236).  Such  a  radical  utilisation  of  chance  was  not  immediately  accepted,  and 
Darwin's  formulations  were  widely  criticised,  especially  by  the  scientist  and  philosopher 
John  Hershal  who  decried  notions  like  accidental  variability  as  the  'law  of  higgeldy 
piggeldy'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989,  p152).  At  this  time  a  debate  raged  between  teleologists 
and  mechanists  in  biology.  The  former  viewed  chance  as  an  absence  of  design,  and  in  this 
sense  can  be  seen  as  descendants  of  the  classical  probabilists.  The  mechanists  both 
opposed  and  appreciated  the  importance  of  chance,  and  in  this,  Darwin  was  typical.  Their 
opposition  stemmed  from  a  view  of  chance  as  an  ignorance  of  prevailing  conditions,  their 
appreciation  from  consideration  of  it  as  an  absence  of  non-mechanical  purpose  in  nature. 
Darwin's  account  of  variation  fell  under  this  latter  aspect  of  the  mechanist  position,  and  it 
was  this  position  that  was  to  gather  momentum  throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  until 
finafly,  the  twentieth  century'erosion  of  determinism'was  complete. 
The  implications  of  Darwin's  work  were  recognised  by  C.  S  Pierce,  who  wrote:  'the  idea 
that  chance  begets  order...  which  is  at  the  cornerstone  of  modem  physics,  ...  was  at  that 
time  put  into  its  clearest  light'  (Pierce,  in  Hacking  1990,  p183).  Its  fundamental  insight 
made  possible  the  notion  of  random  mutation  as  a  vital  stochastic  force,  which  is  today 
widely  accepted  by  evolutionary  biologists  such  as  Jaques  Monod  and  Richard  Dawkins. 
For  Monod,  the  two  properties  characteristic  of  all  living  beings  are  invariance  and 
teleonomy;  or  chance  and  necessity  (Monod  1971).  The  genetic  transmission  of 
infonnation  in  the  process  of  evolution  is  characterised  by  the  reproduction  of  randomness, 
thus  the  principle  behind  the  process  of  evolution  itself  is  based  on  chance-  'chance  alone 
is  at  the  source  of  every  innovation  and  all  creation  in  the  biosphere',  and  yet  formed  of 62 
necessity*  'once  incorporated  into  the  DNA  structure,  the  accident...  Nvill  be  mechanically 
and  faithfully  replicated  and  translated...  Drawn  from  the  realm  of  pure  chance,  the 
accident  enters  into  that  of  necessity,  of  the  most  implacable  certainties'  (.  %Ionod  197  1, 
pl  14) 
Pierce  is  the  hero  of  Hacking's  second  book  on  probability,  Ihe  Mming  of  (hance.  A 
nineteenth  century  scientist  and  phflosopher,  he  anticipated  the  role  chance  would  come  to 
play  in  the  next  hundred  years  and  in  this,  Hacking  sees  not  a  man  ahead  of  his  time,  but  a 
man  peculiarly  of  his  time.  Pierce  was  the  incarnation  of  indeterminism  for  he  believed  in  a 
universe  of  absolute  and  irreducible  chance:  'Chance  itself  pours  in  at  every  avenue  of 
sense.  it  is  of  all  things  the  most  obtrusive.  That  it  is  absolute  is  the  most  manifest  of  all 
intellectual  perceptions.  That  it  is  a  being,  loving  and  conscious,  is  what  all  the  dullness 
that  belongs  to  ratiocination's  self  can  scarce  muster  the  hardihood  to  deny'  (Pierce,  in 
Hacking  1990,  p200).  Here  was  the  scientific  counterpart  to  Nietzsche  who  was  already 
declaring  the  role  of  chance  in  the  world  through  Zarathustra-  'I  have  found  this  happy 
certainty  in  all  things:  that  they  prefer  to  dance  on  the  feet  of  chance'  (Nietzsche  1969, 
p  186).  With  this  in  mind,  the  only  response  avaflable  to  the  individual  was  the  possibility  of 
self-overconýiing  in  the  will  to  power.  The  chaos  of  life  could  be  transmuted  by  an 
overcoming  of  life,  and  the  way  to  do  this  was  to  'live  dangerously  in  effect,  to  plunge 
into  chance.  As  demanded  by  Zarathustra:  'Live  dangerously!  Build  your  cities  on  the 
slopes  of  Vesuvius!  '  (Nietzshe  1969,  p  18). 
In  experimentation,  Pierce  deliberately  used  the  properties  of  chance  devices  to  introduce  a 
new  level  of  control  -a  control  that  worked  not  by  eliminating  chance  fluctuations  but  by 
adding  more!  (Hacking  1990,  p205)  Here  is  a  Nietzschean  attitude  to  chance  in  action;  a 
practical  plunging  into  a  universe  of  stochastic  processes!  For  Pierce,  chance  was  more 
powerful  than  any  law.  He  was  fond  of  trios,  which  he  called  Firsts,  Seconds  and  Thirds: 
'Chance  is  First,  Law  is  Second,  the  tendency  to  take  habits  is  Third'.  Against  the 
reassurance  of  the  order  supposed  by  the  law  of  large  numbers,  chance  always  prevailed- 
'Even  when  the  dice  are  cast  in  circumstances  of  eternity...  chance  pours  in  at  every  avenue 
of  sense'  (Hacking  1990,  p215).  For  Hacking,  Pierce's  denial  of  the  doctrine  of  necessity 
was  incidental  to  a  life  permeated  by  statistics  and  probabilities,  and  so  his  conception  of chance  was  'oddly  inevitable'  (Hacking  1990.  p9).  Pierce  made  the  'first  leap  into 
indeternunism  7-  straight  into  the  twentieth  century.  'He  oj)etied  his-  ejv.  ý  atid  chwice 
pow-ed  hi  -  from  a  world  which,  in  all  its  small  details,  he  was  seeing  in  a  probabilistic 
way'  (Hacking  1990,  p201).  In  this  respect,  although  he  was  a  nineteenth  centurý,  man, 
Pierce  was  already  living  in  a  twentieth  century  environment,  in  a  world  full  of 
probablilties. 
Chance  As  Explanation 
By  the  twentieth  century,  the  Empire  of  Chance  was  consolidated.  The  erosion  of 
determinism  over  the  previous  hundred  years  meant  that  chance  'had  attained  the 
respectability  of  a  Victorian  valet,  ready  to  be  the  loyal  servant  of  the  natural,  biological 
and  social  sciences'  (Hacking  1990,  p22).  fndetermýinism  became  the  guiding  pnnclple  of 
vast  conceptual  continents,  most  importantly,  physics. 
The  mechanistic  Newtonian  model  of  the  world  was  fundamentally  a  model  of  cerlainty. 
Its  basic  categories  of  space,  time  and  solid  matter  existed  as  properties  with  fixed 
identities  which  acted  in  definite,  predictable  ways.  In  principle,  and  given  a  certain  amount 
of  information,  causal  laws  could  predict  any  number  of  these  properties.  However,  as 
quantum  physics  overtook  the  classical  model,  the  inherent  uncertainty  of  quantum  reality 
replaced  the  familiar  fixedness  of  the  mechanistic  world.  The  monumental  discoveries  of 
scientists  such  as  Planck,  Bohr,  Heisenberg,  Einstein  and  Schrodinger  at  the  beginning  of 
the  century  meant  that  probability  in  physics  became  'irreducible  and  uneliminable  in 
principle,  [and]  so  classical  determinism  was  finally  overthrown'  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989, 
p  175). 
It  was  Planck  who  first  coined  the  term  'quantum'  by  showing  that  energy  is  radiated  in 
tiny,  discrete  quantum  units  rather  than  smoothly  and  continuously  as  classical  physics  had 
thought.  A  few  years  later  Niels  Bohr  demonstrated  that  electrons  jump  from  one  energy 
state  to  another  in  discontinuous  'quantum  leaps'.  These  jumps  were  unpredictable  and 
indeterminate;  there  were  no  causes  or  explanations  for  why  an  electron  moved  at  a  certain 
time  in  a  certain  way,  it  simply  'happened'. 64 
Traditional  notions  of  properties,  measurements  and  the  identity  of  things  ýýere  blown 
apart  by  discoveries  like  'contextualism',  whereby  quantum  reality  shifts  its  nature 
according  to  its  surroundings.  Zohar  and  Marshall  liken  the  activity  of  electrons  or  protons 
to  homonyms  -  words  that  look  the  same  but  have  different  senses  depending  on  context 
The  actions  of  elementary  particles  also  change,  and  are  in'constant  creative  dialogue'wlth 
the  environment  (Zohar  and  Marshall  1993,  p2l).  The  idea  that  fight  can  be  both  a  waN,  e 
and  a  particle  at  the  same  time  is  one  of  the  most  revolutionary  concepts  of  quantum 
physics.  Far  from  the  notion,  in  classical  physics,  that  light  must  be  permanently  identified 
with  one  or  the  other,  in  the  new  physics)  both  properties  complement  each  other  and  are 
necessary  for  a  description  of  what  fight  actuafly  is.  The  fact  that  such  duality  cannot  be 
measured  was  set  out  in  1927  in  Heisenberg's  Uncertainty  Principle,  a  theorem  which 
destroyed  the  bastion  of  classical  physics  by  proving  the  impossibi-lity  of  ascribing  precise 
values  to  both  position  and  momentum  simultaneously.  Measuring  the  position  of  for 
example,  fight,  as  a  particle  gives  an  indistinct  reading  of  its  momentum,  while  measuring 
its  momentum  as  a  wave  gives  a  similarly  indistinct  reading  of  its  position.  Such 
measurements,  Heisenberg  showed,  could  only  ever  be  probable  (Girgenzer  et  al.  1989, 
p  199-202). 
The  concrete  either/or  way  of  thinking  in  the  classical  mould  was  replaced  by  quantum 
physics'  more  fluid  both/and  dichotomy  (Zohar  and  Marshall  1993,  p20),  an  orientation 
demonstrated  by  Schr6dinger's  famous  quantum  cat.  In  this  example,  a  cat  is  hidden  in  a 
box  which  also  contains  a  device  that  will  randomly  feed  it  either  poison  or  normal  food. 
Using  mechanistic  logic  we  would  expect  the  cat  either  to  be  dead  (if  fed  poison)  or  alive 
(if  not).  But  in  quantum  reality,  so  long  as  it  is  not  observed  the  cat  exists  M 
superimposition  -  alive  and  dead  at  the  same  time.  It  is  only  when  we  open  the  box  to  see 
it  that  the  cat's  state  must  collapse  into  a  choice. 
Probabilistic  thinking  also  influenced  theories  of  atomic  movement,  with  the  discovery  of 
Brownian  motion  in  1827  providing  the  earliest  evidence  for  the  random  motion  of 
molecules.  As  an  example  of  a  stochastic  process,  such  motion  became  'one  of  the  main 
tools  for  creating  models  of  phenomena  dependent  on  time  and  chance'  (Eketand  199"), ( 
p160).  Not  only  was  atorruc  motion  not  guided  by  divine  purpose.  but,  as  'a  Movenient 
totally  devoid  of  memory'  (Ekeland  1993,  p  160)  it  was  not  compelled  by  any  form  of 
purposefulness  whatsoever,  and  so  existed  as  an  example  of  pure,  secular  indeterminism  in 
I 
action. 
Within  this  framework,  Einstein  appears  as  a  scientist  of  the  classical  mould,  contributing 
reluctantly  to  the  probabilistic  revolution.  The  probabilistic  implications  of  his  work  on 
radioactivity  and  non-locality  posed  problems  for  the  Theory  of  Relativity,  and  he  uneasily 
referred  to  chance  in  inverted  commas,  while  arguing  against  non-locality,  as  'ghostly'  and 
'absurd'(Zohar  and  Marshall  1993,  p35).  His  famous  aphorism'God  does  not  play  dice'  is 
evocative  of  a  Newtonian  God  winding  up  a  clockwork  universe;  an  image  already 
anachronistically  out  of  place  in  the  stochastic  universe  of  the  twentieth  century. 
By  Mid-century,  further  evidence  of  the  non-continuous  nature  of  realitY  was  emerging  in 
the  form  of  chaos  theory.  The  discovery  that  a  modification  of  the  initial  conditions  of  a 
system  could  multiply  at  an  exponential  rate,  resulting  in  a  state  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  magnitude  of  the  starting  condition,  was  labelled  'chaotic  behaviour',  and  signalled  a 
move  towards  the  construction  of  non-linear  systems.  (Waldrop  1992,  p66).  Because  tiny 
perturbations  could  escalate  until  a  system's  future  became  utterly  chaotic,  prediction  of 
that  future  would  have  to  take  such  a  vast  amount  of  information  into  account  that  the 
calculation,  in  practise,  would  be  impossible.  The  famous  example  of  such  unpredictability 
is  of  a  butterfly  flapping  its  wings  and  generating  a  change  in  starting  conditions  which,  by 
the  end  of  the  year,  has  multiplied  exponentially  to  trigger  a  hurricane  in  another  part  of 
the  world.  The  game  of  roulette  is  a  similar  instance  of  how  tiny  changes  of  initial 
conditions  can  influence  the  final  trajectory  of  a  baH  (Waldrop  1992,  p287). 
After  their  discovery  in  physical,  chemical  structures,  chaotic  systems  were  found  to  be 
inherent  in  larger  structures,  including  economic  and  ecological  systems  and  were  widely 
used  to  'analyse  and  predict  the  gyrations  of  stock  market  Prices,  weather  records  and 
other  such  random-seeming  phenomena'  (Waldrop  1992,  p95). 66 
in  the  midst  of  all  this  complexity.  we  find  the  appearance  of  a  fundamental  -  albeit 
incredibly  complex  -  order.  The  laws  of  entropy  and  attraction  prw0de  stability,  and  lead 
to  spectacular  geometric  constructions,  such  as  the  fractals  of  Bemot  Mandelbrot. 
Predicting  the  outcomes  of  these  processes  can  defeat  even  the  most  sophisticated 
computers  but,  as  Zohar  and  Marshall  point  out,  this  is  because  they  are  linuted,  not 
because  the  processes  themselves  are  truly  indeterminate.  Unlike  quantum  reality,  where 
indeterminacy  is  an  inherent  feature  of  the  world,  chaotic  systems  are  simply  incredibly 
complex  (Zohar  and  Marshall  25). 
The  complexity  of  the  order  behind  chaos  theory,  and  the  indeterminacy  inherent  in 
quantum  theories  of  reality  means  that  traditional  causation  and  linear  systems  are  not 
applicable  to  modem  physics.  The  unpredictability  of  phenomena  (whether  through 
complexity  or  inherent  indeterm=inacy),  far  from  being  shortcomings  of  theoretical  models, 
are  now  features  of  scientific  models  themselves,  and  their  metaphysical  implications  are 
vast.  As  a  scientist  at  the  vanguard  of  the  formation  of  complexity  theory  descnibes  it  -  'the 
world  has  to  adapt  itself  to  a  condition  of  perpetual  novelty,  at  the  edge  of  chaos'  (in 
Waldrop  1992,  p356). 
At  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century,  the  irreducible  indeterminism  of  the  world  appears  as 
a  fundamental  tenet  not  only  of  modem  physics,  but  of  modem  Ihmight.  It  is  a  feature 
which  has  even  come  to  be  reflected  in  culture,  in  the  atonal  and  random  noise  symphonies 
of  composers  like  Sch6nberg  and  John  Cage,  and  the  apparently  haphazard  lines  of 
modem  painters  like  Jackson  Pollock  and  Wassily  Kandinsky. 
For  Girgenzer  et  al.,  indeternýiinism's  conquest  of  'vast  conceptual  continents'  constitutes 
the  'bridgehead  of  the  empire  of  chance'.  Today:  'The  empire  of  chance  seems  to  be 
6  The  formation  of  order  -  however  complicated  -  in  such  models  has  been  the  subject  of  a  number  of 
recent  studies  exploring  the  possibility  of  overall  coherence  in  the  apparently  haphazard  and  diNerse. 
Lowry  considers  the  consistent  creation  of  'structure,  order  and  regularity'  in  muftiplicitN,  and  the 
production  of  'predictable  structures*  whose  principle  is  'distinctly  archetroruc'  out  of  theories  of  chaos 
and  complexity  (Lowry  1989,  p8).  In  a  similar  vein,  Harris  looks  to  the  larger  picture  In  his  quest  for  a 
new  metaphysics  for  the  new  physics,  outlining  the  order  and  coherence  underhing  apparent  chaos  and 
indeterminacy.  Adopting  a  neo-Dar%inian  approach  he  argues  for  the  widespread  recogru'Lion  of  'the 
possibility  of  seemingly  teleological  order  coming  into  being  by  chance  variation  and  natural  selection' 
(Harris  1991,  P4  ). 6 
rooted  not  only  in  the  human  mind,  but  also  in  the  constitution  of  the  universe'  (Girgenzer 
et  al.  1989,  p202). 
In  this  conquest,  the  transition  of  chance  from  an  epislemological  to  an  owological 
category  is  complete. 
Risk 
As  part  of  the  erosion  of  determinism,  the  notion  of  risk  has  come  to  occupy  a  central 
position  in  the  explanation  of  the  social  world.  As  distinct  from  its  original  seventeenth 
century  meaning  of  hazard  or  danger,  and  especially  exposure  to  commercial  danger,  our 
modem  usage  of  risk  has  come  to  express  the  probabilistic  nature  of  reality.  In  the 
twentieth  century,  the  calculation  of  risk  is  an  articulation  of  our  probabitistic 
Lebensgefahl,  and  provides  'a  theoretical  base  for  decision-making'  (Douglas  1992,  p23). 
This  concept  is  distinct  from  -  albeit  connected  to  -  that  of  chance.  Whereas  the  latter 
exists  as  a  building  block  of  the  world,  and  a  testimony  to  genuine  stochasticity  in  life,  the 
former  is  an  expression  of  the  calculation  of  possible  outcomes  based  on  the  knowledge  of 
the  effect  of  this  chance  on  the  world.  While  chance  is  neutral  in  this  respect,  risk  retains 
its  seventeenth  century  connotations  of  danger  and  generally  implies  the  possibility  of  loss. 
Furthermore,  it  is  a  loss  that  can  be  estimated.  Risk  then,  deals  with  knowledge.  It 
represents  an  acknowledgement  of  the  irreducible  existence  of  chance  in  the  world,  and  the 
formation  of  a  new  kind  of  inquiry  based  on  this  fact.  This  is  an  order  of  knowledge  that 
does  not  aspire  to  absolute  certainty,  but  one  that  deals  instead  with  degrees  of  certainty, 
hence  Knight's  description  of  risk  as  'determinate  uncertainty'  (  Knight  192  1,  p46). 
In  the  concept  of  risk  then,  we  find  a  modern,  probabilistic  type  of  knowledge,  whose  main 
applications  in  the  social  sciences  have  been  in  the  field  from  which  it  originally  emerged  - 
economics,,  and,  more  recently,  in  the  sociological  analysis  of  modernity. 
In  the  work  of  writers  such  as  von  Neumann  and  Morgensteta,  Knight  and  von  Nfises,  the 
role  of  risk  as  well  as  that  of  uncertainty  and  unpredictability,  is  central  to  modem 
econormc  systems.  Contrary  to  the  classical  economists'  depiction  of  economic  man  as  an 6X 
individual  acting  rationally  from  perfect  knowledge  ot'certain  conditions,  in  these  systems, 
actors  make  decisions  based  only  on  partial  knowledge.  The  uncertainty  engendered  by 
such  ignorance  is  endemic  in  economic  life,  and-  'Once  we  admit  the  presence  of  ignorance 
in  an  economic  world,  we  leave  the  comfortable  confines  of  certainty  and  find  ourselves  in 
the  wilderness  of  risk,  or  the  swamp  of  uncertainty'  (Tsukahara  and  Brumm  1976,  p92). 
That  this  uncertainty  was  a  reflection  of  genuine  stochasticity  in  the  world  had  been 
recognised  earlier  when,  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  mathematician  J  Bachelier 
proposed  a  model  based  on  Brownian  motion  to  explain  the  fluctuations  of  the  stock 
exchange.  His  model  did  not  rise  to  prominence  until  1973,  however,  when  Fischer  Black 
and  Myron  Scholes  demonstrated  a  'formula'  for  the  stockmarket  based  on  stochastic 
calculus  -  'the  modem  outgrowth  of  Brown-ian  motion'  (Ekeland  1993,  p162).  A  similar 
application  of  mathematics  to  economic  uncertainty  later  formed  the  subject  of  von 
Neumann  and  Morgenstern's  seminal  Iheory,  of  Games  and  Economic  Behaviour  (1944). 
Their  insight  was  that,  since  in  situations  where  an  individual's  course  of  action  depends  on 
what  his  colleagues  or  competitors  are  likely  to  do,  absolute  certainty  concerning  the 
future  is  impossible.  Thus,  since  risk  cannot  be  eliminated,  the  option  with  the  highest 
probability  of  success  is  simply  risk  minimisation.  The  possible  courses  of  action  that  arose 
from  this  resolution  have  since  formed  the  basis  of  rational  ri  sk-  rninirni  sing  action  in 
uncertainty. 
The  unpredictable  and  hence  risky  nature  of  action  implied  by  such  stochastic  systems 
were  regarded  by  some  modem  economists  as  vital  preconditions  for  any  kind  of  action  at 
all.  So,  for  von  Mises-  'If  man  knew  the  future,  he  wouldn't  have  to  choiky-  and  would  not 
act.  He  would  be  fike  an  automaton,  reacting  to  stimulus  without  any  will  of  his  own'  (von 
Mises,  in  Kirzner  1985,  p49-50).  This  kind  of  view  finds  even  more  radical  support  in 
writers  like  Knight  for  whom  the  system  of  free  enterprise  arises  as  a  reaction  to  risk,  and, 
for  whom,  according  to  some  authors,  consciousness  itself  would  disappear  in  the  absence 
of  uncertainty  (Arrow  1970,  p  I).  Risk  for  Knight  is  objective,  measurable  uncertainty  (as 
distinct  from  uncertainty,  which  is  not  measurable),  and  is  always  present  in  econornic 
action  because  ultimately,  the  latter  can  only  ever  be  guided  by  opinion.  'neither  entire 
ignorance,  nor  complete  and  perfect  information,  but  partial  knowledge'  (Knight  1921, 69 
p  199).  In  Knight,  we  see  a  strand  of  radical  doubt  "  hich  is  beginning  to  question  just  hoNN 
much  we  can  ever  understand  the  world  -  and  not  just  the  economic  world-  According  to 
Knight  himself,  this  is  not  a  questioning  of  the  validity  of  logical  processes,  but  a  more 
profound  query  'as  to  how  far  the  world  is  intelligible  at  all'  (Krught  1921,  p209).  'Are  ý.  Ne 
then  to  assume  real  indetermindness  in  the  cosmos  itselff  he  asks  uneasily,  and,  two 
pages  of  prevarication  later,  is  forced  to  answer  in  the  affirmative  (Knight  192  1,  p220  and 
222). 
Elsewhere  in  the  social  sciences  we  find  a  number  of  authors  attempting  to  construct  a 
theory  of  risk  as  a  paradigm  for  modem  society.  '  According  to  Giddens,  'secular  nsk 
culture  I  is  synonymous  with  modernity,  since  'To  live  in  the  universe  of  high  modernity  is 
to  live  in  an  environment  of  chance  and  risk'  (Giddens  1991,  p109).  This  is  not  to  sav  that 
pre-modem  societies  did  not  encounter  risks,  but  only  that  our  perception  of  them  as  such 
is  distinctive;  for  today  'thinking  in  terms  of  risk  and  risk-assessment  is  a  more  or  less 
ever-present  exercise'  (Giddens  1991,  p124).  Additionally,  and  unlike  in  pre-industrial 
society,  through  the  institutions  of  economic  markets,  labour  power  and  investments, 
modem  society  can  be  said  to  be  constituted  by  risks,  rather  than  risk  being  incidental  to 
them  (Giddens  1991,  pI  17-8).  Beck  regards  risk  as  a  definitive  feature  of  modem  life,  and 
part  of  a  lengthy  historical  process  in  which  'reflexive  modernisation'  has  displaced 
industrial  society  and  brought  about  the  'risk  society'  (Beck  1992). 
Characteristic  of  this  society  is  the  increasing  prevalence  of  the  state  of  'ontological 
insecurity'  first  experienced  in  the  nineteenth  century  as  the  breakdown  of  a  sense  of  order, 
of  wholeness  and  of  meaning.  By  the  late  twentieth  century,  such  insecurity  has  grown  into 
a  'radical  doubt'  about  all  forms  of  critical  reason  (Giddens  199  1,  p3).  Symptomatic  of  this 
insecurity  are  works  of  postmodern  depression  by  writers  like  Francis  Fukuyama,  who 
claims  that  since  there  is  nothing  left  to  know,  there  wil-I  be  no  more  progress,  and  we  have 
thus  reached  the  'end  of  history'  (Fukuyama  1992). 
7  See  Smith  (1993)  for  an  ovenicw  of  changing  sociological  perspectives  on  chance.  vkherc  the  author 
describes  how,  until  the  undermining  of  the  'orthodox  consensus'  of  structural  -functionati  sul,  in  the 
1960s,  a  determimst  paradigm  excluded  the  consideration  of  chance.  This  useful  suimaory  is  rurred 
when  Smith  fails  to  notice  that,  in  the  general  move  towards  the  increasing  status  of  indetertninisin,  his 
analysis  of  chance  slides  into  a  consideration  of  risk. The  risk  society,  then,  oversees  the  breakdown  of  certainty  and  the  erosion  of 
metaphysical  mearung,  for  in  the  Empire  of  Chance,  the  pursuit  of  knoAAledge  takes  the 
form  of  the  calculation  of  risks.  As  the  universe  of  possibilities  opens  up,  cultural  pluralism 
overtakes  cultural  hegemony  and  certain  knowledge  fragments  and  dissolves  into  a  myriad 
of  subjective  viewpoints.  In  a  probabilistic  world  of  risk,  the  idea  of  objective  truth 
becomes  anachronistic  and  every  claim  to  'knowledge'  must  be  fought  for.  As  Douglas  puts 
it  'Knowledge  has  to  be  defended  at  every  point;  the  open  society  guarantees  nothing' 
(Douglas  1992,  p32).  With  the  erosion  of  certainty  in  knowledge  comes  the  perennial 
insecurity  of  modem  life,  described  by  Beck  in  tones  redolent  of  Durkhemian  anorruie- 
'People  are  set  free  from  the  certainties  and  modes  of  living  of  the  industrial  epoch...  The 
shocks  unleashed  by  this  constitute  the  other  side  of  the  risk  society.  The  system  of  co- 
ordinates  in  which  life  and  thinking  are  fastened  in  industrial  moderruity  -  the  axes  of 
gender,  family  and  occupation,  the  belief  in  science  and  progress  -  begins  to  shake  and  a 
new  twilight  of  opportunities  and  hazards  comes  into  existence  -  the  contours  of  the  risk 
society'  (Beck  1992,  p  15).  With  the  co-ordinates  of  social  meaning  tom  asunder,  is  clear 
that  'there  is  no  risk  free  behaviour...  There  is  no  absolute  safety  or  security'  (Luhmann 
1992,  p28).  Moreover,  we  must  abandon  the  hope  that  greater  knowledge  will  lead  to 
greater  security.  Contrary  to  the  optimistic  Enlightenment  belief  that  perfect  knowledge 
would  reveal  the  divine  and  absolute  order  of  the  world,  now  quite  the  opposite  is  true  - 
the  more  we  know,  the  less  certain  we  become.  For  the  classical  probabdists,  the  pursuit  of 
knowledge  was  synonymous  with  the  pursuit  of  certainty,  the  risk  theorists  of  the  modem 
age,  however,  have  uncertainty  as  their  subject. 
For  all  these  authors,  the  creation  of  risk  is  inherent  in  the  capitalist  system  of  production, 
and  (with  the  exception  perhaps  of  Giddens),  the  assumption  that  it  has  overtaken  class  as 
the  dynamic  of  that  system  is  implicit  in  their  work.  In  fact,  an  actual  antipathy  to  the 
notion  of  class  is  evident  from  their  endless  discussion  of  eco-politics  and  corresponding 
lack  of  debate  about  the  kind  of  politics  that  effect  the  differential  distribution  of  risks  in  a 
stratified  society.  The  kind  of  risks  the  authors  insist  could  effect  ev,  eryone  -  nuclear 
holocaust,  environmental  disaster  -  are  the  very  ones  that  have  in  fact  so  far  affected  no- 
one.  Beck  writes  that  'In  advanced  modernity,  the  social  production  of  wealth  is systematically  accompanied  by  the  social  production  of  risks'  (Beck  1992,  p19)  Although 
he  admits  that  risks  adhere  inversely  to  class,  with  wealth  accumulating  at  the  top  and  risks 
at  the  bottom  of  the  social  hierarchy,  he  insists  that  the  'globalisation  of  risks'  affects 
everyone  equally  (Beck  1992,  p35).  Thus,  unlike  class  positions,  risk  positions  are 
universal  and  unspecific:  'In  class  positions,  being  determines  consciousness,  while  in  risk 
positions,  conversely,  consciousness  (knowledge)  determines  being'  (Beck  1992,  p53). 
Luhmann  makes  a  stronger  statement  of  this  view  when  he  declares  that  technological  and 
ecological  risks  have  become  the  new  object  of  sociology  now  that  old  'prejudices' 
(presumably  Marxism)  are  no  longer  of  interest  in  our  brave  new  postmodern  world- 
'Following  the  ebb  of  anticapitalist  prejudice,  it  [sociology]  now  finds  a  new  opportunity 
to  fill  its  old  role  with  new  content,  namely  to  warn  society  (Luhmann  1992,  p  5). 
If  this  is  the  case,  then  readers  of  the  'new'  sociology  will  find  much  to  wam  them  off  it, 
for  we  come  to  a  second  theme  of  the  new  discipline-  the  attempt  to  find  some  sort  of 
analogy  between  medieval  notions  of  fate  and  modem  ones  of  risk.  '  On  the  basis  of  the 
declared  ubiquity  of  risk  in  modem  society,  Beck  concludes  that  the  latter  is  comprised  of 
'a  kind  of  risk-fate...  into  which  we  are  bom  and  cannot  escape...  i.  e.  we  are  all  confronted 
simflarly  by  that  fate'  (Beck  1992,  p4l).  Not  content  with  such  a  fantastic  companson,  he 
goes  on  to  ascribe  to  contemporary  poisons  the  role  of  malicious  spirits  in  the  middle  ages- 
'Everywhere,  pollutants  and  toxins  laugh  and  play  their  tricks  like  devils  in  the  middle 
ages'  (Beck  1992,  p73). 
Luhmann  and  Douglas  also  seek  some  kind  of  theoretical  continuity  between  what  they 
take  to  be  medieval  and  modem  notions  of  danger.  For  Douglas,  the  language  of  risk  takes 
over  from  the  language  of  sin  as  a  means  of  moralising  and  politicising  danger  (Douglas 
1992,  p25),  while  Luhmann  claims  that  the  two  are  'functionally  equivalent'  insofar  as  they 
C  serve  to  explain  how  misfortune  comes  about'  (Luhmann  1992,  p8).  At  one  point  he  goes 
so  far  as  to  make  the  astounding  claim  that  risk  calculation  'is  clearly  the  secular 
counterpart  to  a  repentance  -  FnInimisation  programme'  (Luhmann  1992,  pI  1).  At  the 
vanguard  of  the  new  sociology,  Luhmann  is  in  the  interesting  position  of  believing  that  'in 
8  Again,  %ith  the  exception  of  Giddens  (1991,  p130-1,141.183).  Alio  Identifies  providential  belICfs  in 
notions  of  fate  as  'residual'  and  existing  alongside  but  separate  from,  other  modem  ideas  about  ns-k  and 
pragniatism. 72 
the  real  world  there  is  no  such  thing  as  chance'  (Luhmann  1992,  p  182).  He  should  kno%ý 
better,  for  as  well  as  the  mass  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  his  own  analysis  of  nsk  Is  based 
on  the  premise  that  chance  exists  as  an  irreducible  part  of  the  world. 
Criticism  of  the  specious  parallels  outlined  above  could  be  extended-  for  our  purposes  it  is 
sufficient  to  note  that  modem  risk  is  simply  not  synonymous  with  medieval  sin  and/or  fate. 
The  two  represent  entirely  different  world  views  -  one  religious,  concernedNVIth  notions  of 
divine  will  and  predestination,  the  other  scientific,  arising  in  seventeenth  century  commerce 
and  concerned  with  the  calculation  of  uncertainty  in  a  probabilistic  universe. 
However,  despite  their  shortcomings,  these  works  are  in  fact  representative  of  the  r1sk 
society:  not  because  their  imagined  paradigm  of  postmodemity,  in  which  risk  has 
overtaken  class  as  a  dynamic  of  social  action,  bears  any  relation  to  reality,  but  because  it  is 
now  possible  to  conceive  of  such  a  model.  In  this  sense,  they  are  more  symptomatic  of  the 
risk  society  than  they  are  its  impartial  observers.  As  Giddens  has  pointed  out,  it  is  not  the 
case  that  risk  is  now  paramount  in  social  life.  what  is  important  is  that  the  perception  of 
these  risks  is  now  paramount.  This  perception  should  be  seen  as  the  product,  not  of  a 
society  that  has  suddenly  become  full  of  risks,  but  of  a  long  historical  process  that  gave 
ontological  status  to  chance,  and  to  us  a  probabilistic  Lebensgeftihl. CHAPTERTWO:  THE  PURSUITOF  CHANCE 
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THE  PURSUIT  OF  CHANCE 
GAMBLING  AND  DIVINATION 
Sacred  Play 
As  the  correspondence  between  ancient  divinatory  ritual  and  some  of  the  formal 
characteristics  of  gambling  practice  has  been  established,  we  can  now  turn  to  a  closer 
examination  of  the  historical  development  of  the  formal  and  social  characteristics  of 
specific  types  of  games.  In  this  Chapter  it  will  be  seen  that  the  con-flation  of  chance  and 
determinism  reviewed  in  Chapter  One  is  matched  by  a  corresponding  conflation  of  early 
games  of  chance  and  divination.  Their  gradual  historical  separation  (though  never  entirely 
completed)  can  be  regarded  as  a  process  propelled  by  the  same  dynamic  as  that  which  saw 
the  separation  of  chance  from  notions  of  divine  providence  and  fate. 
Most  of  our  modem,  commercial  gambling  games  derive  from  the  manipulation  of  cards  or 
dice,  both  of  which  have  their  origin  in  the  ancient  casting  of  lots.  This  is  not  intended  to 
imply,  however,  as  some  have  (e.  g.  Martinez,  David,  Cohen,  Tylor),  that  modem  games 
are  merely  the  secularisation  of  what  was  once  sacred.  There  exists  no  evidence  that  one 
form  'grew  out'  of  the  other  as  one  was  discarded.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  much  to 
suggest  that  the  two  practices  were  coterminous,  for  the  form,  the  content  and  even  the 
purpose  of  certain  activities  brought  play  and  ritual,  sacred  and  profane,  together  into  the 
same  sphere.  Both  gambling  and  divination  utilised  the  same  implements  in  rituals  which 
were  pursued  with  varying  degrees  of  seriousness,  and  characterised  by  a  certain  attitude 
of  irreverence.  As  we  saw  in  Chapter  One,  social  fife  is  seldom  demarcated  into  clear  cut 
areas  of  action  and  belief,  and  nowhere  is  this  more  evident  than  in  the  dynamic  of  ffivolity 
and  seriousness  that  characterised  these  game-fituals.  Levi-Strauss  has  described  the 
formal  identity  of  games  and  ritual,  writing-  'there  are  relations  of  the  same  type  between 
games  and  rites'  (Levi-Strauss  1989,  p30),  whfle  Csikszentmihalyi  and  Bennett  have 
established  that  games  of  chance  'were  first  played  in  a  context  of  religious  ceremonial 
activities'.  In  this  way,  'divination  is  play  before  it  becomes  a  game',  although,  the  authors '74 
admit,  it  is  impossible  to  know  the  process  by  which  religious  ceremony  becomes  Omere' 
game.  What  is  certain  however,  is  that  even  when  such  activities  ha,,,,  e  become  pastimes,  a 
relation  to  'genuine  divination'  still  exists  (Csikzentmlhalyi  and  Bennett  1971,  p  47)1 
1 
Within  certain  activities  then,  the  boundary  we  generally  expect  to  find  separating  ritual 
from  play  simply  did  not  exist.  At  these  points  in  the  social  fabric  the  categories  of  sacred 
and  profane  blurred  and  ran  into  one  another.  It  was  Plato  who  first  pointed  to  this 
conjunction  of  play  and  ritual,  suggesting  the  sacred  nature  of  the  former,  when  he  said 
(man  is  made  God's  plaything,  and  that  is  the  best  part  of  him.  Therefore  every  man  and 
woman  should  live  life  accordingly,  and  play  the  noblest  games...  Life  must  be  lived  as 
play...  and  then  a  man  wiR  be  able  to  propitiate  the  gods,  defend  himself  against  his 
enemies,  and  win  in  the  contest'  (Plato  1934,  p182).  In  this  Platonic  tradition,  Hulzinga 
identified  the  'essential  and  original  identity'  of  play  and  ritual.  Consciousness  of  the 
sacred  unites  both,  he  wrote,  for  in  play  'man's  consciousness  that  he  is  embedded  in  a 
sacred  order  of  things  finds  its  first,  highest  and  holiest  expression.  Gradually  the 
significance  of  a  sacred  act  permeates  the  playing.  Ritual  grafts  itself  upon  it  but  the 
primary  thing  is  and  remains  play'  (Huizinga  1957,  pl.  8).  For  Huizinga,  this  identity 
renders  explanations  of  causal  primacy  irrelevant,  for  both  are  of  the  same  essence  and 
grow  out  of  one  another:  'just  as  there  is  no  formal  difference  between  play  and  ritual,  so 
the  consecrated  spot  cannot  be  formally  distinguished  from  the  play  ground.  The  arena,  the 
card  table,  the  magic  circle,  the  temple,  the  stage,  the  screen,  the  tennis  court,  the  court  of 
justice  etc,  are  all  in  form  and  function  play  grounds;  i.  e.  forbidden  spots,  isolated,  hedged 
round,  hallowed,  within  which  special  rules  obtain.  All  are  temporary  worlds  within  the 
ordinary  world,  dedicated  to  the  performance  of  an  act  apart'  (Huizinga  19  5  7,  p  10). 
Instances  of  such  sacred  games  occur  frequently  in  histoncal  and  anthropological 
literature,  for  example  amongst  the  early  American  Indians,  who  believed  that  theff  gods 
both  created  and  oversaw  their  gambling  games,  and  that  they  determined  the  outcome 
(Brenner  and  Brenner  1990,  p3).  The  oblong  court  in  which  the  game  known  as  ilachil' 
The  correspondence  bet"wn  games  of  chance  and  reli  Jous  belief  has  been  widelý,  recognised  (Otto.  91 
Culin,  David,  Csikszentnuhalyi  and  BenneU)  with  Roberts  et  al.  argWng  that  the  fonner  are  'exercises  in 
relationships  With  the  supernatural'  (Roberts  et  al.  1959,  p602).  According  to  Martinez-  the  earliest  games 
were  not  'performed  independently  of  a  belief  in  some  sort  of  spiritual  power'.  Dice  and  cards  %kere 
'important  components  of  natural  religious  rituals,  seeking  to  foretell  the  future'  (Martinez  1976,  p16). 7i 
among  the  Aztecs  and  pok-a-lok  among  the  Mayas  was  played  was  a  sacred  enclosure  -a 
'magic  circle'  or  'consecrated  spot'  -  in  which  the  spirits  of  the  dead  resided.  The  i-,  ame, 
whose  object  was  to  put  a  rubber  ball  through  a  ring  without  the  use  of  the  hands,  Ný  as 
performed  before  the  holy  rulers  of  the  Aztec  and  Maya  tribes  as  early  as  500  B.  C. 
Enormous  bets  of  gold,  slaves,  houses  and  comfields  were  wagered  by  both  spectators  and 
participants  alike  on  which  player  would  direct  the  bal-l  into  the  nng  most  skilfully  (von 
Hagen  1962,  p6l).  The  game  also  had  a  more  serious  side,  whereby  its  outcome  revealed 
the  will  of  the  gods-  'a  question  was  asked  of  the  gods  and  one  side  represented  the 
answer  'yes',  the  other  the  answer  'no'  and  the  outcome  was  settled  by  whichever  side  won' 
(Adams,  in  Moore  and  Myerhoff  1977,  p238).  This  popular  gambling  game  was  thus  both 
game  and  ritual;  its  'ritualistic  and  magical'  form  reflecting  its  character  as  'essentiany  a 
religious  game'  (von  Hagen  1962,  p6  1).  The  court  of  t1achti  and  pok-a-tok  were  places  of 
worship  as  well  as  stadiums  for  play,  so  that  in  these  spectacular  performances  were 
combined  the  devotion  of  religious  ritual  with  all  the  excitement  of  gambling. 
The  game  of  huayru  played  by  the  Canelo  of  Ecuador  further  demonstrates  the  confluence 
of  secular  drama  with  religious  ritual.  The  Canelo  play  huayni  at  the  death  vigil  of  the 
master  of  the  house,  ranging  themselves  in  two  rows  on  either  side  of  the  corpse.  Players 
take  it  in  turn  to  throw  the  die  across  the  body  of  the  dead  man  so  that  during  the  course 
of  the  game  all  the  goods  and  livestock  of  the  deceased  are  gambled  away  to  the 
participants.  This  game-ritual  is  imbued  with  religious  significance,  and  Jensen  writes  that 
'the  ceremony,  formally  identical  with  our  games  of  chance,  is  inseparably  part  of  the 
death  cult'  (Jensen  1963,  p6l).  The  outcome  of  the  game  is  interpreted  according  to 
ritualistic  criterion:  a  particularly  lucky  player  is  believed  to  be  favoured  by  the  dead  man 
while  a  chronic  loser  is  thought  to  be  disliked  by  him  and  a  long  run  of  unfavourable 
throws  is  attributed  to  the  displeasure  of  the  deceased.  Jensen  explains  how  the  game 
illuminates  a  common  trend,  for:  'so  fi7equently  are  games  encountered  as  essential  parts  of 
a  cult  and  as  vivid  expressions  of  central  religious  concepts  that  even  the  sceptic  must  be 
persuaded  [of  their  affinity]'  (Jensen  1963,  p6l).  Levi-Strauss  found  that  the  mythological 
function  of  all  such  North  American  games  of  chance  was  to  enable  the  soul  of  the 
deceased  to  enter  the  spirit  world,  and  in  this  function,  ntual  and  play  were  often  rendered 
indistinguishable:  'Ritual,  which  is  also  played  is 
... 
like 
...  a  game'  (Levi-Strauss  1989,  p30). ,  7o 
The  intense  ceremonial  activity  which  preceded  divination  ritual  was  often  obser-v,  ed  before 
engagement  in  gambling  games  Fasting,  sexual  continence,  incantations,  exorcisms  and  the 
emphasis  on  dreams  and  other  omens  of  good  luck  were  as  important  to  gamblers  before  a 
game  as  they  were  to  shamen  about  to  undertake  divination.  Ln  some  societies,  di,,,  -ination 
itself  could  precede  a  game,  and  was  carried  out  in  order  to  determine  the  outcome  of  the 
latter.  Levy-Bruhl  quoted  a  missionary  describing  just  such  a  tradition  among  the  Huron. 
'Before  playing  games  of  chance,  the  natives  have  recourse  to...  divination.  There  are 
some  who  always  fast  for  days  before  playing;  the  previous  evening  they  all  meet  in  a  hut 
and  make  a  feast  for  the  purpose  of  finding  out  what  the  issue  of  the  game  will  be...  They 
used  to  chose  someone  who  dreamt  he  would  win  to  pass  the  [dice]  dish...  '  (in  Levy-Bruhl 
1923,  p  163). 
It  can  be  seen  then,  that  early  gambling  games  could  possess  the  character  of  sacred  ritual. 
'Secular'  drama  and  religious  ritual  were  profoundly  entwined,  sharing  the  same 
implements,  the  same  formal  structure  and  the  same  orientation  of  participantsl  the  latter 
of  which  was  tinged  by  both  a  respect  for  all  that  was  holy  in  the  world  of  the  gods,  as 
well  as  an  irreverence  for  all  that  was  absurd  in  the  human  world.  These  two  attitudes 
were  conjoined  in  the  sacred  game  -  sacer  ludus  -  the  encounter  of  man  and  God  (van  der 
Leeuw  1967,  p376).  Play  was  not  merely  incidental  to  the  business  of  ritual,  on  the 
contrary  it  was  an  integral  feature  of  the  encounter;  and  it  is  on  this  basis  that  Huizinga 
criticised  Tacitus'  astonishment  on  seeing  the  Germans  'casting  dice  in  earnest  as  a  serious 
occupation'.  Such  a  disposition  was  entirely  natural,  he  argued,  for  it  is  'precisely  the  play 
character  of  dicing  that  gives  it  so  important  a  place  in  ritual'  (Huizinga  1957,  p58). 
The  Wager 
Within  the  same  divination  ritual  that  served  as  a  forum  for  the  expression  of  the  divine 
voice  existed  gambling  ritual,  serving  the  expression  of  the  human  voice.  The  outcome  of 
a  chance  event  was  the  medium  through  which  the  divinity  spoke,  and  the  wager  the 
medium  through  which  the  individual  spoke.  In  this  sense  the  wager  can  be  seen  as  a  kind 
of  pact  with  the  divine:  a  token  of  man's  involvement  in  sacred  ritual,  through  which  his opinion  on  the  proceedings  could  be  demonstrated.  As  such  a  measure  ofinvolvement,  the 
wager  had  to  be  something  of  value,  worthy  of  representing  the  participant's  opinion 
With  the  individual  included  in  the  ritual,,  the  nature  of  the  ceremony  itself  was  chanv'ed 
from  a  straightforward  case  of  divination  to  a  more  interactive  game  of  chance.  It  was  still 
a  sacred  encounter,  but  one  in  which  the  individual  no  longer  passively  awaited  divine 
pronouncement,  instead  challenging  the  deity  to  reveal  its  intentions.  Like  the  stake  in 
modem  games  of  chance,  the  wager  in  ritual  brought  together  the  propitiate  and  the 
propitiated.  in  -vacer  ludus.  In  the  words  of  Baudrillard:  'The  stake  is  a  summons,  the  game 
a  duel:  chance  is  summoned  to  respond,  obliged  by  the  player's  wager  to  declare  itself 
either  favourable  or  hostile'.  In  this  way  'Chance  is  never  neutral,  the  game  transforms  it 
into  a  player  and  agonistic  figure'  (Baudrillard  1990,  p143).  Within  the  sacred  circle  the 
player  boldly  demonstrated  his  personal  opinion  through  the  medium  of  his  wager.  By 
anticipating  the  result  of  the  ritual,  the  individual  was  attempting  to  demonstrate  his 
understanding  of  the  divinity.  A  correct  guess  indicated  his  personal  opinion  was 
consonant  with  that  of  the  divinity,  and,  thus  vindicated,  he  felt  momentarily  as  though  he 
belonged  to  the  realm  of  the  sacred.  A  wrong  guess  demonstrated  his  lack  of  harmony 
with  the  sphere  of  the  divine  and  was  reinforced  by  the  prompt  removal  of  his  wager;  his 
representative  of  himself 
Dice 
Dice  are  the  oldest  gaming  instruments  of  human  civilisation,  occurring  more  or  less 
ubiquitously  throughout  history  in  the  ancient,  primitive  and  classical  worlds.  Sophocles 
reputedly  claimed  that  they  were  invented  by  Palamedes  during  the  siege  of  Troy,  while 
Herodotus  pointed  to  a  Lydian  invention  in  the  days  of  King  Atys  (Scame  1974).  Both 
'inventions'  however  have  been  discredited  by  archaeological  finds  which  indicates  the 
existence  of  dice  long  before  the  appearance  of  the  classical  or  pre-classical  eras. 
Archaeological  excavations  from  prehistoric  graves  in  North  and  South  America,  Africa 
and  the  Orient,  have  uncovered  primitive,  four-sided  gaming  sticks  from  6000  B.  C.,  whilst 
similar  finds  in  the  Egyptian  tomb  of  Osiris  date  from  2000  B.  C.  (Sifakis  1990).  These 
early  civilisations  gambled  with  dice  made  of  many  materials  -  plurr,  and  peach  stones, pebbles  and  the  knucklebones  of  cows  and  sheep,  known  as  amragah.  These  asiragall 
would  come  to  rest  when  rolled  and  were  used  in  this  manner  In  both  games  of  chance 
(where  today  dice  still  retain  the  slang  term  'bones')  and  prinýiitive  divination  ritual, 
especially  in  the  casting  of  lots.  (Sifakis,  Scame,  Loewe  and  Blacker). 
Some  of  the  earliest  dice  games  involved  the  tossing  of  bones  or  marked  stones,  with 
winning  combinations  deduced  from  the  way  they  landed.  In  more  complex  games,  like  the 
Egyptian  tab  and  the  ancient  Indian  chaturatiga  (later  chess),  the  throw  of  a  die  controlled 
the  movement  of  counters  on  a  marked  playing  surface,  as  in  the  backgammon  of  today 
(Scarne  1974,  p37).  Similarly,  the  dramatic  Aztec  games  of  totoloque  and  patolh  used 
marked  boards  and  counters,  upon  which  golden  dice  were  tossed  in  high  stakes  gambling 
games  (von  Hagen,  1962,  p64). 
In  other  types  of  game,  the  concurrence  between  the  sacred  and  the  recreational  was  more 
marked.  The  White  Dog  Feast  of  the  Onodagas  inextricably  linked  the  two  in  a  game  in 
which  points  were  given  for  the  combinations  eight  rectangular  plum.  stones,  marked  half 
black  and  half  white,  fell  in.  On  their  White  Dog  Feast  the  game.  was  carried  out  to 
predict  the  next  years  harvest,  using  the  same  moves  'on  which  they  bet  their  possessions 
in  gambling  sessions  during  the  rest  of  the  year'  (Chafetz  1960,  p8).  In  India,  dice  known 
as  coupon  (Steinmetz  1870,  p27)  were  used  as  a  means  of  divination  in  the  practise  of 
Ramala  at  the  same  time  they  were  used  for  gambling.  The  latter  was  recorded  in  the 
Indian  epic,  1he  Mahabharata,  where  Sakuni  chaflenged  Yudhisthiva  to  a  contest,  saying: 
'the  dice  are  my  bows  and  arrows,  the  heart  of  the  dice  my  string,  the  dicing  rug  my 
chariot!  '  (1he  Mahabharata  1975,  p122).  The  sacred  significance  of  the  game  was 
apparent  in  Duryodhama"s  assertion  that  'if  we  gamble,  the  heavenly  gate  will  be  nearerl, 
and  in  the  divine  hall  which  was  specially  erected  to  contain  the  contest  (The  Mahabharata 
1975,  p123). 
The  Greeks  and  Romans  frequently  used  astragali  and  lesserae  (six  sided  dice  made  of 
ivory,  porcelain,  or  marble)  in  both  games  and  rituals.  The  Greek  custom  of 
astragalommicy  utifised  the  astralagus  for  fortune-telling  as  well  as  gambling  (Scarne 
1974,  p30),  while  the  Romans  used  the  same  implements  for  casting  lots,  lottery  draws - 
and  gaming  alike.  Inveterate  gamblers,  they  enjoyed  the  quick  results  of  dice  games  and 
chariot  races  which  they  saw  as  a  demonstration  of  character.  The  reckless  gambling  of  the 
Roman  Empire  was  highlighted  at  the  racetrack,  where  the  main  attraction  was  the 
possibility  of  making  rash  bets  -  audax  sponsio  -  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  instead  of 
those  based  on  sensible  observation  of  the  Racing  Calendar  (Harris  1972,  p  226).  The 
Romans  called  their  bets  pignus,  and  regarded  them  as  a  pledge  of  the  gamblers  confidence 
in  his  own  opinion  (Harris  1972,  p224).  According  to  Steinmetz,  Augustus  'gambled  to 
excess',  Claudius  'played  like  an  imbecile'  and  Nero  'like  a  madman'  (Steinmetz  1870, 
p64,5).  Suetonius's  remark  that  'Claudius's  reputation  for  stupidity  was  farther  enhanced 
by  stories  of  his  drunkenness  and  love  of  gambling'  (Suetonius  195  8,  p  185),  is  evidence  of 
the  low  esteem  with  which  gambling  was  officially  held  in  the  Roman  Empire.  However, 
even  severe  laws  condemning  players  as  'robbers  and  thieves'  could  not  quell  the  passion 
for  play  which  Juvenel  describes  in  his  Satires: 
'When  was  gambling  more  frantic 
Than  it  is  today?  Men  face  the  tables 
Not  with  their  purse  but  with  their  strong  box  open  beside  them 
Here  you  will  see  notable  battles  with  the  croupier  for  squire 
Holding  stakes  instead  of  a  shield.  Is  it  not  plain  lunacy 
To  lose  ten  thousand  on  the  turn  of  a  dice,  yet  grudge 
A  shirt  to  your  shivering  slave' 
(Juvenal  1988,  p68) 
The  culture  of  the  classical  and  pre-classical  worlds  was  imbued  with  images  of  dicing: 
excavations  of  porticos  and  basilicas  have  revealed  etchings  of  gaming  tables,  for  any  flat 
surface  was  regarded  as  a  potential  place  to  play  and  the  appropriate  markings  quickly 
made.  These  tables  would  be  used  for  simple  throwing  and  guessing  games  such  as  'odds 
and  evens',  as  well  as  games  like  'tabula'  which  were  played  for  stakes  of  thousands  of 
sesterhi  by  moving  counters  and  throwing  dice.  This  favounte  game  of  the  later  Roman 
Empire  later  developed  and  spread  westwards  as  backgammon  (Sifakis  1990,  p15).  The 
Popularity  of  'ten'  was  undisputed,  and  is  believed  to  have  been  played  for  Christ's 
garments  at  his  execution:  'When  the  soldiers  had  crucified  Jesus  they  took  his  garments... 84) 
and  said...  "let  us  not  tear  it,  but  cast  lots  to  see  whose  it  shall  be"'  (John  19-23-224)  In 
this  three-dice  game,  all  players  lose  their  wagers  if  the  player  thro  Vin  the  dice  scores  less 
than  ten-,  more  than  ten,  and  they  win.  Such  a  betting  system  bears  some  resemblance  to 
the  game  of  'hazard',  which  was  widespread  throughout  Europe  from  the  nuddle  ages,  and 
by  the  nineteenth  century  had  developed  into  the  modem  casino  game  of  craps. 
It  is  in  Seneca  that  we  find  the  most  vivid  portrayal  of  the  Roman  fascination  with  dicing, 
and  its  perceived  link  with  the  Divine.  In  The  Apocolocpitosis,  the  gods'  punishment  for 
the  dice  playing  emperor  Claudius  is  to  force  him  to  throw  dice  from  a  bottomless  cup 
forever.  In  the  description  of  such  an  exquisite  torture,  we  see  a  reluctant  admiration  of  so 
ingenious  a  punishment,  symptomatic  of  a  wider  ambivalence  toward  dicing  and  its 
continued  correspondence  with  divination  in  the  classical  world  - 
'When  from  the  rattling  cup  he  seeks  to  throw 
The  die  they  trickle  through  the  hole  below 
And  when  he  tries  the  recovered  bones  to  roll  - 
A  gambler  fooled  by  the  eternal  goal  - 
Again  they  fool  him;  through  his  finger  tips 
Each  time  each  cunning  die  as  cruelly  slips 
A  Sisphus'  rocks,  before  they  reach  the  crest 
Slip  from  his  neck  and  roll  back  to  their  rest' 
(Seneca  1986,  p232-3) 
Although  bearbating  and  cockfighting  involved  heavy  betting,  from  the  advent  of  the 
Saxons,  Danes  and  Romans  in  Europe,  dicing  became  '  the  classic  gambling  game  of  the 
entire  medieval  period'  (Strayer  1982,  p350).  The  earliest  recorded  references  to  gambling 
with  dice  come  from  Ordevicus  Viticus  (1075-1143)  who  tells  us  that  'the  clergymen  and 
bishops  are  fond  of  dice  playing',  and  from  John  of  Salisbury,  0  100-  1182),  writing  of  'the 
damnable  art  of  dice-playing'  (in  Ashton  1898,  p  13).  More  generously,  Alfonso  X  of 
Castile,  the  enlightened  thirteenth  century  monarch,  wrote  in  his  Libros  acedrex  dados  e 
tables  (Book  of  chess,  dice  and  board  gwnes)  that  gambling  was  a  harmless  distraction, 81 
since  'God  has  intended  that  mankind  should  enjoy  themselves  with  playing'  (in  Straver 
1982,  p352). 
Simple  guessing  games  with  dice  were  popular,  as  were  variations  on  a  'hunt'  game  played 
with  counters  on  a  square  or  cross  shaped  grid  (Strayer  1982,  p350).  Representative  of  the 
agrarian  society  in  which  it  was  played,  the  game,  known  as  gujddewy/  in  Wales,  and 
alquerque  in  Spain,  portrayed  a  kind  of  farmland  battle.  The  aim  was  for  the  fifteen  pieces 
-  the  geese  -  to  comer  the  single  piece  -  the  fox  -  of  the  opponent,  without  the  fox  taking 
the  geese  by  jumping  over  them.  A  variation  of  the  theme  was  known  to  the  Vikings  by  the 
name  of  hiteftaff,  while  a  similar  game  combining  dice  throws  and  placing  of  men  -  like  the 
'tables'  played  by  the  Romans  -  was  called  taefal  -a  'kind  of  backgammon'  (Traill  and 
Mann  1893,  p313).  The  game  of  'hazard'  (the  forerunner  of  modem  casino  craps)  was 
perhaps  the  most  engrossing  medieval  dice  game,  especially  favoured  amongst  soldiers.  It 
involved  a  player  throwing  two  dice,  and  the  others  betting  on  whether  or  not  he  would 
achieve  certain  numbers  with  them. 
Dicing  played  an  important  role  in  the  everyday  life  of  the  middle  ages  and  was  assiduously 
pursued  by  all  classes  of  society.  However,  not  everyone  had  the  capital  of  players  like 
Yudhisthiva  in  7he  Mahabharata,  who  staked  a  hundred  thousand  gold  pieces,  a  thousand 
elephants,  his  slaves,  his  army  and  all  his  wealth  in  a  single  game.  Finally  he  staked  the 
liberty  of  his  brothers,  his  wife  and  even  himself  (]he  Mahabharala  1975,  p128-137)ý  a 
practice  which,  while  unusual  among  the  wealthy,  was  not  uncommon  amongst  the  poorer 
classes  of  society  in  an  age  when  the  vast  majority  of  the  population  possessed  little  of 
value  to  stake  in  a  game.  While  the  wealthy  could  wager  land  and  gold,  the  poor 
frequently  had  nothing  to  lose  but  their  liberty.  Describing  the  ancient  German  practice  of 
'vicious  dicing',  Tacitus,  records  how  slaves  were  frequently  made  from  gambling  sessions-. 
'They  play  at  dice...  making  a  serious  business  of  it;  and  they  are  so  reckless  in  their 
anxiety  to  win...  that  when  everything  else  is  gone  they  will  stake  their  personal  liberty  on 
a  last  decisive  throw.  A  loser  willingly  discharges  his  debt  by  becoming  a  slave..  . 
[and] 
allows  himself  to  be  bound  and  sold  by  the  winner'  (Tacitus  1982,  p  122).  Often,  their 
meagre  stakes  were  virtually  indistinguishable  from  the  gamblers  themselves,  as  was  in  the 
case  with  the  Indians  'who  stake  their  fingers  and  cut  them  off  themselves  to  pay  the  debt 82 
of  honour,  and  the  Englishmen  who  'cut  off  their  ears,  both  as  a  'security'  for  a  gambling 
loan  and  as  a  stake...  '  (Steinmetz  1870,  p  11). 
I 
It  is  during  the  middle  ages  that  we  find,  in  innumerable  bans  and  prohibitions,  attempts  to 
suppress  the  gambling  activities  of  the  working  population.  fn  what  was  an  essentially 
pragmatic  position,  the  Catholic  Church  recommended  individuals  indulge  themselves  in 
moderate  recreation  just  sufficient  to  improve  their  health,  so  fortifying  them  for  the 
resumption  of  work.  Field  games,  walks  and  serious  conversation  were  regarded  as  fit  for 
this  purpose,  while  gambling  games,  having  fittle  to  offer  in  the  way  of  fresh  air  and 
exercise,  and  much  to  encourage  idleness  and  usury,  were  generally  disapproved  of 
(Dunkley  1985,  p37).  Those  activities  condoned  by  the  Church  had  the  added  advantage 
of  maintaining  a  fit  workforce  in  an  era  whose  violence  made  the  existence  of  a  reserve 
population  who  could  quickly  be  rallied  into  an  indigent  army,  very  attractive.  It  was  thus 
practical  considerations  which  led  to  the  encouragement  of  outdoor  sports  like  archery, 
and  the  suppression  of  pastimes  which  might  detract  from  then  like  gambling.  Although 
gan-ýng  was  ostensibly  prohibited  to  protect  the  noble  practice  of  archery  'to  the  terrible 
dread  and  fear  of  all  strange  nations'  (Steinmetz  1870,  p418),  underlying  the  medieval 
statutes  was  also  the  fear  (which  would  become  increasingly  pervasive)  of  the  disorderly 
effects  of  such  practices.  To  control  the  activities  of  soldiers,  an  edict  was  established  'for 
the  regulation  of  the  Christian  army  under  the  command  of  Richard  I  of  England  during 
the  Crusade.  Anyone  below  the  rank  of  knight  was  forbidden  to  play  dice  for  money. 
Knights  and  clergymen  were  allowed  to  play,  but  not  to  lose  more  than  twenty  shillings  in 
a  day,  'under  a  penalty  of  one  hundred  shillings  to  be  paid  to  the  archbishops  in  the  army'. 
The  monarchs  could  play  as  they  wished  'but  their  attendants  were  restricted  to  the  sum  of 
twenty  shillings  and  if  they  exceeded  they  were  to  be  whipped  naked  throughout  the  army 
for  three  days'.  Thus,  a  kind  of  'sliding  scale'  of  prohibition  regulated  the  army,  while,  in 
succeeding  statutes  for  the  population  at  large,  'dicing  [was]  particularly  and  expressly 
forbidden'  (in  Ashton  1898,  p  13). 
In  Chaucer  we  find  the  articulation  of  a  strand  of  late  medieval  thought  which  would  grow 
more  vocal  over  the  centuries,  and  which  condemned  gambling  expressly  for  its 8--, 
squandering  of  time  and  money,  particularly  amongst  the  higher  ranks.  In  the  Cmuerburl- 
Mles,  he  wrote. 
I 
And  now  that  I  have  spoken  of  glotonye, 
Now  wol  I  yow  deffenden  hasardrye.  [forbid  gambling] 
Hasard  is  verry  mooder  of  lesynges  flies] 
And  of  deceite,  and  cursed  forswerynges,  [pedury] 
Blaspheme  of  Crist,,  manslaughtre,  and  wast  also  [blasphemy] 
Of  catel  and  of  tyme  ...  [property] 
Unusually  in  medieval  thought,  Chaucer  believed  the  higher  the  station  of  the  gambler,  the 
greater  the  magnitude  of  the  sin- 
And  ever  the  hyer  he  is  of  estaat, 
The  moore  is  he  yholden  desolaat. 
(Chaucer  1966,  p351-2) 
[  rank  ] 
[considered  abandoned] 
Cards 
In  the  same  way  that  dice  came  into  existence  with  divinatory  practice,  cards  appeared 
alongside  the  divinatory  use  of  the  arrow  around  the  twelfth  century.  The  etymology  of  the 
word  belies  this  heritage;  in  Italy,  cards  are  known  as  nalbs,  in  Spain  miypes,  both  of 
which  are  corruptions  of  the  Arabic  twbi,  which  means  'prophet'  or  'predict'  (Faylor 
1865,  p32).  Casting  rods  and  feathered  sticks  marked  with  four  different  symbols  were 
used  by  the  American  Indians  and  also  in  the  ancient  Orient  in  rituals  in  which  priests  and 
other  sacred  figures  interpreted  the  commands  of  the  gods  according  to  the  direction  in 
which  the  sticks  fell.  Contrary  to  Sifakis'  assertion  that  the  design  of  these  throwing  sticks 
was  a  gradual  historical  development,  with  decorative  images  and  a  general  flattening  of 
the  sticks  being  added  over  the  centuries  (Sifakis  1990,  vii),  evidence  from  as  early  as 
4000  B.  C.  shows  that  in  fact  such  a  design  probably  existed  coeval  with  the  most  ancient N4 
sticks  themselves.  '  Ivory  rods  from  Babylon  and  Egypt  have  been  found,  beanng  figures 
of  father,  mother  and  child  that  are  similar  in  function  to  the  tribal  divisions  of  bear, 
tortoise  and  eagle  marked  on  the  sticks  of  the  Alaskan  and  Haida  Indians.  The  designs  of 
these  rods  gave  them  specific  values  in  divination  practices  as  well  as  in  games  of  chance, 
for  as  emblems  of  'mystic  power  and  authority'  they  were  used  in  boih  types  of  ritual  (-van 
Renssalaer  1912,  p42).  In  his  Korean  Games,  Stewart  Culin  conflated  the  activities  of 
gamblers  and  diviners  as  they  were  conflated  in  reality.  'In  Chinese  fortune-telling,  the 
gamblers...  throw  numbered  arrows  or  sticks  to  divine  the  wishes  of  the  gods..  . 
'.  The 
markings  on  these  sticks  represented  social  groups  and  individuals  within  them,  and  this 
(enabled  a  man  to  ask  queries  of  the  gods  in  a  most  particular  way'  (Culin  1896,  p  18  1  ).  To 
ask  a  question  as  a  father,  or  a  fighter,  or  a  member  of  the  Bear  tribe,  he  would  select  an 
appropriate  emblem  to  represent  him,  and  interpret  the  meaning  of  the  sticks  surrounding 
it  when  it  fell. 
The  recurrent  four-fold  division  of  these  early  cards  is  an  aspect  of  the  tendency  to  regard 
the  world  as  an  entity  composed  of  four  units,  and,  according  to  Cassirer,  is  a  basic 
schema  of  religious  thought.  Describing  its  establishment  within  divinatory  ritual,  he 
writes:  'In  searching  the  sky  for  omens  of  man's  undertakings  on  earth,  the  augur  began  by 
dividing  it  into  definite  sectors'.  An  east-west  fine  represented  the  course  of  the  sun  and 
was  bisected  by  a  vertical  north-south  line,  and  so  'With  intersection  of  the  decumainis  and 
the  cards,  religious  thinking  created  its  first  basic  schema  of  co-ordinates'  (Cassirer  1953, 
plOO).  It  is  this  cosrrUc  order  that  was  represented  by  the  symbols  and  markings  that 
decorated  divining  arrows,  and  which  the  design  of  playing  cards  continued  with  their 
distinction  between  four  suits. 
Our  modem  cards  are  descended  from  strips  of  oiled  paper  from  twelfth  century  Korea 
known  as  Htou-Ijen,  or  'fighting  arrows'  (van  Renssalaer  1912,  p32).  Bearing  the  Image 
of  an  arrow  on  their  backs,  these  primitive  cards  'flaunted  their  lineage  from  the  ancient 
rites  of  the  feathered  arrow  and  the  magic  ring'  (Hargrave  1966,  p7).  In  the  twelfth 
2  Similarly,  Martinez'  evolutionist  notion  that  'the-  massification  of  divination  objects  for  gambling 
purposes  represents  a  secularisation  and  %ulgarisation  of  religious  magic'  is  an  oversuqp1ification. 
However,  his  statement  that  the  need  for  priests  or  shaman  would  have  been  diminished  '%4hen  easllý 
readable  symbols  were  placed  on  dice  and  cards*  probably  has  some  (unsubstantiable)  degree  of  truth 
(Martinez  1976,  p  17). X5 
century,  Chinese  cards,  influenced  by  these  Korean  ones  and  by  Chinese  paper  mone-v 
appeared.  A  pack  consisted  of  four  sets  -  coins,  strings,  myriads  and  tens  of  mynads  -  each 
with  thirty-eight  cards  bearing  pictorial  representations  of  their  value.  The  latter  two  suits 
were  believed  to  be  imbued  with  powerful  magical  properties  and  were  placed  on  the 
coffins  of  the  dead  (Hargrave  1966,  p9).  The  development  of  games  was  probably  coeval 
with  the  appearance  of  cards  themselves.  The  Chinese  played  two  main  types  of  game, 
with  cards  either  forming  winning  combinations,  or  high  cards  capturing  low  ones;  a 
formulation  which  stifl  forms  the  basis  of  all  modem  gambling  games. 
The  number  and  variation  of  the  design  of  cards  makes  a  pack  a  compact  and  ingenious 
system  for  play,  with  the  maximum  number  of  variables  handled  in  a  neat,  economical  way. 
In  this  sense,  cards  are  a  more  creative  means  of  gambling  than  dice,  with  greater  potential 
for  manipulation  and  an  enormous  possible  number  of  games.  As  a  result  of  such 
complexity,  they  can  be  viewed  as  a  symbolic  system,  with  packs  and  games  depicting  an 
image  of  the  society  in  which  they  are  created  and  played. 
In  her  beautifully  illustrated  History  of  Playitig  Cards,  Hargrave  examines  the  cards  of 
Asia  and  Europe,  building  up  a  picture  of  these  tablets  as  miniature  pieces  of  artwork,  the 
social  and  cultural  life  of  their  country  of  origin  embodied  in  the  exquisite  detail  of  their 
design.  They  were,  she  writes,  Cas  individual  and  faithful  a  nuirror  of  the  taste  and 
temperament  and  traditions  of  the  people  as  other  branches  of  their  arts'  (Hargrave  1966, 
p  170).  Early  cards  were  crafted  by  hand  on  wood,  copper  and  ivory  as  well  as  card  and 
paper.  The  individual  who  wanted  a  set  would  commission  a  painter  who  would  then 
design  the  pack  according  to  the  wishes  of  the  purchaser;  usually  designs  were  images  of 
the  purchaser  himself,  his  family  or  his  hunting  lands.  The  process  of  creating  an  entire  set 
of  cards  by  hand  was  painstakingly  slow,  but,  with  painters  Re  Andrea  Mantegna,  Martin 
Schongauer  and  Botticelli  employed  at  the  task,  the  resulting  set  was  a  unique  and  fragile 
work  of  art. 
In  Plate  One,  we  can  see  this  variation  in  card  design.  On  the  top  left  are  ancient  Chinese 
'domino  cards'  used  for  fortune-telling  as  well  as  gambling,  top  right  are  Indian  eight-suit s6olk 
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cards,  on  the  bottom  left  is  a  card  painted  for  Charles  NII  of  France  in  1392.  and  bottom 
right  are  cards  from  the  Japanese  game  hatw  awase,  or  'flower  game'  (in  Hargrave  1966), 
The  hand-crafting  of  cards  made  their  cost  prohibitive  to  all  but  the  nobility,  and,  although 
popular  demand  encouraged  their  creation  with  stencils  and  wood  blocks,  the  price  of  the 
resulting  set  put  them  out  of  reach  of  the  Majority  of  the  population,  It  was  not  until  the 
momentous  invention  of  the  printing  press  in  the  fifteenth  century  that  cards  came  into 
mass  everyday  use  and  became  widely  disseminated  throughout  Europe  (Sifakis  1990, 
p56).  As  well  as  increasing  their  number  and  availability,  the  printing  of  cards  on 
mechanical  presses  encouraged  the  standardisation  of  design)  so  that  by  the  end  of  the 
century,  the  luscious  images  in  Hargrave's  visual  history  were  becoming  less  idiosyncratic 
and  less  varied  and  beginning  to  look  more  like  each  other. 
From  their  inception  in  the  East,  cards  were  introduced  to  Europe  in  the  late  thirteenth  and 
early  fourteenth  centuries,  probably  first  into  Italy  by  explorers  such  as  Marco  Polo,  who 
had  witnessed  their  use  in  ancient  Eastern  lands  such  as  Cathay,  where  gambling  was 
4more  prevalent  than  anywhere  else  in  the  world'  (Polo  1968,  p161)  These  Italian  cards, 
known  as  tarots,  were  highly  decorative,  and  were  used  'possibly  as  a  means  of  divination' 
(Hargrave  1966,  p223).  As  well  as  picture  cards  and  numbers,  the  tarot  had  a  third  set,  the 
trionfi  which  played  an  important  role  in  the  cards'  fortune-telling  function.  The  images  on 
these  trionfi  have  been  the  subject  of  mystical  association  since  the  eighteenth  century 
when  a  tract  by  de  Gebelin,  fuelled  by  the  centuries'  revival  of  eastern  wisdom,  interpreted 
them  in  terms  of  occult  Egyptian  mysticism.  The  images  are  of  Italian  origin,  however,  and 
represent  the  stages  that  make  up  the  semireligious  pre-Lenten  carnival  processions  in 
fourteenth  century  Italy  (Strayer  1982,  p352).  Nor  is  the  fortune-telling  function  of  the 
cards  peculiarly  'eastern',  but  typical  of  the  continued  association  of  all  cards  With  their 
divinatory  origin. 
OfiginaRy,  the  tarot  were  used  for  the  amusement  of  children  and  for  forms  of  divination 
like  fortune-telling,  but  as  their  'heathen'  symbols  were  christianised,  they  began  to  be  used 
in  games  of  chance.  After  the  Chinese  tradition  of  the  four  suits,  the  Venetians  developed 
their  own  which  represented  the  contemporary  Italian  social  order.  Long  curved  swords s- 
symbolised  the  nobility,  cups  the  church,  money  the  merchants  and  clubs  the  peasantrN 
(Hargrave  1966,  p224).  In  agrarian  German  culture  the  design  was  slightly  different,  "ith 
suit  signs  of  acoms  for  the  peasantry,  linden  leaves  for  the  nobility,  hearts  the  clergv  and 
hawk  bells  (an  old  medium  of  trade  and  exchange),  for  the  merchants  (Olmstead  1967, 
p138).  These  suits  were  ranked  in  a  microcosm  of  hierarchical  medieval  society  with  cups 
at  the  apex,  swords  next  (later  these  were  reversed),  followed  by  money,  and  finafly  clubs 
(Olmsted  1967,  p138).  The  internal  organisation  of  the  suits  corresponded  to  the  divisions 
in  the  medieval  army,  headed  by  the  King,  followed  by  the  Knight  (later  replaced  by  the 
Queen),  valet  and  lastly  the  faceless  foot  soldiers  -  the  number  cards  (Strayer  1982,  p 
352).  The  number  cards  occasionally  carried  roman  numerals,  but  most  often  their  value 
was  simply  depicted  by  the  amount  of  representatives  of  their  suit  sign.  The  joker  carried 
on  its  status  from  the  tarot.  Having  no  suit  or  number  it  existed  in  a  class  of  its  own,  and 
symbolised  fate  and  chance;  'the  unforeseen,  the  unexpected,  uncertainty  or  uncontrollable 
fate  and  the  destiny  that  presides  over  every  walk  of  life'  (van  Renssalaer  1912,  p55). 
Over  the  following  three  hundred  years  the  design  of  European  playing  cards  was 
modified  to  reflect  their  social  and  political  rnilieu.  The  idiosyncratic  designs  which 
proliferated  as  a  result  of  the  individual  crafting  of  every  pack  created  a  corresponding 
diversity  of  suit  designs.  Sometimes  figures  from  legend  or  myth  were  represented, 
sometimes  contemporary  heroes.  In  Germany,  astronomical  cards  depicted  the  Copernican 
universe,  while  more  terrestrial  ones  bore  the  images  of  national  poets  (Hargrave  1962, 
p102-9).  Most  common  however  were  heraldic  series'  -  cards  carrying  portraits  of  the 
reigning  families  of  the  land.  It  was  in  this  heraldic  tradition  that  a  knight  by  the  name  of 
Lahire  designed  a  new  suit,  replacing  the  Italian  one  with  images  more  representative  of 
the  chivalric  order  he  came  from.  Coers  (hearts  v)  were  the  church,  carreaux  (arrowheads 
or  diamonds  *  ),  the  vassals,  trýfles  (clubs  4),  the  husbandmen  and  piques  (spades  4),  the 
knights.  The  face  cards  showed  the  old  European  family  system  -  father,  mother  and  eldest 
son,  rather  than  king,  knight  and  valet.  This  new  design  served  as  a  model  for  cards  in  the 
similarly  courtly  society  of  fifteenth  century  England,  where  the  first  record  of  their 
recreational  use  appeared  in  a  letter  from  Margaret  Paston  to  her  husband  in  December 
1459.  She  wrote  that  the  Christmas  activities  of  a  neighbouring  noble  household  were 
none  disguisings,  nor  harping,  nor  luting,  nor  singing,  nor  no  loud  disports,  but  playing  at 8  F) 
the  tables  and  chess  and  cards...  '  (Margaret  Paston  1991,  p54).  After  this,  earIN,  reterences 
to  cards  in  England  are  prohibitory.  Ihe  History  of  the  Order  of  the  (;  arter  (1278) 
discusses  'the  Plays  forbidden  by  the  Clergy 
...  which  might  be  cards,  chesse  (in 
Ashton  1898,  p35),  and  in  1397  cards  were  sufficiently  common  to  elicit  a  law  forbidding 
them  on  work  days  (Strayer  1982,  p352). 
In  Plate  Two  we  see  the  beautifufly  painted,  but  indistinct  suit  signs  of  hand  painted  cards, 
contrasted  with  more  standardised  ones  made  on  printing  presses.  In  the  top  left  is  the 
valet  of  cups  from  1644;  top  right,  a  valet  of  swords,  modelled  on  a  member  of  a  noble 
eighteenth  century  Italian  household.  In  the  bottom  right  we  have  an  English  court  card 
made  by  a  London  card  maker  in  1678;  while  the  bottom  left  is  a  recognisably  modem 
Russian  card  from  1840  (in  Hargrave  1966). 
As  well  as  the  cards  themselves,  the  games  played  with  them  were  representative  of  their 
social  milieu.  Games  and  cards  existed  in  a  dynamic  relation  with  each  other  and  with  the 
social  world  in  general.  The  affinity  of  card  games  (and,  indeed,  of  games  in  general)  with 
the  social  body  reflect  'on  the  one  hand,  the  tendencies,  tastes  and  ways  of  thought  that 
are  prevalent,  while  at  the  same  time,  in  educating  and  training  the  players  in  these  very 
virtues  and  eccentricities  ...  subtly  confirm  them  in  their  habits  and  preferences'  (Caiflois 
1962,  p83).  In  the  fight  of  such  reciprocity,  cards  became  a  microcosm  of  the  society  that 
played  with  them.  Games  were  continually  modified  and  altered,  following  the 
configurations  of  the  world  around  them,  with  the  result  that  those  played  in  the  fifteenth 
century,  such  as  primero,  pair,  brelan  and  gleek,  were  very  different  from  those  of  the 
seventeenth  and  nineteenth  centuries. 
The  principle  behind  medieval  card  games  was  the  acquisition  of  combitwhons,  or 
murnivals  and  melds  (Taylor  1865,  p313).  Certain  cards  have  a  prescribed  value  when 
grouped  with  others  which  they  'match",  such  as  four  of  a  kind  -a  murnival.  Examples  of 
melds  are  a  marriage  -a  king  and  queen  of  the  same  suit,  a  flush  -  three  or  more  cards  of 
the  same  suit,  a  sequence  -  three  or  more  cards  in  ranking  order,  and  a  pair  -  two  cards  of 
the  same  rank.  In  games  like  primero,  instead  of  each  deal  ranking  as  a  separate  event,  play 
is  continuous.  In  such  an  ongoing  process,  scoring  follows  the  principle  that  cards  not I  ENI  I. 
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melded  in  significant  groupings  are  penalties  (Parlett  1979).  In  such  games,  it  is  assumed 
that  all  cards  'go  together'  with  specific  others  in  sequences,  groups  and  combinations. 
Each  card  has  a  definite  place  in  relation  to  a  larger  whole,  and  it  is  only  in  these 
I 
configurations  that  their  properties  emerge  and  they  are  ascnbed  a  value.  Indi"'idual  cards 
have  no  value,  and  are  actively  penafised  in  such  a  cohesive  system.  In  these  medieval 
games,  individual  properties  such  as  number,  suit  and  rank  are  less  important  than  the 
overall  picture  given  by  the  cards'place  in  relation  to  significant  others.  Such  principles 
demonstrate  a  clear  correspondence  with  the  densely  hierarchical  society  in  which  the 
games  were  played.  Like  the  cards  in  their  melds,  the  properties  of  people  are 
predeterniined  by  their  position  in  social  groups.  Individual  cards  have  no  value  because 
their'nature'  is  only  realised  as  part  of  a  larger  unit,  and  single  cards  thus  carry  a  penalty. 
Similarly,  the  individual  was  treated  with  suspicion  in  medieval  society  for,  in  a  world 
where  everyone  had  a  place  in  a  fixed  'chain  of  being',  character  and  lifestyle  were  to  be 
found  in  conjunction  with  others.  There  was  literally  no  place  for  solitude.  This 
correspondence  between  cards  and  society  is  particularly  marked  in  the  change  of  the  rules 
of  triomphe  (later  whist).  The  identity  of  the  trump  suit  was  originally  deten-nined  by 
turning  over  a  card,  so  that,  consonant  with  a  society  of  hereditary  ranking  in  which  both 
status  and  suit  are  'seen  as  fixed,  not  to  be  altered,  a  variable  not  under  the  control  of  the 
player'  (Olmsted  1967,  p  143),  the  most  important  suit  was  chosen  by  chance.  In  the  later 
development  of  auction  whist,  it  is  possible  for  a  player  to  bid  for  trumps  with  whichever 
suit  he  had  the  most  of,  or,  if  no-one  had  the  necessary  cards,  have  no  trumps  at  afl.  In  the 
more  mobile  society  of  the  nineteenth  century,  status  is  no  longer  fixed  and  detennined  by 
chance.  The  game  is  more  competitive  and  individualistic;  a  player  with  sufficiently  strong 
cards  and  enough  nerve  to  bid  for  them,  can  chose  trumps. 
The  gradual  dissolution  of  the  rigid  medieval  system  by  the  seventeenth  century  meant  that 
rank,  suit  and  number  started  to  become  more  important  than  place  in  games,  and,  by  the 
nineteenth  century,  the  rise  of  individualism  saw  a  corresponding  emphasis  on  the 
numerical  values  of  single  cards. 
Throughout  their  history,  the  separation  between  the  recreational  and  the  divinatory  use  of 
cards  (like  that  of  dice)  was  often  non-existent:  all  the  while  they  were  being  played  in 90 
games  of  chance,  they  were  also  being  used  to  predict  the  future.  The  earliest  work  on 
cartomancy,  by  Francesco  Mariolini,  came  from  Venice  in  1540,  while  in  1634  Le 
Passlempts  de  la  Forlune  des  Rez,  explaining  the  supernatural  significance  of  various  cards 
and  their  combinations,  was  popular.  There  was  no  shortage  of  such  material  in  England 
either,  where  a  multitude  of  divinatory  series'  with  explanatory  leaflets  such  as  Me 
Dreamers  Oracle,  Fortune-Telling  by  Cards  and  Napoleon's  Book  of  Fate  were  printed. 
(Steimetz  1870,  p391). 
At  the  same  time  that  tracts  on  the  mystical  quasi-religious  function  of  cards  were  being 
printed,  and  cards  themselves  being  used  for  fortune-telling,  another  type  of  card-related 
literature  was  flourishing.  By  the  seventeenth  century,  card  games  were  so  numerous  and 
popular  that  a  need  to  codify  and  record  the  rules  developed,  giving  rise  to  a  group  of  self 
styled  'experts',  who  explained  and  formulated  the  rules  and  strategies  of  specific  games. 
In  a  rationall  scientific  manner,  such  writers  utilised  the  insights  of  probability  theory  and 
applied  them  to  increasingly  popular  games  of  chance.  In  a  time  when  books  were  still 
relatively  scarce,  'rows  upon  rows  of  volumes'  on  gaming  existed  (Hargrave  1966,  p205)-, 
scientific  formulations  on  strategy  sitting  side  by  side  with  mystical  directions  for 
divinatory  ritual.  At  times  it  may  have  appeared  that  the  scientific  had  supplanted  the 
religious  worldview  in  the  world  of  games,  for,  as  von  Renssalaer  informs  us:  'when  any 
dispute  arose,  [Hoyle's]  book  was  consulted  and  instead  of  the  players  saying  'it  is  the 
wish  (or  the  voice)  of  the  gods...  it  became  customary  to  say  'It  is  according  to  Hoyle" 
(Hargrave  1966,  p276). 
Lots 
We  have  already  seen  the  ubiquity  of  lot  casting  in  Chapter  One-,  a  practise  which  was  used 
to  ascertain  the  preference  of  the  Divine  Will,  especiafly  with  regard  to  the  appropriation 
of  material  goods.  It  is  from  this  function  that  our  modem  lottery,  and  all  games  of  chance 
whereby  winning  is  simply  dependent  on  the  possession  of  the  correct  ticket,  derives. 
The  word  'lot'  is  of  Teutonic  origin  (Sullivan  1972,  p4),  and  comes  from  New  whIch 
designated  a  bean  or  pebble  or  some  other  token  used  to  settle  disputes.  The  term  has 91 
similar  meanings  and  sounds  in  other  languages  -  in  Anglo-Saxon,  'to  cast  lots'  is  Illew-mi, 
in  Dutch  it  is  Lotlen  and  in  Swedish  Lona  (Ashton  1898,  p222). 
The  conflation  of  game  and  ritual,  found  over  and  over  again  in  the  use  of  cards  and  dice  is 
perhaps  clearest  in  the  drawing  of  lots  -  an  activity  easily  viewed  as  either  sacred  practise 
or  secular  game,  depending  on  the  occasion.  In  his  explanatory  note  on  the  translation  of 
the  Koran,  Sale  articulates  this  conflation  in  sixteenth  century  Arabia.  -  'Lots.  The  onginal 
word  al  Meiser  properly  signifies  a  particular  game  played  with  arrows  and  much  in  use 
with  the  pagan  Arabs.  But  by  lots  we  are  here  to  understand  all  games  whalsoet,  er  which 
are  s-ubject  to  chance  or  hazard...  '  (in  Ashton  1898,  p10;  my  italics).  The  Koran 
denounced  the  pre-Islamic  practice  of  maysir,  the  drawing  of  lots  with  arrows,  and, 
recognising  the  continuation  of  the  principle  in  'secular'  gambling  on  games  of  chance, 
extended  the  prohibition  to  those  as  wefl.  Still,  Strayer  teUs  us,  the  practice  of  maysir 
nevertheless  'flourished  at  all  times  in  the  forms  of  betting,  guessing  and  casting  of  lots' 
(Strayer  1982,  p353). 
The  origin  of  the  lottery  itself  has  been  traced  to  the  Roman  Apophoreta  (Steinmetz, 
Sullivan,  Sifakis),  where  gifts  were  given  to  guests  upon  leaving  banquets.  Augustus 
Caesar  was  the  first  to  sell  lots  to  his  guests,  establishing  a  practice  where  he  would 
"auction  tickets  for  prizes  of  most  unequal  value,  and  paintings  with  their  faces  tumed  to 
the  wall,  ) 
for  which  every  guest  present  was  expected  to  bid  blindly,  taking  his  chance  like 
the  rest'  (Suetonius  1958,  p93).  Nero  awarded  prizes  of  villas  and  slaves  to  his  revellers, 
while  the  eccentric  Heliogabalus  presented  'gifts'  of  dead  dogs,  flies  and  ostriches!  An 
incipient  form  of  lottery  was  practiced  by  Caligula,  who,  at  the  Games  'would  scatter 
vouchers  among  the  audience  entitling  them  to  all  sorts  of  gifts'  (Suetonius  1958,  p158), 
and  Nero,  who  used  lots  to  dispose  of  goods  he  had  stolen  from  shops  (Suetonius  1958, 
p222).  After  the  fall  of  Rome,  feudal  princes  continued  the  tradition  at  banquets,  finding 
the  indiscriminate  appropriation  of  tickets  an  ideal  way  of  distributing  gifts  without 
exciting  jealousy  (Sullivan  1972,  p4).  The  device  of  the  lottery  found  willing  patrons  in  the 
traders  of  a  nascent  system  of  commercial  exchange.  Sixteenth  century  Venetian  and 
Genoese  merchants  used  the  Iotto'  as  a  means  of  disposing  of  their  wares,  selling  tickets 
to  their  customers  and  holding  drawings  to  determine  the  winners  in  a  practice  which  was 9 
soon  found  to  return  profits  at  least  as  large  as  from  conventionad  methods  of  enterpn*-w 
(Ashton  1898,  p222).  Lotteries  were  also  used  when  an  ind"vidual  wanted  to  dispose  of 
household  goods  or  land  -  items  which  might  be  too  expensive  to  find  a  single  buyer.  For 
example,  the  advertisements  in  Me  Tatler  newspaper  September  14  1779  read  'Mr 
Stockton's  sale  of  jewels,  Plate  and  C,  will  be  drawn  on  Nfichelmas  Day...  The  Sale  of 
Goods  to  be  seen  at  Mrs  Butlers  and  C-  will  certainly  be  drawn  on  Tuesday  the  17th  inst 
... 
Mrs  Guthridge's  Sixpenny  Sale  of  Goods  and  C,  continues  to  be  drawn  every  day'  (in 
Ashton  1898,  p229). 
Sifakis  dates  the  first  recorded  European  lottery  to  Burgundy  in  1420,  the  proceeds  from 
which  were  used  for  the  fortification  of  the  town  (Sifakis  1990,  p  18  7),  while  Ashton  finds 
it  later  in  1446  when  the  widow  of  the  Flemish  painter  Jan  van  Eyck  held  a  lottery  in 
Bruges  to  raise  funds  for  the  poor  (Ashton  1898,  p222).  Whichever  is  the  more  accurate, 
the  utility  of  these  smaH  scale  lotteries  to  individuals,  merchants  and  towns  was  obvious, 
and  was  soon  grasped  by  the  politicians  and  monarchs  of  the  emergent  European  nation 
states.  From  then,  the  development  of  lotteries  increased  in  rapid  and  uneasy  symbiotic 
relation  to  the  development  of  a  capitafist  system  of  production.  On  the  one  hand,  as  an 
alternative  to  unpopular  taxation,  the  revenue-raising  potential  of  a  lottery  offered  obvious 
attractions  to  the  leaders  of  new  states;  on  the  other,  however,  its  'pagan'  ancestry  In  lot 
casting  appeared  sacrilegious  to  the  defenders  of  the  new  refilpous  order  established  by  the 
Reformation,  whHe  defenders  of  the  secular  pofitical  order  worried  that  its  appeal  to  Fate 
over  the  virtues  of  work  was  a  disruptive  (if  not  ince,  "dary)  force  encouraging  idleness  and 
violence  in  the  population. 
Such  ambivalence  can  be  seen  in  legislation  which  vacillates  between  outright 
condemnation  and  tacit  encouragement  of  lottery  schemes. 
The  principality  of  Germany  established  a  national  lottery  in  1521,  Francis  I  began  the 
French  loterie  in  1539,  while  Florence's  first  government  lottery,  La  Lotto  de  Pirenze,  "as 
held  in  1528,  with  other  city-states  following  Suit. 
3  Such  schemes  raised  vital  funds  for 
3  The  French  Lottery  "-as  known  as  Blanques,  from  the  Italian  term  blanca  carta  -  white  tickets  -  sInce  all 
the  losing  tickers  were  considered  blanks.  Hence  the  derivation  of  the  phrase  'to  dra-A,  a  blank'  (Ne,  %  ille 
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public  projects  and  in  fact  French  fiscal  policy  depended  almost  entirely  on  its  Iwerie 
during  the  period  when  its  citizens  refused  to  pay  their  taxes  (Sullivan  1972,  p4). 
In  Britain,  the  first  public  lottery  was  projected  in  1566  by  Queen  Elizabeth,  but  not  drawn 
until  1569.  It  was  'A  verie  rich  Lotterie  Generall...  containing  a  number  of  prices,  as  wel  of 
redy  money  as  of  plate,  and  certaine  sorts  of  marchandizes,  having  been  valued  and  priced 
by  the  comaundment  of  the  Queen's  most  excellent  majestie...  The  number  of  lots  shall  be 
foure  hundrett  thousand...  and  every  lot  shall  be  the  summe  of  tenne  shillings  sterling  only 
and  no  more'  (Ashton  1898,  p223).  Participation  in  the  lottery  was  presented  as  a  patriotic 
undertaking,  for  'the  Lotterie  is  erected  by  her  majestie's  order,  to  the  intent  that  such 
commoditie  as  may  chaunce  to  arise  thereof,  after  the  charges  borne,  may  be  converted 
towards  the  reparation  of  the  havens  and  strength  of  the  Realme,  and  towards  such  other 
publique  good  workes'  (Ashton  1898,  p223).  Revenue  from  this  lottery  and  the  ones 
following  it  did  indeed  benefit  the  realm,  paying  for  the  supply  of  water  to  London,  the 
building  of  the  first  Westminster  Bridge  and  the  creation  of  public  libraries.  The  interests 
of  the  realm  abroad  were  also  greatly  advanced  by  the  lottery-  as  British  colorusts 
struggled  to  create  the  New  World,  British  subjects  in  the  old  helped  to  ameliorate 
economic  hardship  through  participation  in  lotteries  specifically  designed  to  support  the 
colonial  venture.  Here,  buying  a  lot  served  to  further  the  glory  of  the  British  Kingdom 
abroad  and  this  time  the  appeal  was  taken  up  mostly  by  the  gentry.  Having  already 
invested  in  the  Virginia  Company,  they  played  the  lottery,  not  to  increase  their  fortunes, 
'but  to  enhance  their  status  by  following  the  example  of  great  noblemen  and  government 
leaders  already  committed  to  financing  overseas  colonies'  (Findlay  1986,  p13).  7hese 
'gamblers'  played  to  establish  rank  and  status,  less  concerned  with  the  possibility  of  profit 
than  with  the  honour  and  digaity  of  the  British  Empire.  The  colonies  became  the  public 
work  of  the  lottery  par  excellence  and  both  were  equated  with  the  greater  glory  of  the 
country  by  promising  that  'so  worthie  an  enterprise  would  enhance  the  Christian  truth,  the 
honor  of  our  nation,  and  benefite  of  English  people'  (Findlay  1986,  p  13). 
Since  they  played  an  integral  part  of  foreign  and  domestic  policy,  seventeenth  century 
Britain  was  'awash  with  Lotteries'  both  private  eux/  state.  Tickets  were  sold  everywhere  - 
in  barbers,  bakers,  newstand  proprietors  and  shoemakers  (Sullivan  1972,  p  14)  -  as  lottery 94 
fever  gripped  the  nation.  In  1698  1he  Lotuloii  ýI)y  decried  the  situationý  'The  Gazette  and 
Post-Papers  lay  by  neglected,  and  nothing  was  Pur'd  over  in  the  Coffee  Houses,  but  the 
Ticket  Catalogues;  People  running  up  and  down  the  Streets  in  Crowds  and  Numbers,  as  if 
one  end  of  the  Town  was  on  Fire,  and  the  other  were  running  to  help  'ern  off  with  their 
Goods...  '  (in  Ashton  1898,  p227). 
In  1694  il.  000,000  was  raised  by  lotteries,  in  1697,  L1,400,000,  and  then,  in  1699,  at  the 
height  of  their  popularity,  it  was  all  over;  an  Act  declaring:  'That  all  such  Lotteries,  and  all 
other  Lotteries,  are  common  and  publick  nuisances,  and  that  all  grants,  patents  and 
licenses  for  such  Lotteries,  or  any  other  Lotteries,  are  void  and  against  the  Law'  (Ashton 
1898,  p227). 
Ashton  offers  no  explanation  for  this  political  volte-face,  moving  straight  on  to  the 
reintroduction  of  the  lottery  in  the  reign  of  Queen  Ann.  It  is  in  this  Act  of  17  10  however, 
that  a  clue  to  the  cessation  of  the  Lottery  in  the  seventeenth  century  fies.  In  the  new  state 
lottery,  150,000  tickets  were  to  be  sold  at  LIO  each,  with  prizes  paid  in  annuities  (Ashton 
1898,  p228).  Such  ticket  prices  would  have  put  the  Lottery  out  of  the  reach  of  all  but  the 
wealthiest  sections  of  society  and  so  effectively  outlawed  the  lottery  for  the  poor.  Private 
lotteries,  with  their  unregulated  minimum  stakes  were  next  to  go;  proscribed  by  an  Act  of 
1721  which  imposed  a  penalty  of  L500  for  running  them.  These  'little  goes'  as  they  were 
known,  continued  to  run  illegally  despite  the  prohibition,  and  were  patronised  mainly  by 
the  poor  who  found  them  attractive  for  a  number  of  reasons.  Most  obviously,  they  were 
easily  accessible,  simple  to  play  and  cheap,  with  the  size  of  a  possible  prize  far  outweighing 
the  paltry  cost  of  a  ticket.  Furthermore,  as  Kavanagh  and  Dunkley  point  out,  in  a  rigid 
social  and  economic  system  in  which,  despite  its  ideology  of  meritocracy,  little  genuine 
opportunity  for  advancement  through  effort  or  talent  existed,  sudden  wealth  through  a 
lottery  win  appeared  to  the  lower  orders  as  a  viable  means  -  perhaps  their  only  means  -  of 
material  advancement.  Dunkley  notes  that  by  the  eighteenth  century,  the  ideological  basis 
for  prevailing  social  divisions  had  been  sufficiently  weakened  to  encourage  'mobility 
aspirations'  among  the  Third  Estate  (Dunkley  1985,  p222).  However,  the  material 
framework  for  realising  these  aspirations  was  not  correspondingly  advanced,  and  so  a 
chasm  between  ambitions  and  the  means  of  achieving  them  opened  up.  Into  this  gap,  the gi 
lottery  appeared,  and  sustained  the  dream  -  crushed  in  more  com"entional  economic  arenas 
-  of  social  mobility.  So,  the  poor  played  in  the  hope  of  relieving  their  living  conditions  by  a 
spectacular  win,  spuming  the  bourgeois  equation  of  hard  work  and  modest  wealth  in 
favour  of  the  possibility  of  instant  riches.  The  legislation  against  lotteries  can  be  seen  then 
as  an  attempt  by  the  bourgeoisie  to  re-impose  their  values  of  hard  work  and  material 
abstinence  on  the  'depraved  poor'.  The  statutes  also  represented  an  attempt  to  maintain  a 
social  order  whose  stability  was  symbolical-ly  threatened  by  the  lottery's  creation  of 
overnight  wealth.  As  Kavanagh  describes  it:  'For  the  bourgeoisie,  the  spectacle  of  so  rapid 
a  social  promotion  amounted  to  a  scandalous  undermining  of  the  whole  equation  of  wealth 
and  merit  at  the  centre  of  their  ever  more  triumphant  ideology'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p6O). 
The  legislature  of  the  eighteenth  century  echoed  sentiments  expressed  in  papers  like  The 
London  Spy:  'Parliament  could  not  have  given  the  Nation  greater  Assurances  of  their 
especial  regard  to  the  Welfare  of  the  Publick  than  by  suppressing  all  Lotteries  which  only 
serve  to  Buoy  up  the  mistaken  Multitude  with  Dreams  of  Golden  Showers,  to  the  Expense 
of  that  little  Money  which  with  hard  Labour  they  have  Eam'd;  and  often  to  the  neglect  of 
their  Business,  which  doubles  the  Inconveniency.  The  Gentry,  indeed,  might  make  it  their 
Diversion,  but  the  Common  People  make  it  a  great  part  of  their  Care  and  Business,  hoping 
thereby  to  relieve  a  Necessity  of  Life;  instead  of  which  they  plunge  themselves  further  into 
an  Ocean  of  Difficulties...  '  (in  Ashton  1898,  p228). 
From  the  passing  of  the  17  10  Act  to  1824  there  was  no  year  without  a  State  Lottery  (and, 
although  officially  prohibited,  doubtless  few  years  without  various  private,  clandestine 
ones  too).  Although  such  lotteries  provided  a  welcome  source  of  government  revenue, 
Ashton  tells  us  that  'it  began  to  dawn  on  the  public  that  this  legalised  gambling  was 
somewhat  immoral'  (Ashton  1898,  p238).  Just  as  likely,  and  now  the  colonies  no  longer 
needed  support  from  the  mother-land,  it  would  have  begun  to  dawn  on  the  go"',  ernment 
that  other  sources  of  revenue,  such  as  taxation,  existed  as  a  more  viable  alternative  to 
lotteries.  So  by  the  nineteenth  century,  the  lottery  was  no  longer  seen  as  synonymous  with 
the  honour  of  the  nation,  much  less  with  Christian  duty,  and  was  regarded  instead  as  a 
thinly  veiled  instance  of  gambfing;  the  existence  of  which  undermined  the  honest  virtues  of 
hard  work  and  material  abstinence. 96 
in  1808  a  Government  Committee  declared-  'the  foundation  of  the  lottery  system  is  so 
radically  vicious...  that  under  no  system  of  regulations...  will  it  be  possible  for  Parliament 
to  adopt  it  as  an  efficacious  source  of  revenue...  '  The  purpose  of  the  lottery  as  provider  of 
state  revenue  had  come  full  circle;  in  1819  a  parliamentarian  moved  that  the  lottery 
'manifestly  weakening  the  habits  of  industry,  must  diminish  the  permanent  sources  of  the 
public  revenue'  (Ashton  1898,  p238).  Inevitably,  a  final  Act  of  1823  made  provision  for  its 
discontinuance,,  and  the  last  British  lottery  was  held  in  1826.  A  satirical  epitaph  ývas 
inscribed  on  the  hall  of  its  last  drawing- 
In  Memory  of 
THE  STATE  OF  LOTTERY, 
the  last  of  a  long  line 
whose  origin  in  England  commenced 
in  the  year  1569 
which,  after  a  serious  of  tedious  complaints, 
Expired 
on  the 
18th  day  of  October  1826 
During  a  period  of  257  years,  the  family 
flourished  under  the  powerful  protection 
of  the 
British  Parliament; 
the  Minister  of  the  day  continuing  to 
give  them  his  support  for  the  improvement 
of  the  revenue 
As  they  increased  it  was  found  that  their 
continuance  corrupted  the  morals 
and  encouraged  a  spirit 
of  Speculation  and  Gambling  among  the  lower 
classes  of  the  people, 
thousands  of  whom  fel-I  victims  to  their 
insinuating  and  tempting  aflurements...  (in  Ashton  1898,  p238). 97 
THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY  EXPLOSION 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  the  phenomenon  of  gambling  appeared  suddenly  to  burst  upon 
a  startled  society,  who  continued  to  reel  from  the  shock  of  its  almost  epidemic  proportions 
for  the  next  hundred  years.  This  was  a  manifestation  of  the  general  extrax"'agance  of  the 
Baroque,  an  era  that  Huizinga  described  as  characterised  by  the  'general  tendency  to 
overdo  things  . 
It  was,  he  wrote,  an  era  that  inspired  'visions  of  exaggeration,  of 
something  imposing,  overawing,  colossal,  avowedly  unreal'.  Most  importantly,  it  was  an 
age  immersed  in  play  for  the  'Baroque,  manifest[ed]  the  play  element  to  an  almost  striking 
degree'  (Huizinga  1949,  p182). 
If  contemporary  observers  are  to  be  believed,  the  nation  was  virtually  turned  upside  down- 
'for  the  spirit  of  play,  having  overspread  the  land  like  a  pestilence,  raged  to  such  a  degree 
of  madness  and  desperation  that  the  unhappy  people  who  were  infected  laid  aside  all 
thoughts  of  amusementl  economy  or  caution  and  risked  their  fortunes  upon  issues  equally 
extravagant,  childish  and  absurd'  (Smollet,  in  Ashton  1898,  p  15  5). 
'That  destructive  fury,  the  spirit  of  play'  (Neville  1909,  p38)  wreaked  havoc,  leaving  a  trail 
of  wrecked  careers,  lost  fortunes,  bankruptcies,  suicide  and  madness  in  its  wake.  Writers 
and  commentators  watched  this  'prophane,  mad  entertainment'  (Pepys,  I  January  1668,  in 
Latham  and  Mathews,  eds,  1976  vol  9,  p4)  sweep  the  nation  with  a  peculiar  combination 
of  fearful,  disapproving  fascination.  Gambling  was  a  plague,  a  disease,  a  curse;  but  most 
importantly,  it  was  madness,  the  antithesis  of  an  enlightened  society's  pursuit  of  reason. 
Cotton's  definitive  description  of  gambling  in  his  Compleat  Gamester  (1674)  articulates  all 
these  nuances  of  the  ambivalent  seventeenth  century  response-  'Garning  is  an  enchanting 
witchery  ...  an  itching  disease 
...  a  paralytical  distemper  which  drives  the  gamester's 
countenance,  always  in  extreams,  always  in  a  storm  so  that  it  threatens  destruction  to  itself 
and  others,  and,  as  he  is  transported  with  joy  when  he  wins,  so,  losing,  is he  tost  upon  the 
billous  of  a  high  swelling  passion,  til  he  hath  lost  sight  both  of  sense  and  reason'  (Cotton 
1674,  pl). 9h 
The  unprecedented  populanty  of  garn-ing  in  the  seventeenth  century  has  to  be  seen  in  the 
wider  context  of  the  growth  of  a  mercantile  society.  Increased  affluence  allowed  greater 
participation  in  games  previously  played  only  by  the  very  rich,  but  more  important  were 
new  notions  of  making  money  and  the  correspondence  between  the  dynamic  of 
commercial  development  and  that  of  games  of  chance.  The  speculative  nature  of 
commercial  transactions  was  recogrused  by  one  observer,  who  wrote  that  England  was 
'the  most  speculative  nation  on  earth  ... 
Nowhere  else  is  the  adventurous  rage  for  stock- 
jobbing  carried  on  to  so  great  an  extent.  The  fury  of  gambling  so  common  in  England  is 
undoubtedly  a  daughter  of  this  speculative  genius'  (Dunne,  in  Steinmetz  1870,  p129).  The 
growth  of  a  money  economy  created  a  standardised,  universal  measure  of  value,  and  as 
such,  its  place  in  gambling  was  central.  The  universal  equivalent  in  a  capitalist  economy 
became  the  universal  wagerin  games  of  chance.  The  eimmeration  of  the  world  created  by 
the  advance  of  the  money  economy  encouraged  the  belief  that  every  mundane 
phenomenon  had  its  numerical  counterpart,  demonstration  of  how  the  pnnciple  behind 
rational  calculation  could  easily  foster  quasi-mystical  belief  Books  of  dream 
interpretations,  linking  dream  images  to  numbers,  were  common  at  this  time,  with 
gambling  providing  an  ideal  opportunity  for  the  expression  of  both  these  connotations  of 
number.  We  should  note  that  there  is  no  contradiction  contained  in  the  increasingly 
numerical  seventeenth  century's  sustainment  of  these  apparently  antithetical  types  of 
knowledge,  for,  as  Cassirer  has  shown,  number  lends  itself  just  as  easily  to  rational- 
scientific  as  to  mystical  knowledge.  Whereas  in  scientific  thought,  number  appears  as  an 
instrument  of  explanation,  in  mythical  thought  it  is  a  vehicle  of  religious  signification.  In 
this  latter  formulation,  it  serves  to  sanctify  the  profane;  the  mythical  character  of  number 
thus  finds  meaning  in  the  realm  of  the  sacred:  'For  whatever  partakes  of  number  in  any 
way  ...  no  longer  leads  a  mere  irrelevant  existence  ... 
but  has  precisely  thereby  gained  an 
entirely  new  significance.  Not  only  number  as  a  whole  but  every  particular  number,  is  as  it 
were,  surrounded  by  an  aura  of  magic,  which  communicates  itself  to  everything  connected 
with  it,  however  seemingly  irrelevant'  (Cassirer  1953,  p143).  Number  thus  has  two-fold 
significance.  While  for  science  it  is  a  criteria  for  truth  and  a  condition  for  rational 
knowledge;  for  mythical  thought  it  is  permeated  by  'a  character  of  mystery  -a  mystery 
inaccessible  to  reason'  (Cassirer  1953,  p146).  This  dual  character  can  be  traced  to  its  very 
inception.  Just  as  astronomy  derived  from  astrology  and  chemistry  from  alchemy,  so 99 
arithmetic  and  algebra  stem  from  the  science  of  almacabala,  a  magical  form  of  number 
theory.  Frequently,  we  find  some  conjunction  of  the  two  forms.  dI  not  on  y  did  the 
Pythagoreans  stand  between  the  two  views  of  number,  but  even  in  the  Renaissance, 
alongside  the  scientific  Descartes  and  Fermat  we  have  Giordano  Bruno  and  Reuchlin, 
writers  who  subscribed  to  belief  in  the  'miraculous,  magical-mythical  power  of  numbers' 
(Cassirer  1953,  p144).  In  games  of  chance,  of  course,  while  one  (rational,  scientific) 
orientation  to  number  was  instrumental  in  the  development  of  probability  theory,  another, 
mythical  one  went  to  sustain  magical  notions  surrounding  gambling  activity.  On  the  one 
hand  then,  we  have  probabUists  like  Pascal  and  Hoyle,  on  the  other,  mystics  such  as 
Afliette  and  Marcolini.  Gambling  was  the  ideal  vehicle  for  the  expression  of  ail  this 
variation,  for  the  existence  of  number  was  central  to  its  dynamic-  whether  in  the 
calculation  of  wagers,  or  in  the  play  itself,  afl  games  of  chance  revolved  around  numbers. 
The  expansion  of  international  trade,  the  development  of  a  money  economy,  the  increase  in 
enumeration  and  the  concomitant  rise  of  a  numerical,  probabilistic  Weltanschauung  seen  in 
Chapter  One  was  conducive  not  only  to  the  theoretical  examination  of  chance,  but  also  to 
the  practical  enjoyment  of  the  aleatory.  A  reciprocal  relationship  between  games  of  chance 
and  the  development  of  probability  theory  prevailed  in  this  seventeenth  century,  with  the 
latter  being  disseminated  amongst  a  wide  lay  audience  keen  to  test  its  scientific  application 
at  the  gaming  table.  An  article  in  Ihe  London  Spy  in  1704  inadvertently  highlights  this 
relation  whilst  describing  the  dissolute  existence  of  gamblers-  'they  read  no  books,  but 
cards,  and  all  their  mathematics  is  to  understand  truly  the  odds  of  a  bet'  (in  Barnhart 
1983,  p27;  my  italics).  Predicated  almost  entirely  on  number,  gambling  encapsulated  the 
numerical  milieu  of  the  seventeenth  century,  as  well  as  embodying  the  speculative  nature 
of  the  commercial  development  of  the  era.  Guttman  links  the  growth  of  capitalism  in 
England  with  the  birth  of  modem  sports,  and  in  his  paraflel,  the  place  of  betting  is  central.. 
'The  readiness  to  wager  on  horses,  cocks,  beans,  ships  and  pugilistic  butchers  paralleled 
the  increasing  willingness  to  risk  venture  capital  in  the  development  of  England's 
expanding  industry.  From  the  eagerness  to  risk  and  wager  came  the  need  to  measure  time 
and  space.  The  capitalist's  ledgers  are  close  kin  to  the  scoreboard.  We  suddenly  enter  the 
world  of  the  book-keeper  and  the  bookie'  (Guttman  1978,  p60). 1  (X) 
As  well  as  embodying  the  speculative,  numefical  spifit  of  the  time.  the  activity  of  gambling 
was  universalised  by  the  involvement  of  money,  a  feature  which  made  its  eventual 
commercialisation  in  the  nineteenth  century  afiail  accompli  of  modem  capitalism 
In  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  the  nature  of  the  games  played  with  cards  had 
subtly  altered.  Out  of  the  games  of  the  middle  ages,  in  which  they  were  combined  in  melds 
to  form  significant  groupings,  cards  broke  free  as  bearers  of  number,  suit  and  rank. 
Significantly,  the  Joker,  the  representative  of  chance  and  destiny  in  the  medieval  pack,  was 
aH  but  banished  from  post  sixteenth  century  games.  The  rational  new  society  of  the 
seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  had  no  place  for  such  an  unpredictable  'wild  card', 
and  so  devalued  it  to  the  status  it  holds  now,  as  a  mere  replacement.  In  this  period,  games 
like  bassette,  ecarte,  loo  and  nap  emerged,  based  on  tricks.  A  trick  occurs  when  each 
player  plays  a  card  in  turn  and  the  best  card  -  either  the  highest  or  the  card  of  the  'trump' 
suit  -  wins  all  the  cards  played  in  a'trick'.  Often  a  trump  suit  may  predominate  and  may  be 
chosen  by  a  player  on  the  strength  of  his  hand  (as  in  auction  whist);  otherwise  suits  have 
no  order  in  the  capture  of  tricks  (Parlett  1979,  p2l).  Unlike  melds,  in  tricks  cards  have 
individual  merit,  and,  far  from  being  penalised,  sole  cards  are  now  actively  courted,  for  all 
tricks  are  won  for  their  player  on  the  strength  of  a  good  single  card.  This  recognition  of 
the  value  of  individual  cards  in  the  games  of  the  late  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries 
can  be  seen  as  a  reflection  of  the  increasing  individualisation  of  mercantile  society. 
Released  from  the  rigidity  of  the  great  chain  of  being,  individuals  were  increasingly  firee  to 
define  themselves,  not  in  relation  to  a  fixed,  traditional  place,  but  according  to  the  more 
fluid  dynamic  of  a  market  economy.  Just  as  one  exceptional  individual  could  rise  above  his 
station  and  enjoy  commercial  success  in  the  wider  world,  so  in  the  microcosm  of  games 
was  one  particularly  good  card  empowered  to  break  free  firom  its  dependence  on  others 
and  determine  the  outcome  of  a  game  according  to  its  individual  value. 
Out  of  that  'destructive  fury'  of  the  seventeenth  century,  three  distinct  but  interrelated 
forms  of  gambling  can  be  discerned,  occurring  as  separate  expressions  of  a  single  spirit. 
They  are  gambling  in  games  of  chance,  beuing  between  individuals,  and  speculating  in 
econornic  ventures.  These  will  be  dealt  with  in  reverse  order. 101 
Specu  ation 
On  Ist  January  1695  the  Bank  of  England  was  created,  and  from  that  time  on  'we  mav 
date  the  methodical  dealing  in  stocks  and  shares'  (Ashton  1898,  p243).  On  its  authority, 
companies  were  formed  and  their  stocks  bought  by  hopeful  adventurers.  Speculation  NNas 
rampant  as  new  companies  appeared  every  day,  optimistically  undertaking  projects  which 
had  defeated  science  for  centuries,  such  as  the  one  for  the  creation  of  a  wheel  for  perpetual 
motion  and  the  company  which  aimed  to  transform  quicksilver  into  a  'malleable  fine  metal' 
(Ashton  1898,  p249).  The  field  of  economic  speculation  in  which  the  new  mercantile  spirit 
was  played  out  was  part  of  a  general  entrepreneurial  risk-taking  Milieu  of  which  the  playful 
urge  to  gamble  was,  to  some,  clearly  a  sinister  branch.  A  contemporary  observer  depicted 
the  trend  rather  grimly:  'The  passion  for  gambling  reached  its  chmax  in  this  age.  A  desire 
to  build  up  a  rapid  fortune  and  contempt  for  the  slower  results  of  patient  industry  seized  all 
classes  of  society.  Company  after  company  was  formed;  scheme  after  scheme  of  the  most 
fantastic  description  rose  and  glittered  and  burst'  (in  Ashton  1898,  p227).  To  the  more 
conservative  of  the  era,  speculation  was  equated  with  gambling  which  was  equated  with 
chaos.  it  truly  appeared  as  if  the  world  had  been  turned  upside  down.  Describing  the  Court 
of  Ofivarez  and  the  artist  Veldzques,  who  ruled  and  painted  seventeenth  century  Spain 
respectively,  Gonzalez-Crussi  inadvertently  describes  the  entire  western  world.  It  was  a 
time,  he  writes,  in  which  'the  fates  of  individuals.,  or  of  nations  were  firmly  believed  to  be 
at  the  mercy  of  unintelligible  forces  that  passed  all  comprehension  and  were  neither 
foreseeable  nor  controllable'.  Reason  had  been  annihilated  in  this  'gigantic  court  of 
miracles',  and  a  new  type  of  individual  -a  'gambling  man'-  created.  'The  era  of  discoveries 
and  colonialism  had  bred  a  type  of  man  .... 
fit  for  paroxysmal  efforts  and  heroic  deeds  but 
incapable  of  the  quiet  tenacity  that  alone  could  save  the  country.  This  new,  seventeenth 
century  man  stood  holding  the  gambler's  mentality  of  win-all,  lose-all,  but  disdaining  as 
petty  and  mean  hearted  the  quiet  and  patient  effort  necessary  to  set  [his]  house  in  order' 
(Gonzalez-Crussi  1986,  p  179). 
The  speculative  energy  of  the  time  also  extended,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter  One,  towards  the 
creation  of  insurance  and  annuities.  Ashton  waxes  indignant  that  a  wager  on  a  possible  loss 
should  be  classed  a  lesser  evil  than  one  on  a  possible  gain-  'parado)dcal  as  it  may  appear, 102 
there  is  a  class  of  gambler  that  is  not  considered  harmless,  but  beneficial  and  even 
necessary'  (Ashton  1898,  p275).  Rapidly  expanding  from  its  application  to  manine 
insurance,  by  the  eighteenth  century,  a  form  of  speculauve  insurance  'which  could  be 
affected  upon  anything'  had  become  a  favoufite  form  of  gambling  (Neville  1909,  p  49). 
Anyone's  life  could  be  insured  in  this  system,  and  to  help  customers  make  up  their  mýinds 
who  to  'back',  daily  quotations  of  the  rates  on  the  lives  of  eminent  pubhc  people  were 
issued  by  Garraways  and  Lloyds.  In  1708  Taylor's  Ffiendly  Society  adverfised  the 
insurance  of  the  lives  of  adults  and  chfldren  with  the  logo  'longest  liver  takes  all'!  (Traill 
and  Mann  1893,  p  817). 
All  of  these  concerns  -  of  which  the  Mssissippi  Company's  devotion  to  colonial  expansion 
in  the  South  Sea  Bubble  was  the  most  famous  example  -  were  founded  on  credit 
speculation.  'Credit'  from  the  Latin  credere  -  'to  believe'  -  was  charactensed  by  'the  twin 
emotions  of  hope  and  fear'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p69)  and  founded  on  a  reversal  of  the 
temporality  of  wealth.  Previously,  the  foundation  of  any  representative  of  value  was 
(rooted  in  the  past  of  the  issuing  authoritys  actual  holdings  in  gold  or  silver'  (Kavanagh 
1993,  p86).  The  use  of  credit  reversed  this.  Here,  the  belief  in  the  wealth-creating 
potential  of  credit  would  be  the  foundation  for  the  creation  of  real  wealth.  So  'instead  of 
gold's  giving  birth  to  money,  the  dynamics  of  an  increased  money  supply  would  produce 
gold  and  silver  in  a  quantity  far  surpassing  the  value  of  the  banknotes  initiating  the 
process'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p86).  The  fantastic  degree  to  which  wealth  depended  on  faith 
was  satirised  by  Montesquieu,  who  ridiculed  the  Scottish  banker  John  Law's  revolutionary 
system  of  credit  and  the  illusory  basis  of  the  speculative  wealth  on  which  it  was  based.  In 
the  Persian  Letters,  two  mythological  figures  -  the  son  of  the  god  of  wind,  accompanied 
by  the  'blind  god  of  chance  5-  sell  air-filled  balloons,  saying  "'Citizens  of  Bettica,  you  think 
yourselves  rich  because  you  have  silver  and  gold.  Your  delusion  is  pitiable.  Take  my 
advice.  leave  the  land  of  worthless  metal  and  enter  the  realms  of  imagination  and  I  promise 
you  such  riches  that  you  will  be  astonished"'  (Montesquieu  1977,  p256). 
This  period  saw  a  dramatic  transition  in  the  locus  of  value  that  was  founded  ýn  a  shift  in 
power  in  a  capitalising  economy.  It  was  a  transition  in  which  the  economic  power  of  a 
declining  feudal  aristocracy,  represented  by  gold,  was  overtaken  by  a  mercantile 101, 
bourgeoisie,  whose  wealth  was  rooted  in  money-  The  new  foundation  of  ýk-ealth  is 
eloquently  articulated  by  Kavanagh:  'Money,  no  longer  a  lifeless  moon  only  reflecting  the 
true  light  of  gold,  was  recognised  as  a  demiurgic  force  thriving  in  its  own  moN"ement, 
(Kavanagh  1993,  p87).  It  is  such  a  'den-ýurgic  force'  that  Surly  in  Jonson's  A  Ichemist  refers 
to  when  he  compares  gan-fing  with  alchemy  as  two  magical  means  of  making  money 
'Give  me  your  honest  trick  yet  at  primero, 
Or  gleek;  and  take  your  latum  sapientis  [seating  paste], 
Your  menstruum  simplex  [solvent]:  I'll  have  gold  before  you 
And  with  less  danger  of  the  quicksilver; 
Or  the  hot  sulphur' 
(Jonson  1987,  p66-67) 
Within  this  new  order,  the  credit  system  was  precariously  linked  to  Wider  political 
interests,  so  that  any  news  of  political  or  economic  upheaval  abroad  could  send  the  price 
of  a  stock  soaring  or  plummeting.  As  such,  credit  was  'the  evanescent  illusion  of  Wealth 
ready  to  be  obliterated  by  the  next  roll  of  the  world's  dice'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p72).  Such 
vicissitudes  were  reflected  in  the  capricious  nature  of  the  stockjobber,  described  by  Ashton 
in  terms  which  made  him  virtuafly  indistinguishable  from  Cotton's  gamester-  'He  rises  and 
falls  like  the  ebbing  and  flowing  of  the  Sea;  and  his  paths  are  as  unsearchable  as  hers  are... 
He  is  ten  times  more  changeable  than  the  Weather...  '  (Ashton  1898,  p246).  LikeWlse,  the 
value  of  stocks  and  shares  could  fluctuate  wildly,  ever-sensitive  to  the  most  minuscule 
aberration  in  political  situation  or  opinion:  'Shares  which  the  previous  week  were  worth  a 
fortune  were  the  next  a  fatality  to  their  owners'  (Ashton  1898,  p271).  Bemoaning  the 
havoc  wrought  by  Law's  System,  Montesquieu  declared  France  to  be  at  the  mercy  of 
I  upheavals  which  plunge  rich  men  into  destitution  and  swiftly  raise  the  poor,  as  if  on 
wings,  to  the  heights  of  opulence...  The  man  who  has  just  become  nch  is  amazed  at  the 
wisdom  of  Providence,  and  the  poor  man  at  the  blind  inevitability  of  fate'  (Montesquieu 
1977,  p182).  The  result  of  such  an  unholy  unleashing  of  power  was  turmoil.  -  'The  nobility 
is  ruined!  the  State  is  in  chaos!  the  classes  are  in  confusion!  '  (Montesquieu  1977,  p245). 104 
Speculation  was  clearly  fuelled  by  a  thinly  veiled  spirit  of  gambling.  Stocks  "ere  a  gamble, 
and  buying  them  was  a  bet.  To  profit,  the  adventurer  had  to  pre-empt  the  'mood'  of  the 
market,  and  to  do  this  he  had  to  absorb  himself  into  the  aggregate  of  speculators,  for 
4-profitability  depended  not  on  what  the  investor  might  do  as  an  individual,  but  on  how  his 
choice  related  to  everyone  else's'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p96).  To  buy  was  to  bet  that  others 
were  about  to  act  the  same  way,  and  that  prices  would  rise;  to  sell,  that  they  too  would  sell 
and  prices  would  drop.  The  investor  was  thus  not  gambling  on  himself  as  an  indi,,,  -idual  'but 
on  himself  as  part  of  that  same  large  number  that  [had]  playfed]  so  crucial  a  role  in  the 
development  of  probability  theory  and  statistics'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p97). 
On  another  level,  speculation  encouraged  play  at  games  of  chance,  for  the  dynamics  of 
stock-trading  had  accustomed  individuals  to  handling  paper  as  a  representative  of  wealth. 
This  particular  representation  appeared  less  'real'  than  gold  however,  and  was  used  more 
extravagantly.  In  this  frame  of  mind,  it  was  but  a  short  step  to  carry  the  cycle  of  profits 
and  losses  sustained  in  the  economic  realm  over  to  the  equally  'unreal',  equally  capricious 
fluctuations  of  wealth  at  the  gaming  table  (See  Dunkley  1985). 
The  legacy  of  the  stock  companies  of  the  seventeenth  century  was  far  more  important  than 
the  success  or  failure  of  any  single  one  of  them.  For  the  first  time  they  called  into  question 
a  fundamental  belief  'that  wealth  somehow  stood  apart  from  the  volatile,  mysterious  play 
of  pure  chance.  It  was  the  breaking  down  of  a  previously  unchallenged  frontier  between 
legitimate  wealth  and  pure  speculation...  '  (Kavanagh  1993,  p85).  Fortunes  could  be 
doubled,  tripled  or  lost  altogether  in  a  single  day  simply  by  making  the  right  decision  on 
the  stockmarket,  by  buying  the  most  buoyant  shares  or  selling  the  least  popular  ones.  The 
relation  of  wealth  to  material  production  became  ever  more  distant  as  adventurers, 
investors  and  speculators  gambled  with  abandon  on  international  markets.  Credit 
speculation  shared  the  same  spirit  as  pure  gambling,  and,  when  unleashed  on  the  world, 
turned  the  seventeenth  century  economy  into  'an  enormous  casino,  where  all  were  obliged 
to  risk  their  fortunes  on  the  winning  combination'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p86). 10i 
Betting 
The  explosion  in  the  sheer  amount  of  gambling  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries 
was  matched  by  an  enormous  surge  in  the  'extraordinary  range  of  subjects'  for  betting  on 
(Stone  1967,  p568).  This  betting  was  a  different  type  of  gamblin-g-  usually  involving  wagers 
between  predominantly  aristocratic  individuals  on  uncertain  events  or  matters  of  opinion. 
The  'curious  mania  for  making  eccentric  wagers'  (Neville  1909,  p  103)  led  I  he  Connoisselir 
to  declare  in  1754  that  'there  is  nothing,  however  trivial  or  ridiculous,  which  is  not  capable 
of  producing  a  bet'  (in  11ibbert  1987,  p3  72).  People  lost  no  opportunity  in  placing  wagers 
on  the  outcome  of  undecided  events,  turning  the  minutiae  of  daily  life  into  tense  gambling 
situations.  Money  was  staked  on  'the  colour  of  a  coach  horse,  the  build  of  a  child,  the 
breaking  off  of  a  marriage,  and  even  a  change  in  the  weather',  With  betting  on  life 
expectancies  and  the  birth  of  children  being  especially  popular.  Mitchell  recounts  how 
'Lord  Merton  of  Evelina  could  scarcely  open  his  mouth  without  offering  odds  about  some 
trifle'  (Mitchell  1950,  p436).  One  of  the  more  grotesque  examples  of  such  wagers  is  the 
(somewhat  apocryphal)  anecdote,  attributed  by  Sifakis  to  Horace  Walpole  who  wroteý  'A 
man  dropped  down  at  the  door  of  White's:  he  was  carried  into  the  house.  Was  he  dead  or 
not?  The  odds  were  inunediately  given  and  taken  for  and  against.  It  was  proposed  to  bleed 
him.  Those  who  had  taken  odds  that  the  man  was  dead  protested  that  the  use  of  a  lancet 
would  affect  the  fairness  of  the  bet;  he  was  therefore  left  to  himself  and  presently  died  -  to 
the  great  satisfaction  of  those  who  had  bet  for  that  event'  (Sifakis  1990,  p3  14,  also  Ashton 
1898,  p  155). 
When  naturally  occurring  events  were  insufficient  to  sate  the  public  appetite  for  betting, 
artificial  ones  were  constructed,  over  which  considerable  sums  of  money  changed  hands. 
In  1735,  the  Count  de  Buckeburg  laid  a  large  wager  on  his  being  able  to  fide  a  horse  from 
London  to  Edinburgh,  backwards  (Ashton  1898,  p205),  while  'a  young  Irish  gentleman' 
had  120,900  on  his  ability  to  walk  to  Constantinople  and  back  in  a  year  (Ashton  1898, 
p163-171).  Such'matches  against  time'  were  common;  the  most  famous  being  the  wager 
of  the  Counte  d'Artois  to  Marie  Antoinette  of  100,000  livres  that  he  would  erect  a  palace 
(the  Bagatelle)  in  six  weeks.  In  a  feat  almost  as  demanding,  a  journeyman  won  a  bet  by 
riding  three  times  between  Stilton  and  Shoreditch  -  213  rrules  -  in  eleven  hours,  thirty-four 106 
minutes,  on  fourteen  different  horses.  A  similar  accomplishment  won  its  executor  f  16,000 
for  covering  fifty  miles  in  two  hours  (Ashton  1898,  p210). 
In  the  twentieth  century,  such  betting  appears  fascinating  in  its  quaint  eccentricity  and,  in 
what  appeared  trivial  and  insignificant  to  observers  at  the  time,  we  can  see  action  which  is 
highly  symptomatic  of  the  milieu  in  which  it  was  performed.  In  bets  like  that  between  two 
nobles;  five  to  one  that  King  Charles  would  go  to  Scotland  in  1641  (Stone  1967,  p568), 
we  can  see  the  development  of  probabilistic  awareness  of  the  world.  The  decidedlv 
arithmetical  nature  of  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  century  wagers  demonstrates  a  new- 
found  tendency  to  break  the  world  down  into  discrete,  quantifiable  units.  Concomitant 
with  the  development  of  mercantile  society,  and  paralleling  the  rise  of  a  'doctrine  of 
chances',  betting  behaviour  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  demonstrates  the 
emergence  of  a  probabilistic  LebensgeAhl,  in  which  worldly  phenomena  are  perceived  as 
numerical  entities.  This  enumeration  of  the  world  reaches  its  apogee  in  the  quantification 
of  the  categories  of  time  and  space  to  a  degree  of  precision  that  would  have  been 
unthinkable  in  agrarian  society.  Not  so  much  the  undertaking  itself,  but  the  description  of 
the  II  hour,  34  minute,  213  mile  journey  seen  earlier,  is  only  conceivable  in  a  modem 
society  which  requires  and  values  the  accurate  measurement  of  time  and  distance.  In  bets 
like  that  of  'the  young  man  who  undertook  for  a  considerable  sum'  to  pull  a  pound  weight 
on  a  mile  long  string  towards  himself  in  two-and-a-half  hours,  and  the  1500  bet  that  a  man 
could  travel  from  London  to  Dover  and  back  before  another  made  a  million  dots  on  a 
sheet  of  paper  (Ashton  1898,  p230),  we  see  the  numerical  reduction  of  the  world  to  the 
language  of  an  arithmetical  equation-  'take  x  quantity  y  distance  in  z  time' 
The  calculation  of  odds  begun  in  the  seventeenth  century,  was  the  beginning  of  a  trend  in 
which  numerical  values  were  assigned  to  opinions.  Fully  reallsed  in  the  twentieth  century, 
such  a  movement  has  resulted  in  the  attribution  of  number  to  opinions  on  phenomena  like 
films,  books  and  ideas,  lending  an  aura  of  objectivity  to  that  whose  origin  is  firmly  in  the 
mind  of  the  beholder. 
The  eagerness  with  which  so  many  people  attached  money  to  opinion  in  matters  of 
uncertainty  was  demonstrative  of  another  seventeenth  century  trend.  In  commercial  societ'y the  measure  of  value  was  no  longer  found  in  the  utilitarian  function  of  an  Item,  instead 
being  derived  from  its  motion  in  exchange.  Money,  the'universal  equivalent'  embodied  the 
potential  of  all  such  exchange  and  thus  was  the  ultimate  representative  of  value.  This 
peculiarity  of  money  could  be  displaced  so  that  as  well  as  being  a  measure,  it  could  also  be 
seen  as  an  allribuler  of  value.  The  ultimate  association  of  an  article,  event  or  even  opinion 
(however  trivial  or  worthless  in  itself),  with  money  could,  as  if  by  magic,  bestow  on  the 
former  the  value  of  the  latter.  This  transference  of  the  value  of  money  onto  various 
arbitrary  phenomena  was  concomitant  with  the  measurement  of  value  in  monetary  terms 
and  embodied  a  new  measure  of  legitimacy  in  mercantfle  society;  a  move  away  from 
chivalric  codes  of  honour.  As  Neville  put  it:  'As  a  means  of  settling  disputes  the  wager 
was  stated  to  have  supplanted  the  sword,  all  differences  of  opifflon  being  adjusted  by 
betting'  (Neville  1909,  p38). 
In  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  the  craze  for  betting  on  anything  was  a  means 
of  applying  money  -  and  hence  value  -  to  opinions  which,  in  an  age  of  dramatic  econonuc, 
political  and  religious  upheaval  had  become  unstable.  This  insecurity  was  particularly  acute 
amongst  the  old  feudal  order  who,  almost  daily,  witnessed  the  erosion  of  their  authority  by 
an  ascendant  bourgeoisie.  It  is  thus  no  coincidence  that  it  is  from  this  group  we  see  the 
most  extravagant  and  the  most  reckless  bets.  In  their  betting  frenzy,  we  can  see  the  actions 
of  an  insecure  class  attempting  to  validate  their  opinions  and  re-establish  their  authority  by 
ranging  themselves  behind  the  new  measure  of  value.  By  proffering  money  as 
representative  of  their  opinion,  they  made  the  latter  tangible  by  expressing  it  in  the  new 
language  of  commercial  exchange.  That  they  would  take  up  the  challenge  on  virtually 
anjlhitig  is  evidence  of  their  manifold  uncertainty,  for  such  easy  demonstrations  of 
confidence  in  fact  belied  a  profound  insecurity. 
The  aristocratic  response  to  money  at  this  time  was,  however,  ambivalent.  WMst  some 
declared  the  value  of  their  opinions  in  it,  other  groups  demonstrated  patrician  disdain  by 
squandering  it  in  huge  amounts  in  games  of  chance.  This  attitude  wifl  be  examined  next. 108 
Gambling 
Beginning  in  the  mid  seventeenth  century  and  continuing  throughout  the  eighteenth.  a 
gradual  demarcation  of  the  gambling  world  into  private  and  public  leisure  spheres  began, 
of  which  the  latter  developed  into  a  stratified  network  of  commercial  gaming  houses. 
During  this  period,  and  backed  by  various  legislature,  leisure  was  becoming  increasingly 
class  bound  in  its  submission  to  the  economic  imperatives  of  capitalist  development. 
Nowhere  were  these  developments  more  apparent  than  in  the  social  arena  of  gambling. 
The  Private  Sphere 
Private  gambling  was  carried  on  in  aristocratic  court  circles:  the  homes  of  the  nobility, 
exclusive  upper  class  haunts  like  Newmarket  and  Windsor  and  'Watering  places'  like  Bath 
and  Spa.  Tucked  away  in  private  social  spaces,  court  gambling  led  the  fashion  in  games 
and  constituted  an  exclusive  network  of  privilege  with  its  own  rituals  and  rationale  of  play. 
The  high  stakes  play  of  the  court  of  Louis  XIV  -  the  'Sun  King'  -  set  the  tone  for 
aristocratic  circles  throughout  Europe,  for  here,  gambling  'played  an  integral  part  of  the 
social  rituals  of  the  most  influential  groups  within  the  anden  regime'  (Kavanagh  1993, 
p33).  By  centring  aristocratic  life  on  the  court,  the  King  removed  from  the  aristocracy  the 
chance  of  proving  themselves  competitively,  and  so  reduced  them  to  idleness  and 
impotence.  As  a  result,  they  charinefled  'some  of  their  competitive  energies  into  an 
aleatory  area  in  their  everyday  fives'  (Dunkley  1985,  p  221).  The  degree  and  extent  to 
which  this  focus  absorbed  the  idle  aristocracy  led  to  Versaifles  itself  becoming  known  as 
ce  tripot  -  the  gambling  den  -  'and  indeed  resembled  a  casino'  (Mitford  1966,  p56).  The 
intensity  of  its  baroque  rituals  was  captured  in  Pushkin's  portrait  of  early  eighteenth 
century  France;  a  period  in  which  'nothing  could  equal  the  ffivol-ity,  folly  and  luxury  of  the 
French';  when  'a  greed  for  money  was  united  to  a  thirst  for  pleasure  and  dissipation, 
estates  were  squandered,  morals  foundered;  the  French  laughed  and  speculated  and  the 
state  was  going  to  ruin  to  the  lively  refrain  of  satirical  vaudevifles'  (Pushkin  1962,  p  18). 
A  'phenomenal  rise  in  the  stakes',  as  weH  as  the  frequency,  meant  that  'gambling  orgies  at 
court...  became  a  by-word  for  prodigality'  (Stone  1967,  p570).  Soficitous  hosts 109 
entertained  guests  all  night  with  games  like  pharaoh,  bassette  and  ombre,  games  based  on 
creating  sequences  and  combinations  from  the  suit  and  ranking  order  of  the  cards.  The 
fever  of  gambling  activity  led  to  a  situation  in  which  the  ability  to  play  the  most  fashionable 
games  was  a  prerequisite  of  entering  polite  society.  With  this  in  mind,  many  parents  hired 
cgaming  masters'  to  instruct  their  children  in  the  arts  of  various  games,  causing 
Montesquieu  to  lament  the  degree  to  which  gambling  had  become  a  measure  of  social 
status-  'Being  a  gambler  gives  a  man  position  in  society;  it  is  a  title  which  takes  the  place 
of  birth,  wealth  and  probity.  It  promotes  anyone  who  bears  it  into  the  best  society  without 
further  examination'  (Montesquieu  1977,  p  119).  In  England,  the  office  of  Groom  Porter 
existed  to  regulate  national  gaming,  and  more  specifically  to  oversee  prodigious  royal 
gaming.  The  Palace  soon  became  known  as  a  place  of  excessive  play,  where  the  King,  who 
was  (much  enticed  to  play  at  tennis  and  at  dice'  (Traill  and  Mann  1893,  p206),  would  lose 
L100  on  the  turn.  of  a  card.  A  keen  player,  Henry  would  announce  that  'His  Majesty  was 
out'  when  the  desire  to  gamble  came  upon  him,  'On  which  intimation  all  Court  ceremony 
and  restraint  were  set  aside  and  the  sport  commenced;  and  when  the  Royal  Gamester  had 
either  lost  or  won  to  his  heart's  content,  notice  of  the  Royal  pleasure  to  discontinue  the 
game  was,  with  like  formality,  announced  by  intimation  that  'His  Majesty  was  at  home', 
whereupon  play  forthwith  ceased,  and  the  etiquette  and  ceremony  of  the  palace  was 
resumed'  (Ashton  1898,  p47). 
At  court,  the  sheer  scale  of  the  spectacular  'leviathan'  bets  of  the  aristocracy  rendered 
their  gambling  both  very  private  through  its  exclusivity,  and  also  extremely  conspicuous 
through  its  prodigality,  making  it  a  baroque  form  of  Veblen-esque  'conspicuous 
consumption'.  The  size  and  frequency  of  court  wagers  quickly  passed  into  popular 
folklore.  A  Lady  Couper  refused  to  sit  down  at  one  game  when  she  saw  that  no-one  was 
playing  with  less  than  1200  a  hand  (Traill  and  Mann  1893,  p191),  whilst  in  France,  a 
Madame  de  Montespan  lost  four  mil1ion  livres  in  a  single  evening  at  cards  (Kavanagh 
1993,  p32).  A  welter  of  gloomy  prognostications  accompanied  such  flamboyant  acts,  With 
conservative  journals  like  ]he  Connoisseur  muttering  'we  shall  soon  see  the  time  when  an 
allowance  for  bet  money  wiH  be  stipulated  in  the  marriage  articles...  '  (in  Ashton  1898, 
P157).  For  Walpole  the  crisis  was  even  more  serious;  such  excessive  play  was  'worthy  of 
the  decline  of  our  empire'  (Hibbert  1987,  p313). 110 
These  dire  misgivings  were,  however,  unfounded  The  excesses  of  anstocratic  play, 
watched  with  such  foreboding  by  many  bourgeois  commentators,  was  indicative  not  of  the 
establishment  of  a  new  social  order,  but  of  the  frenzied  death  rattle  of  an  old  one. 
At  court,  gambling  was  more  than  a  simple  recreation,  and,  as  an  Important  symbolic 
activity  through  which  the  nobility  could  demonstrate  their  detachment  from  money 
(Kavanagh  1993,  p38),  ) 
it  was  in  fact  actively  expected  from  courtiers.  For  centuries  the 
existence  and  status  of  the  nobility  had  been  rooted  in  the  unquestioned  authority  of 
tradition,  heredity  and  honour,  but  in  the  seventeenth  century,  a  momentous  divide 
appeared,  interrupting  the  seamless  lineage  of  history  and  undermining  the  very 
foundations  of  aristocratic  life.  A  new  social  group  had  begun  to  emerge  whose  authontY 
and  status  were  predicated  entirely  on  the  anonymous  force  of  money,  already  ubiquitous 
throughout  society.  Everything  was  reducible  to  this  universal  equivalent,  and  therefore 
anything  could  be  bought,  even,  to  the  general  chagrin  of  the  aristocracy,  noble  title.  Thus 
a  fift  appeared  in  the  aristocratic  order.  The  traditional,  hereditary  Old  Guard  who  avoided 
all  lucrative  activity  out  of  a  profound  contempt  for  commercial  bourgeois  values  now 
faced  a  new  order  of  nobility  literally  made  of  money.  The  two  groups  represented 
antithetical  worldviews;  while  the  Old  Guard  linked  prestige  with  land  and  lineage,  the 
ennobled  bourgeoisie  saw  value  as  synonymous  with  individual  wealth,  an  equation  which 
earned  them  the  contempt  of  their  more  ancient  peers  (Kavanagh  1993,  p49-50). 
According  to  Kavanagh,  'these  wealthy  bourgeois  purchased  the  privilege  of  denouncing  a 
group  whose  explicit  value  system  recognised  no  merit  in  what  had  been  the  arena  of  their 
greatest  success'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p55).  Their  denunciation  found  focus  in  gambling, 
which  became  the  'scapegoat  of  everything  this  ennobled  bourgeoisie  chose  to  deny, 
condemn  and  repress'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p56).  'Traditional'  notions  of  honour  and  duty  - 
areas  not  yet  touched  by  the  pervasive  grasp  of  money  or  its  attendant  bourgeois  law  - 
became  arenas  of  symbolic  conflict  for  the  old  aristocracy.  Gambling  debts  were  not 
legally  binding,  therefore  the  gambling  contract  depended  entirely  on  the  wodd  of  the 
parties  involved.  Thus,  to  pay  one's  gambling  debts  demonstrated  the  value  of  one's  wor& 
'the  true  aristocrat  recognised  a  gambling  debt  as  binding  because  in  doing  so  he  was  not submitting  to  the  dictates  of  any  externally  imposed  law  but  acting  entirely  of  his  own  free 
choice'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p42).  Gambling  became  an  arena  in  which  to  demonstrate  status 
and  gain  prestige.  Knowing  how  to  lose  was  an  important  test  of  character,  and  sholAed 
one's  indifference  towards  money:  'high  stakes  gambling  was  an  important  symbolic 
activity  for  a  nobility  obliged  to  affirm  its  prestige  and  its  independence  of  any  firniting 
financial  considerations'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p42).  For  the  nobility,  such  gambling  was  a 
'metaphoric  substitution'  for  an  old  way  of  life,  and  by  playing,  the  aristocrat  showed  his 
allegiance  to  the  old  order  of  tradition  and  demonstrated  his  contempt  for  the  modem 
values  of  pecuniary  gain.  In  this  symbofic  activity,  'A  man  had  to  be  able  to  hazard  his 
fortune  on  a  turn  of  the  cards  as  coolly  as  his  forefathers  risked  their  lives  on  the  luck  of 
battle.  Card  tables  at  Versailles,  where  millions  of  l.  ivres  were  yearly  staked,  offered  a  new 
tournament  ground  for  blood  to  show  its  quality'  (Kierman,  in  Kavanagh  1993,  p44). 
These  grand  rituals  constitute  a  form  of  what  Veblen  was  later  to  call  'conspicuous 
consumption';  the  large-scale,  non-utilitarian  consumption  of  wealth  and  goods,  regarded 
by  those  who  engaged  in  it  as  a  mark  of  human  dignity  (Veblen  1899,  p68-102). 
Aristocrats  did  not  gamble  to  win,  but  rather  to  project  a  self-image  of  honour.  In  the  way 
that  the  upper  classes  participated  in  the  Virginia  lottery  scheme,  status,  not  financial  gain 
was  these  gamblers  motivation.  In  fact,  financial  interest  was  reprehensible  to  this  group, 
as  is  apparent  in  one  nobles'  warning  to  her  grandson  that  'to  playe  for  gayne  more  than 
recreation  illegitimates  all  good  meetings'  (in  Stone  1967,  p569).  Aristocratic  play  of  the 
late  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  can  be  seen  as  a  desperate  attempt  by  the  old 
feudal  order  to  reaffirm  their  rapidly  declining  position  in  a  world  where  'the  sway  of 
money  was  already  irresisfible'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p5  1).  The  following  exchange  between  a 
member  of  the  old  order  and  one  of  the  new,  illustrates  the  declining  legitimacy  of  the 
feudal  measure  of  wealth,  and  the  development  of  money  as  a  demiurgic  force,  no  longer  a 
reflection  of  the  'true  light'  of  gold.  At  a  whist  party,  a  woman  won  L2  1,  which  her 
opponent  paid  in  bank  notes,  whereupon  'The  fair  gamester  observed,  with  a  disdainful 
toss  of  her  head,  "in  the  great  houses  which  I  frequent,  sir,  we  always  use  gold";  "That 
may  be,  madam  11,  rephed  the  gentleman,  "but  in  the  little  houses  which  I  frequent  we 
always  use  paper!  "'  (in  Neville  1909,  p63). IQ 
Their  ostentatious  display  of  nonchalance  in  handling  large  sums  of  moneY  demonstrated 
the  afistocracy's  moral  superiority  to  it,  and  to  the  values  of  a  society  in  ýkhich  they  were 
increasingly  marginalised.  Mauss's  essay  on  1he  Gift  gives  us  an  insight  into  the 
motivations  behind  these  flamboyant  rituals,  or  what  Kavanagh  calls  'the  distinctively  anti- 
modem  underpinnings  of  aristocratic  gambfing  in  aticien  regime  France  (Ka,,  anagh  1993, 
p45).  In  it,  Mauss  describes  the  'gift'  economies  of  archaic  systems  of  exchange,  where  the 
function  of  the  exchange  of  goods  and  services  is  not  to  increase  personal  wealth,  but  to 
establish  the  giver's  merit  in  a  hierarchy  of  prestige  and  honour.  As  in  court  etiquette,  these 
exchanges  are  expected  of  participants,  for  in  spite  of  appearing  'voluntary,  disinterested 
and  spontaneous'  they  are  actually  'obligatory  and  interested'  (Mauss  1954,  pl).  Such 
behaviour  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of  the  ceremony  of  the  pollach  of  the  North  Amencan 
Indians.  Here,  a  group  displays  its  superiority  by  presenting  another  with  magnificent  gifts, 
which  the  recipient  is  obfiged  to  return  in  ever  greater  magnitude.  The  large-scale 
destruction  of  a  tribe's  own  goods  also  features  in  the  potlach,  and  serves  to  demonstrate 
the  destroyers  indifference  to  material  possessions  and  noble  distance  from  economic 
utility.  In  such  dramatic  ceremonies,  the  honour  of  the  individual  is  closely  bound  with  his 
expenditure,  for  'it  is  the  veritable  persona  which  is  at  stake'  (Mauss  1954,  p38).  In  these 
societies,  prestige  is  valued  over  economic  wealth,  and  the  system  of  pollach  is  a  means  of 
converting  one  into  the  other,  for-  'The  rich  man  who  shows  his  wealth  by  spending 
recklessly  is  the  man  who  wins  prestige  ... 
Sometimes  there  is  no  question  of  receiving 
return;  one  destroys  simply  in  order  to  give  the  appearance  that  one  has  no  desire  to  win 
anything  back'  (Mauss  1954,  p35).  In  this  way,  a  peculiar  kind  of  commerce  is  instigated, 
'but  it  is  an  aristocratic  type  of  commerce  characterised  by  etiquette  and  generosity, 
moreover,  when  it  is  carried  out...  for  immediate  gain,  it  is  viewed  with  the  greatest 
disdain'  (Mauss  1954,  p36).  In  this  system  of  'noble  expenditure',  wealth  is  'as  much  a 
thing  of  prestige  as  a  thing  of  utility'  (Mauss  1954,  p73),  and  an  individual's  position  in  the 
social  hierarchy  is  determined  by  how  he  handles  it.  'To  give  is  to  show  one's  superiority, 
to  show  that  one  is  something  more  and  higher,  that  one  is  magister.  To  accept  Without 
returning  or  repaying  more  is  to  face  subordination,  to  become  a  client  and  subservient,  to 
become  minister'  (Mauss  1954,  p72).  Mauss  explicitly  identifies  gambling  as  a  form  of 
pollach  and  means  of  gaining  prestige,  along  with  war,  hunting  and  wrestling. 
Furthen-nore,  a  Germanic  form  of  the  gift  relationship  -  the  wadium  -  displays  a  particularly III, 
clear  affinity  with  gambling.  The  contractual  bond  of  the  4aditim  engages  the  honour. 
authority  and  mana  of  the  individual  who  hands  it  over,  and  places  the  recipient  in  an 
inferior  position  unti-I  he  can  respond  in  kind.  Here,  the  words  weite  and  i4eiter, 
translations  of  wadjum  'imply  wager  as  much  as  pledge'  (Mauss  1954,  p6l).  Mauss's 
collaborator,  Davy,  makes  the  affinity  of  the  pollach  with  gambling  even  clearer  when  he 
likens  the  communities  that  practise  it  to  'big  gambfing  dens  where,  as  a  result  of  bets  and 
chaUenges,  reputations  are  made  and  whole  fortunes  exchange  hands'  (in  Huizinga  1949, 
p6l). 
The  aristocratic  gambler  of  the  ancien  regime  can  be  seen  to  be  engaged  in  such  pollach- 
style  behaviour,  where  the  heroic  dissipation  of  whole  estates,  jewels  and  money  displayed 
to  the  world  the  magnanimity  and  status  of  the  nobility.  While  they  were  engaging  in  this 
(noble  expenditure'  however,  another  type  of  economic  behaviour  was  being  practised 
within  their  ranks.  The  figure  of  Dangeau  -  eventually  the  Marquis  de  Dangeau  - 
epitomised  the  struggle  for  ascendancy  Within  the  aristocracy.  When  gambling  at  Court, 
Dangeau  was  hugely  successful  in  a  manner  that  was  the  'anthesis  and  nemesis'  of  the  truly 
noble  style  of  play  (Kavanagh  1993,  p54).  Dangeau  played  to  win  and  he  based  his  play  on 
rational  calculation,  thus  bringing  the  bourgeois  values  of  self-interested  accumulation  to 
the  gaming  table.  He  proceeded  by  'pitting  his  careful  study  of  probabilities  against 
aristocratic  opponents  for  whom  such  an  approach...  was  unthinkable'  (Kavanagh  1993, 
p55).  To  an  aristocratic  observer,  the  difference  in  style  was  startling,  as  Madame  de 
Sevigne  recorded:  ...  I  saw  Dangeau  play!  -  what  fools  we  9  are  compared  to  him  -  he 
minds  nothing  but  his  business,  and  wins  when  everyone  else  loses:  he  neglects  nothing, 
takes  advantage  of  everything,  is  never  absent;  in  a  word  his  skill  defies  fortune,  and 
accordingly  200,000  francs  in  ten  days,  10,000  crowns  in  a  fortmght,  all  go  to  his  receipt 
book"'  (in  Steinmetz  1870,  p90;  my  italics).  The  sense  of  the  player  in  aristocratic 
gambling  was  always  of  an  individualised  unit,  while  gambling  itself  was  the  personal-ised 
and  individual  conflict  between  each  specific  person  and  his  opponents.  Dangeau  was  well 
aware  of  anonymous  mathematical  probabilities,  and  of  the  notion  of  the  average,  and  in 
this  he  represented  the  end  of  the  old  feudal  order.  'his  willingness  to  reduce  himself  and 
his  opponents  to  faceless  permutations  of  a  mathematical  structure  signalled  the  coming 
universal  victory  of  the  scientific  man,  the  average  man,  the  economic  man'  (Kavanagh 114 
1993,  p64).  The  insouciance  of  the  aristocratic  gambler  was  the  incarnation  of  N)etzsche's 
allegorical  dice  thrower-,  a  romantic  figure  who  already  appeared  anachirornstic  in  a  A,  orld 
steadily  submitting  to  the  imperative  of  capitalist  organisation.  In  his  patrician  rejection  of 
economic  necessity  and  the  needs  of  the  workday  world,  the  aristocratic  gambler 
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continued  the  Platonic  tradition  of  play  as  a  non-utifitarian  activity  in  which  the  display  of 
human  values  -  in  this  case,  the  virtues  of  honour  and  nobility  -  were  paramount. 
ironically,  it  is  in  the  figure  of  the  aristocratic  player,  not  the  bourgeois  Dangeau,  that  we 
recognise  the  character  of  the  twentieth  century  gambler.  Although  Dangeau  represented 
the  vanguard  of  the  new  intellectual  paradigm  out  of  which  probability  theory  would 
develop,  future  generations  of  gamblers  did  not  go  on  to  copy  his  style  or  utilise  the 
insights  presented  by  the  doctrine  of  chances.  Apparently  oblivious  to  the  rational 
calculation  of  odds,  modem  gamblers  do  not  play  according  to  any  kind  of  objectively 
judicious  rules.  Unlike  Dangeau,  they  do  not  play  'sensibly'  or  conservatively,  and  above 
all,  they  do  not  (normally)  play  to  win.  The  play  itself,  and  the  demonstration  of  character 
and  nerve  in  the  course  of  the  game,  are  the  motivations  of  the  modem  gambler,  and  these 
will  be  considered  in  Chapter  Four. 
Commercial  Gambling 
In  the  conflict  within  the  aristocracy  we  see  in  rrucrocosm  a  glimpse  of  the  shape  of  things 
to  come.  In  the  wider  society  the  values  of  the  ennobled  bourgeoisie  were  already  a 
dominant  social  force,  visible  in  the  gambling  arena  in  the  development  of  commercial 
gaming  houses.  In  keeping  with  a  rigid  social  hierarchy:  'Englishmen  developed  a  stratified 
network  of  public  gambling  shops,  providing  a  milieu  for  betting  that  suited  the  larger 
society'  (Findlay  1986,  p29).  From  the  luxurious  rooms  of  private  clubs  to  the  'hells' 
tucked  away  in  taverns,  gambling  was  for  the  first  time  being  carried  on  in  a  commercial 
envirownent  which,  by  the  early  nineteenth  century  would  have  profoundly  altered  the 
nature  of  play  and  the  very  style  of  the  games  themselves. 115 
Clubs 
At  the  top  of  the  gaming  hierarchy  were  the  private  Clubs  which,  with  their  stnct 
membership  and  dress  codes,  were  reserved  for  the  exclusive  use  of  the  upper  classes  - 
gentry,  dandies  and  society  men.  The  licensing  of  public  gaming  houses  belonged  by  patent 
to  the  royal  Groom  Porter,  and  was  not  given  out  without  careful  consideration  of  the 
social  position  of  the  applicant.  Licenses  were  sometimes  given  to  courtiers  and  peers, 
who  it  seemed,  had  an  almost  undeniable  fight  to  run  a  gaming  house,  some  of  them  using 
a  portion  of  their  town  houses  for  this  purpose  (Burke  1941,  p49).  Play  at  houses  and 
clubs  such  as  these  was  a  private  affair,  and  therefore,  like  the  nobility,  not  subject  to  the 
law  (Burke  194  1,  p9  1). 
Ashton  describes  'all  the  wit  and  gaiety  and  excitement'  contained  within  the  'magnificent 
rooms'  of  the  'luxurious  clubs'  like  Whites,  Crockfords  and  Almacks  (Ashton  1898,  p  13  1  ). 
Legally  at  least,  gambling  was  not  the  sole  focus  of  these  places,  although  'in  reality,  the 
social  life  of  the  clubs  revolved  around  the  gaming  tables.  According  to  Steinmetz:  'Good 
meats;  good  cooking  and  good  wines,  given  gratis  and  plenteously  at  these  houses,  drew 
many  to  them  at  first  for  the  sake  of  the  society...  '  (Steinmetz  1870,  p388).  Opened  in 
1698,  Whites  attracted  the  wealthiest  nobles  of  the  day  and,  whilst  offering  popular  games 
like  hazard  and  bassette. 
)  also  oversaw  private  bets  between  individual  members  on 
subjects  ranging  from  politicians'  longevity  to  the  likelihood  of  contracting  venereal 
disease!.  The  Almack  Club  (1764)  strived  for  even  greater  exclusivity-  to  join  'no  name 
that  was  not  socially  perfect  could  pass  and  no  second  application  was  possible'  (Burke 
1941,  p42).  It  is  amongst  the  elite  of  the  Clubs  that  we  see  the  establishment  of  minimum 
and  maximum  stakes.  Those  playing  the  new  guinea  table  were  required  to  keep  at  least 
fifty  guineas  before  them,  at  the  twenty  table,  no  less  than  twenty  (Ashton  1898,  p9l). 
By  the  nineteenth  century,  Crockfords  was  recognised  as  the  most  exclusive  and  popular 
club  of  its  time,  offering  a  variety  of  games  to  nobles  who,  two  centuries  earlier,  would 
have  been  playing  their  high  stakes  hands  in  private  gambles  at  court.  'Leviathan'  bets  still 
went  on  -  whole  estates  were  lost  in  a  single  night  at  Crockfords.  In  a  legendary  seven 
hour  hazard  game,  Lords  Rivers,  Sefton  and  Grenville  each  lost  the  equivalent  of  half  a 116 
million  pounds  (Sifakis  1990,  p147).  Such  excess  %kas  tvpical  in  the  seý'enteenth  and 
eighteenth  centufies,  Burke  tells  us,  and  in  his  description  of  the  social  whirl  -  -the 
promiscuity  of  Club-life'  -  we  recognise  a  glimmer  of  the  ambience  of  our  modem  casino. 
The  rooms  of  the  club  would  be  open  for  dinner,  but  its  real  life  came  at  a  later  hour'  when 
$superb  suppers,  with  noble  wines,  were  servedwrithout  charge'.  After  supper,  dancing  and 
gambling  would  go  on  all  night,  with  the  supper  table  'cleared  and  re-set  half  a  dozen 
times  between  midnight  and  morning'  (Burke  1941,  p92).  It  was  common  for  parties  to  sit 
at  the  hazard  table  'through  a  night,  the  whole  of  the  next  day,  the  following  rught  and  up 
to  noon  of  the  second  day,  tifing  out  three  shifts  of  waiters...  At  the  same  clubs  the  players 
wore  a  special  costume.  To  save  damage  to  their  fine  clothes  they  put  on  ftieze  coats  and  a 
sort  of  leather  mitten  to  protect  their  cuffs...  they  also  wore  broad  brimmed  straw  hats  and, 
to  prevent  opponents  from  guessing  by  their  expressions  what  sort  of  cards  they  were 
backing,  the  hats  were  fitted  with  tassels  which  hung  before  the  eyes'  (Burke  194  1,  p77,8). 
'Hells' 
As  the  upper  classes  played  in  luxurious  surroundings,  the  rnýiddle  and  lower  orders 
experienced  a  very  different  world  of  gambling.  What  was  tolerated  as  legitimate 
entertainment  for  the  rich  was  considered  unsuitable  for  the  rest  of  society,  and  so 
attempts  were  made  to  restrict  and  control  the  playing  of  games  of  chance  amongst  the 
poor.  Such  attempts  had  been  enshrined  in  legislation  since  the  time  of  Henry  VIII,  when  a 
statute  confined  gaming  to  Christmas  when,  assurrung  the  lower  orders  would  be 
celebrating  anyway,  its  disruptive  effects  would  be  minimal.  This  Act  stated  that  'no 
manner  of  artificer  ...  apprentice,  labourer,  or  any  serving  man,  shall  from  the  said  feast  of 
the  Nativity  of  St  John  Baptist,  play  at  the  tables,  tennis,  dice,  cards...  or  any  unlawful 
game,  under  the  pain  of  xxs  to  be  forfeit  for  any  time'  (in  Ashton  1898,  p60).  In  the 
eighteenth  century,  a  flurry  of  legislation  removed  gambling  even  further  from  the  reach  of 
the  poor  by  imposing  taxes  on  gaming  instruments;  sixpence  on  a  pack  of  cards  and  five 
shillings  on  a  pair  of  dice.  Swift  observed  the  desired  result  in  his  Jounial,  writing  that 
'Cards  are  very  dear,  which  spoils  small  gamesters'  (Swift,  in  Traill  and  Mann  1893, 
p817).  This  was  followed  by  another  statute  which  outlawed  specific  games  and,  while 
penalising  the  owners  of  public  gaming  houses,  excused  the  play  of  the  rich-  'The  games forbidden  are  Ace  of  Hearts,  Faro,  Bassett  and  Hazard,  excelm  itt  RQva/  Palace.  v*  (in 
Ashton  1898,  p59,  my  italics).  These  later  prohibitions  should  be  seen  within  the  general 
eighteenth  century  condemnation  of  excess,  which  had  special  resonance  for  the  actj,,  -ities 
of  the  lower  orders.  In  the  rational  society  of  the  Erdightenment,  the  threat  of  disorder  - 
desodrý  -  posed  by  gamblers,  was  regarded  as  particularly  acute  from  gamblers  of  the 
lower  classes.  As  well  as  disrupting  the  health  of  the  individual  player,  gambling  was 
feared  to  disrupt  the  well-being  of  the  social  order,  encouraging  the  indiscnrrunate 
mingling  of  the  classes  and  undermýining  the  orderly  social  values  and  thrift  and  family 
loyalty.  The  effects  of  gambling  on  poor  famihes  were  especially  ruinous,  for  such  famýilies, 
reduced  to  destitution  by  the  reckless  play  of  their  breadwinners,  would  be  unable  to  pay 
their  taxes  and  so  become  a  burden  on  the  state.  The  fým=ifial  cohesion  of  the  lower  orders 
was  thus  regarded  as  a  particularly  pressing  moral  problem  in  the  eighteenth  century,  and 
one  which  the  activity  of  gambling  had  a  particularly  negative  role  in.  It  was  in  this  climate 
that  concerted  efforts  to  restrict  working  class  gaming  were  made,  resulting  in  the 
increasing  stratification  of  the  gambling  economy.  In  this  period,  the  vast  amount  of 
privately  owned  land  and  the  declining  availability  of  public  space  made  leisure  increasingly 
class  bound.  The  outcome  of  such  a  spatial  segregation  was  a  shrinking  of  public  space 
which  pushed  the  poor  into  ever-smaller  and  less  visible  areas  (Cunningham  1980,  p84). 
Excluded  ftorn  Clubs,  and  with  cards  and  dice  kept  artificially  expensive,  they  were  forced 
to  gamble  in  illegal  taverns  and  in  lotteries.  With  their  cheap,  easily-available  tickets,  the 
latter  were  immediately  accessible  to  all  but  the  most  impoverished,  and  offered  the  hope 
of  unimaginable  riches  for  a  minimal  stake.  Meanwhile,  in  unlicensed  alehouses  and  coffee 
shops,  cards  and  dice  were  played  with  'enthusiasm  and  vigour'  throughout  the  land 
(Mtchell  and  Leys  1950,  p305).  In  their  small,  dimly  lit  interiors,  the  stakes  were  low,  and 
anyone  could  play  with  only  a  minimal  bet.  Not  being  clubs,  these  'Sdver  liells'  were 
illegal  and  liable  to  be  raided  at  any  time  and  their  owners  imprisoned.  The  need  for 
concealment  was  pressing,  and  so  these  clandestine  houses  often  had  four  or  five  doors 
separating  them  from  the  outside  world.  Grilles,  secret  passages  and  watchdogs  made  the 
gaming  room  deep  in  the  interior  aH  but  inaccessible  to  the  initiate  (Burk-e  194  1,  p9  I).  The 
contrast  with  the  plush  opulence  of  the  Clubs  is  stark,  as  Cotton's  unsavoury  depiction  of 
an  eighteenth  century  hell  testifies:  'The  day  being  shut  in  you  may  properly  compare  this 
place  to  these  Countries  which  lye  far  to  the  North,  where  it  is  as  clear  at  nudnight  as  at IIx 
raidday...  This  is  the  time  when  ravenous  beasts  usually  seek  their  pre),  '  (Cotton,  1674. 
p6).  The  'ravenous  beasts'  to  which  Cotton  is  referring  are  the  professional  cheats  and 
robbers  that  made  up  the  cfiminal  underworld  of  the  gambling  scene.  Unobserved  and 
unregulated  by  the  law,  these  illegal  taverns  were  home  to  a  hierarchy  of  card  sharps  - 
'takers-up',  'versers'  and  'robbers'  -  practised  in  the  various  techniques  by  xNhich  an 
honest  player  -a  'cousin  1)  -  could  be  relieved  of  his  money.  The  clandestine  goings-on  in 
these  hells  frequently  made  the  operation  of  chance  a  mere  secondary  consideration  in  the 
outcome  of  a  game  (See  Judges  1965).  Despite  the  differences  in  appearances  and 
organisations,  the  games  played  in  hells  and  Clubs  were  surprisingly  similar.  Although 
played  for  lower  stakes,  hazard,  primero  and  whist  were  as  popular  in  private  refinement 
as  they  were  in  sequestered  squalor.  More  straightforward  games  such  as  four-of-a-kind 
and  tabu,  which  Pablillos,  the  hero  of  the  seventeenth  century  novel  The  SwItufler, 
successfuHy  cheated  players  with,  were  also  popular  in  rural  distncts. 
Stratification 
By  the  eighteenth  century,  a  clear  social  stratification  with  Clubs  at  one  pole  and  hells  and 
lotteries  at  the  other,  had  emerged.  A  world  of  difference  distinguished  the  conspicuous, 
leviathan  bets  of  the  aristocracy  from  the  modest,  clandestine  play  of  the  poor,  for 
generally,  the  classes  played  different  games  and  had  different  motivations  for  pla)-ing 
them.  Although  the  lower  classes  did  play  cards,  and  the  wealthy  did  participate  in  the 
lottery,  by  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  a  broad  class  allegiance  to  specific  forms  of 
play  had  emerged,  with  the  gambling  of  the  upper  classes  characterised  by  high  stakes  card 
play  at  court  and  in  private  clubs,  and  that  of  the  lower  classes  compnsed  of  a  majority  of 
gamblers  who  pinned  their  hopes  on  the  lottery.  While  the  conspicuous  dissipation  of 
wealth  by  the  aristocracy  demonstrated  the  latter's  indifference  to  money,  the  engagement 
of  the  poor  in  the  lottery  was  a  contract  whose  sole  aim  was  the  pursuit  of  wealth.  For  a 
minimal  stake,  they  hoped  to  reap  great  riches,  and  aspire  to  a  social  mobility  that  was 
denied  them  through  more  convenfional  economic  means.  So,  as  the  rich  proved  their 
status  through  their  losses  at  cards,  the  poor  hoped  to  improve  iheirs  by  winruing  the 
lottery.  This  stratification  left  an  indelible  mark  on  the  physiognomy  of  play,  traces  of 
which  are  still  evident  in  the  gambling  economy  of  today,  as  we  will  see  in  Chapter  Three. 119 
For  the  moment  however,  we  should  note  that  even  ýýhile  it  was  at  its  height,  this 
stratification  was  being  challenged  by  the  increasingly  powerful  force  of 
commercialisatioti,  which  would  bring  in  its  wake  the  equally  powerful  trend  towards 
demo,  cratisation. 
Commercialisation 
A  complex  division  of  labour  which  saw  the  employment  of  croupiers,  waiters,  and 
directors  developed  within  the  public  gaming  houses  and  Clubs  of  the  eighteenth  century 
as  the  economic  imperative  of  capitalism  extended  to  the  practise  and  organisation  of 
gambling.  The  amorphous  flux  of  individuals  wagering  and  collecting  money,  as  well  as 
those  actively  involved  in  running  games  of  chance,  at  this  time  gave  way  to  an  ordered 
collection  of  employees,  each  with  a  specific  function.  The  Genlleman.  -v  Magazine  of  1731 
outlined  a  list  of  seven  offices  'established  in  even  the  most  notorious  gaming  houses', 
These  included  'A  Director,  who  superintends  the  Room...  Two  Crowpees,  who  watch  the 
cards  and  gather  the  money  for  the  Bank...  a  Clerk,  a  Flasher;  a  Waiter...  '  (in  Ashton  1898, 
p57).  This  recognisably  modem  organisation  mirrored  the  changing  nature  of  play  itself 
Since  Clubs  and  hells  were  run  as  businesses,  gambling  was  organised  in  such  a  way  that 
the  house  itself  might  profit  from  the  money  wagered  between  individual  bettors.  This 
applied  to  all  ranks  of  the  public  gaming  hierarchy,  and  contributed  to  the  standardi.  5ation 
of  the  activity.  Although  the  games  themselves  appeared  the  same  as  their  privately  played 
counterparts,  their  nature  had  subtly  altered.  Instead  of  a  players  losses  being  the  gains  of 
his  direct  opponent(s),  now  they  became  incorporated  into  commercial  enterpnse  and 
partially  absorbed  as  the  gains  of  the  faceless  house  -  the  ubiquitous  opponent  in  el,  ery 
game.  By  interposing  an  anonymous  opponent  between  real  flesh  and  blood  gamblers,  this 
commercial  reorganisation  of  play  to  some  extent  depersonalised  high-stakes  gambling 
contests,  removing  the  element  of  face  to  face  confrontation  so  important  in  the  creation 
of  prestige  amongst  the  upper  classes.  The  introduction  of  percentages  and  house  edges 
took  away  something  of  the  excess,  and  so  expurgated  the  whole  notion  of  the  heroic 
'noble  exchange',  from  gambling  in  Clubs.  At  the  other  end  of  the  scale,  they  also  took 
away  some  of  the  cheating  from  the  hefls.  Since  it  denied  them  the  opportunity  to 
intervene  and  take  their  percentage,  it  was  not  in  gaming  houses'  interests  to  allow 120 
cheating.  Therefore,  efforts  were  made  to  elimýinate  all  'irregular'  practices,  %vith  rules 
tightened  up  and  harsher  penalties  inflicted  on  cheats.  In  these  ways  the  introduction  of 
commercial  interests  began  to  regulale  the  experience  of  gambling.  'evening-out  .  its 
extremes  in  a  process  that  would  gradually  make  it  more  homogenous  across  the  classes. 
'The  Sport  of  Kings' 
In  horseracing,  we  see  the  encapsulation  of  the  forces  of  commercialisation  and 
democratisation  that  were  gaining  ascendance  in  the  wider  society,  and  being  bitterly 
resisted  at  every  turn  by  the  patrician  legislation  of  a  steadily  declining  aristocracy. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  consistent  with  a  tradition  stretching  back  to  the  Assyrian 
Kings  of  1500  B.  C.  and  the  Roman  Emperors  of  the  first  millennium,  horseracing  was  the 
privilege  of  the  very  wealthy.  The  cost  of  their  upkeep  confined  horse  ownership  to  the 
upper  classes;  a  group  whose  over-riding  concern  was  the  maintenance  of  the  pnvllege  of 
racing  and  betting  on  the  animals  as  their  exclusive  fight.  In  twelfth  century  England,  the 
elitist  nature  of  the  sport  seemed  to  promise  the  indefinite  continuation  of  the  sltuatlorý  for 
racing  tended  to  be  a  private  affair  between  gentlemen  who  rode  their  own  horses  on  their 
own  grounds  (Ashton  1898,  p  175).  Under  the  Royal  Patronage  of  Charles  IL  'the  father  of 
the  British  Turf,  post-Restoration  racing  was  gradually  systematised,  with  rules  of  play 
laid  down  and  professional  jockeys  installed.  During  this  period  of  patronage,  racing 
appeared  more  than  ever  as  the  'sport  of  kings',  with  successive  monarchs  Charles  11, 
James  H  and  Queen  Anne  building  homes  by  Newmarket  racetrack  and  entering  horses  to 
race  in  their  own  names  (Ashton  1898,  p  179). 
However,  events  which  were  to  dramatically  change  the  face  of  racing,  turning  It  ftorn  an 
elite  pastime  to  a  mass  spectator  sport  were  already  under  way  by  the  eighteenth  century. 
The  role  of  popular  broadsheets  was  crucial  -  by  the  1750s  London  papers  were  carrying 
advertisements  of  major  meetings  and  news  of  results  to  a  wide  public  (Plumb  1950,  p  16). 
Such  a  dissemination  of  information  meant  that,  for  the  first  time,  it  was  no  longer  only 
owners  and  their  ftiends  who  were  privy  to  information  on  the  time  and  location  of  races. 
As  a  result,  huge  crowds  began  to  gather  at  races,  stimulating  the  demand  for  more  and 121 
larger  courses.  When  Tattershalls  came  into  existence  in  the  1770s,  betting  finally  became 
formalised  according  to  the  rules  of  probability.  No  longer  carried  out  man  to  man,  it  was 
now  organised  by  an  anonymous  bookmaker  according  to  set  odds.  Just  like  card  and  dice 
games,  racing  was  regulated  by  the  science  of  probability,  a  regulation  which  took  it  out  of 
the  hands  of  individual  upper  class  patrons  and  placed  it  in  the  public  domain  of 
commercial  interests.  The  proliferation  of  racetracks,  encouraged  by  the  spectator  -  appeal 
of  the  sport,  encouraged  racing  for  small  stakes  so  that  by  1722,  over  112  towns  and  cities 
were  holding  smafl  races.  Horrified.  by  the  erosion  of  the  exclusivity  of  'their'  ancient 
game,  the  aristocracy  resisted  the  trend,  and  a  tide  of  defensive  legislation  surrounded  the 
proliferation.  Thus,  because  'the  Great  Number  of  Horse  Races  for  Small  Plates,  Prizes  or 
Sums  of  Money,  have  contributed  very  much  to  the  Encouragement  of  Idleness,  to  the 
impoverishment  of  the  meaner  Sort  of  the  Subjects  of  the  Kingdom'  an  Act  of  1740 
insisted  every  race  have  a  L50  prize,  effectively  excluding  the  'meaner  sort'  fforri 
participating  (in  Cunningham  1980,  p  19).  The  very  integrity  of  racing  came  to  depend  on 
its  separation  from  the  lower  classes.  In  1674,  and  this  was  made  explicit,  when  a  tailor 
was  punished  for  racing  his  horse  against  a  planter's  'it  being  contrary  to  Law  for  a 
Labourer  to  make  a  race,  being  a  sport  only  for  Gentlemen'.  The  planteTwas  also  punished 
by  an  hour  in  the  stocks  for  the  crime  of  arranging  the  race  in  the  first  place!  (Findlay 
1986,  p22). 
But  it  was  all  too  late!  The  inexorable  march  of  capitalism  was  dragging  racing,  along  with 
cards  and  dice,  out  of  the  private  recesses  of  the  upper  classes  and  into  the  public  domain, 
and  no  amount  of  retrograde  legislation  could  stop  it.  By  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  democratic  coup  would  be  complete. 
THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY:  PLAYING  WITH  NUMBERS 
In  the  industrial  discipline  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  separation  of  the  spheres  of  leisure 
and  work,  which  had  been  ongoing  for  the  previous  two  hundred  years,  was  finally 
consofidated.  Such  a  development  was  particularly  evident  in  the  gambling  arena  which  at 
this  time  was  disengaged  from  its  surrounding  social  life  and  organised  into  distinct,  highly 122 
commercial  spheres.  The  casino  was  perhaps  most  representative  of  the  trend,  emerging  in 
the  second  half  of  the  century  as  a  collection  of  public  rooms  devoted  exclusively  to 
gambling,  away  from  its  earlier  formulation  as  a  dancing  saloon  and  sum-Mer  house 
(Yarwood  1993). 
in  this  period,  the  fashionable  watering  places  of  the  aristocracy  continued  to  be  popular 
gaming  centres  and  were  supplemented  by  the  development  of  a  series  of  resorts 
throughout  Europe,  in  which  gaming  houses  -  now  casinos  -  were  the  central  attraction. 
This  development  of  what  Turner  and  Ash  describe  as  a  decadent  and  extravagant 
'Pleasure  Periphery'  in  the  French  RiViera  included  Nice,  Cannes  and  Monte  Carlo,  or,  as 
the  French  called  them,  'the  World,  the  Flesh  and  the  Devil'  (Turner  and  Ash  1975,  p6l). 
Baden  Baden,  Bad  Homberg  and  Wiesbaden  were  small  localities  whose  deliberate 
expansion  turned  them  from  health  spas  into  gambling  resorts  (a  process  which  would  be 
perfected  in  the  twentieth  century  in  Las  Vegas) 
.4 
Mthough  generally  exclusive  -  Monte 
Carlo  was  known  as  the  'pleasure  reserve'  of  the  aristocracy  (Turner  and  Ash  1975,  p64)  - 
the  commercialism  of  at  least  some  of  these  resorts  bore  witness  to  some  degree  of 
democratisation.  In  Bad  Homberg  and  Wiesbaden  the  great  mass  of  visitors  were  of  the 
middle  and  lower  middle  classes,  'leavened  by  very  few  celebrities  and  persons  of  genuine 
distinction'  (Steinmetz  1870,  p213).  In  this  eTa  of  commercial  gambling,  Steinmetz 
noticed  with  disapproval  that  'the  general  run  of  guests  is  by  no  means  remarkable  for 
birth,  wealth  or  respectability'  (Steinmetz  1890,  p213). 
I  In  the  description  of  the  interior  of  one  of  these  nineteenth  century  'temples 
,  we 
immediately  recognise  the  experience  of  the  modem  casino:  'On  entering,  the  eye  is  at 
once  dazzled  by  the  blaze  of  fights  from  chandeliers  of  magnificent  dimensions,  of  lamps, 
lustres  and  sconces.  The  ceiling  and  borders  set  off  into  compartments,  showered  over 
with  arabesques,  the  Oded  pillars,  the  moving  mass  of  promenaders,  the  endless  labyrinth 
of  human  beings  assembled  from  every  region  in  Europe,  the  costly  dresses,  repeated  by  a 
host  of  mirrors,  all  this  combined  which  the  eye  conveys  to  the  brain  in  a  single  glance... 
As  with  the  eye,  so  it  is  with  the  ear-  at  every  step  a  new  1wiguage  falls  upon  it...  the 
4  See  Russell  T  Bamhart's  history  of  these  gambling  centres,  as  well  as  the  111usthous  figures  who 
frequented  them  (Bamhart  1983). 121 
suppressed  buzz  of  conversation,  the  muffled  jingle  of  the  money  on  the  green  cloth,  the 
sweep  of  the  croupiers'  rakes,  and  the  ticking  of  very  ornate  French  clocks'  (Stelftmetz 
1890,  p188).  'In  short',  Steinmetz  concludes  'every  possible  antithesis  that  the  eYe,  ear  or 
heart  can  perceive,  hear  or  respond  to,  or  that  the  mind  itself  can  imagine,  Is  here  to  be  met 
with  in  two  minutes'.  And  yet  aH  this  was  no  Babel;  'for  afl,  though  concentrated,  is 
admirably  void  of  confusion...  '.  Through  the  'bfifliant  and  moving  throng',  crowds  of 
stationary  individuals  are  engaged  by  tables  that  'fascinate  and  rivet  their  attention'  so  that 
Eperfect  order  and...  deportment'  reigns  (Steinmetz  18  70,  p  166). 
But  for  the  existence  of  clocks  and  the  use  of  money  instead  of  chips,  Steinmetz's 
impressions  could  describe  any  modem  Las  Vegas  casino.  This  is  indicative  of  the 
dramatic  changes  which,  by  the  nineteenth  century,  had  transformed  the  nature  of  the  play 
of  commercial  games  of  chance,  overseeing  the  formulation  and  codification  of  what  we 
now  recognise  as  modem  casino  games. 
Just  as  the  economic  imperatives  of  emergent  capitalism  were  reflected  in  the  growth  of 
commercial  gaming  houses,  so  the  games  themselves  came  to  reflect  the  social  logic  of  a 
capitalist  system.  It  is  these  changes  we  shall  turn  to  next. 
Cards 
In  cards,  traditional  games  that  revolved  around  various  kinds  of  patterns  and  sequences, 
such  as  the  gaining  of  suits,  trumps  and  tricks  or  the  making  of  combinations  like  flushes 
and  marriages  in  melds,  were  being  supplanted  by  a  new  form  of  game.  This  new  style  of 
play  was  based  on  the  arithmetical  values  of  the  cards  in  their  properties  as  individual 
numerals,  and  forms  the  basis  of  all  modem  casino  card  games. 
Such  a  shift  was  made  possible  by  an  experiment  of  the  Woolley  card  company.  In  1884,  in 
keeping  with  the  statistical  spirit  of  the  times,  they  printed  the  numerical  value  of  each  card 
on  one  of  each  of  the  suit  signs  (Hargrave  1966,  p  189).  As  numbers  'poured  into'  the 
nineteenth  century,  so  they  poured  onto  packs  of  cards.  With  this  seemingly  trivial 
development,  the  face  of  cards  was  literally  changed  forever.  The  value  of  these  new  cards 124 
was  depicted  by  a  bold  unequivocal  number,  no  longer  represented  by  an  image.  'AhIch 
was  necessarily  more  ambiguous.  The  authority  of  the  number  ývas  not  open  to 
interpretation;  it  was  a  fact.  Not  only  was  it  instantly  more  striking,  in  the  new  style  of 
games,  the  number  on  these  cards  was  also  more  important  than  all  the  other  information 
they  contained.  In  games  based  on  the  speedy  calculation  of  number,  it  was  vital  that  each 
card  be  immediately  recognisable  to  the  player.  A  simple  digit  in  each  comer  met  this 
requirement  in  a  way  that  a  more  vague  pictorial  depiction  never  could.  Given  the 
commercial  environment  of  the  new  games,  it  was  not  only  important  that  the  player 
should  quickly  recognise  his  cards,  but  equafly,  that  other  players  should  not.  Until  now, 
the  backs  of  cards  had  been  either  plain  or  decorated  with  a  single  one-way  design.  This 
meant  that  they  could  easfly  be  marked,  or,  in  the  case  of  decorated  cards,  arranged  with 
some  backs  upside  down  to  distinguish  for  example,  high  cards  from  low  ones,  face  cards 
or  suits  (Sifakis  1990,  p57).  The  possibilities  for  cheating  with  such  packs  were  unlinuited,  - 
even  a  player  without  a  good  memory  could  not  fail  to  recognise  specific  cardsfi7om  their 
backs  after  a  while!  In  the  nineteenth  century  this  golden  age  of  cheating  was  ended  when 
companies  began  experimenting  with  uniform  back  designs  so  that  by  the  end  of  the 
century,  simple  two-way  designs  had  rendered  cards  indistinguishable  (Encyclopedia 
Americana  1990  vol  5,  p639).  These  twin  developments  made  cards  at  once  both  uruique 
aW  standardised.  As  instances  of  'the  same  kind  of  thing'  they  were  indistinguishable,  yet 
within  this  general  category  each  one  was  recognisably  the  bearer  of  a  specific  value. 
Similarly,  in  the  wider  society,  I'homme  moyen  was  characterised  by  his  representativeness 
of  all  others  of  his  kind.  At  the  same  time,  these  characteristics  came  out  in  individual 
properties  which  displayed  as  much  statistical  variation  in  their  particular  sample,  as,  say, 
the  individual  cards  in  their  particular  pack.  In  the  nineteenth  century  then,  both  I'homme 
moyen  and  the  new-style  cards  came  to  be  represented  as  individual  variations  on  a  single, 
standard  theme.  By  strean-dining  them,  the  numbering  and  standardisation  of  cards  was 
integral  to  the  development  of  new  styles  of  play,  loosely  termed  banking  games,  which 
evolved  into  casino  games. 
In  the  game  of  vingl-et-un  (which  later  grew  into  pontoon,  and  then  the  casino  game  of 
blackjack),  and  chemin  defer  (baccarat),  suits  and  court  cards  were  irrelevant,  numencal 
values  paramount.  From  their  regal  status  as  the  most  important  cards  in  the  pack  (many 12  ; 
beanng  the  image  of  their  owner),  in  baccarat,  picture  cards  were  dethroned  and  ii  Oven  no 
value  at  all.  A  similar  fate  befell  court  cards  in  blackjack  v,  hich  were  also  democratised  and 
given  a  single  numerical  value  -  ten.  Consonant  with  the  statistical  spirit  of  the  times,  cards 
in  these  games,  like  all  the  others  in  the  pack,  were  ordy  important  through  their 
representation  of  number.  Both  games  were  basically  arithmetical  exercises  whose 
principle  was  to  assemble  cards  whose  value  did  not  exceed  a  specified  number,  21  in 
blackjack,  9  in  baccarat.  Sifakis'  advice  on  splitting  strategies  shows  the  degree  to  which 
pontoon  and  its  later  incarnation  as  blackjack  are  pure  number  games.  'always  split  aces, 
and  never  fives  or  tens...  if  holding  twos,  threes  or  sevens,  split  if  the  dealer  shows  two 
through  seven;  holding  fours,  spht  against  five  or  six;  holding  sixes,  split  against  two 
through  six;  holding  eights,  split  against  two  through  nine...  '  (Sifakis  1990,  p35)  and  so 
on!  These  rules  are  evidence  of  a  level  of  complexity  that  would  be  impossible  to  achieve 
without  numbered  cards,  for  pictorial  representations  of  value  would  make  this  kind  of 
play  immensely  difficult  and  very  slow. 
With  their  emphasis  on  calculation  and  the  irrelevance  of  any  distinctions  other  than 
numerical  ones,  we  can  see  in  these  games  the  mirror  of  the  commercial,  statistical 
interests  of  an  increasingly  capitalist  society. 
It  was  not  only  in  card  games  that  the  dynamic  relation  between  games  and  society  was 
apparent.  The  early  probabilists  used  games  of  chance  to  develop  their  theorems,  and  their 
discoveries  in  turn  affected  the  games  they  experimented  with.  As  probability  became  more 
fully  understood,  the  games  it  was  apphed  to  became  more  complex,  so  that  games  and 
theory  developed  by  feeding  off  each  other  in  an  ever  more  complex  dialectic  of  theoretical 
and  practical  appfication. 
Roulette 
The  game  of  E-0  (even-odd)  was  popular  during  the  eighteenth  century  in  fashionable 
resorts  like  Bath  and  consisted  of  a  wheel  with  forty  cups  alternately  marked  E  for  even 
and  0  for  odd.  A  baH  was  released  as  the  wheel  rotated  and  players  wagered  whether  it 
would  fall  into  an  E  or  0  pocket.  Pascal  experimented  with  a  similar  ball  and  wheel  device, 126 
but  did  not,  as  is  sometimes  claimed,  'invent'  roulette.  The  game  as  %k  e  know  it  today  ýý  as 
actually  developed  in  the  nineteenth  century  when  the  French  addition  of  thIrtV-sIx 
numbers  and  colours  to  the  wheel  revolutionised  the  simplicity  of  the  original  game 
(Sifakis  1990,  p256).  The  impact  of  the  addition  was  enormous,  greatly  increasing  the 
variety  of  betting  available  from  one  to  ten,  with  different  odds  on  each.  The  player  could 
still  bet  odd  or  even,  but  now  any  single  number  or  combination  of  numbers  as  well.  The 
addition  of  numbers  made  roulette  a  far  more  exciting  and  complex  game  than  its  rather 
staid  predecessor,  and,  with  the  inclusion  of  a  zero  (two  in  America),  also  made  it  a  very 
commercial  one,  for  when  the  ball  landed  in  this  pocket,  all  bets  were  won  by  the  house. 
Dice 
Advances  in  the  study  of  probability,  together  with  the  imperative  of  commercial 
expansion,  also  transformed  the  ancient  game  of  hazard  into  a  faster,  more  streamlined 
version  known  as  craps.  Hazard  had  been  played  in  the  same  way  for  centuries,  with  a 
player  betting  that  he  would  eventually  throw  a  certain  number  with  two  dice,  throwing 
until  he  did  and  then  continuing  to  throw  until  the  original  number  or  'point'  came  up 
again.  However,  since  the  odds  of  certain  numbers  coming  up  before  others  vanes,  a 
competent  player  would  require  a  basic  understanding  of  probability  to  play  well.  Such  an 
understanding  of  averages  and  odds  in  relation  to  dice  simply  did  not  exist  until  the 
seventeenth  century,  with  the  result  that  most  bettors  did  not  comprehend  all  the  ways 
various  combinations  could  be  achieved  writh  two  dice.  For  hundreds  of  years  'A  hustler 
could  indeed  have  made  a  fortune'l  (Sifakis  1990,  p147). 
In  France,  hazard  was  known  as  Krabs  (after  the  Engfish  work  for  a  throw  of  two  or 
three),  later  corrupted  to  creps  or  craps  (Scarne  1974,  p35).  When  introduced  to  Amenca 
by  French  colonists,  a  modified  version  grew  in  popularity  among  black  slaves  in  New 
Orleans  and  took  its  name  from  French  craps  (Scarne  1974,  p39).  In  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  intricate  betting  odds  of  haza  d  were  reformulated  in  craps,  making  the  latter 
a  'far  more  mathematically  equal'  game  than  its  predecessor  (Sifakis  1990,  p78).  Hazard 
was  further  streamlined  into  craps  by  the  constant  addition  of  new  concepts  'to 
compensate  for  new  knowledge  gained  about  gambling  odds'  (Sifakis  1990,  p148). 12- 
Dozens  of  types  of  bets  now  became  available  to  the  player,  with  many  more  vari'ations  of 
each  type. 
With  its  multitude  of  betting  strategies  and  combinations  of  odds,  the  appeal  of  craps  as  a 
lucrative  commercial  game  was  obvious.  To  entice  it  into  the  casino,  further  modifications 
were  made,  which  changed  its  structure  yet  again.  A  small  charge  was  made  by  the  house 
whenever  the  thrower  made  two  or  more  passes.  This  was  known  as  a  Take-off  game. 
Next,  the  house  took  the  opposition  against  the  thrower,  so  that  all  players  now  had  to  bet 
the  dice  to  win  against  the  house.  A  simple  table  layout  bearing  the  six  and  eight,  the  Field, 
Win  and  Come  bets,  was  drawn  up  to  play  on;  exactly  half  of  the  table  layout  today.  The 
house  now  took  its  cut  'not  as  a  direct  charge,  but  indirectly  and  less  noticeably  bV 
offering  short  odds  so  that  it  gained  a  percentage'  (Scame  1974,  p4l).  A  further 
development  offered  players  the  opportunity  to  bet  the  dice  to  lose,  as  well  as  to  Win.  In 
effect,  every  bet  could  now  be  either  for  or  against  the  dice  or  the  house.  Betting 
opportunities  were  doubled,  and  the  craps  table  reflected  the  change,  changing  its  shape 
from  a  semi-circle  to  a  full  ovaL  with  one  half  a  mirror  image  of  the  other.  The  game  of 
craps  at  times  appeared  as  the  archetypal  game  of  probabiEty  theory,  with  its  complex 
permutations  of  odds,  pay-offs  and  house  percentages,  a  working  (or  rather  playing) 
example  of  a  theoretical  construction. 
Gaming  machines 
One  of  the  most  significant  developments  of  the  nineteenth  century  was  the  introduction  of 
gaming  machines.  The  Industrial  Revolution  of  eighteenth  century  Britain  had  laid  the 
foundations  for  automatic  gambling  when  a  London  bookseller  created  an  automatic 
vending  machine  in  order  to  sell  proscribed  literature,  although  the  introduction  and 
proliferation  of  coin  operated  machines  did  not  appear  on  a  mass  scale  until  the  last 
quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  (Costa  1988,  pI  1).  During  this  period  of  technological 
innovation,  the  automation  of  the  leisure  sphere  was  complemented  by  that  of  the 
workplace,  so  that  the  development  of  what  Costa  calls  'automatic  pleasures'  was 
symptomatic  of  the  automation  of  the  wider  world  of  the  late  nineteenth  century  (Costa 
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Being  bom  in  a  secular,  industrial  age,  the  ancient  image  of  divinatory  drama  which  ran  as 
a  leitmotif  through  most  older,  established  types  of  gambling  would  not  be  expected  to 
feature  in  this  young  form.  However,  slot  machines  did  manage  to  maintain  the  link  of  all 
gambling  with  the  sacred,  for  the  automated  machines  from  which  the  eafly  garning 
machines  drew  their  inspiration  were  originally  used  for  fortune  telling!  In  the  white  heat 
of  the  technological  revolution,  the  art  of  divination  was  not  made  redundant,  it  was 
simply  mechanised. 
Fortune  telling  was  automated  early  on  in  the  history  of  the  coin  machine  (Costa  1988). 
Around  1820  the  Great  Magician  Clock  appeared  and  'answered'  questions  put  to  it  by 
curious  bystanders.  More  machines  followed 
,  inviting  individuals  to  discover  their  future 
by  means  of  a  spinning  pointer,  a  card  dispenser  or  some  kind  of  animated  figure  (Costa 
1988,  p2l).  The  earliest  gaming  machines  utilised  the  principles  of  these  fortune  tellers, 
their  patents  stating  that  they  could  be  used  either  as  divinatory  devices  or  in  modified 
form  as  games  of  chance,  although  in  an  attempt  to  limit  their  appeal,  both  forms  of 
amusement  were  only  aHowed  to  return  tokens  such  as  cigarettes  and  chewing  gum  and 
not  cash,  as  prizes.  The  design  of  many  of  these  first  machines  was  simply  an  automatic 
adaptation  of  already  existing  games  -  hence  the  popularity  of  images  of  cards  and  horses, 
as  well  as  of  pieces  of  fi-uit,  from  which  the  term  'fruit  machine'  is  derived. 
In  Plate  Three  we  see  two  late  nineteenth  century  machines-  the  'gypsy  fortune-teller'  and 
the  'mysterious  hands',  that  were  used  partly  as  fortune-tellers,  partly  as  gaming  machines 
(in  Costa  1988). 
The  first  automatic  three  reel  machine,  or  (one  arm  bandit  '-  the  prototype  of  our  modem 
gambfing  machines  -  appeared  in  San  Fransisco  in  1905  (Sifakis  1990)  when  Charles  Fey 
developed  a  device  in  which  a  handle  was  pulled  to  spin  three  wheels  and,  if  a  winning 
combination  was  made,  a  stream  of  nickels  poured  out  into  a  tray  below.  The  one  armed 
bandit  (which  Fey  patriotically  named  the  Liberty  Bell  )  was  developed  in  a  rush  of 
pioneering  individualism  typical  of  the  Gold  Rush  state  of  that  time.  Throughout  the 
nineteenth  century  risk-hungry  Californians,  whom  Findlay  cafled  'people  of  chance' r 
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(Findlay  1986),  were  possessed  of  a  dynamic,  innovative  spirit  which  cuirmnated  in  their 
westwards  advance  across  Nevada  and  the  subsequent  creation  of  that  testimony  to 
American  entrepreneurialism  that  is  Las  Vegas.  It  is  no  wonder  then,  that  in  an  era  of 
technological  advance  ,  it  was  these  'people  of  chance  that  gave  slot  machines  their  final 
configuration  and  so  created  the  most  modem  form  of  gambling  device. 
Horses 
The  numerical  preoccupation  of  the  age,  along  with  technological  innovation  was  to 
change  the  face  of  horse  race  betting  forever 
The  role  of  newspapers  became  steadily  more  important  in  this  process  until,  in  the 
nineteenth  century  'the  demand  for  tips  and  news,  played  a  large  part  in  the  development 
of  the  popular  press'  (Cunningham  1980,  p  177).  Sporting  journals  devoted  entirely  to  this 
type  of  information,  began  to  appear,  with  Sporting  Life  *in  1863  and  Sporling  Chronicle 
in  187  1.  Furthermore,  according  to  Cunningham,  'no  less  than  half  the  evening  papers 
started  in  the  1870s  and  1880s  had  a  close  connection  with  sport  and  gambling' 
(Cunningham  1980,  p177).  For  the  second  time  in  history',  print  encouraged  -  and  was 
encouraged  by  -  gambling.  This  plethora  of  sporting  journals  fed  the  voracious  public 
appetite  for  information,  and  was  crammed  full  of  facts  and  statistics  about  horses,  races, 
jockeys  and  odds.  Aided  by  the  electronic  telegraph  system,  which  meant  the  press  could 
quickly  publish  results  and  starting  odds,  the  1880s  saw  the  development  of  large  scale 
organised  betting  (McKibbon  1979,  p  148).  In  a  move  which  the  aristocracy  would  have 
fought  bitterly  against,  railways  helped  make  horseracing  a  national  spectator  sport  by 
sponsoring  races  and  linking  towns  to  courses  (Cunningham  1980,  p159).  Meanwme, 
good  railway  communications  and  fee  paying  spectators  encouraged  massive  investment  - 
the  future  of  public  racing  was  assured. 
These  nineteenth  century  developments  revolutionised  racing.  Now  thoroughly 
democratised,  its  status  was  reversed  from  being  the  prerogative  of  a  nch  elite,  to  being  a 
massive  working  class  entertainment.  Under  the  imperative  of  comnlercialisatjorý 
S  The  first  being  the  dissemination  of  cards  from  the  fifteenth  century  printing  press. 1,10 
spectacular,  individual  upper  class  bets  had  disappeared  and  popular  betting  betAeen  a 
mass  of  punters  -  both  on  and  off  the  track  -  taken  over.  Such  bets  were  subject  to  strict 
odds-  the  chances  of  a  horse  winning  a  race  was  calculated  by  taking  many  vanables  into 
account,  and  expressed  in  a  numerical  equation.  Payoffs  were  equally  subject  to  S-tnct 
calculation,  based  on  the  amount  of  the  original  stake  and  the  odds  on  the  particular  horse. 
No  longer  a  simple  'gentlemen's  agreement'  for  a  set  amount,  betting  became  a-n  infinitely 
complex  contract  between  bettors  and  central  race  organisers,  relayed  through  a  number  of 
betting  shops. 
The  physiognomy  of  betting  now  changed  from  being  private  and  limited,  to  being  public 
and  widespread.  Whole  areas  were  permeated  with  this  form  of  gambling:  'The  streets  of 
our  towns  are  perambulated  by  bookmakers  or  their  betting  agents  inviting  persons  to  bet 
with  them...  Houses  or  shops  exist  in  large  numbers  in  all  towns  where...  the  real  business 
is  the  receipt  and  collection  of  betting  slips  for  some  bookmaker...  '  (Report  ftom  the 
Select  Committee  on  Betting  Duty  1923;  in  McKibbon  1979,  p  160). 
According  to  Nevifle,  the  first  betting  house,  owned  by  Messrs  Drummond  and  Grenville 
opened  in  1847,  and  by  1850,  around  400  existed  (Neville  1909,  p99).  Most  were  no  more 
than  smafl  rooms  in  'obscure  and  dirty  thoroughfares',  where  'regular  lists  of  prices  were 
openly  exhibited'  (Nevifle  1909,  p99).  Crowds  gathered  to  watch  the  rise  and  fall  of  the 
odds  before  a  big  race,  and,  in  the  scenes  of  wild  excitement,  which  usually  ensued,  'an 
epidemic  of  gambling  was  declared  to  have  attacked  even  the  poorest  class'  (Neville  1909, 
p99).  Needless  to  say,  An  Act  for  the  Suppression  of  Betting-Houses  swiftly  appeared  in 
1853.,  fining  owners  1100  for  aflowing  betting  on  their  premises  (Neville  1909,  p102). 
Again,  it  was  too  late.  The  popular  tide  of  betting  simply  went  underground,  largely 
unaffected  by  the  'suppression". 
The  highly  numerical  nature  of  all  these  forms  of  gambling  made  them  consonant  vAth  the 
statistical  milieu  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  particularly  suited  to  the  imperatives  of 
commercial  organisation.  Their  commodification,  in  an  expanding  capitalist  economy, 
signalled  a  new  orientation  to  chance;  for,  before  the  latter  had  even  reached  ontololpcal 
status,  the  organisation  of  these  new  games  created  yet  another  dimension  of  the I  'ý  i 
phenomenon*  the  commml?  ficalion  of  chance 
The  commercial  i  sation  of  gambling  changed  the  expenence  of  play  forever.  In  gaming  halls 
and  public  houses,  people  played  all  day  and  all  night  at  games  like  craps  and  roulette, 
which  had  been  refined  and  organised  in  such  a  way  as  to  include  a  *space'  for  a  'player' 
who  always  won  -  the  house,  or  dealer.  Commercialisation  encouraged  dealers  to  rely 
increasingly  'upon  the  more  predictable  and  more  secure  profits  provided  by  odds  fixed 
inflexibly  in  their  favour'  (Findlay  1986,  p9l).  Realising  the  impossibility  of  winning  games 
of  chance  by  participating  in  them,  the  commercial  interests  -  'the  house'  -  made  a  brilliant 
move  whereupon  winning  was  assured.  Rather  than  participate  in  a  game,  they  removed 
themselves  from  it  altogether  and  affied  themselves  with  the  very  law  that  told  them  they 
had  to  lose.  By  placing  themselves  actuafly  within  the  probability  equation,  they  could 
simply  sit  back  and  await  the  profits  which  would  inevitably  result  from  favourable  odds. 
Backed  by  the  indomitable  authority  of  probability,  the  house  could  not  possibly  lose.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  alliance  of  both  odds  and  house  meant  the  individual  gambler  could  not 
possibly  win.  He  found  himself  competing  against  an  invisible  opponent  with  a  permanent 
place  at  every  table  and  unlimited  resources.  What  is  more,  he  was  forced  to  play  against 
the  house,  for  this  element  of  competition  had  been  built  into  the  commercial  games  and 
was  now  inherent  in  their  structure.  Gamblers  no  longer  played  against  each  other,  but 
were  directed  against  the  house,  whose  invisible  impersonal  force  mirrored  the  imperatives 
of  economic  behaviour,  the  'invisible  hand'  of  market  forces. 
Commercialisation  changed  the  social  composition  of  play  by  encouraging  'players  of  more 
moderate  means':  as  the  size  of  wagers  became  smaller  'the  number  of  bettors  expanded 
tremendously'  (Findlay  1986,  p9l).  1-fiding  behind  the  iron  laws  of  probability,  garniing 
entrepreneurs  made  profits,  not  by  increasing  the  stakes  of  games,  but  by  increasing  the 
volume  of  players.  With  enough  individual  participants,  the  law  of  large  numbers  could  be 
realised,  and  with  it,  the  profits  of  the  gaming  house  accumulated. 
As  its  nature  was  transformed  through  cornmercialisation,  the  experience  of  gambling  itseif 
underwent  a  change.  'With  the  odds  against  them,  it  came  to  matter  less  whether  players 
won  or  lost,  so  long  as  they  got  a  chance  to  participate'  (Findlay  1986,  p83).  The  meaning 112 
of  gambling  changed:  'Players  still  hoped  to  win...  but  they  looked  upon  be"ing  more  as  a 
commodity  for  sale  ...  as  an  experience  worth  purchasing  with  losing  wagers'  (Findlay 
1986,  p92).  In  a  capitalist  economy,  gambling  had  finally  succumbed  to  commodification. 
But  this  was  no  ordinary  commodity,  for  it  had  a  unique  experiential  component  While 
players  continued  to  gamble  for  money  'they  did  so  in  larger  and  lairger  pan  for  the  thrifls 
that  it  provided'  (Findlay  1986,  p94).  Now  'thrills  that  came  fi7om  taking  risks  had  become 
almost  as  important  as  winning;  the  excitement  of  the  speedy  games  and  the  unusual 
suffoundings  combined  to  make  even  losses  seem  worthwhile'  (Findlay  1986,  p93).  Fast 
games  and  moderate  stakes  became  valued  for  prolonging  participation  and  therefore 
maximising  excitement.  Although  it  was  good  to  win,  acknowledged  one  historian,  'the 
tremulous  rapture  of  mingled  hope  and  fear  is  almost  compensation  enough  even  if  one 
loses'.  Now  that  their  main  motivation  was  participation,  gamblers  played  simply  to  play,, 
for:  'Next  to  the  pleasure  of  winning  is  the  pleasure  of  losing,  only  stagnation  is 
unendurable'  (Bankcroft,  in  Findlay  1986,  p94). 
Out  of  this  process  of  commercialisation,  we  see  the  final  emergence  of  the  modem  form 
of  gambling,  and  the  experience  of  the  modem  gambler.  Ironically,  in  this  modem  figure 
we  see  an  image  of  the  aristocratic  gambler  of  the  seventeenth  century.  Despite  the  victory 
of  the  values  of  players  like  Dangeau,  the  edifice  of  modem  commercial  gambling,  created 
by  the  institutionalisation  of  his  style  of  play,  bore  more  resemblance  to  the  vanquished 
aristocrat  than  to  the  calculative  bourgeois. 
Although  the  appearance  of  aristocratic  and  modem  gambling  differs,  underlying 
motivations  point  to  a  fundamental  correspondence  between  the  two.  For  both,  money 
serves  only  as  a  measure  of  play,  unimportant  in  itself  The  high  stakes  of  the  aristocracy 
showed  their  indifference  to  money;  they  participated  in  gambling  rituals  in  order  to 
demonstrate  their  laodicean  disregard  for  contemporary  worship  of  mammon.  As  such,  the 
aristocrat  played  to  participate,  never  to  win.  The  low  stakes  of  the  modem  gambler  at 
first  seem  far  removed  from  the  leviathan  bets  of  the  aristocrat,  but  they  serve  a  similar 
purpose:  to  lengthen  participation.  The  aim  of  the  modem  gambler  too,  is  participation, 
not  winning.  Again,  money  is  only  a  means  of  play,  and  the  indifference  of  the  modem 
gambler  to  it  stems  from  his  participation  in  play  itself  So,  while  the  aristocrat  played  to 133 
demonstrate  indifference,  for  the  modern  gambler,  indifference  stems  from  play  These 
orientations  will  be  examined  further  in  Chapter  Four. 
POSTSCRIPT:  'THE  VORTEX  OF  VICE' 
Various  fonns  of  suppression  and  condemnation  ran  alongside  the  long  history  of 
gambling,  a  persistent  and  largely  ineffectual  distraction  to  the  serious  ffivolity  of  play. 
From  the  Roman  prohibition  of  gaming  during  the  Saturnafia  to  the  medieval  bans  for  the 
'protection  of  archery,  the  practice  of  gambling  was  accompanied  by  a  succession  of 
specific  legislative  prohibitions  and  enforced  by  individual  rulers. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  just  as  gambling  reached  unprecedented  popularity,  attempts  to 
forbid  it  suddenly  became  more  draconian,  and  previously  disparate  cniticisms  were 
focused  into  a  coherent  and  intensely  vitriolic  assault.  The  fulminations  of  a  new  urban 
Protestant  bourgeoisie  against  the  'Satanic  vice'  of  gambling  made  the  relatively 
perfunctory  criticisms  of  feudal  monarchs  appear positively  lenient!  What  had  been 
tolerated  by  the  Catholic  Church  was  not  by  the  Reformed  one. 
Plate  Four  represents  two  images  of  the  'vice'  of  gambling.  The  top  picture,  a  caricature 
by  Thomas  Renton  from  1790  entitled  'The  Dangers  of  Dice  Addiction',  outlines  the 
havoc  wrought  by  that  'destructive  fury,  the  spirit  of  play'  on  seventeenth  century  reason, 
while  the  caption  on  the  lower  picture:  'Lawyers  and  Soldiers  are  the  Devil's  Playfellows, 
suggests  the  specifically  sinfW  nature  of  the  activity  (in  Arnold  1993). 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  the  condemnation  of  gambling  was  virtually  a  shibboleth  of  the 
Protestant  -  bourgeoisie.  It  was  seen  as  the  apotheosis  of  vice,  superseding  deviations  like 
drinking,  blasphemy  and  all  kinds  of  immoral  excess,  for,  by  uprooting  the  foundations  of  a 
virtuous  order,  it  could  create  any  of  the  above.  Gaming  was  evil  in  itself  and  because  it 
could  lead  to  even  greater  evil.  As  'a  doore  and  a  windowe'  into  all  sorts  of  ungodly 
behaviour  (in  Findlay  1986,  p18),  it  represented  the  antithesis  of  the  Protestant  bourgeois 
search  for  a  society  founded  on  a  rational  godly  order.  The  Puritan  New  Englanders  of 134 
seventeenth  century  Harvard  College  exemplified  the  values  of  both  groups  by  fining 
individuals  according  to  the  sinfulness  of  their  behaviour.  In  this  sliding  scale  of  oce, 
gambling  was  the  most  expensive  act  of  all!  The  activities  listed  xA,  ere- 
Keeping  guns  Is  Od 
Drunkenness  1 
Lying 
1 
Frequenting  Taverns  16 
Profane  Cursing  26 
Profanation  of  Lord's  day  30 
Graduates  playing  cards  50 
(in  Findlay  1986,  p20) 
It  is  the  criticism  of  the  Protestant-bourgeoisie  that  interests  us  most,  for  the  legacy  of 
their  condemnation  was  passed  through  the  ages,  and  permeated  each  subsequent  wave  of 
attack.  Their  disapproval  was  evident  in  the  Enlightenment  struggle  against  disorder,  in  the 
nineteenth  century  enforcement  of  labour  discipline,  and  in  the  categorisation  of  gambling 
as  a  form  of  mental  illness  of  our  own  era. 
In  the  statutes  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  we  see  a  new  bourgeoisie 
attacking  what  it  regarded  as  the  immoral  extravagance  of  those  surrounding  it  -  'the 
unrespectable  leisure  of  aristocracy  and  poor'  (Cunningham  1980,  pI  10)  -  and  struggling 
with  the  problem  of  labour  discipline  and  the  wider  fear  of  irrational  disorder.  To  this  end, 
attempts  were  made  to  sweep  examples  of  roaming  irrationality  out  of  sight.  By  an  act  of 
George  IV,  if  found  gambling  in  the  street,  individuals  were  to  be  'committed  to  gaol  as 
rogues  and  vagabonds'  and  sentenced  to  corporal  punishment  and  hard  labour.  Such 
confinement  was  the  remedy  for  the  'common  and  intolerable  nuisance'  of  young  boys  and 
men  'sprawling  about  the  pavement...  and  playing...  at  games  of  chance'  (Steinmetz  1870, 
p427).  Such  imprisonment  confined  the  gambler  to  a  secure  space  where,  out  of  public 
sight,  he  could  no  longer  exist  as  an  affront  to  the  rational  society  around  him.  In  America, 
river  gambling  was  organised  in  steamboats  so  as  to  be  outwith  the  junsdiction  of  states 
which  prohibited  gambling.  The  vast,  slow  moving  boats  glided  slowly  up  and  down  the 135 
rivers  of  southern  America  in  a  kind  of  limbo,  a  no-mans-land,  wth  no  particular 
destination,  keeping  moving  to  remain  untouched  by  the  laws  of  the  land  around  them. 
Like  the  Renaissance  'ships  of  fools',  these  'strange  drunken  boat[sl'  that  'convqed  their 
insane  cargo  ftom  town  to  town'  (Foucault  1961,  p8)  contained  examples  of  roaming 
irrationality  and  moved  them  on  6.  The  loss  of  reason  which  the  En-lightenment  saNk 
inherent  in  gambling  was  anathema  to  its  ideal  of  rational  progress,  and  was  a  particularly 
abhorrent  form  of  madness.  Of  the  other  archetypes  of  irrationality  -  the  madman,  the  child 
and  the  primitive  (Ferguson  1990),  the  gambler  was  by  far  the  most  offensive,  for  his 
refusal  of  reason  was  wilful.  Unlike  the  others,  who  could  not  help  their  actions,  the 
gambler  made  a  decision  no  reasonable  human  was  supposed  to  be  able  to  make.  fie 
intentionally  gave  up  his  most  precious  faculty,  his  mark  of  humanity,  for  nothing  more 
tangible  than  the  vicissitudes  of  chance.  Writing  in  this  Enlightenment  tradition, 
Montesquieu  stated  that  God  forbade  anything  which  disturbed  reason,  and,  since  they 
produced  'anxiety  and  frenzy',  he  especially  denounced  games  of  chance  (Montesquieu 
1977,  p  120). 
The  horror  of  the  gambler's  rejection  of  reason  continued  to  run  as  a  leitmotif  through  the 
nineteenth  century.  By  the  beginning  of  the  era,  it  was  believed  by  certain  members  of  the 
British  Medical  Association  that  gambling  was  explained  by  the  nervous  tension  offin-de- 
siecle  Britain.  By  the  end  of  the  century,  working  class  gambling  was  equated  with 
idleness  and  with  the  moral  ill-health  of  the  nation,  and  psychologists  began  to  concern 
themselves  with  the  possibility  of  the  hereditary  effects  of  this  'disease'  (Brenner  and 
Brenner  1990,  p141).  It  was  an  apocalyptic  vision:  'anti-gambling  writers  came  to  regard 
their  attack  on  working  class  gambling  as  a  crusade  to  save  England  fi7om  economic  and 
social  disaster,  to  maintain  political  stability,  to  preserve  the  Empire  and  even  to  halt  the 
degeneration  of  the  English  race  and  so  to  defend  civilisation'  (Dixon,  in  Brenner  and 
Brenner  1990,  p75).  It  is  in  this  era  of  social  Darwinism  that  we  can  see  the  genesis  of  the 
medical  psychology  of  the  twentieth  century,  including  the  origin  of  the  contemporary 
search  for  a  gambfing  'gene'.  Such  perspectives  were  voiced  in  the  hysterical  polemic  of 
reformers  Re  Anthony  Comstock,  who  wrote  that  gambling  was  a  trap  set  by  Satan 
6  With  its  surveillance  camers  and  security  guards,  the  twentieth  centUlY  casino  can  be  seen  as  the  legacý 
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which  swept  morals  'with  the  ti-iry  of  a  tornado'  Into  the  'vortex  of  \,  lce'  (Comstock  196  1, 
p58).  The  loss  of  reason  was  the  inevitable  consequence  of  such  moral  decline.  Gambling 
gave  rise  to  'unhallowed  appetites  and  passions',  which  "render[ed]  the  mind  ungovemable 
and  destroy[ed]  it  for  useful  purposes'  (Comstcwk  1961,  p58).  Comstock  could  barely 
articulate  his  loathing,  which  poured  out  in  a  stream  of  rhetoric-  'Tastes  and  appetites  are 
perverted,  evil  habits  are  formed,  vicious  and  filthy  habits  encouraged  and  death  and 
destruction  escort  our  youth  on  every  side.  That  human  beings  can  sink  so  low  seems 
almost  incomprehensible'  (Comstock  1961,  p92).  The  gambler,  by  renouncing  reason, 
gave  up  his  claim  to  humanity:  'These  are  caricatures  of  true  men.  They  are  forms 
hoflowed  out  by  this  cursed  traffic  untfl  there  is  nothing  but  form  left'  (Comstock  1961, 
p83).  The  equation  of  gambling  with  formlessness  had  been  made  earlier  by  Jean  Dusaulux 
in  De  la  passion  du  jeu  (1779).  Here,  the  loss  of  reason  bore  a  physical  stamp  'what 
particularly  characterises  gamblers  is  their  lack  of  any  character.  Their  tumultuous  and 
contrary  feelings  reciprocally  destroy  each  other  and  leave  only  confused  traces.  They  have 
the  faces  of  lost  men  with  no  distinct  physiognomy".  Lacking  will,  self  control  and  any 
sense  of  purpose,  the  gambler  became  'an  empty  space  within  the  triumphant  discourse  of 
reason'  (Dusaulux,  in  Kavanagh  1993,  p36).  In  this  state,  the  gambler  was  the  incarnation 
of  that  primordial  chaos,  Zaos,  which,  as  'an  abyss  or  empty  space',  characterised  'the  first 
state  of  the  universe'  we  saw  in  Chapter  One. 
As  chaos  incarnate,  the  gambler  was  a  thing  to  be  condemned,  denied  and  repressed,  and 
this  the  Protestant  bourgeoisie  did  with  unprecedented  violence. 
From  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  gambling  came  to  embody  the  fears  of  this 
group  in  two  distinct  senses.  On  the  one  hand,  as  we  have  seen,  it  encapsulated  the  unease 
felt  by  the  Protestant  and  the  bourgeois  at  the  outside  world;  a  chaotic,  disorderly  world 
whose  members  did  not  share  the  rational,  godly  values  of  the  hard  working  Christian.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  embodied  an  even  more  terrifying  vision:  it  held  up  a  mirror  to  the 
Protestant  in  which  he  saw  reflected  all  that  was  unacceptable  within  himself.  In  one 
moment  of  revelation  he  witnessed  his  belief  stripped  of  its  cloak  of  piety  and  reason,  and 
all  his  doubts  and  fears  -  so  carefidly  contained  within  the  security  of  its  articles  -  laid  bare. 
The  horrified  cry  uttered  from  this  moment  of  introversion  was  diverted  into  a  stream  of 13 
vitriol  against  gambling  -  the  activity  that  had  provoked  this  terrible  recognition. 
As  a  reaction  against  the  activity,  the  Protestant  bourgeoisie  violently  condemned 
I 
gambling  on  both  economic  and  religious  grounds.  Each  condemnation  hoýýeý,  -er. 
concealed  a  more  profound  recogrfition  of  their  own  actions  and  beliefs  in  gambling  and  it 
was  this  which  really  stimulated  their  attack.  These  condemnations  and  recognitions  are 
examined  next. 
Economic  Disapproval 
The  activity  of  gambling  displayed  a  blatant  disregard  for  the  values  of  the  Protestant. 
Hard  work  in  a  calling,  glorification  of  God  through  earthly  activity  and  an  ascetic 
disregard  for  material  gain  were  shamelessly  flouted  by  the  actions  of  the  gambler  and  thus 
existed  as  a  blasphemous  assault  on  the  divine  order.  Although  Christianity  had  always 
recognised  the  virtues  of  work,  with  the  Protestant  emphasis  on  worldly  activity,  its  value 
was'mightily  increased'  (Weber  1990,  p83).  Especially  for  Calvinists,  diligent  labour  in  a 
calling  became  defined  as  a  virtuous  activity,  which  would  result  in  gradual,  predictable, 
and,  more  importantly  virtuous  rewards,  whereas  idleness  and  the  squandering  of  precious 
time,  were  regarded  as  the  epitome  of  vice.  The  activities  of  the  gambler  represented  the 
antithesis  of  these  virtuous  pursuits.  His  reaction  to  wealth  was  one  of  immediacy  and 
extremity.  Instead  of  the  slow  accumulation  of  money,  appropriated  for  the  future  through 
saving  and  investment,  the  gambler's  financial  transactions  were  located  firmly  in  the 
present,  where  his  economic  standing  could  soar  to  immense  riches  or  plummet  to  penury, 
out  of  all  proportion  to  physical  effort.  Such  vicissitudes  were  seen  to  disrupt  the  ideal  of  a 
meritocratic  social  balance,  and,  in  the  new  moral-economic  climate,  gambling  represented 
unearned,,  therefore  immoral  and  illegitimate  wealth.  it  was  this  orientation  that  prompted 
the  Puritan  John  Northbrooke's  outburst  in  his  7ýeatise  againsi  Dicing,  Dancing,  Plays 
and  Interludes  (15  77)  against  'turpe  lucrum,  filthie  gaine'  which,  because  it  was  'gotten  in 
a  trice  over  the  thumbe,  without  any  trafficke  or  loan'  would  be  witness  against  its  winners 
'at  the  last  daye  of  judgment  if  they  repent  it  not'  (Northebrooke  1843,  p  125).  Given  the 
ambivalence  of  the  Puritan  attitude  to  wealth,  the  latter  of  which  could  only  by  legitimated 
by  work,  the  existence  of  such  riches  that  had  accrued  iviihout  effort  was  simply  regarded 1  '%x 
as  theft-.  'money  gotten  by  play  is  flat  theft,  and  to  gaine  by  such  measures  is  plaint.  v  to 
robbe,  and  to  possesse  other  men's  goodes  without  just  cause..  -[and]  ... 
is  playne  against 
the  commandment  of  God,  that  sayth  'thou  shalt  not  steale'  (Northebrooke  1843,  p  123)  ' 
It  was  the  waste  of  time  and  money  inherent  in  gambling  that  preoccupied  the  Protestant 
bourgeoisie  during  the  period  when,  for  the  bourgeois,  the  systematic  use  of  both  were 
necessary  for  capitalist  expansion,  and  for  the  Protestant,  both  were  appropriated  by  God. 
The  rational  management  of  time  and  money  was  a  prerequisite  of  the  labour  discipline 
which,  in  the  early  years  of  capitalist  development,  was  pursued  mainly  by  the  bourgeoisie. 
Thus  the  aristocracy  were  attacked  primarily  for  their  profligacy;  their  gambling  for  its 
wastage  of  money,  while  the  poor  were  attacked  for  their  laziness;  their  gambling  for  its 
wastage  of  time.  It  is  in  this  vein  that  Steinmetz  described  a  congregation  of  the  poor 
around  a  lottery  drawing.  His  criticism  (and  Steinmetz  writes  as  a  dispassionate  observer, 
not  an  ideologue!  )  was  excited  not  so  much  by  the  possibility  that  the  crowd  may  have 
stolen  money  to  enter  the  draw,  but  by  their  very  presence,  which  meant  that  they  were 
'stealing  from  their  masters'  time'  (Steinmetz  1870,  p402).  Thus  the  Protestant  bourgeoisie 
criticised  the  gambler  of  idleness  and  excess,  proffigacy  and  greed,  caprice  and  persistence- 
characteristics  which  always  stood  to  one  side  of  the  balanced,  moderate  bourgeois  ideal. 
As  such,  the  figure  of  the  gambler  was  generally  perceived  as  a  member  of  the  aristocratic 
or  labouring  classes. 
However,  the  tide  of  condemnation  which  the  bourgeoisie  poured  on  the  gambling  of  their 
social  neighbours  could  not  conceal  the  fact  that  the  very  root  of  their  existence  grew  from 
this  activity  in  its  purest  form.  Their  wealth  derived  from  adventure  capitalism-  the 
speculation  on  conunodifies  and  circulation  of  money  on  international  markets.  Bourgeois 
power  was  thus  created  by  the  risking  of  money  on  events  whose  outcomes  were 
determined  by  the  operation  of  chance. 
It  is  this  fundamental  similarity  which  links  two  of  the  (ostensibly  oppositional)  characters 
we  saw  earlier  -  Cotton's  gamester  and  Ashtods  stockjobber.  Their  capricious  natures,  the 
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sirnilarvicw  of  gambling  as  theft  N;  -as  observed  by  Marco  Polo  to  be  held  by  the  ruler  Kubilai  Khan, 
who  told  his  subjects:  "I  have  acquired  you  by  force  of  arms  and  all  that  ,.  ou  possess  is  mine.  So,  if  Nou 
gamble,  you  are  gambling  With  my  property"  (Polo  1953,  p  16  1). P9 
former  'always  in  extreams,  always  in  a  storm',  the  latter  'ten  times  more  changeable  than 
the  weather,  are  united  by  their  common  economic  origin  in  financial  speculation.  The 
'immoral  excesses'  of  the  gambler  were  thus  being  carried  on  as  everyday  business  by  the 
respectable  bourgeoisie!  But  even  in  the  nineteenth  century  it  took  a  perceptive  -  and 
brave  -  observer  to  point  out  that  the  piously  -  clad  bourgeois  had,  in  fact,  no  clothes,  One 
such  observer  wrote  in  1865  that  'the  Stock  Exchange...  has  completely...  superseded 
'four  aces'.  It  looks  more  respectable  to  game  in  the  guise  of  business  than  to  stake  a 
fortune  upon  the  turn  of  a  card,  or  the  haza  d  of  a  pair  of  dice'  (Taylor  1865,  p374). 
The  bourgeoisie,  themselves  'acutely  uneasy  about  the  real  source  of  [their]  power'  sought 
to  deny  it  by  attacking  it  whenever  it  appeared  (Kavanagh  1993,  p56).  For  Kavanagh,  'It  is 
this  obsession  with  erasing  their  own  shameful  origins  in  money  that  explains  why 
gambling  became  for  the  ascendant  bourgeoisie  a  scandalous  evil...  '.  Such  condemnation 
served  as  a  convenient  smokescreen  for  the  pecuniary  origins  of  this  class,  for  it  implied 
that  'there  existed  an  essential  difference  between  gambling  as  a  self-Miterested 
manipulation  of  money  and  those  various  other  manipulations  of  money  through  which  the 
bourgeoisie  had  acquired  its  wealth'  (Kavanagh  1993,  p56,7). 
The  'artillery  of  the  Puritans'  (Taylor  1863,  p313)  was  directed  at  the  gambler  vAth,  if 
anything,  even  more  force  in  the  realm  of  non-economic  activities. 
Religious  Condemnation 
'The  ladies',  arm  and  arm  in  clusters, 
As  great  and  gracious  a'  as  sisters 
On  lee-long  nights,  wi'  crabbit  lewks 
Pore  owne  the  devil's  picture  beuks' 
(Bums,  in  von  Renssalaer  1912,  p294) 
The  Protestant  criticism  of  gambling  on  non-economic  grounds  took  two  forms,  which,  if 
examined  closely,  are  found  to  be  contradictory.  Out  of  this  contradiction  we  see  the  real 
source  of  Protestant  antipathy  to  gambling,  and  gain  insight  into  the  very  nature  of 141) 
gambling  itself 
On  the  one  hand,  games  of  chance  were  seen  to  foster  superstition  and  idolatry  by 
sustaining  belief  in  pagan  gods  and  transcendental  forces  like  fate,  and  so  fuelled  'the 
Puritans  ferocious  hatred  of  anything  which  smacked  of  superstition,  of  afl  survivals  of 
magical  or  sacramental  salvation'  (Weber  1990,  p169).  For  Northbrooke,  the  pernicious 
effect  of  such  games  was  the  invention  of  the  devil  himself-  'the  playe  at  cardes  is  an 
invention  of  the  devill,  which  he  found  out  that  he  might  the  easier  bring  in  idolatrie 
amongst  men.  For  the  Kings  and  coate  cards  that  we  use  now,  were  in  old  times  the 
images  of  idols  and  false  gods,  which  they  that  would  seem  Christians  have  changed  into 
Charlemaire,  Lancelot,  Hector  and  such  lyke  names,  bicause  they  would  not  seem  to 
imitate  their  ilolatrie  therein,  and  yet  maintaine  the  playe  itself  the  very  invention  of 
Satan...  would  so  disguise  the  nýischief  under  the  cloake  of  such  gaye  names' 
(Northbrooke  1843,  p143). 
On  the  other  hand,  Protestant  divines  criticised  gambling  for  deliberately  invoking  the 
presence  of  God  in  trivial  matters,  for  'God,  whose  hand  the  Puritan  sees  in  all  the 
occurrences  of  life'  (Weber  1990,  p162)  was  as  interested  in  the  outcome  of  a  game  of 
chance  as  he  was  in  the  unfolding  of  more  serious  worldly  affairs.  Ashton's  recollection  of 
a  dialogue  between  a  sixteenth  century  preacher  and  a  professor  clarifies  the  role  of  the 
Divine  in  this  matter,  when  the  former  explains  how  activities  such  as  'Dice,  Cardes  and 
Tables  are  Lots 
... 
%  and  as  such,  presuppose  the  special  providence  and  determining 
presence  of  God...  '  in  their  unfolding  (in  Ashton  1898,  p30).  Such  an  intervention  was 
unproblematic  for  some  Protestants  who  actually  condoned  the  deliberate  casting  of  lots. 
Zinzedorf  s  Pietists  advocated  the  use  of  the  lot  as  a  means  of  revealing  the  Divine  Will, 
while  John  Wesley's  Methodists  utilised  scriptural  playing  cards  for  the  same  purpose. 
Containing  Biblical  verses  and  hymns,  these  cards  would  be  shuffled  and  the  one  drawn 
would  provide  a  conversational  text.  Hargrave  draws  attention  to  their  ancient  roots  lying 
just  beneath  the  pious  surface:  Jthe  cards]  quickly  took  on  the  old-time  significance  of 
cards  as  a  means  of  divination.  Good  men  and  women  believed  that  Providence  spoke 
through  them,  and  many  decisions  were  made  according  to  the  guidance  of  those  little 
scraps  of  paper'  (Hargrave  1966,  p324).  These  instances  were  exceptional,  however,  for 141 
on  the  whole,  opinion  railed  against  what  it  saw  as  the  blasphemous  profanation  ofthe  ýk  III 
of  God.  Ashton's  preacher  voiced  the  orthodox  position  on  the  subject,  declaring  that 
because  God  is  a'pnncipafl  actor'in  games  of  chance,  'the  use  of  lots  is  not  to  be  in  sport', 
and  'we  are  not  to  tempt  the  Almightie  by  a  vaine  desire  of  manifestation  of  Ns  power  and 
special  providence.  Such  an  action  would  be  even  worse  than  blasphemy.  'For  as  calling 
God  to  witness  by  vaine  swearing  is  a  sinne...  so  making  God  an  umpire  by  playing  With 
lots  must  need  be  a  sinne;  yea  such  a  sinne  as  maketh  the  offender...  more  blame  -  worthie' 
(Ashton  1898,  p32).  8 
Taken  together,  these  lines  of  criticism  present  a  peculiar  picture  of  the  protestant's 
relation  to  gambling.  By  condemning  gamblers  as  tempting  the  Almighty,  their  critics  were 
attributing  to  him  a  role  in  play  which  gamblers  themselves  assigned  to  mystic,  pagan 
forces.  The  existence  of  a  divine  presence  of  some  kind  in  gambling  was  not  in  dispute;  the 
Protestant  argument  was  simply  that  it  was  the  wrong  one!  There  existed  only  one 
legitimate  presence  for  them  -  the  Christian  God,  and  so  by  rejecting  gamblers'  beliefs 
merely  for  their  paganism,  Protestants  did  not  dispute  the  presence  of  the  divine  in  play  per 
se.  Their  argument  was,  on  the  one  hand,  that  to  see  this  divinity  as  anything  other  than  the 
Christian  God  was  pagan,  and  on  the  other,  to  see  it  as  this  God  and  still  play  was 
blasphemous  and  idolatrous.  Thus  the  Protestant  accepted  the  presence  of  God  in 
gambling  just  as  ancient  man  had  accepted  the  presence  of  his  gods  in  divination.  No  doubt 
the  continuance  stirred  acutely  uneasy  Protestant  feelings,  as  he  recognised  in  gambling  the 
descendance  of  divination  and  magic.  The  collocation  he  felt  at  this  vague  perception  of 
the  sin-filarity  between  ancient  divination,  which  invoked  pagan  gods,  and  modem  gambling 
which  invoked  his  God,  struck  at  the  heart  of  profound  tensions  he  experienced  with  his 
own  religion,  for  it  was  becoming  apparent  that  Protestantism  -  that  most  rational  of 
religions  -  contained  aspects  of  the  most  mystical  of  beliefs.  This  mysticism  occurr  in 
two  main  areas. 
reco  -,  -A  and  made  more  explicit  in  A  similar  containment  of  the  sacred  in  games  of  chance  is  gnised 
Chinese,  where  the  character  tou  applies  to  games  of  chance,  bets  and  ordeals,  and  is  also  the  name  for 
blasphemy,  for  'to  tempt  chance  is  considered  a  sacrilegious  wager  against  deginy'  (Ca  II  lots  1962,  p3  4). 142 
Mysticism  in  Protestantism 
For  a  religion  which  had  succeeded  in  attaining  the  'radical  elimination  of  magic  fi-om  the 
world'  (Weber  1990,  p  149),  and  which,  as  the  apogee  of  religious  rationafisation.  pro%ided 
a  systematic  basis  for  action  founded  on  rational  beheý  Protestantism  in  fact  contained 
profoundly  mystical  elements  9.  What  is  more,  these  elements,  albeit  in  a  different  context 
and  with  different  application,  also  constituted  the  worldview  of  the  Protestants'  arch  rival 
-  the  gambler.  There  exist  two  areas  of  this  confluence. 
Firstly,  the  focus  for  both  was  an  omnipotent,  transcendent  being  who  determined  the  fate 
of  every  individual  and  who  could  not  be  perceived  or  measured  in  any  rational, 
quantifiable  way.  An  'unbridgable  gulf  '  separated  the  Protestant  from  his  God,  before 
whom  he  stood  alone  -  sola-fide  -  for  the  first  time.  This  God  had  predestined  the  fate  of 
every  individual  in  the  afterlife  as  a  member  of  the  elect  or  the  damned,  and  no  amount  of 
earthly  activity  could  effect  this  decision,  for  the  state  of  grace  was  as  impossible  to  lose 
for  those  granted  it  as  it  was  unattainable  for  those  not  similarly  chosen  (Weber  1990, 
p104).  The  mystical  nature  of  the  idea  of  predestination  was  pointed  out  by  Otto,  who 
wrote  'from  the  standpoint  of  the  rational,  this  notion  of  predestination  is  a  sheer 
absurdity,  an  absolute  offence'  (Otto  1925,  p90).  Such  a  doctrine  of  'magnificent 
consistency'  but  'extreme  inhumanity'  was  all  but  intolerable  to  the  Protestant,  and  the 
Dutch  Armenians  and  Cambridge  Platonists  reacted  against  it,  cafling  it  'this  divine 
fatalism  arbitraiy'  and  the  'divine  Fate  immoral'  (Campbell  1987,  pl  10).  The  distant  God 
of  the  Protestant  had  come  to  resemble  the  capricious  and  amoral  forces  which  regulated 
the  gamblers'  life.  For  Campbell,  'the  emphasis  on  the  independent  activity  of  divine  grace 
was  so  strong  as  to  make  divine  wiH  appear  to  be  mere  fate,  and  God  ffimself  to  be  an 
arbitrary  rather  than  a  moral  and  loving  figure'  (Campbell  1987,  p  109).  This  divinity  was 
unacceptable  to  Mi1ton,  who  wrote  'Though  I  may  be  sent  to  heU  for  it,  such  a  God  will 
never  command  my  respect'  (in  Weber  1990,  p  10  1).  The  majority  of  Protestants  however, 
tried  to  come  to  terms  with  this  aspect  of  their  refigion;  and  unable  to  control  or  even 
kww  their  fate,  were  forced  to  five  in  a  state  of  'unbearable  psychological  tension'. 
9  See,  for  example,  Otto's  discussion  of  the  non-rational  in  Luther  (Otto  1925,  p98-112) I4 
it  is  this  tension  which  leads  us  to  the  second  mystical  aspect  of  Protestantism  -  the 
emphasis  onfaith.  The  central  issue  for  the  Protestant  was  the  mover  from  the  sialas 
naturoe  (state  of  nature)  to  the  stalus  gralloe  (state  of  grace),  and  the  achievement  of 
certitudo.  vahii;  ',  s  (certainty)  of  being  in  this  state.  The  Reformation  had  emphasised  the 
importance  of  inner  faith  over  outward  shows  of  ceremony  in  devotion  to  God,  and  as 
such  the  Protestant  had  a  duty  to  consider  himself  one  of  the  elect,  for  inner  faith  was  the 
means  by  which  such  certainty  could  be  attained.  The  emphasis  on  faith  in  the  matter  of 
election  was  a  recourse  to  subjective  feeling  over  objective  knowledge;  a  state  ý,  ý'hich 
could  not  be  held  up  to  rational  scrutiny  and  which  lent  itself  to  all  kinds  of  irrational 
mysticism.  Various  Protestant  sects  possessed  different  solutions  to  the  problem  of  cerfll4c 
salutis  -  all  of  them  Oudged  by  their  own  criteria  of  rationality),  mystical.  For  Lutherans, 
as  'vessels'  of  the  holy  spirit,  the  highest  religious  experience  was  the  unio  my'sh  . ca;  the 
experience  of  certainty.  Apparent  as  a  loss  of  ego,  and  communion  With  God-  'a  powerful 
feeling  of  light-hearted  assurance...  breaks  over  them  [the  supplicants]  with  elemental 
force  and  destroys  every  possibility  of  the  belief  that  this  overpowering  gift  of  grace  could 
owe  anything  to  their  own  co-operation  or  could  be  connected  with  achievements  or 
qualities  of  their  own  faith  and  will'  (Weber  1990,  pl.  01-2).  The  unio  mv-sfica  was  a 
strange  state  for  a  religion  in  which  the  elimination  of  irrationality  '[came]  here  to  its 
logical  end',  for  'it  is  a  feeling  of  actual  absorption  in  the  deity,  that  of  a  real  entrance  of 
the  divine  into  the  soul  of  the  befiever'  (Weber  1990,  p  112).  Something  fike  the  unio 
mystica  was  experienced  by  the  Pietists,  whose  extreme  asceticism  led  to  a  'hystencal 
character'  that  was  realised  in  half  conscious  states  of  refigious  ecstasy,  nervous 
enthusiasm  and  overwhelming  trances  (Weber  1990,  p130).  Methodists  also  relied  on 
subjective  emotion  as  a  guide  to  certainty;  the  only  basis  for  the  latter  was'a  pure  feeling 
of  absolute  certainty  of  forgiveness,  derived  immediately  from  the  testimony  of  the  spint' 
(Weber  1990,  p140).  As  tools  of  the  divine  will,  Calvinists  believed  that  I  intense  worldly 
activity  gives  certainty  of  grace'  (Weber  1990,  p  112)  and  so  their  faith  was  demonstrated 
in  a  more  tangible  fashion  by  the  active  pursuit  of  one's  calling  -  the  direct  execution  of 
God's  will.  The  performance  of  good  works  in  an  earthly  calling  was  thus  a  medium 
through  which  certainty  of  election  could  be  demonstrated.  Such  apparently  rational, 
worldly  conduct  was  not  free  of  mystical  elements  however.  More  than  mere  performance, 
some  degree  of  success  in  a  calling  was  regarded  as  a  sign  of  election.  Good  works  in 144 
themselves  were  useless  for  attaining  salvation,  but  were  'indispensable  as  a  sign  of 
election',  being  'the  technical  means...  of  getting  rid  of  the  fear  of  damnation'  (Weber 
1990,  pI15).  The  Calvinist  would  create  the  conviction  of  election  through  systematic 
good  works,  so  that  the  will  of  God  -'  that  God,  whose  hand  the  Puritan  sees  in  all  the 
occurrences  of  life(Weber  1990,  p162)  -  could  thereby  reveal  itself  through  those  works. 
Success  was  a  sign  of  electioný  and  the  life  of  the  tormented  Calvinist  a  search  for  such 
signs  -  secular  symbols  of  a  divine  plan  he  was  powerless  to  influence. 
The  conjunction  of  these  two  areas  of  mysticism  in  Protestantism  created  a  certain  tension. 
The  belief  in  a  transcendental  predetenninin&  God  created  a  terrible  uncertainty-,  mitigated 
only  by  its  'solution'  -  the  emphasis  onfaith.  Together,  the  tension  between  pure  faith  in 
the  face  of  overwhelming  uncertainty  shaped  the  Protestant  worldview  and  provided  a 
dynamic  for  action.  The  mystical  -  religious  worldview  of  the  Protestant  was  shared,  in 
part,  by  the  gambler,  whose  actions  were  driven  by  a  similar  dynamic  -  the  tension  between 
faith  and  uncertainty.  The  nature  of  the  gambler's  worldview  will  be  examined  in  Chapter 
Five,  but  for  now  a  brief  description  of  it  will  serve  to  highlight  the  similarities  between  it 
and  that  of  the  Protestant. 
Like  the  Protestant,  the  gambler  believed  his  fate  had  been  predetermined  by  an 
anthropomorphic,  transcendent  force.  the  'hand  of  God'  of  one  is  the  equally  omnipotent 
'hand  of  fate'  of  the  other.  He  knew  his  destiny  was  decided  and  outwith  his  control,  and 
was  desperate  to  know  what  it  was.  The  belief  in  a  predetermining  deity  led  to  the  terrible 
condition  of  uncertainty.  Like  the  Protestant,  the  gambler  longed  for  the  state  of  cerilludo 
salutis,  and  again  like  the  Protestant,  he  found  the  only  possible  means  of  achieving  it  in 
faith.  Just  as  a  member  of  the  elect  simply  laiew  he  was  chosen,  so  the  gambler  simply 
knew  he  would  win.  For  the  gambler,  this  faith  was  manifest  in  the  conviction  of  the 
efficacy  of  his  own  luck,  whose  apprehension  in  play  reassured  him  of  his  select  status. 
The  fact  that  every  gambler  considered  himself  lucky,  but  not  every  one  couldVAn,  did  not 
shake  his  faith,  just  as  the  Protestant  remained  unperturbed  that,  although  every  believer 
regarded  himself  elect,  not  all  were.  Faith  transcended  the  irrationality  of  these 
convictions,  which,  being  purely  subjective,  could  never  be  subjected  to  rational  analysis 145 
Like  the  Calvinist,  the  gambler  was  driven  by  his  uncertainty  to  search  for  sips  of  the 
divine  plan.  When  he  played,  the  rrýinutlae  of  a  game  revealed  deep  sigruficance,  for  Fate 
ccommunicate[d]  with  him  by  means  of  small  signs  indicating  approval  or  reproach' 
(Bergler  1970,  p230).  Like  the  Protestant,  the  gambler  interpreted  success  (a  "in)  as 
approval,  for  gambling  was  a  perpetual  posing  of  the  question  -  'am  I  your  favounteT-  to 
Fate.  The  Protestant  asked  the  same  question  when  he  beseeched  God  -  'am  I  one  of  your 
electT.  The  unfolding  of  a  game  in  terms  of  lucky  runs,  near  misses,  wins  and  losses,  was 
combed  by  the  player  for  signs  which  would  provide  indications  of  his  destiny.  Likewise, 
the  unfolding  of  the  Calvinist's  fife  was  a  vast  tableau  upon  which  clues  to  his  fate  were  to 
be  found.  The  activities  of  both  were  necessari1y  repetitive,  for  the  Calvinist  knew  that  the 
value  of  his  works  lay  in  their  systematic  appfication,  and  the  gambler,  who  was'  obsessive 
in  his  uncertainty'  demanded  constant,  repeated  signs  of  assurance  (Bergler  1970,  p83). 
The  realisation  of  faith  -  the  certitudo  salutis  -  of  the  Lutheran,  Pietist  and  Methodist 
resembled  the  experience  of  the  realisation.  of  faith  of  the  gambler  -  the  experience  of 
winning.  The  'powerful  feeling'  that  'breaks  over'  the  Lutheran,  and  the  half-conscious 
states  of  ecstasy  of  the  Pietist  were  the  apotheosis  of  the  befief  of  the  Protestant.  Sinlilarly, 
when  winning,  the  gambler  reached  the  apogee  of  his  faith  and  was  in  direct  communion 
with  Fate.  The  turmofl  of  Disraeli's'  Young  Duke  was  typical  of  the  ecstatic  experience  of 
winning-  'His  hands  and  feet  were  fike  ice,  his  brow  like  fire;  his  ears  rung  With 
supernatural  roaring,  a  nausea  had  seized  upon  him'  (in  Steinmetz  1870,  p77).  Certainty  of 
election  overwhelmed  the  gambler,  who  knows  that  'Fate  has  singled  him  out  fi-om  the 
other  two  biffion  inhabitants  of  the  earth...  '  (Bergler  1970,  p230).  He  transcended  himself 
through  his  faith  and  communicated  with  the  Deity,  as  did  a  young  officer  who  won  so 
enormously  that  'he  thought  he  was  no  longer  an  ordinary  mortal'  (Steinmetz  1870,  p58). 
It  can  be  seen  that  it  was  the  same  fundamental  dynamic  -  the  tension  between  faith  and 
uncertainty  -  which  drove  both  the  Protestant  and  the  gambler.  But  of  course,  each 
responded  differently  in  action  to  this  tension.  The  Protestant  response  was  one  of  overtly 
ascetic  withdrawal  from  all  forms  of  uncertainty  and  irrationality  in  the  world.  The 
gambler's  response  was  a  voluptuous  abandonment  to  chance;  a  reaction  which  the 
Protestant,  with  his  denial  of  afl  forms  of  sensuousness,  could  only  behold  with  the  utmost 146 
horror 
Both  responses  derived  from  the  same  basic  dynamic,  and  so  touched  a  nerve  in  the 
Protestant's  armour  of  rationality.  On  one  level,  the  activity  of  the  gambler  represented 
pagan  mysticism  and  econormc  irrationality  which  was  anathema  to  the  Protestant 
worldview.  On  another  level  however,  lay  a  subconscious  recognition,  within  this  'vortex 
of  vice  %,  of  aspects  of  the  Protestant's  owti  belief,  and  it  was  the  horrified  recognition  of  his 
true,  if  repressed,  self  that  lent  real  vitriol  to  the  Protestant  attack  on  gambling.  The 
motivation  to  attack  thus  grew  out  of  the  vague  perception  of  the  disquieting  simýarities 
between  gambling  and  Protestantism.  Any  correspondences  between  the  two  activities 
were  unacceptable  in  a  religion  supposedly  divested  of  all  mystical  association.  Such  a 
correspondence  demonstrated  that  the  most  mystical  -  pagan  belief  shared  with  the  most 
rational  -  Christian  fundamental  correspondences  and  fears',  a  correspondence  which  could 
only  be  denied,  condemned  and  repressed  as  having  no  place  in  the  world  of  the  bourgeois. C"APTERTHREE:  PLAY  GROUNDS  -A  NIAP  OFTHE  MODERN' 
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PLAYGROUNDS 
A  MAP  OFTHE  MODERN  GAMBLING  SITES 
THE  MAP 
In  the  late  twentieth  century  the  stratified  gambling  network  which  emerged  in  the 
seventeenth  century  has  been  consolidated  and  institutionalised  through  a  process  that  has 
culminated  in  the  commodification  of  chance.  The  apogee  of  this  process  is  the 
differenfiation  of  the  gambling  economy  into  distinctive  'phenomenoloDcal  sites',  each 
bound  by  its  own  rules  and  governed  by  its  own  dynamic. 
Just  as,  throughout  its  historical  development,  gambling  represented  the  social  rnifieu  in 
which  it  existed,  so  contemporary  gambling  represents  its  period  and  can  be  said  to  exist 
as  a  microcosm  of  modernity. 
The  legitimation  and  commercial  expansion  of  games  of  chance  in  modem  13,,  -estem 
economies  matches  those  economies'  own  development,  which  comes  increasingly  to 
resemble  the  purest  form  of  gambling.  In  the  world  of  high  finance  speculation  and  shares 
trading,  the  absence  of  the  creation  of  any  tangible  product  and  the  refiance  on  correctly 
predicting  future  changes  in  the  market  have  brought  economic  systems  under  the  sway  of 
a  kind  of  'casino  capitalism',  leading  some  to  conclude  that  'the  western  financial  system  is 
rapidly  coming  to  resemble  nothing  as  much  as  a  vast  casino'  (Strange  1986,  p  I).  Thus  it 
is  in  the  language  of  games  that  a  currency  dealer  advises  companies  on  how  to  play  the 
markets:  'It's  gambling',  he  states  'Problems  arise  when  people  don't  see  it  as  a  gamble  and 
try  to  dress  it  up  with  macro-econornic  wisdom.  It's  a  gut  feel.  Dol-lar's  up.  Sterling's 
down.  Let's  trade'  (Bellini  1993,  p57). 
This  speculative  econonuc  trend  goes  unremarked  until  unforeseen  events  result  in  huge 
losses.  Then,  like  any  gambler  who  starts  to  lose  and  is  labelled  'compuls,  ve',  the  econoniý, 14,,  -, 
is  declared  sick,  unstable  and  111  n  imminent  danger  of  collapse.  Commentators  sudden1v 
become  aware  of  the  correspondence  between  gambling  and  econormc  speculation  and, 
much  like  those  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centunes,  draw  back  in  horror  at  the 
recognition.  Since  the  speculative  boom  of  the  seventeenth  century  and  the  disastrous 
bursting  of  the  South  Sea  Bubble,  the  economic  history  of  the  west  has  been  littered  with 
such  gambling  losing  runs,  including  the  Wall  Street  Crash  of  1929,  Black  Wednesday  in 
1987  and  most  recently,  the  coRapse  of  Barings  Bank  due  to  the  over-ambitious  bets  of 
trader  Nick  Leeson. 
Despite  its  failed  bets,  the  capitalist  economic  system  seems  to  be  both  driven  by  the 
risking  of  money  on  uncertain  future  events  and  limitlessly  able  to  cope  when  the  risk  falls. 
For  these  reasons  it  always  appears  slightly  disingenuous  of  commentators  to  feign 
surprise  when  the  gambling  -  speculation  equation  is  highlighted  by  a  spectacular  loss. 
When  Strange  writes  that  our  old  image  of  bankers  as  'staid  and  sober  men'  has  been 
displaced  by  one  that  is  altogether  more  entrepreneurial,  and  that  something  'radical  and 
serious  has  happened  to  the  international  financial  system  to  make  it  so  much  like  a 
gambling  hafl'  (Strange  1986,  p2),  we  are  forced  to  point  out  that  surely  by  now  it  is 
apparent  that  this  kind  of  speculative  risk  is  part  of  the  very  nature  of  capitalism  itself 
Those  stereotypes  of  Weberian  rationality  described  by  the  author  occupied  only  a  fleeting 
moment  of  economic  history,  for  the  dynamic  of  capitalist  expansion  has,  since  the 
seventeenth  century,  been  lodged  in  the  casino. 
It  is  appropriate  that  in  this  era  of  heightened  sensitivity  to  indeterminism  in  economics, 
Borges  should  write  his  tale  of  hypostatised  Chance:  Me  Lottery  Of  BabY1011.  In  the 
mythical  society  of  Babylon,  the  lottery  has  swallowed  up  all  other  institutions,  subsurning 
the  laws  of  justice  and  econoniics  to  the  rule  of  chance,  so  that  the  narrator  says:  'I  come 
from  a  dizzy  land  where  the  lottery  is  the  basis  of  reality'  (Borges  1985,  p55).  The  sacred 
drawings  which  are  held  every  sixty  days  determine  the  course  of  a  citiZens  life  for  that 
period,  and  since  the  lottery  has  permeated  every  social  institution,  the  individual  could 
find  himself  imprisoned  or  fined  with  an  unlucky  ticket  and  promoted  or  rewarded  with  a 
lucky  one.  This  fantastic  social  upheaval  was  once  reality  when  a  sixteenth  century  British 
lottery  win  brought  with  it,  as  well  as  a  cash  prize,  immunity  from  arrest  except  for  major 149 
crimes!  (Brenner  1990,  p  10).  In  Borges  words  'I  stole  bread  and  they  did  not  behead  nie 
(Borges  1985,  p55).  In  such  a  scheme,  the  edifice  of  society  has  been  turned  on  its  head  so 
that  social  consequences  are  arbitrarily  divorced  from  their  actions,  and  it  is  no  longer 
economic  reason  but  chance  itself  that  determines  the  infrastructure  of  society.  The  land  of 
Babylon  then  'is  nothing  less  than  an  infinite  game  of  chance'  (Borges  1985,  p6l).  In  this, 
it  is  not  unlike  Montesquieu's  'Bettica',  an  imaginary  land  created  to  satirise  what  he 
considered  the  iUusory  basis  of  the  speculative  wealth  on  which  it  was  based. 
Montesquieu's  'blind  god  of  chance'  who  oversaw  the  selling  of  air-filled  balloons  to  the 
citizens  of  Bettica,  performed  a  similar  allegorical  function  to  Borge's  lottery-society  in 
which  a  hypostatised  chance  threw  the  lives  of  its  citizenry  into  confusion  and  disarray. 
Both  fables  can  be  seen  to  express  a  similar  disquiet  with  chaotic  economic  conditionsý 
once  eighteenth  century.  )  the  other  twentieth,  and  both  descriptive  of  our  present  situation 
of  'casino  capitalism'. 
it  is  not  surpnsing  that  such  an  economic  system  as  this  should  so  willingly  embrace  the 
pure  form  of  its  own  dynamic  -  the  arena  of  games  of  chance. 
Thus  in  the  twentieth  century,  we  see  the  rapid  development  of  games  of  chance, 
accelerated  by  the  influence  of  technology  and  the  institutionalisation  of  play,  into  the 
economic  framework  of  capitalist  economies.  Much  has  been  written  on  the  capitalist 
embrace  of  gambling  and  the  mechanics  of  the  resulting  relationship,  and  it  is  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  essay  to  recount  the  debate  here.  '  However,  the  salient  point  which  emerges 
is  that,  after  a  lengthy  historical  suppression,  the  activity,  while  still  retaining  some  moral 
ambiguity,  has  shed  its  pariah  status  and  become  fully  incorporated  into  western  capitalist 
economies  as  just  another  type  of  commercial  enterprise.  The  ability  of  market  economies 
to  embrace  almost  any  kind  of  activity  has  resulted  in  games  of  chance,  for  the  first  time, 
being  encouraged,  developed  and  organised  according  to  the  hornogemising  dynamic  of 
entrepreneurialism.  Such  is  the  embrace  of  what  Balzac  acutely  described  as  'an  essentially 
taxable  passion'  (Balzac  1977,  p2l).  Having  achieved  ontological  status,  chance  has  been 
commodified  as  the  ultimate  twentieth  century  product,  sold  by  business  and  purchased  by 
the  consumer  -  the  gambler.  An  excerpt  from  the  Circus  Casino's  1989  annual  report 
1  See,  for  example  Abt  et  al.  1985-,  Eadington  (ed)  1988  Volumes  I  and  2  and  Caldwell  (ed)  1985. 1,;  () 
illustrates  this  new  status,  explainmg  that,  like  any  shop-  'Circus  is  an  entertainment 
merchant.  It's  just  that  we  happen  to  merchandise  playtime  to  our  customers  rather  than 
goods'  (in  Spanier  1992,  p  10  1). 
Along  with  its  institutionalisation  and  commercialisation,  the  democratising  trend  begun  in 
the  nineteenth  century  has  led  to  a  certain  degree  of  homogenisatiott  of  gambling 
behaviour.  The  previous  stratification  of  the  gambling  economy  with  horses  and  high 
stakes  casino  play  the  prerogative  of  the  aristocracy  and  lotteries  patrorused  mainly  by  the 
poor,  is  gradually  breaking  down,  and  the  middle  class  -  traditionally  opposed  to  all  forms 
of  gambling  -  are  becoming  incorporated  into  the  map.  As  the  organisation  of  this 
gambling  economy  comes  increasingly  under  the  sway  of  commercial  interests  (Witness  the 
effective  repeal  of  the  1968  legislation  and  subsequent  deregulation  of  the  industry  since 
the  introduction  of  the  lottery  in  Bfitain),  casinos  and  racecourses  are  becoming  less 
exclusive  while  bingo  halls  and  bookmakers  are  'upgrading'  their  image  to  attract  more 
affluent  customers.  These  changes  are  leading  to  the  homogenisation  of  once  disparate 
areas  of  gambling  activity  and  to  the  inclusion  of  a  classes  into  their  fold.  In  this  respect  it 
is  perhaps  not  too  early  to  predict  what  appears  to  be  the  shape  of  a  future  trend  -  the 
embourgeoisment  of  gambling.  At  the  same  time,  however  it  must  be  emphasised  that 
these  sweeping  changes  do  not  signify  the  breakdown  of  social  distinctions  altogether,  for, 
since  games  can  only  reflect  the  society  they  are  played  in,  as  long  as  social  divisions 
remain  in  the  world  outside,  so  will  they  remain  in  the  world  of  play. 
From  all  these  developments  we  can  conclude  that,  in  the  twentieth  century,  gambling  has 
become  a  diverse  phenomenon,  and  that  there  exist  many  different  ways  to  wager  money 
on  games  of  chance.  It  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  outline  the  diversity  of  modern 
gambling  by  drawing  a  map  of  its  major  areas  or  'sites',  and  to  distinguish  the 
phenomenological  experience  in  each  by  referring  to  the  physical  structure  and 
Organisation  -  the  physiognomy  -  of  these  sites. 
The  major  sites  of  the  late  twentieth  century  are  the  lottery  and  its  derivative,  the  bingo 
hall,  the  slot  machine  arcade,  on  and  off-track  betting  and  the  casino.  The  physiognomy  of 
these  sites  can  be  approached  by  a  delineation  of  the  categories  of  skill  and  chance,  the IiI 
rate  of  play  of  a  game,  the  player  relation  to  the  game,  the  spatial  organisation  and  social 
integration  of  the  site,  and  the  socio-economic  constitution  of  the  players  themselves. 
These  categories  can  be  regarded  as  a  set  of  co-ordinates  upon  which  the 
phenomenological  map  is  based,  and  are  intended  neither  to  be  exhaustive  nor  mutualk- 
exclusive. 
Skill  and  Chance 
Two  broad  forms  of  gambling  exist.  games  of  skifl  and  games  of  chance.  The  practical 
orientation  of  the  player  to  the  game  is  different  in  each,  for  the  former  imply  the 
possibility  of  (at  least  some)  mastery  over  play  wHe  the  latter  imply  submission  to  the 
blind  laws  of  chance. 
Although  the  existence  of  chance  is  pervasive,  games  of  skill  such  as  horse  race  betting 
and  poker  facifitate  the  exercise  of  varying  degrees  of  ability  on  the  part  of  the  player.  His 
choice  in  the  placement  of  his  wager  can  be  informed  by  the  rational  application  of  relevant 
knowledge  and  by  analysis  and  prediction  based  on  the  results  of  future  outcomes.  Such 
games  are  marked  by  'the  existence  of  an  underlying  order,  a  principle  which  can  be 
figured  out  and  mastered  by  a  skilled  observer'  (Zola,  in  Herman  1967,  p26).  With 
sustained  attention,  appropriate  training,  assiduous  application,  discipline  and 
perseverance'  (Caillois  1962,  p  15)  the  gambler  can  learn  from  past  experience  and  develop 
a  technique  for  play,  such  as  the  handicapping  of  horses.  Numeracy  and  psychological 
insight  are  vital  for  the  poker  player  while  the  synthetic,  probabifistic  analysis  of  many 
variables  are  pre-requisites  of  the  successful  handicapper.  This  type  of  gambling  Herman 
describes  as  work  (Herman  1967),  but  we  can  term  belling  in  order  to  distinguish  it  from 
involvement  in  games  of  chance  which  will  be  referred  to  as  playing.  In  betting,  the  work- 
play  distinction  often  appears  to  break  down,  as  is  revealed  in  a  statement  from  one 
gambler,  who  says:  'God,  there's  nothing  I  love  better  than  staying  up  all  night  and 
studying  the  relative  positions  and  abilities  of  the  teams  and  comparing  points  and  then 
coming  up  with  my  choices...  '  (in  Lieseur  1984,  p29).  This  calculative  approach  represents 
the  apotheosis  of  a  statistical,  probabilistic  Lebensgýfiihl.  the  tendency  to  reduce I  ý-) 
phenomena  to  numbers  and  to  express  the  relations  between  such  phenomena  as  relations 
between  numbers,  a  trend  which  first  emerged  as  a  science  in  the  seventeenth  century. 
The  orientation  involved  in  betting  can  be  distinguished  from  that  of  games  of  pure  chance, 
whereby  winning  numbers  or  combinations  are  generated  at  random.  For  Cail-lois,  such 
aleatory  games  include  'all  games  that  are  based  on  a  decision  independent  of  the  plaver, 
an  outcome  over  which  he  has  no  control  and  in  which  winning  is  the  result  of  fate  rather 
than  triumphing  over  an  adversary'  (Caillois  1962,  p  17).  These  games  are  not  amenable  to 
human  prediction,  for  the  operation  of  chance  activates  play  and  it  is  this,  'the  very 
capriciousness  of  chance  that  constitutes  the  unique  appeal  of  the  game'  (Caillois  1962, 
p17).  Outcomes  are  determined  by  the  laws  of  probability,  where  the  past  is  irrelevant  for 
future  outcomes,  and  so  it  is  impossible  for  the  gambler  to  enhance  his  chances  of  "inning 
through  knowledge  or  skiU.  He  may  be  involved,  but  his  actions  are  not  influential  in  play. 
According  to  Caillois  he  complies  with  the  'verdict  of  destiny'  and  such  compliance 
4signifies  that  the  player  submits  to  the  roll  of  the  dice,  that  he  will  do  nothing  but  throw 
them  and  read  the  number  that  comes  up'  (Caillois  1962,  p72).  Such  games  are  the 
antithesis  of  betting  games,  and  exist  as  C  constant  external  reproaches  to  those  who  would 
try  to  manipulate  the  cards,  dice  or  chips  as  they  would  operate  a  lathe  or  balance  a  set  of 
accounts'  (Cohen  and  Taylor  1978,  p  105). 
Part  of  the  'unique  appeal'  of  games  of  chance  is  their  absolute  democracy.  As  Gogol  put 
it:  'Play  is  no  respecter  of  persons  ... 
All  men  are  equal  at  cards'  (Gogol  1926,  p220). 
Each  player  is  equally  powerless  in  his  inability  to  influence  or  predict  the  outcome  of  a 
game  for  alea  tends  to  'abolish  natural  or  acquired  individual  differences  so  that  all  can  be 
placed  on  an  absolutely  equal  footing  to  await  the  blind  verdict  of  chance'  (Caiflois  1962, 
p  18).  In  contrast  to  games  of  skill,  alea  'negates  work,  patience,  experience  and 
qualifications.  Professionalism,  application  and  training  are  elirniýnated...  Alea...  grants  the 
lucky  player  infinitely  more  than  he  could  procure  by  a  lifetime  of  labour,  discipline  and 
fatigue 
- 
It  seems  an  insolent  and  sovereign  insult  to  merit'  (C  aifloi  s  1962,  p  17). 
This  merciless  egalitarianism  was  illustrated  when  the  pem-bourgeois  Trina  Aon  the 
lottery  in  Frank  Norris's  Mcleague.  -  "'Why  should  I  win"'  She  asks,  '"Eh,  why  shouldn't I 
You9"  cried  her  mother.  In  fact,  why  shouldn't  she9...  after  all,  it  was  not  a  quest'  ion  of 
effort  of  merit  on  her  part...  '  (Norris  1985,  pl  10).  The  undiscriminating  favour  of  destiny 
was  not  met  with  such  equanimity  by  the  ragman,  Zerkov,  however,  for  the  converse  of  its 
democracy  can  be  seen  as  the  unjust  caprice  of  chance.  "35000.  For  what9  For  nothing, 
for  simply  buying  a  ticket;  and  I  have  worked  so  hard  for  it,  so  hard,  so  hard...  fought  for 
it,  starved  for  it,  am  dying  every  day. 
-- 
"'  (Norris  198  5,  p  126). 
Although  the  gambler  cannot  predict  which  numbers  Will  Win,  he  does  not  lapse  into 
passive  fatalism,  but  actively  entertains  superstitious  and  mystical  notions  to  guide  his 
selection.  In  fact,  the  greater  the  degree  of  chance  in  a  game,  the  greater  the  degree  of  the 
gambler's  superstition  (Brown,  Devereaux,  Caillois).  The  structures  of  belief  underlying 
games  of  skill  and  games  of  chance  thus  rest  on  different  foundations-  while  'Knowledge 
and  skill  aid  and  reward  agon,...  magic  and  superstition  and  the  study  of  nUracles  and 
coincidences  are  invariable  accompaniments  of  the  study  of  aled  (Caillois  1962,  p77).  The 
mystical  orientation  that  results  from  exposure  to  alea  will  be  exanuned  in  Chapter  Five. 
The  abandonment  of  one's  wager,  guided  by  nothing  more  concrete  than  magical  belief,  to 
the  vicissitudes  of  chance,  is  a  form  of  play,  and  is  the  apotheosis  of  the  mystical  attitude 
towards  number.  The  distinction  between  betting  and  playing,  and  the  rationalist  and 
mystical  orientations  to  the  world  implied  in  each,  first  emerged  in  the  seventeenth  century 
when  the  simultaneous  publication  of  scientific  laws  of  probability  as  well  as  tracts  on  the 
magical  and  divinatory  use  of  cards  demonstrated  two  antithetical  approaches  to  the 
understanding  of  the  phenomenon  of  number. 
Of  course,  the  analytical  distinction  between  modem  games  of  chance  and  games  of  skill  is 
somewhat  artificial.  As  noted  earlier,  all  games,  even  those  most  amenable  to  the  skilful 
prediction  of  the  player,  contain  an  element  of  chance.  The  distinction  outlined  above  is 
therefore  not  an  absolute  separation,  for  between  the  two  extremes  'lie  a  multitude  of 
games  that  combine  the  two  attitudes  in  varying  degree'  (Caillois  1962,  p75).  Even  in 
games  like  poker,  a  winner  depends  on  not  being  dealt  appalling  cards  while  opponents  are 
dealt  favourable  ones,  and  all  the  skill  involved  in  handicapping  is  rendered  obsolete  if  at 
the  last  minute  it  rains  or  a  horse  becomes  ifl.  No  amount  of  skill  can  ever  eliminate 154 
uncertainty  and  confer  absolute  control,  for  chance  is  an  ontological  feature  of  the  Uorid, 
its  influence  is  pervasive  and  the  outcome  of  a  gamble  is  always  a  contingent  event. 
Rate  of  Play 
The  rate  of  play  of  a  game  includes  'the  number  of  complete  gambling  transactions  which 
take  place  in  any  given  unit  of  time'  (Devereaux  1949,  p44).  The  length  of  time  that 
elapses  between  the  placing  of  a  wager  on  an  uncertain  event  and  the  resolution  of  that 
event  constitutes  the  duration  of  the  gamble  or  risk,  while  the  intensity  of  the  risk  is 
effected  by  whether  or  not  the  event  is  settled  instantly  or  gradually;  for  example,  in 
roulette  'the  entire  and  final  outcome  is  settled  the  moment  the  ball  comes  to  rest  in  its  cup 
and  the  outcome  is  completely  indeterminate  before  that  instant.  Subjective  hopes  and 
tensions  are  held  in  suspense  whi-le  the  issue  is  pending,  but  no  sense  of  progression, 
involving  reorientation  is  present'  (Devereaux  1949,  p45).  On  the  other  hand,  at  the  race 
track  the  gambler  may  see  the  odds  and  conditions  continuafly  change  before  the  race  even 
begins  and  so  witness  "the  entire  process  as  an  infinite  series  of  progressive  stages  in  the 
materialisation  of  the  final  result'  (Devereaux  1949,  p45).  Similarly  in  poker  the  structure 
of  the  situation  changes  with  every  hand  and  the  gambler  must  therefore  reassess  his 
position  in  each  round.  The  risk  experienced  in  such  games,  while  stifl  intense,  is  more 
drawn  out  and  less  acute. 
Despite  the  various  rates  of  different  types  of  games,  gamblers  tend  to  act  in  a  manner  that 
shortens  the  rate  of  play.  By  placing  their  bets  on  any  game  at  the  last  possible  moment 
(Dickerson  1985,  pl4l),  gamblers  actually  homogenise  rates  of  play,  despite  the  different 
structural  characteristics  of  individual  games.  The  reasons  for  and  results  of  this  tendency 
vAll  be  exan-ýined  in  the  next  chapter. 
Individual  Relation  to  Game 
The  players  relation  to  a  game  and  to  other  players  is  complex.  Whether  he  participates 
directly  or  is  removed  fi7om  the  action  depends  on  the  separation  of  the  event  from  the 
betting  on  it.  In  a  sense,  all  gambling  'events'  (with  the  exception,  perhaps,  of  horse 15ý 
racing)  are  artificially  created  situations  which  would  never  be  instigated  but  for  the  fact 
that  people  bet  on  them.  Events  like  lotteries  are  set  up  for  the  sole  purpose  of  generating- 
an  uncertain  situation  on  which  to  wager  money.  What  is  important  here  is  whether  or  not 
such  events  directly  engage  the  bettor,  and  in  this  sense,  the  players'  relation  to  a  game  can 
take  one  of  three  forms  -  (1)  physical  participation,  (2)  observation  at  close  proximity  or 
(3)  distance.  Goffinan's  distinction  between  focused  and  unfocused  interaction  can 
illuminate  the  form  of  interpersonal  relations  in  gambling.  Whereas  in  cases  of  the  former, 
individuals  extend  defiberate  communication  to  each  other  ,  in  the  latter,  communication 
occurs  merely  by  virtue  of  their  being  in  the  same  situation  (Goffi-nan  1963,  p83).  All 
forms  of  gambling  can  thus  be  seen  to  be  instances  of  unfocused  interaction. 
In  casino  games  like  blackjack,  craps  and  baccarat,  and  in  slot  machine  play,  the  player  is 
physicafly  involved  and  is  betting  on  a  situation  which  is  at  least  superficially  derived  from 
his  own  actions.  His  sheer  physical  presence  is  necessary  for  such  games  to  occur  for  he 
must  manipulate  the  cards,  throw  the  dice  and  activate  the  buttons  on  the  slot  machine  for 
play  to  continue.  Despite  the  interactive  nature  of  such  games,  the  presence  of  other 
players  is  extrinsic  to  the  gambling  experience,  for  it  is  not  they,  but  the  house  or  the 
machine  that  the  gambler  plays  against.  He  plays  neither  with  nor  against  them,  they  are 
simply  there;  each  playing  their  own  private  game. 
Games  where  the  relation  is  one  of  distance  are  non-mteractive.  The  player  is  not 
physically  involved,  and  need  not  even  be  present  at  all,  as  is  the  case  with  lotteries  and 
races.  Here  the  player's  relation  to  the  game  is  distant  and  mediated  by  technology- 
telephones,  cables  and  fax  machines  can  afl  be  employed  to  place  a  bet  on  an  event  which 
may  be  occurring  thousands  of  miles  away.  Technology  thus  expands  the  'reach'  of  the 
gambler  -  from  sitting  at  a  blackjack  table,  holding  cards  in  his  hand,  he  can  expand  and 
protect  his  'gambling  body'  into  a  thing  of  huge  proportions  over  vast  distances  in  such  a 
way  that  his  actual  body  need  not  be  present  in  any  single  specific  space.  According  to  AN 
et  al..  'Bookmaking  is  the  first  major  form  of  commercial  gambling  to  be  transformed  by 
the  twentieth  century  revolution  in  communications  technology.  The  face-to-face 
transactions  between  bookmaker  and  bettor  that  were  so  prominent  a  feature  of  the 
nineteenth  century  American  gambling  scene  have...  almost  whofly  disappeared.  Many I  ý(, 
regular  sports  bettors  never  see  the  person  who  books  their  bets,  their  personal  contact 
with  the  betting  operation  being  limited  to  periodic  settlements  Alth  the  book's  collection 
agents  or  "runners"'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p45).  Here,  the  gambler  is  completely  absent  from 
the  action-  there  is  nothing  he  need  do,  nowhere  he  need  be  to  allow  a  lottery  or  race  to  go 
ahead.  In  fact,  the  lottery  or  horse  race  gambler  is  only  a  player  at  afl  in  the  sense  that  he 
demonstrates  interest  in  the  event  through  his  wager,  which  is  sufficient  to  include  him  in  a 
ritual  which  can  then  go  onwithout  him.  The  players  relation  to  others  is  as  distant  as  his 
relation  to  the  game  itself  In  the  lottery,  he  need  have  no  contact  vAth  other  participants-, 
and  in  off-track  betting,  he  deals  directly  with  a  commercial  bookmaker. 
Observation  at  close  proxinlity  is  a  peculiar  relationship  in  which  the  gambler  is  neither 
physically  involved  nor  physically  distant  from  the  game.  Pari-mutual  wagering  is  the  sole 
example  of  this  'in  between'  state.  Unlike  fixed  odds  ,  in  pari-mutual  betting,  gamblers 
wager  among  themselves  with  the  result  that  the  odds  on  horses  change  before  the  race  as 
an  expression  of  the  changing  confidence  and  opinions  of  the  bettors  involved.  Changes 
are  reflected  on  the  tote  board  which  records  shifts  in  odds  as  well  as  wagers  and  so 
registers  the  collective  betting  opinion  'in  a  manner  analogous  to  the  stock  market  ticker 
tape'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p86).  Pari-mutual  betting  is  thus  a  competition  among  bettors. 
Although  these  bettors  are  not  directly  involved  in  the  gambling  event  -  the  race  -  their 
non-physical  presence  -  their  opinions  are  necessary  for  the  event  to  be  defined  as  a 
gambling  one.  In  other  words,  competition  'does  not  deterrfýne  the  outcome  of  the 
gambling  event...  which...  is  beyond  the  bettors  control...  But  the  competition  among  the 
bettors  does  detem-fine  the  financial  value  of  successful  bets  as  to  this  outcome  -m  other 
words,  the  odds  at  which  winning  bets  are  paid'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p86). 
Spatial  Organisation  and  Social  Integration 
The  spatial  organisation  of  a  gambling  site  refers  to  the  concentration  or  diffusion  of  the 
gambling  environment.  Concentrated  sites  are  areas  of  intense,  localised.  gambling  activity 
like  the  casino  and  racetracic,  wMe  diffuse  'sites'  are  disseminated  over  a  wide  area,  as  in 
the  lottery. 157 
Such  spatial  organisation.  is  related  to  the  social  separation  or  incorporation  of  sites  into 
the  larger  social  fabric,  with  concentrated  sites  tending  to  exist  oumith  the  local 
environment  in  their  own  separate  spheres  and  diffuse  ones  tending  to  be  incorporated  into 
the  routine  of  daily  life. 
Spatial  organisation  affects  the  players  relation  to  a  game.  Upon  entering  a  concentrated 
site,  the  player  is  likely  to  be  physically  immersed,  if  not  actually  involved  in  play,  whereas 
a  diffuse  site  has  no  tangible  'site'  to  enter  and  hence  the  gambler  does  not  participate  in 
the  means  of  play  themselves.  Diffuse  sites  provide  many  intermediary  points  of  contact 
where  the  gambler  may  interact  with  the  larger  game  going  on  elsewhere.  Such  sites  as 
lottery  vendors  exist  fike  spokes  in  a  wheel,  reaching  deep  into  the  social  fabriic  from  a 
central  hub  -  the  lottery  draw.  These  'spokes'  reach  out  to  the  most  everyday  locations  like 
shops  and  kiosks  and  are  thus  incorporated  into  the  social  fabric,  while  concentrated  sites 
that  have  no  such  outlets  are  demographically  separated  in  their  own  exclusive  spheres. 
AN  et  al.  describe  this  distinction,  referring  to  casinos  as.  'timeless,  hermetic  environments 
of  near-monastic  abstraction  and  isolation  from  the  real  world...  In  contrast,  state  lottery 
tickets  are  purchased...  in  the  most  prosaic  neighbourhood  environments-.  bars,  grocery 
stores,  newstands  and  so  forth.  Unlike  casinos,  lotteries  are  perfectly  integrated  into  the 
real  world'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p46).  The  otherworldly  separation  of  the  casino  is  typified  in 
its  most  extreme  form 
,  in  the  giant  city-casino  of  Las  Vegas,  isolated  from  the  rest  of 
America  by  hundreds  of  miles  of  Nevada  desert 
- 
Player  Profile 
The  phenomenological  sites  host  a  variety  of  social  groups,  each  wIth  their  own 
motivations  for  playing  and  with  their  own  relations  to  chance.  Since  the  socio-economic 
constitution  of  players  varies  between  individual  games  and  even  within  games,  player 
Proffle  will  be  examined  separately  in  each  site. 15K 
ME  SITES 
Every  phenomenological  site  forms  its  own  separate  world,  with  its  oNAn  distinctive 
ambience  and  relation  to  chance.  Each  has  the  character  of  what  Goffman  cafls  'social 
occasions':  events  which  are  bounded  in  space  and  time  and  which  possess  'a  distinctive 
ethos,  a  spirit,  an  emotional  structure  that  must  be  properly  created,  sustained  and  laid  to 
rest'  during  a  'pre-established  unfolding  of  phases'  or  'agenda  of  activity'  (Goffman  1963, 
p  10).  In  their  existence  as  social  occasions,  the  sites  are  possessed  of  a  spectacular  nature, 
for  the  nature  of  the  spectacle  is  of  a  'social  relation  among  people,  mediated  by  images' 
(Debord  1987,  p4).  It  is  this  dimension  of  sociability  that,  for  Caillois,  lends  to  gambling 
its  character  as  a  'spectacular  pleasure'.  Although  games  of  chance  can  be  pursued  as  a 
solitary  pastime,  they  are  more  attractive  when  played  in  a  crowd,  for,  he  argues,  gamblers 
would  rather  'be  pressed  by  the  throng  which  fills  the  hippodrome  or  casino,  for  the 
pleasure,  thriH  and  excitement  engendered  by  fraternisation  with  an  anonymous  multitude' 
(Caillois  1962,  p40).  As  'spectacular  pleasures',  modem,  commercial  games  of  chance  are 
typical  of  a  trend  of  modernity  which  is  outlined  by  Debord.  Paraphrasing  Marx  on  the 
nature  of  capitalism  as  an  immense  collection  of  commodities,  he  begins  his  Society  of  the 
Spectacle,  by  writing.  -  'In  societies  where  modem  conditions  of  production  prevail,  all  of 
life  presents  itself  as  an  inimense  accumulation  of  spectacles'  (Debord  1987,  p  1). 
No  doubt  the  spectacular  nature  of  the  phenomenological  sites  will  be  drawn  out  in  future 
sociologies  of  gambling,  but  these  should  proceed  carefully  in  a  territory  where  specious 
analogies  cloaked  in  post-modem  jargon  are  easily  made.  It  is  easy  to  see  evidence  of  the 
spectacle  in  the  architecture  of  the  phenomenological  sites;  amongst  the  halls,  rotundas 
and  grandstands  that  house  the  various  games  of  chance.  However,  the  conveniently 
spectacular  nature  of  this  physical  design  tends  to  obscure  a  contrary  trend  towards  the 
increasing  fragmentation  and  insulation  of  the  gambling  experience.  This  privatisation,  the 
result  of  commercial  and  technological  development,  undermines  the  sense  of  'social 
occasion'  in  gambling  and  is  most  obvious  in  the  sites  of  the  lottery  and  the  bookmaker 
where,  as  we  shall  see,  individuals  are  increasingly  enabled  to  gamble  at  home,  and,  with 
the  appearance  of  technologies  such  as  the  internet,  across  larger  and  larger  distances. 159 
Although  leaving  the  physical  structure  of  the  sites  intact,  this  trend  removes  from  their 
essential  constitution  the  element  of  the  spectacle. 
The  Lottery 
Although  lottery-type  games  like  football  pools,  on  which  the  gambler  bets  on  the  results 
of  future  matches,  have  been  run  in  Britain  for  years,  the  creation  of  a  state  lottery  in  1994 
institutionalised  the  form,  creating  almost  overnight  the  foremost  type  of  national  gambling 
and  effectively  sweeping  away  competition  from  companies  like  Littlewoods  and  Vemons. 
After  168  years  of  prohibition,  the  British  state  lottery  was  reinstated  to  resume  its  orig  n  ,i  al 
function  of  state  fund-raising  and  the  creation  of  private  profit.  In  an  era  in  which  the 
government  is  unwilling  to  levy  unpopular  taxes  for  services  it  is  reluctant  to  fund  at  all, 
the  lottery's  role  as  state  fund-raiser  comes  to  the  fore.  Once  again  arguments  against  the 
'immorality'  of  games  of  chance  go  unheeded  as  the  vested  interests  of  capital  see  in  such 
games  the  opportunity  for  pecuniary  gain.  Just  as  sixteenth  century  British  lottenies  funded 
the  growth  of  a  nascent  state  -  bridges,  libraries,  and  its  exploits  abroad  -  so  the  twentieth 
century  one  finances  the  recreation  of  a  declining  one  -  opera  houses,  sports  fields  and  the 
exploits  of  its  organisers  closer  to  home.  The  proceeds  fi7om  stake  money  are  divided 
between  players,  organisers  and  government,  with  50%  going  to  Winners,  5%  to  retailers, 
5%  to  lottery  organisers  Camelot,  12%  to  the  treasury  and  28%  forgood  causes'  such  as 
arts  funding  and  charities. 
In  the  late  twentieth  century  the  embrace  of  lotteries  by  state  fiscal  policy  is  more  apparent 
than  ever,  with  lotteries  world-wide  running  unashamedly  as  capitalist  ventures, 
distributing  revenue  for  both  public  works  and  private  profit.  Far  from  the  lottery  taking 
over  other  social  institutions  as  in  Borges'  tale  of  chance,  western  economies  have  proved 
themselves  quite  able  not  only  to  incorporate  it  in  their  structure,  but  also  to  use  the  lottery 
for  their  own  ends. I  (,  A  ) 
To  date  little  research  on  the  social  basis  of  lottery  participation  in  Britain  has  been  camed 
out,  and  significantly,  what  interest  there  has  been  has  come  not  from  social  scientists  but 
from  market  researchers. 
The  historical  trend  towards  the  over-representation  of  the  lowest  socio-econornic  groups 
in  lottery  drawings  is  substantiated  today  with  a  geographical  concentration  of  both  state 
and  private  lotteries  in  poor  countries  such  as  Brazil,  most  of  Latin  America,  and  Catholic 
countries  like  Spain  and  Italy  (Kaplan  1988).  A  contrary  trend  is  also  becoming  apparent 
however,  whereby  effective  marketing  and  distribution  campaigns  by  privately  run 
businesses  have  brought  about  the  proliferation  of  lotteries  and  the  expansion  of  their 
socio-economic  base  throughout  the  industriahsed  west.  Walker  has  pointed  to  the  high 
incidence  of  lottery  participation  amongst  the  poor,  the  under-educated  and  the  old,  and 
the  increase  in  participation  in  times  of  high  unemployment  (Walker  1992,  p59-63).  He 
ascribes  these  patterns  to  decreasing  marginal  utility  with  increasing  wealth,  (i.  e.  a  lower 
relative  value  of  prizes  for  the  rich  and  higher  value  for  the  poor),  making  a  L5000  return 
on  a  il  stake,  even  at  long  odds,  appear  more  attractive  to  an  individual  who  has  no  other 
means  of  raising  such  fiinds  than  to  an  individual  who  can  obtain  such  amounts  through 
solid  investments,  or  by  saving.  Greater  participation  with  age  Walker  sees  as  another 
desperate  measure:  when  an  individual  reaches  end  of  his  productive  life  without  achieving 
his  original  goals,  a  lottery  win  may  appear  as  only  remaining  option  (Walker  1992,  p62). 
This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  case  of  the  British  lottery  whose  launch  in  November 
1994  signified,  in  the  words  of  one  market  analyst,  'Ahe  biggest  event  in  Britain's  econonuc 
fife  since  decirnifisation'  (Ae  Guardian  21  st  March  1995,  p22).  Spending  f  100  million  a 
week  on  tickets,  more  than  is  spent  annuafly  on  bread,  health  and  beauty  care,  books  or 
rail  travel  (1he  Guardian,  22nd  August  1995,  pl),  the  public  embraced  the  lottery  with 
open  arms,  transforming  the  nature  of  the  consumption  economy  almost  overnight  as  they 
did  so.  Patterns  of  spending  and  recreation  have  changed-  the  lottery  has  created  12 
million  new  shopping  trips  each  week  and  sales  in  shops  with  terminals  have  risen  by  20%, 
due  in  part  at  least  to  the  five  thousand  new  customers  brought  in  by  the  desire  to 
purchase  tickets.  Leisure  habits  have  also  changed:  Saturday  rught  television  viewing  has 16  1 
increased  by  20%  because  of  the  televised  draw  (Hetilet,  Cewre  Report,  i  1he  Guarchmi  n 
22nd  March  1995,  p3). 
It  is  not  only  in  economic  life  that  the  impact  of  the  lottery  has  been  felt,  for  it  has 
dramatically  and  irrevocably  altered  the  profile  of  British  gamblers.  Here  the 
homogenisation  of  the  gambling  experience  inherent  in  the  commodification  of  games  of 
chance  is  most  strongly  felt.  Before  the  introducfion  of  the  lottery  there  were  15  million 
regular  gamblers  in  Britain;  now  there  are  25  million.  In  1994  -  the  year  of  the  lottery  - 
around  90%  of  the  population  took  part  in  some  kind  of  gambling  activity,  compared  with 
74%  the  previous  year.  The  increase  is  directly  attributable  to  the  lottery.  Over  a  year 
later,  playing  habits  have  stabilised  and  market  analysts  Mintel  estimate  that  58%  of  the 
population  now  play  every  week.  Groups  previously  under-represented  in  gambling 
activities  -  the  young,  women  and  the  middle  class  -  are  now  becoming  visible  through 
their  lottery  participation.  Traditionally  a  male  pastime,  playing  lotteries  like  the  pools  was 
popular  with  skilled  manual  workers  aged  between  35  and  44.  However,  the  lottery  has 
attracted  more  young,  female  and  affluent  patrons.  Mintel  comments*  'Women  in 
particular  seem  to  be  attracted  by  the  lottery'  so  that,  with  its  influence,  their  total 
participation  in  gambling  activities  has  risen  from  its  pre-1994  figure  of  70%  to  87%, 
bringing  them  almost  level  with  male  gambling  which  stands  at  8Wo  (Mintel,  Report,  in 
7he  Guardian  5th  June  1995,  p3). 
Remarkably  little  socio-econon*  or  geographical  variation  exists  amongst  players. 
Traditional  middle  class  dislike  of  gambling  has  been  overcome  in  this  state  sanctioned 
activity,  which  further  assuages  uneasy  consciences  with  the  reminder  of  the  'good  causes' 
that  benefit  from  participation.  The  predilection  of  'upmarket'  ABCI  socio-econon-& 
groups  for  the  game  is  a  source  of  pride  for  its  wealthy  organisers,  Camelot,  who  state 
'Guardian  readers  are  just  as  likely  to  play  as  Sun  readers'  (in  Ihe  Guardian  22  March 
1995,  p2).  The  introduction  of  the  lottery  has  initiated  the  deregulation  of  the  entire 
gambling  economy.  Seeing  its  success,  and  fearing  its  competition,  other  forms  of 
gambling  such  as  casinos  and  bingo  companies  have  demanded  the  same  freedoms  to 
advertise  and  promote  their  'product'  as  the  lottery  monopoly,  with  the  result  that  the  1968 
Gaming  Act  is  graduafly  being  repealed.  The  paternalistic  tone  of  the  Act  was  designed  to 162 
litnit  what  was  generally  regarded  as  a  dubious  activity  and  so  stipulated  that  Rambling 
facilities  could  not  encourage  the  public  to  gamble  in  any  way,  but  could  only  satisfý- 
existing  demand.  Strict  rules  thus  forbade  advertising  and  the'proliferatlon'  of  facilities  that 
exceeded  demand.  Now,  the  strictures  of  the  Act  are  being  swept  away,  and  the  entire 
gambling  industry  being  opened  up  to  the  vicissitudes  of  market  forces. 
The  ubiquity  of  participation  and  the  inclusion  of  the  young,  the  middle  class  and  female 
gamblers,  while  an  important  trend  in  the  demographics  of  British  gambling,  should  be 
interpreted  carefully,  for  it  tends  to  conceal  another  trend  -  the  concentration  of  plav 
amongst  the  poorest  socio-econornic  groups.  Although  58%  of  the  population  play,  not  all 
spend  the  same  amount  each  week,  much  less  a  similar  amount  relative  to  their  total 
incomes.  The  average  of  L2.08  per  person  per  ticket  conceals  vast  differences  in  the  reality 
of  play.  The  Henley  Centre  survey  has  built  up  a  profile  of  a  heavy  player  as  an  Individual 
who  is  Scottish,  aged  between  25  and  34,  earning  between  L9,500  and  f  15,000,  watches 
more  than  twenty-nine  hours  of  television  every  week,  and  reads  a  tabloid  newspaper  (1he 
Guardian  22  March  1996,  p3).  Furthermore,  the  National  Low  Pay  Unit  has  observed  that 
millions  of  the  14  million  households  with  an  annual  income  of  less  than  0,000  spend  far 
more  than  this  mythical  'national  average'  on  the  game.  Like  the  poor  who  played  the 
lotteries  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries,  the  unemployed,  the  low  paid  and  the 
economically  marginalised  of  today  regard  the  distant  possibility  of  winning  as  their  best 
chance  to  escape  poverty  in  what  is  essentially  still  a  static  unmeritocratic  social  system. 
One  woman  who  plays  heavily  says  'I  have  to.  It's  a  necessity.  You  live  on  the  bread-line 
all  your  fife  and  this  is  the  only  way  out  of  it'  (in  7he  Guardian  31  October  1994,  p4).  The 
very  reasons  that  led  to  its  outlawing  in  1826  -  its  'buoying  up  the  multitude  with  dreams 
of  golden  showers"  -  are  the  same  reasons  that  assure  its  popularity  today.  Denied  genuine 
opportunity,  the  poor  are  given  a  chimera;  a  vision  of  immense  riches  only  one  in  14 
million  will  ever  attain.  Balzac's  comment  on  the  French  game:  'The  lottery  was  the  most 
powerful  fairy  in  the  world:  did  it  not  nurture  magical  hopes?  No-one  has  realised  that  is 
was  the  opium  of  poverty  %  is  still  as  pertinent  today  as  it  was  in  1945  (in  Culf  1994,  p3). 
The  advertisement  for  scratchcards  in  a  Las  Vegas  casino  in  Plate  Five  embodies  the  brutal 
exploitation  of  hope  that  is  an  integral  feature  of  all  lotteries.  Instead  of  some r-t¬. 161 
redistribution  of  wealth,  here  money  is  taken  directlyfrom  the  impoverished  as  they  cash 
entire  pay  cheques  in  the  hope  of  instant  fiches. 
it  is  ironic  that,  despite  their  over-representation  in  the  purchase  of  tickets,  those  with  leas-t 
to  lose  do  in  fact  end  up  losing  out  in  the  distribution  of  stake  money.  At  only  50%,  the 
return,  )  of  the  total  stake  as  prizes  is  extremely  low,  and  the  impressive  sounding  'good 
causes'  which  supposedly  contribute  to  the  wealth  of  the  nation  have  turned  out  to  be 
highly  partisan  causes  -  in  effect,  the  pastimes  of  the  affluent.  While  pennies  are  thrown  at 
brass  bands  and  school  swimming  pools,  miRions  are  plunged  into  the  playgrounds  of  the 
middle  classes  -  opera  houses  and  art  galleries,  and  those  of  their  children  -  for  example 
the  project  to  refurbish  the  sports  grounds  of  Eton. 
So,  although  lottery  participation  is  biased  to  the  working  classes  in  the  North,  proceeds 
are  appropriated  by  the  middle  classes  in  the  South.  The  Rowntree  Foundation  have 
expressed  concern  at  this  arrangement,  writing  that  the  distribution  of  lottery  funds 
contains  a  'built-in  bias  against  the  poor',  favouring  'the  relatively  well-off  living  in  the 
most  prosperous  areas'  who  enjoy  'artistic,  heritage  and  sporting  pursuits  which  are  less 
interesting  or  less  accessible  to  those  with  smaller  incomes'  (Rowntree  Foundation  Report 
1995,  p2).  Psychologist  Ian  Brown  calls  the  lottery  a  'tax  on  desperation',  but  it  is  more 
than  this,  for,  since  the  lower  socio-economic  groups  play  it  to  the  benefit  of  the  higher 
ones,  it  also  functions  as  an  insidiously  regressive  form  of  taxation. 
In  the  U.  S.  state  lotteries  have  passed  the  point  where  they  generate  revenue  for  only 
'luxuries'  and  are  now  firmly  ensconced  in  an  area  the  state  has  gradually  backed  out  of, 
the  provision  of  vital  services.  In  most  states,  lotteries  are  funding  larger  and  larger 
Proportions  of  expenditure  on  health  and  education,  and  although  (as  in  Britain)  most  deny 
such  funding  is intended  to  take  over  the  state's  share,  it  inevitably  does  so.  For  example, 
in  Pennsylvania,  rent  assistance  and  medical  rebates  for  the  elderly  were  'introduced  under 
the  general  [state]  revenue  and  later  transferred  to  the  lottery  fund  as  lottery  revenues 
increased'  (Abt  and  Smith  1986,  p3  1).  No  doubt  the  temptation  to  allow  lottery  players  to 
I voluntarily'  pay  for  state-funded  services  wM  prove  too  much  for  Britain  over  the  coming 1(4 
years,  and,  with  the  projection  of  'NHS  Loto'..  a  pn  "hose  'good  cause'  is  the  ivate  lottery 
National  Health  Service,  the  process  may  already  have  begun. 
The  organisation  and  form  of  the  lottery  and  its  instantaneous  cousin,  the  scratchcard, 
have  contributed  to  its  easy  integration  into  public  life,  and  the  broad  social  base  of  its 
support.  Its  form  has  remained  virtuafly  unchanged  from  that  of  its  sixteenth  century 
predecessor  and  involves  the  selection  of  six  numbers  which  are  chosen  by  a  randon-fising 
device  every  Saturday  evening.  The  spatial  organisation  of  the  lottery  is  diffuse-,  tickets  are 
available  from  many  points  and,  because  it  is  an  integrated  site,  they  blend  almost 
seamlessly  with  their  local  environment.  Since  they  are  'woven  Mito  the  fabric  of  their 
communities'  buying  a  lottery  ticket  'is  a  part  of  everyday  life'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p62).  The 
very  act  of  playing  the  lottery  has  become  normallsed,  with  tickets  purchased  as  part  of  a 
daily  routine  along  with  the  morning  groceries  or  weekend  shopping.  There  exists  little 
spontaneity  in  this  realm  of  pure  chance:  80%  of  lottery  purchases  are  pre-planned  with 
22  half  the  nation's  players  making  special  trips  to  buy  tickets  (1he  Guardian  A. 
March 
1995, 
p2).  The  customer  stands  in  a  queue  as  he  would  for  any  other  commodity,  and,  upon 
paying  a  pound,  his  bar-coded  ticket  indicates  that  he  is  now  a  gambler.  It  is  In  this  prosaic 
ritual  that  the  modem  cornmodification  of  chance  is  most  evident. 
Because  the  lottery  has  a  slow  rate  of  play  every  stage  in  the  process  of  buying  a  ticket  can 
be  separated  and  stretched  out  to  fill  the  seven  days  between  draws.  There  is  no  sense  of 
urgency  in  this  kind  of  game:  the  gambler  need  not  chose  his  numbers  at  the  same  time  or 
even  in  the  same  place  as  picking  up  his  play  slip.  He  can  fill  them  in  ý-nmediately  or  take 
the  slip  home  and  make  his  selection  at  a  more  leisurely  pace.  When  the  ticket  has  finally 
been  purchased,  another  period  of  inactivity  unfolds,  for  the  player  must  now  wait  for  the 
draw.  In  the  interim,  involvement  is  minimal,  possession  of  a  ticket  being  the  sole  measure 
of  participation  in  an  activity  which  is both  spatially  temporally  dispersed. 
The  most  distinctive  characteristic  of  scratchcards  on  the  other  hand,  is  their  insimilwieltY, 
a  feature  emphasised  in  the  advertisement  'forget  it  all  for  an  instant'.  This  fast  rate  of  play 
makes  scratchcards  an  immediaie  forin  of  gambling,  whose  instant  result  constitutes  a 
large  part  of  their  appeal  and  contributes  to  their  extremely  addictive  effect. I  () 
The  televised,  Saturday  night  draw  is  the  climax  of  the  protraction  of  lottery  act"'it"  In 
contrast  to  the  leisurely  stretched  out  time  of  the  previous  seven  days,  the  draw  is  over  in 
seconds  and  is  characterised  by  a  concentration  of  time  and  space.  It  begins  ýkhen  a  drum 
containing  the  numbered  baRs  is  activated  and,  while  revolving,  ejects  six  M  succession. 
The  entire  episode  lasts  approximately  thirty  seconds  but  as  the  balls  drop  out  of  the  drum 
and  career  down  the  chute,  accompanied  by  drumrolls  and  fanfares  of  trumpets,  player 
excitement  is  at  a  peak.  At  this  point  the  gambler's  relation  to  the  game  is  mediated  by  the 
television  screen  and  for  a  moment  he  is  oblivious  to  his  surroundings  and  absorbed  in  the 
action.  In  seconds  it  is  all  over,  and  the  deflation  of  mood  which  inevitably  follows  such 
tension  has  for  some  been  characterised  as  a  unique  new  illness  -  lottery  stress  disorder.  A 
doctor  describes  how  patients  presenting  with  the  disorder  show  'an  initially  intense 
anticipatory  anxiety,  which  [builds]  throughout  the  week  to  reach  a  characteristic  peak  in 
the  early  evening  on  Saturday'.  Such  anxiety  is  often  accompanied  by  'unrealistic  optimism 
and  grandiose  ideas'  in  which  'the  subject  experiences  the  delusional  belief  that  great 
riches  are  about  to  befall  him  or  her'.  Inevitably,  after  the  draw  on  Saturday,  'these 
feelings  give  way  to  rapid  deflation  of  mood',  and  although  recovery  sets  in  at  the 
beginning  of  the  week,  'characteristically  the  pattern  repeats  itself  over  the  coming  week' 
(Hunter  1995,  p875). 
In  a  sense  the  draw  is  the  lottery,  the  spatial  and  temporal  hub  of  the  action,  while  the 
choosing  of  numbers  and  buying  of  tickets  are  the  spokes  of  dispersed  action  whose  ends 
culminate  in  this  central  point.  The  whole  cycle  of  action  is  repeated  in  long,  slow, 
revolutions  week  after  week  and  year  after  year,  as  regular  as  the  occurrence  of  any 
natural  event. 
The  distant  relation  of  the  player  to  the  game,  the  high  integration  and  the  slow  rate  of 
play  culminate  in  the  normalisalion  of  the  lottery  as  a  form  of  gambling.  Such 
normahsation  is  so  extreme  that  the  gambler  is  not  regarded  as  a  gambler  at  all,  often  even 
by  himself.  In  Spain,  where  the  State  El  Gordo  is  a  national  institution,  most  people  dený 
they  gamble  but  when  asked  if  they  take  part  in  the  lottery  reply  'of  course'  (1he 
Guar&an  31  October  1994,  p3).  This  perception  is  codified  in  language  where,  unlike loo 
gamblers  in  other  games  of  chance,  lottery  gamblers  never  'gamble',  they  merely 
'participate'  or  enjoy  an  innocuous  'flutter'  on  a  sui  generi  .s  event.  The  idea  of  the  lottery 
participant  is  not  so  much  a  euphemism  as  a  reflection  of  the  presentation  of  the  lotterv 
itself,  and  one  which  for  Benjamin,  means  that  'an  incorrigible  patron  of  a  lottery  mll  not 
be  proscribed  in  the  same  way  as  the  gambler  in  a  stricter  sense'  (Benjamin  1992,  p  13  7) 
Such  a  perception  is  descended  from  the  lottery's  sixteenth  century  forebears  ýkhen 
gambling  was  encouraged  by  the  state  as  a  patriotic  duty  and  so  defined  as  a  puanthropic 
gesture,  never  a  gamble.  With  its  emphasis  on  the  lottery's  support  of  'good  causes'  and 
'heritage'  the  modem  state  once  more  sanctions  betting  and,  thus  legitimised,  removes  it 
from  the  arena  of  gambling  proper. 
The  discovery  already  of  a  'lottery  pathology'  serves  to  highlight  the  more  general  malaise 
which  fies  behind  the  official  position  on  gambling.  For  every  'individual  with  Lottery 
Disorder  Syndrome  there  are  thousands  more  whose  poverty  is  exacerbated  by  over- 
spending  on  tickets,  and  worse,  by  the  removal  of  funds  once  provided  by  the  state  and 
now  dependent  on  the  vicissitudes  of  lottery  revenue.  State  lotteries  (and,  to  a  lesser 
degree,  all  state  sanctioned  and  therefore  taxable  gambling)  of  the  late  twentieth  century 
are  an  indication  of  the  degree  to  which  states  are  increasingly  abnegating  responsibility  for 
the  provision  of  services  they  once  felt  bound  to  provide.  In  the  era  of  nascent  capitalism, 
lotteries  provided  revenue  for  states  whose  infrastructures  were  insufficiently  developed  to 
collect  taxes  from  every  citizen.  Now,  the  lotteries  widespread  amongst  the  most  highly 
bureaucratised  nations  in  the  world  function  to  collect  an  indirect  and  regressive  form  of 
taxation  their  governments  are  politically  unwilling  to  collect.  As  the  presence  of  the  state 
recedes  in  public  life,  that  of  the  lottery  grows,  to  the  extent  that  every  harmless  'flutter' 
heralds  a  further  disintegration  of  the  apparatus  of  state  funding. 
The  potentially  pernicious  aspect  of  lotteries  in  the  hands  of  the  modem  state  was 
recognised  by  Orwell.  His  Nineteen  Eighty-Four,  projected  exactly  ten  years  before  the  re- 
introduction  of  the  British  state  lottery,  describes  the  cynical  manipulation  of  hope  by  the 
Party  in  the  flann  of  a  lottery  whose  prizes  were  'largely  imaginary'  and  where  'only  small 
sums  were  actually  paid  out'-  'The  Lottery,  with  its  weekly  payout  of  enormous  pnzes, I()- 
was  the  one  public  event  to  which  the  proles  paid  senOUS  attention...  It  ýkas  their  delight, 
their  folly,  their  anodyne,  their  intellectual  Stimulant'  (Orwell  1984.  p77). 
Bingo 
Defived  from  the  game  of  'lotto',  bingo  is  essentially  a  form  of  lottery,  albeit  a 
concentrated  one  that  occupies  a  separate  site,  is  governed  by  a  faster  rate  of  play  and 
patronised  by  its  own  unIque  social  group. 
As  in  the  lottery,  a  bingo  winner  is  declared  when  a  randomly  generated  series  of  numbers 
matches  those  held  by  a  player.  However,  unlike  the  lottery,  in  bingo  the  player  is  present 
during  the  number-calling  session,  marking  off  the  numbers  on  her  cards  (of  which  she 
usually  has  between  one  and  six)  as  they  are  announced.  Although  unable  to  influence  this 
game  of  pure  chance  in  any  way,  the  player  is  fully  involved  at  every  stage  by  the  need  to 
vigilantly  check  her  cards  and  keep  up  with  the  flow  of  numbers  being  called.  Unlike  the 
weekly  drawing  of  the  lottery,  bingo  sessions  are  conducted  in  the  afternoons  and  evenings 
of  most  week-days  in  buildings  which,  despite  being  part  of  the  local  community,  are 
essentially  separate  sites.  Often  situated  in  disused  cinemas  or  town  halls,  entry  into  a 
bingo  club  is  an  entry  into  another  world,  which  is  secluded  from  the  one  outside  and 
governed  by  its  own  set  of  rules  and  conventions. 
The  bingo  hall  itself  is  housed  in  a  large  atrium,  lined  with  hundreds  of  perfectly 
symmetrical  tables  and  enclosed  by  a  refreshments  bar  at  the  one  end  and  a  caller's  box  at 
the  other.  Despite  these  common  features,  enormous  variations  in  levels  of  comfort,  decor 
and  amenities  can  be  found  between  clubs.  Dixey,  for  example,  writes  that  'the  equivalent 
of  sawdust  and  spittoon  pubs  can  be  found  in  the  tombola  clubs  of  the  north-east,  whilst 
the  refurbished  clubs  of  some  of  the  major  companies  can  be  visually  stunning,  offering  a 
very  different  kind  of  experience'  (Dixey  1976,  p208).  The  ambience  of  a  session  can 
further  vary,  depending  on  whether  it  constitutes  a  'Saturday  night  out',  or  whether  it  Is 
scheduled  on  a  mýid-week  afternoon  and  fitted  around  the  daily  routine  of  children, 
housework  and  shopping. 168 
Although  Downes  et  al.  's  1976  survey  found  males  and  females  to  be  equal  Participants  in 
the  game  of  bingo,  subsequent  research  has  found  female  participation  to  be  far  hip  er,  ,h 
and  has  pointed  to  the  high  degree  of  recruitment  from  working  men's  clubs  in  the  onginal 
survey  as  the  source  of  such  an  imbalance  (Dixey  1987,  Freestone  1995).  The  Gallup 
Survey  of  1991  found  that  83%  of  players  are  women,  17%  men,  with  an  average  age  of 
53  (in  Freestone  1995).  The  socio-economic  basis  of  bingo  participation  is  predominantly 
working  class;  Downes  et  al.  stating  that  'not  being  working  class  was  practically  enough 
to  predict  virtually  no  bingo  playing'  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  pl.  80),  and  that  *the  stable 
middle  class  are  [chiefly]  excluded  from  bingo'  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p  175). 
Such  demographics  are  the  result  of  female  patterns  of  leisure  activity  in  post-war  Britain. 
The  schemes  to  re-house  the  working  class  into  new  housing  estates  and  high  rise  flats  in 
the  1950s  and  1960s  disrupted  established  communities  and  reduced  the  amount  of  semi- 
public  space  in  which  neighbourly  interaction  (especially  amongst  women)  could  take 
place  (Dixey  1987,  p203).  At  the  same  time,  the  large-scale  closure  of  cinemas  in  the 
1950's  curtailed  the  specifically  female  tradition  of  visiting  the  cinema,  and  so  removed  an 
important  female  meeting  place.  However,  the  re-opening  of  cinemas  as  bingo  halls  during 
the  next  decade  provided  a  new  pubfic  space  for  women,  and  the  'natural'  continuation  of 
an  already  existing  habit,  assuring  such  clubs  a  place  in  the  leisure  time  of  the  working 
class  woman.  This  role  is  summarised  by  Dixey.  'The  bingo  club  in  the  early  1960s  thus 
enabled  women  to  get  out  of  the  house,  to  meet  in  a  serni-public  place  in  an  environment 
which  had  been  largely  female  anyway...  in  a  time  of  relative  affluence  and  spare 
disposable  income'  (Dixey  1987,  p203). 
As  well  as  the  intrinsic  rewards  of  the  game  itself  then,  bingo  serves  as  a  sociable  outlet  - 
an  opportunity  to  'get  out  of  the  house'  to  meet  up  with  friends.  Four-fifths  of  Downes  et 
al.  's  female  sample  reported  that  they  tiever  played  alone  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p  177). 
Until  recently,  the  bingo  economy  was  bound  by  the  restrictions  of  the  1968  Act  'A  hich 
allowed  the  opening  of  only  sufficient  clubs  to  meet  'existing'  not  'stimulated'  demand.  To 
this  end,  clubs  were  not  aflowed  to  advertise  -  even  when  their  intention  was  to  attract 
new  members  of  staff  -  or  to  show  any  Hlustration  of  the  inside  of  a  bingo  hall.  Visitors  to 169 
bingo  clubs  were  required  to  be  members,  and  had  to  wait  24  hours  between  joining  a  club 
and  playing  in  it  -a  measure  whose  residual  Puntanism  was  intended  to  eliminate  aný 
'irrational'  playing  on  impulse. 
However  the  general  deregulation  of  the  gafffing  industry  has  been  felt  most  markedly  in 
the  arena  of  bingo  and  has  been  codified  in  an  Act  of  1992  which  lifted  the  ban  on 
advertising  and  allowed  clubs  to  invite  the  public  to  take  part  in  their  activities.  The 
proposed  deregulation  of  1996  will  take  these  first  steps  towards  market  even 
further  by  allowing  bingo  sites  to  exist  without  being  'members  only'  clubs  and  to  abolish 
the  24  hour  'cooling  off  period.  Justices'  powers  to  refuse  licenses  on  the  grounds  of 
'insufficient  demand'  will  be  removed,  as  will  the  limit  on  national  game  multiple  prizes 
(The  Guardian  28  February  1996,  p2). 
As  a  capitalist  enterprise  bingo,  like  the  lottery,  is  attempting  to  broaden  its  demographic 
base  to  attract  younger  and  more  affluent  players,;  in  the  words  of  the  chair-man  of  the 
industry,  to:  'compete  on  equal  terms  for  its  share  of  the  leisure  market'  (in  Freestone 
1995,  p8).  The  renovation  of  many  older  sites  is  defiberately  intended  to  create  a  more 
'upmarket'  image,  as  is  the  introduction  of  various  new  technologies.  For  example,  a 
computer  linked  National  Game  which  joins  together  some  650  clubs  in  competition  for  a 
single  prize  of  L50,000  can,  we  are  told,  be  seen  as  'a  prime  example  of  product 
differentiation  being  used  to  revitalise  a  dwindfing  leisure  market'  (Freestone  1995,  p6). 
Touch  screen  computers  have  further  modernised  bingo,  their  digital  screens  sunk  into 
tables  rendering  books  of  numbers  redundant  in  many  clubs.  The  option  of  a  'waitress  call' 
button  whereby  players  can  order  drinks  at  the  touch  of  a  screen  is  set  to  alter  the 
constitution  of  the  old-style  bingo  experience  still  further  (Griffiths  1994,  p2). 
Already  the  physiognomy  of  bingo  is  changing;  the  deregulation  of  the  industry  and 
intervention  of  modernising  technologies  breaking  down  the  traditional  player  profile.  As 
more  young  people  and  more  upwardly  mobile  social  groups  join  in,  the  game,  hke  the 
lottery,  appears  to  be  increasingly  subject  to  the  hornogenising  force  of  commercial 
interests. I 
Slot  Mac  ines 
Since  the  first  slot  machines  of  the  runeteenth  century  represented  their  era  of  industrial 
mechanisation,  a  century  of  technological  advance  has  ensured  that  the  dulital 
microprocessor  slots  of  the  late  twentieth  century  represent  their  post-Industnal  age  in  a 
similar  fashion. 
Because  of  strict  licensing  controls,  in  Britain  slot  or  'fruit  machines'  occupy  two  types  of 
phenomenological  site:  specially  licensed  arcades,  and  'single  sites'  such  as  cafes,  chip 
shops  and  sports  centres.  These  single  sites  also  include  what  are  termed  'adult 
environments'  -  public  houses,  bingo  clubs,  casinos  and  private  members'  clubs.  Both  the 
number  of  machines  and  maximum  prizes  are  regulated  in  these  areas  so  that  the  top 
payment  in  arcades  and  single  sites  is  L4  in  tokens,  L8  cash,  and  L250  in  'adult 
environments'  where  the  maximum  number  of  machines  is  limited  to  two.  However,  the 
imminent  repeal  of  the  1968  Gaming  Act  is  set  to  relax  these  restrictions  on  slots, 
increasing  jackpot  size  and  making  machines  more  widely  available.  The  Deregulation 
Committee,  whose  report  was  made  to  the  government  in  February  1996,  have  proposed 
to  allow  slot  machines  into  betting  shops.  Casinos  will  be  licensed  to  contain  six  and  bingo 
clubs  four,  while  cash  prizes  in  arcades  will  be  increased  to  LIO.  Further,  electrorUc  tokens 
which  would  store  players'  credits  on  a  kind  of  debit  card  are  to  be  introduced  for  a  trial 
period  (Report  of  the  Gaming  Board  1994-1995,  p4245;  Deregulation  Committee  Report 
1996,  vii-x). 
Although  this  deregulation  looks  set  to  increase  the  integration  of  slots  into  everyday  life, 
for  the  moment,  British  machines  still  occupy  two  distinct  sites.  Being  spread  out  across 
large  sections  of  public  space,  the  organisation  of  machines  in  adult  environments  is 
relatively  diffuse.  Although  they  must  remain  thinly  spread,  such  slots  penetrate  deeply 
into  the  local  social  fabric  and  are  more  or  less  integrated  with  their  surrounding 
neighbourhood.  Amusement  arcades,  on  the  other  hand,  form  concentrated  sites  which 
occupy  their  own  separate  gambling  space.  Found  usually  in  commercial  or  tounst  areas  of 
towns,  arcades  exist  sfightly  apart  from  their  surrounding  environment  in  buildings  whose 171 
interiors  are  darkened  and  concealed  from  the  outside  world  by  blacked  out  windows  One 
can  enter  the  arcade  in  a  way  that  it  is  impossible  to  'enter'  the  diff-use  slot  machine  site. 
From  the  elegant  displays  of  lights  and  the  sopofific  hum  of  a  hundred  vibrating  machines, 
arcades  are  possessed  of  a  distinctive  ambience.  As  the  player  enters  its  dimly  lit  interior, 
he  passes  rows  of  perfectly  aligned  machines,  each  rattling  its  hypnotic  tune  to  a  lone 
player  standing  before  it  in  solitary  rapture.  Tom  Wolfe  described  this  noise  as  'a  random 
sound  John  Cage  symphony'  which  keeps  churning  over  and  over  again  in  eccentric  series 
all  over  the  place...  much  fike  the  sound  a  cash  register  makes  before  the  bell  rings'  (Wolfe 
198  1,  p  19).  Arcades  are  dominated  by  colours  towards  the  red  end  of  the  spectrum 
(Griffiths  and  Swift  1992)  so  that  carpets,  walls  and  fighting  tend  to  a  uniformity  of  tone. 
Such  colouring,  first  noticed  by  Goethe  for  producing  in  the  perceiver  'an  ideal 
satisfaction'  and  an  'active  feefing  of  power'  (Goethe  1840,  p191-5),  reduces  sociability 
2  and  stimulates  the  desire  to  play  among  gamblers  (Stark  et  al.  1982).  In  the  arcade, 
players  indeed  have  little  contact;  in  a  total  environment  of  light  and  colour  and  noise,  it  is 
easy  for  the  gambler  to  forget  the  world  outside  the  arcade  and,  lost  in  his  own  private 
reverie,  immerse  himself  in  play. 
Despite  their  impressive  technological  advancement,  the  microprocessor  slots  of  Las 
Vegas  in  which  the  player  inserts  a  credit  card,  presses  a  button  and  hopes  for  a  multi- 
million  dollar  jackpot,  operate  according  to  the  same  basic  principles  as  their  nineteenth 
century  predecessors.  Like  a  kind  of  mechanical  lottery,  these  machines,  however 
advanced,  are  basicaRy  random  number  generators.  Play  is  straightforward-  the  gambler 
activates  a  machine  by  inserting  money  and  wins  a  prize  if  a  specific  pattern  or 
configuration  of  images  is  produced.  Each  machine  is  a  self-contained  gambling  unit, 
accepting  the  player's  stake  and  paying  out  his  prize,  and  so  rendering  the  presence  of 
other  players  entirely  superfluous.  '  Player  involvement  is  direct  and  immediate.  The 
gambler  sits  in  front  of  'his'  machine,  inserts  his  money  and  pulls  a  handle  or  pushes  a 
button  to  set  the  electronic  wheels  in  motion.  He  is  thus  physical4,  Involved  in  play-  his 
See  Griffiths  1995,  p200-210  on  the  effects  of  colour,  sound  and  structural  detemunants  of  maclunes 
such  as  'nudge'  buttons  and  the  'near  miss'  effect  on  the  continuation  of  play 
3  Although  note  the  social  nature  of  some  forms  of  slot  machine  play.  discussed  in  Griffiths  1995.  p65  and 
Fisher  1993. 1-2 
presence  is  necessary  to  activate  the  machine  and  dunng  the  time  spent  playing  It  he  MUSt 
continually  monitor  his  actions  in  accordance  with  its  commands.  He  vArill  be  presented 
with  a  range  of  options  for  play  and  must  decide  whether  to  hold  or  nudge  the  reels,  insert 
more  money  or  collect  his  winnings.  Such  features  create  direct  player  In",  olvement,  - 
involvement  which  should  not  be  mistaken  for  influence  however,  since  the  slot  machine  is 
a  game  of  pure  chance.  For  Caldwell,  slots  are  'the  epitome  of  non-skill  gambfing...  The 
banker,  the  Cabinet  Nfinister,  the  housewife  and  the  labourer  are  aB  equals  before  the 
poker  machine,  for  skill  and  experience  count  for  nothing'  (Caldwell,  in  Walker  1992, 
p69). 
It  is  perhaps  at  least  partly  their  simplicity  that  contributes  to  slots'  egahtarian  appeal.  Ever 
since  the  first  penny  arcades  offered  a  wide  public  cheap  entertainment  in  the  late 
nineteenth  century,  slot  machines  -  both  in  and  out  of  the  arcade  -  have  been  patrormsed  by 
the  same  cross-class  clientele,  and  especially  by  the  young.  Generally,  'social  class  could 
hardly  make  less  impact  on  slot  machine  play'  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p185,  also  Griffiths 
and  Fisher  1991),  the  distribution  of  players  being  rather  effected  the  age  and  sex  of 
participants.  Their  integration  into  their  surrounding  communities  and  their  utifisation  of 
the  imagery  of  popular  culture  in  designs  which  copy  cartoon  characters,  soap  operas  and 
game  shows  makes  slot  machines  an  everyday  sight  and  also  renders  them  easily 
accessible,  especially  to  those  traditionally  denied  access  to  gaming,  i.  e.  the  young.  The 
situation  of  machines  in  chip  shops,  youth  clubs  and  arcades  provide  a  favourable 
environment  and  opportunity  for  the  young  to  gamble,  with  the  result  that  the  average  age 
at  which  individuals  begin  slot  machine  play  is  ten  or  eleven  years  (Griffiths  1995,  p64).  In 
this  way,  Fisher  explains:  'amusement  arcades...  provide  an  important  leisure  environment 
for  school  age  and  unemployed  youngsters'  (Fisher  1993,  p446).  These  arcades  are 
typically  male  environments  where  young  adolescents  form  groups  in  which  slot  machine 
play  is  central  as  a  source  of  solidarity,  status  and  means  of  impressing  girls  (Fisher  1993). 
However,  although  easy  access  creates  a  profile  of  the  British  slot  machine  player  as 
someone  who  is  primarily  young  and  male  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p185),  limited  access  in, 
for  example,  America  and  Australia  where  machines  are  confined  to  casinos,  creates  an 
average  player  who  is  both  adult  and  female  (Walker  1992,  p77). 17  1 
The  rate  of  play  in  slot  machines  measures  the  time  taken  for  the  P-ambler  to  insert  his 
money,  pull  a  lever  or  push  a  button,  watch  the  display  as  the  wheels  rotate,  carry  out  any 
commands  and,  if  lucky,  collect  his  winnings.  This  process  lasts  between  five  and  twentv 
seconds-,  time  that  is  animated  by  a  cacophony  of  electroruc  sound  and  pulsating  lights. 
Such  a  heady  atmosphere  is  deliberately  designed  to  seduce  the  player  Into  a  rhythm  of 
repetitive,  continuous  play.  Although  he  can  play  at  any  pace  he  wants,  the  gambler  is 
carried  along  by  this  stream  of  noise  and  fight  which  only  stops  when  he  stops,  and  plays 
continuously,  barely  completing  one  round  before  inserting  more  money  for  the  next. 
Speeding  up  what  is  already  a  continuous  rate  of  play,  some  gamblers  play  two  or  even 
three  machines  at  once.  Responding  to  their  commands  and  feeding  each  one  money  at 
lightning  speed,  such  preoccupied  players  assume  the  guise  of  efficient  workers  tending  a 
fast  moving  production  fine.  Unlike  the  slow  stretched  out  rate  of  play  of  the  lottery,  the 
rate  of  slots  is  concentrated;  grinding  on  with  hardly  a  pause  between  one  game  and  the 
next.  In  America,  such  instantaneity  is  encouraged  by  a  device  which  in  some  machines, 
allows  the  winnings  of  one  round,  instead  of  being  paid  out  in  a  clanking  stream  of  coins, 
to  be  retained  and  recycled  into  another.  The  process  is  further  accentuated  by  the  use  of 
credit  cards,  which  credit  a  playei's  winnings  and  deduct  his  losses  from  the  overall  balance 
of  his  account  as  he  plays.  When  winnings  become  invisible  in  this  way,  the  gambler  is 
relieved  of  the  inconvenience  of  pausing  even  for  a  second  to  scoop  up  his  coins,  and  so 
play  speeds  up.  By  retaining  his  winnings,  the  avancious  machine  ensures  that  play  flows 
into  a  sean-dess  continuuni,  one  round  gliding  into  the  next  in  an  effortless,  uninterrupted 
cycle.  In  the  'Megabucks'  progressive  machines  of  the  late  1980s  the  continual  chum  of 
play  is  visible  across  large  distances,  and  is  remorselessly  advertised  for  all  to  see.  These 
machines  stand  together  in  banks  in  casinos  throughout  the  state  of  Nevada.  On  top  of 
each  machine,  in  the  centre  of  the  bank,  is  a  display  panel  showing  the  cumulative  amount 
of  money  being  wagered  as  it  is  wagered.  As  hundreds  of  these  slots  are  linked  together, 
the  money  put  into  them  is  pooled,  resulting  in  fi7equent  million-doflar  jackpots.  The 
display  panel  is  usually  well  into  six  figures  and  is  constantly  moving;  numbers  whirring 
round  like  a  wildly  unravelling  ball  of  string.  The  hundred  dollar  digit  clicks  up  every  five 
or  six  seconds,  the  tens  are  always  running  and  the  single  dollar  digits  are  a  blur,  rushing 
round  too  fast  for  the  human  eye  to  see.  Seeing  money  licked  off  in  this  way,  players  try 
to  'catch  up'  by  playing  faster,  malcing  the  display  reels  whirr  round  at  an  ever  more  rapid 1  74 
pace.  Slot  machine  'guides'  emphasise  the  importance  of  speedy  play.  one  a&isi  i  ing, 
gamblers  that  it  is  'extremely  important'  to  'make  sure  your  play  is  fast  enough  to  keep 
your  numbers  lit  at  all  times'  (Crevelt  1989,  p26).  Occasionally  someone  wins,  making  the 
headlong  rush  of  numbers  freeze  and  the  digits  vanish  from  the  board  for  an  instant,  onIN- 
to  be  replaced  by  stil-I  more  as  the  whole  cycle  begins  again. 
By  linking  together  -  and  yet  keeping  separate  -  hundreds  of  machines  and  players  across 
an  entire  state,  such  machines  literally  record  the  cumulative  rate  of  play.  With  every  push 
of  the  button,  the  categories  of  time  and  money  become  inextricably  entwined  on  the 
screen  above,  the  flow  of  dollars  appearing  as  a  blur  of  digits  as  if  on  some  giant  clock. 
The  categories  of  time  and  money  are  further  conflated  by  the  duration  of  slot  machine 
play,  which  is  relative  to  the  funds  of  the  player  and  the  denormination  of  the  machine. 
Although  in  Britain  the  range  of  stakes  is  limited  to  a  maximum  of  twenty-five  pence,  in 
the  United  States,  the  player  can  insert  anything  from  twenty-five  to  one  hundred  dollars. 
Discounting  such  intangibles  as  good  or  bad  luck,  a  gambler  will  be  able  to  play  for  the 
longest  period  with  a  large  sum  of  money  on  a  small  denomination  machine  and  a  shorter 
time  on  a  high  denomination  one,  while  a  player  with  little  money  will  be  restncted  to  a 
small  denomination  machine  for  a  short  amount  of  time.  In  the  midst  of  play  then,  money 
loses  its  independence  and  becomes  a  mere  measure  of  time. 
The  Racecourse 
The  racetrack  of  the  twentieth  century  still  retains  the  aura  of  its  aristocratic  heritage;  its 
legacy  as  the  'sport  of  the  kings'.  Although  commercialisation  In  the  nineteenth  century 
meant  that  paying  spectators  were  welcomed,  the  sheer  size  of  racetracks  which  places 
them  in  relatively  remote  locations  on  the  periphery  of  urban  areas,  has  tended  to  militate 
against  such  a  democratising  trend.  Racetracks  occupy  distinct,  geographically  separate 
spheres  which  create  'significant  geographic  and  demographic  bamiers  to  regular 
participation'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p93).  Physical  enhances  cultural  separation,  so  that  for 
Abt  et  al.  'the  elaborate,  ritualised  sub-culture  of  horse  racing'  where  the  natives  are 
'absorbed  in  unintelligible  rituals  and  arcane  wagering  terminology'  is  a  confusing  and 175 
often  incomprehensible  experience  to  the  initiate  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p84).  *'  All  this  aloni,, 
with  a  hefty  entrance  fee,  works  as  a  form  of  exclusion,  limiting  regular  attendance  to 
those  living  nearby  and/or  with  the  financial  means  and  leisure  time  to  make  a  habit  of 
spending  'afternoons  at  the  races'.  As  Walker  points  out,  British  racing  is  still  a 
predon,  unantly  upper  middle  class  form  of  gambling  (Walker  1992,  p  105). 
The  architecture  of  the  racetrack  itself  is  a  monument  to  social  stratification.  The  better 
quality  seats  in  the  clubhouse,  traditionally  reserved  for  the  elite,  are  set  slightly  apart  and 
are  more  expensive  than  those  of  the  grandstand  which,  uncovered  and  commanding  a  less 
expansive  view,  are  patronised  by  the  'commoners'.  The  modem  racetrack  is,  then,  a 
separate  site  and  one  which,  despite  the  democratising  commercialism  of  the  past  hundred 
years,  still  retains  an  air  of  privilege  and  exclusivity.  In  contrast,  the  dog  track  is  still  a 
separate  site  but  one  that  is  more  integrated  into  its  surrounding  neighbourhood.  Being 
smaller,  it  need  not  be  situated  on  the  outskirts  of  towns,  and  in  fact,  is  often  close  to 
bettors  homes  in  working  class  or  industrial  areas  of  cities.  It  is  this  that  Downes  et  al.  call 
the'localised  character'  of  the  dog-track,  in  contrast  to  the  'expeditionary  character'  of  the 
horse  racecourse  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p143).  Smaller,  closer  to  home  and  with  more  races 
going  on,  the  dog-track  can  be  seen  as  a  miniature  version  of  the  racecourse.  furthermore, 
free  from  the  aristocratic  heritage  of  the  latter,  it  is  a  site  that  is  occupied  primarily  by  the 
working  class. 
Despite  his  physical  immediacy,  the  gambler's  relation  to  play  at  the  racetrack  is  not  one  of 
involvement  but  immersion.  Although  he  does  not  participate  in  it  in  any  way,  he  is 
surrounded  by  the  race  as  much  as  by  the  air  he  breathes.  The  constant  hubbub  that 
comprises  the  activity  of  the  track  creates  an  atmosphere  so  concentrated  as  to  be  almost 
tangible.  The  smell  of  damp  earth  and  horses,  the  calm  air,  shattered  by  thundering  hooves, 
the  sound  of  flags  flapping  along  the  course  and  the  very  different  'feel'  of  a  race  on  a  cold 
bright  day  and  a  warm  rainy  one,  all  create  a  unique  ambience  peculiar  to  the  track. 
Despite  this  immersion,  the  gambler  at  the  racetrack,  like  the  one  in  the  lottery,  is  extrinsic 
to  the  gambling  event  itself  Unlike  the  lottery  player,  who  is  neither  involved  nor  present 
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in  the  lottery  however,  the  punter  at  the  racetrack  is  present  during  the  race  and  so  can 
watch  the  event  upon  which  he  is  betting  unfold  in  front  of  him. 
I 
The  gambler's  actual  involvement  with  the  race  is  dictated  by  the  paraphernalia  of  the  race 
itself  Having  chosen  his  horse(s)  he  places  his  wager  at  a  betting  Iciosk,  takes  a  receipt  and 
waits  for  the  race  to  begin.  Around  the  track,  tote  boards  display  times  of  races  and  odds 
on  horses,  wMe  loudspeakers  boom  unintelfigible  information  on  conditions  and  events. 
As  the  race  gets  under  way,  such  sources  of  information  are  rendered  obsolete  by  the 
desire  to  see  the  action  as  it  hcrppens.  It  is  at  this  point  that  the  panopticon-style  design  of 
the  stadium  becomes  obvious,  for  every  feature  is  built  in  order  to  extend  vision  ftom  the 
periphery  of  the  stadium  to  a  concentrated  point  in  the  centre  -  the  track.  To  this  end,  giant 
elevated  grandstands  surround  the  course,  descending  down  in  terraces  lined  with  seats, 
like  tiers  of  church  pews.  On  the  ground,  hundreds  of  punters  Une  the  track,  straining 
against  barriers,  as  close  to  the  action  as  is  physically  possible.  On  the  terraces,  gamblers 
have  a  complete  view  of  the  entire  race  in  miniature,  while  on  the  ground,  they  see  a  life 
size  sfice  of  the  action  which,  for  a  fraction  of  a  second  will  be  immediately  in  front  of 
them;  so  close  as  to  drag  the  observer  momentarily  into  the  race  itself, 
Races  are  held  two  or  three  times  a  month  during  the  racing  season,  giving  them  a  rate  of 
play  that  can  be  measured,  like  the  lottery,  in  long  slow  cycles.  Such  cycles  lack  the 
absolute  regularity  of  lottery  draws  however;  for  their  periodicity  can  be  interrupted  by 
natural  events  -  bad  weather  or  track  conditions  -  resulting  in  the  last  minute  cancellation 
of  races.  Planned  races  are  much  publicised,  giving  the  punter  time  to  find  out  who  is 
running  and  what  their  past  records  are  like.  As  it  draws  closer,  the  race  occupies  his 
thoughts  more  and  more  frequently.  With  a  big  race  like  the  Grand  National,  this  sense  of 
an  impending  Event  rushing  ever  closer  is  intensified,  so  that  a  group  of  punters  recounting 
the  anticipation  of  the  race  said:  'We  were  like  sleepwalkers,  imagining  the  race...  through 
a  week  long  trance...  '  (Inside  Racing  8,  p  15).  Unlike  the  lottery  draw  where  the  gamble  - 
the  event  -  is  over  in  seconds,  on  a  race  day  the  gambling  lasts  all  day  long,  broken  up  into 
three  or  four  separate  races. 1  -77 
The  racetrack  is  a  concentrated  site  within  which  the  concentration  of  action  11.0f  ý%axes 
and  wanes  in  a  series  of  stages.  It  peaks  during  the  two  to  ten  minutes  of  the  race  and 
declines  during  the  twenty  minute  periods  in-between.  The  rate  of  play  is  intimateiv 
connected  to  the  players  relation  to  the  game  and  to  the  concentration  of  action,  a 
connection  which  is  centred  on  the  vast  amounts  of  geographical  and  temporal  space  at  the 
racetrack.  After  making  his  bet,  the  gambler  has  a  period  of  'empty'  time  before  him  until 
the  start  of  the  race.  Because  of  its  separation  from  the  outside  world,  he  cannot  leave  the 
track  and  so  enters  a  period  of  waiting.  During  this  time,  punters'  actions  betray  a  certain 
purposelessness.  From  the  distance,  their  coflective  mifling  appears  like  a  particularly 
anxious  form  of  Brownian  motion.  As  the  race  is  prepared,  expectation  mounts  and  a 
sense  of  direction  graduaIly  guides  the  disparate  actions  of  individual  punters  into  a 
focused  movement  towards  the  track  and  the  stands.  Pronouncements  over  the 
loudspeakers  come  more  and  more  frequently  as  the  race  draws  closer.  Corresponding  to 
this  temporal  narrowing  of  distance  is  a  physical  one,  with  the  race  only  minutes  away, 
punters  draw  closer  to  their  vantage  points;  the  directionless  flux  becomes  gathered, 
concentrated  and  stationary.  Paraphrasing  Merleau-Ponty,  Scott  writes  that  the  individual 
at  the  track  is  so  engrossed  in  the  action  that  the  reality  of  his  field  of  consciousness  'is 
confirmed  and  thrust  upon  him  with  clearness  and  distinctness'  (Scott  1974,  p  114).  Just 
before  it  begins,  anticipation  reaches  a  climax:  the  entire  stadium  come  to  a  halt,  focused 
entirely  on  the  track,  watching  a  space  that  is  so  full  of  activity,  so  charged  with 
excitement  that  it  brims  over,  obliterating  any  distractions  and  making  the  race  immediate 
in  the  consciousness  of  its  spectators.  Such  charged,  'full'  space  contrasts  with  the  'empty' 
featureless  space  experienced  in  the  period  of  waiting  just  before  the  race.  The  gambler's 
concentrated  attention  overcomes  any  physical  distance  between  himself  and  the  focus  of 
his  attention.  completely  immersed  and  blind  to  distractions,  he  is  Yhere. 
Seconds  into  the  race,  absolute  concentration  makes  hundreds  of  punters  stand  immobile, 
frozen  but  for  the  gradual  incline  of  their  heads  which  turn  almost  imperceptibly.  as  if  to 
the  strains  of  a  hidden  orchestra.  The  harmonious  tension  snaps  as  the  home  straight 
appears,  and  the  unitary  mass  of  spectators  erupt  into  a  cacophony  of  individual  screams 
and  imprecations. 178 
The  race  is  over  in  minutes-,  time  concentrated  by  gut-wrenching  tension.  'Now  a  penod  of 
quietude  ensues  in  which  energy  and  individuals  are  again  dissipated  throughout  the 
course.  This  whole  cycle  of  energy  and  concentration,  lassitude  and  relaxation,  is  repeated 
several  times  throughout  the  day,  a  stage  in  the  drawn  out  recurrence  of  peaks  and  troughs 
that  is  the  rate  of  play  of  the  racetrack. 
The  Bookmaker 
The  bookmaker  is  an  ambiguous  site  and  one  that  is  in  transition.  concentrated  but 
becoming  more  diffuse;  separate  but  in  many  ways  incorporated  into  its  local  environment. 
Such  ambiguity  stems  from  a  historical  tension  between  the  existence  of  racing  as  a 
legitimate  aristocratic  sport,  and  simultaneously  as  an  iflegitimate  working  class  one.  This 
disparity  was  formalised  in  statutes  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  'A-hich 
effectively  prohibited  the  poor  from  betting  on  races,  and  again  in  the  nineteenth  century 
outlawing  of  betting  shops.  The  imperative  of  capitalist  development  proved  a  stronger 
force  than  moral  outrage  however,  so  that  by  the  late  1950s  bookmaking  was  legabsed, 
allowing  companies  like  Ladbrokes,  Coral  and  Wdliam  Hill  to  form  and  start  making  huge 
-  and  legal  -  profits  from  their  ventures.  Like  the  private  clubs  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
these  bookmakers  accepted  individual  bets  on  disparate  events,  as  well as  setting  odds  on 
horse  and  dog  races  and  football  matches.  Betting  shops  became  visible  and  proliferated 
after  the  1950's,  especially  in  the  working  class  districts  of  urban  areas.  Despite  being 
located  on  street  comers  and  among  conventional  shops  and  pubfic  amenities,  bookmakers 
until  very  recently  were  legally  required  to  separate  or  distance  themselves  from  their 
immediate  surroundings.  Blacked  out  windows  and  double  sets  of  doors  were  permanent 
fixtures,  ensuring  that  at  no  time  could  even  a  chink  of  their  mysterious  interiors  be 
glimpsed  from  the  street.  Such  an  extreme  attempt  at  separation  was  complemented  by  a 
deliberately  austere  interior  design.  From  their  barren,  brightly  lit  walls  and  rows  of  metal 
stools  nailed  to  the  floor,  to  their  dusty  linoleum  floors  covered  with  cigarette  ends  and 
discarded  betting  slips,  decoration  was  mýirumal.  Every  relentlessly  ftinctional  fixture  was 
designed  to  encourage  the  gambler  to  make  his  bet  and  leave.  This  project  was  effecti-v'e, 
for  the  vast  majority  of  patrons  chose  not  to  finger  in  such  an  inhospitable  enviromnent, 17 
remaining  in  the  betting  shop  only  for  the  few  minutes  necessary  to  place  their  bet 
(Downes  et  al.  1976,  p126).  Although  forced  to  separate  themselves  from  their 
surroundings,  bookmakers  nevertheless  became  incorporated  into  the  daily  routine  of  their 
local  neighbourhoods.  Their  situation  and  their  opening  hours  (generally  9.30  a.  m.  until 
5.30  or  7.00  p.  m.,  now  with  the  inclusion  of  Sundays)  enabled  them  to  blend  in  with  the 
rhythm  of  daily  life  around  them,  making  it  convenient  for  punters  to  drop  in  on  their  way- 
home  from  work  or  on  their  way  to  the  local  pub.  Downes  et  al.  found  that  proximity  leads 
to  regularity:  three-quarters  of  those  regularly  visiting  betting  shops  lived  only  five  minutes 
from  one  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p314). 
Their  concentration  in  working  class  neighbourhoods  has  resulted  in  an  overwhelmingly 
working  class  and  also  an  overwhelmingly  male  clientele.  Downes  et  al.  's  1976  studN, 
found  the  working  class  to  be  using  betting  shops  between  five  and  twelve  times  as  often 
as  the  middle  class,  with  fi7equency  increasing  with  descent  down  the  class  hierarchy 
(Downes  et  al.  1976,  p123).  They  also  found  males  eight  times  more  likely  to  use  the 
premises  than  females  and  that  when  women  did  wish  to  bet  on  a  race,  they  would  do  so 
by  proxy,  asking  a  male  friend  or  relative  to  place  the  bet  for  them,  rather  than  entering  the 
premises  themselves  (Downes  et  al.  1976,  p  122). 
Until  the  deregulation  of  gambling  in  1995,  the  artificial  separation  and  deliberate  austerity 
of  the  betting  shop  served  as  a  testimony  to  the  ambiguous  status  of  working  class 
gambling;  a  token  reminder  of  its  clandestine  past.  In  an  effort  to  attract  a  broader  range  of 
'customers'  -  notably  the  middle  class  and  women  -  in  April  1995  the  restrictions  that  made 
them  deliberately  inhospitable  to  discourage  demand  were  lifted.  Now  bookmakers  are 
allowed  to  have  clear  windows,  to  advertise  what  goes  on  inside  and  even  display  odds  to 
passers-by.  Restrictions  on  the  maximum  size  of  television  aflowed  inside  have  been 
abofished,  and  bookmakers  ficensed  to  sefl  refreshments.  More  comfortable  seats,  carpets 
and  sitting  areas  are  no  longer  frowned  on  by  a  government  suddenly  eager  to  throw  open 
the  closed  shop  of  the  betting  world  to  a  wider,  paying  audience.  It  remains  to  be  seen, 
however,  whether  such  deregulation  wifl  prove  sufficient  to  alter  the  physiognomy  of  the 
bookmakers,  and  so  overcome  the  cohesion  of  a  social  formation  developed  over  centuries 
of  social  stratification. I  ýW 
The  site  of  off-course  betting  is  a  strangely  contradictory  location.  Separated  from  the 
outside  world  in  an  enclosed  and  claustrophobic  space,  it  presents,  on  the  one  hand,  an 
intense  concentration  of  action  and  on  the  other,  a  sense  of  removal,  an  absence  from 
action.  This  uneasy  dualism  is  derived  from  the  relation  of  the  subject  -  the  bookmakers  - 
to  its  object  -  the  race;  a  relation  characterised  by  the  overcoming  of  spatial  distance  by 
technology. 
Corresponding  to  the  integration  of  individual  sites  into  their  local  environment  is  the 
diffusion,  amongst  these  separate  sites,  of  a  single  concentrated  site  of  action. 
Only  the  actual  gambling  event  itself  does  not  take  place  in  the  bookmakers.  E%,  erything 
else  -  from  making  a  bet  and  watching  the  action  unfold,  to  collecting  winnings  -  is 
contained  within  its  walls.  Thus,  as  a  scene  of  action  in  its  own  fight,  the  betting  shop  is  a 
concentrated  site.  However,  insofar  as  it  exists  to  receive  an  image  of  the  race  and  to 
accept  bets  to  and  from  areas  outwith  the  actual  scene  of  the  action,  it  also  exists  as  part  of 
a  larger  whole.  In  this  sense,  it  functions  as  a  diffuse  site,  dispersing  a  single  locallsed 
event  throughout  a  wide  area.  Like  the  lottery  vendor,  the  bookmaker  is  a  spoke 
emanating  from  the  hub  of  the  action  -  the  race  itself 
The  distinctive  atmosphere  of  the  racetrack  is  removed  from  its  geographical  location, 
fragmented  into  hundreds  of  smaller  races  and  flung  onto  the  walls  of  betting  shops  across 
the  country.  From  the  flickering  screens,  these  new,  miniature  races  are  projected  across 
smoky,  brightly  lit  rooms  in  a  multitude  of  points.  The  variable  weather  of  the  track  is 
replaced  by  the  static  luminosity  of  artificial  lighting,  while  the  dynamic  interplay  of  a 
single  mass  of  individuals  freezes  into  numerous  groups  of  punters  whose  mobility  is 
conditioned  by  their  cramped  surroundings  and  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  screen  in 
their  constant  field  of  vision.  The  action  of  the  racetrack  is,  then,  both  displaced  from  Its 
original  location,  and  dj&sed  among  many  new  ones. 
The  betting  shop  is  a  site  in  transition;  one  which  technological  development  is  m  -ing 
ever-more  diffuse.  In  the  nineteenth  centw-y,  railways  took  bettors  to  the  racetrack,  now  in 181 
the  twentieth  century,  technology  brings  the  race  to  them.  An  innovation  in  Computer 
linkage  has  brought  the  twentieth  century  trend  of  automisation  and  privatisation  in 
gambling  to  its  logical  conclusion.  Pioneered  by  a  company  called  'Betpoint',  this  latest 
development  will  literally  bring  the  betting  shop  into  the  living  room,  in  a  package  which 
links  races  and  bank  account  details  to  a  personal  computer.  To  place  a  bet  with  Betpoint, 
the  punter  simply  connects  his  personal  computer  to  his  telephone,  and  relays  his  credit 
card  details  to  it.  The  system  can  link  together  miffions  of  players,  who  need  ne,  ý,  -er  interact 
with  each  other  and  who  can  gamble  on  a  race  going  on  many  miles  away  without  ever 
leaving  their  own  home.  The  betting  shop  is  made  redundant  when  'After  choosing  a  bet 
from  the  menu  of  options,  the  gambler  waits  for  the  most  favourable  odds  to  come  onto 
the  screen  and,  by  pushing  a  button,  places  a  bet.  The  stakes  are  instantly  taken  fi-om  your 
(sic)  bank  account  and  winnings  credited  as  soon  as  the  race  is  over'  (Gfiffiths  1994,  p  I). 
Thus,  the  various  transactions  of  play  are  made  instantaneous  and  the  garnbler  isolated  into 
a  solitary,  gambling  'unit'. 
Like  the  lottery,  this  increasingly  diffuse  site  reaches  deep  into  society.  Its  spokes  are 
breaking  down  into  ever-smaller,  more  individualistic  units  which  can  penetrate  the  social 
Mric  even  further  than  the  sociable  aggregate  of  the  betting  shop. 
While  the  separation  of  the  racetrack  works  to  encourage  its  exclusivity,  the  increasing 
diffusion  of  the  bookmaker  encourages  the  opposite  trend  of  democratisation,  bringing  the 
race  to  an  increasingly  wide  audience.  In  the  betting  shop,  the  object  of  the  punter's 
attention  -  the  race  -  is  only  available  to  him  through  the  medium  of  technology.  At  no 
point  is  he  able  to  perceive  or  interact  with  it  directly  since  it  occurs  outwith  his  perceptual 
sphere,  possibly  hundreds  of  miles  away.  The  gambler  is  physically  removed  from  the 
game;  he  inhabits  a  facsimfle  of  the  action,  forced  to  participate  in  a  distant,  fragmented 
manner.  His  perception  of  the  action  is  formed  by  technology;  video  screens  relay  details 
of  the  race  to  him  from  outside,  bringing  together  many  different  races  held  in  different 
places  and  at  different  times  into  one  central  location.  By  not  being  present  at  any  of  themý 
the  gambler  can  observe  -  and  gamble  on  -  them  all.  Although  his  attention  is  focused 
wholly  on  a  race,  absorbed  as  by  osmosis  into  the  real  action,  his  Physical  presence  is 
rooted  in  the  betting  shop.  With  his  mind  engrossed  in  the  distant  events  and  his  body I  X-) 
engage  in  its  immediate  physical  surroundings,  the  gambler  experiences  a  kind  of 
'removed  action'  -  he  interacts  with  his  surroundings,  but  his  nund,  like  the  action,  is 
elsewhere 
As  with  the  lottery  and  slot  machine  play,  the  presence  of  other  players  is  superfluous  to 
action  in  the  betting  shop.  However,  the  integration  of  the  site  into  the  daily  routine  of  its 
regular  clients,  the  cramped  condifions  and  the  importance  of  specialist  'insider' 
information  A  provide  points  of  contact  between  punters  and  so  make  the  bookmakers  a 
fairly  sociable  site. 
Like  the  long  waves  of  lottery  play,  the  rate  of  play  in  the  betting  shop  is  a  drawn  out, 
protracted  affair.  Although  bets  are  made  on  races  which  necessarily  involve  speed,  the 
placing  of  bets  themselves  can  be  achingly  slow.  Calculation,  deliberation  and  careful 
consideration  overcome  any  sense  of  urgency  -  bets  can  be  made  hours,  days  or  even 
weeks  before  a  race.  Like  the  lottery  transaction,  the  gambler  'buys'  his  wager  like  any 
other  commodity.  After  calculating  the  odds  on  choosing  his  bet,  he  writes  his  stake,  race 
and  time  on  a  shp,  hands  it  over  and  pays  for  it.  Another  time  lapse  follows  in  which  the 
result  is  waited  for  in  physically  and/or  temporally  distant  form.  The  gambler  may  remain 
in  the  betting  shop  and  watch  the  distant  race  on  the  screen,  or,  since  his  presence  is  not 
necessary,  he  may  leave  the  premises  altogether. 
In  the  betting  shop  the  punter  puts  his  money  on  a  race  in  leisurely  cycles  with  pauses, 
consideration,  even  physical  departure  from  the  site  altogether  between  bets.  Generally 
days  mark  the  temporal  separation  of  bets,  as  opposed  to  the  seconds  of  frenetic  haste  of 
the  slot  machine  player.  The  fuH  immersion  of  the  latter,  surrounded  by  action  and 
physically  participating  in  the  repetition  of  successive  bets  contrasts  with  the  gambler  at 
the  betting  shop,  who,  displaced  spatially  and  temporaUy  from  the  action,  slowly  and 
careffifly  repeats  day  'long  wave'  bets. 
But  for  the  fact  that  the  punter  at  the  bookmakers  is  not  actually  present  to  see  the  race. 
the  conditions  for  the  exercise  of  skifl  are  the  same  for  him  as  they  are  for  the  gambler  at 
the  racecourse.  The  'arcane  wagering  tern-linology'  of  the  racetrack  belies  the  complex Is', 
frame  of  reference  which  underlies  horse  race  betting.  Such  a  frame  of  reference,  based  on 
the  art  of  handicapping,  demands  considerable  skill  and  knowledge  for  the  list  of  variables 
which  can  influence  the  outcome  of  a  race  is  vast,  and  requires  the  talents  of  a  perceptive 
and  experienced  punter  for  effective  interpretation.  A  wide  range  of  betting  options  further 
increases  the  complexity  of  race  gambling.  The  punter  can  decide  which  type  of  bet  to 
place  -  single,  double,  treble  or  accumulator,  chose  the  odds  of  the  bet  -  favourite,  outsider 
or  in-between  and  select  whether  or  not  his  bet  is  'each  way'  or  'to  win'  (Downes  et  al. 
1976,  p134).  Such  levels  of  complexity  have  elevated  the  practice  of  betting  on  horses  into 
a  virtual  science  with  top  punters  regarded  as  skilled  probabilists.  The  sporting  media  have 
been  instrumental  in  creating  this  specialist  subculture.  Since  their  humble  beginnings  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  sports  journals  like  7he  Sporting  Life  and  Me  Sporting  Chronicle  have 
flourished  and  been  all  but  drowned  in  an  avalanche  of  highly  speciallsed  magazines  and 
papers  so  that,  by  the  late  twentieth  century,  literally  hundreds  are  widely  available  to  the 
general  public.  Learned  magazines  like  Inside  Racing  disseminate  information  that  is  all 
but  unintefligible  to  the  lay  reader,  but  extremely  useful  to  the  skifled  punter.  Lists  of 
'strike  rates',  expressed  as  a  percentage  of  wins  to  runs,  and  'level  stakes'  which  show  the 
net  profits  or  losses  of  a  punter's  II  bet  on  each  of  a  particular  trainer's  runners  on  a 
certain  course  and  over  a  specific  period,  read  like  the  hieroglyphics  of  an  advanced 
mathematical  textbook.  The  ability  to  deal  with  such  a  range  of  information  is  described  by 
Zola  as  'a  pragmatic  system  of  integration  of  available  information'  which  functions  as  a 
major  source  of  prestige  amongst  horse-race  bettors  (Zola  1976,  p26). 
The  Casino  :  Las  Vegas,  Capital  of  the  Twentieth  Century 
If  as  Debord  has  suggested,  we  do  indeed  five  in  a  society  of  the  spectacle,  then  Las 
I 
Vegas  is  the  incarnation  of  such  a  society;  the  casino  its  spectacular  form. 
The  casino  can  be  said  to  be  the  purest  of  the  phenomenological  sites  for  it  presents  in 
microcosm  a  map  of  the  various  sites  of  gambling,  and  in  doing  so  employs  a  category  not 
yet  used.  It  is  an  inclusive  site,  for  the  casino  (and  especially  the  Las  Vegas  casino), 
incorporates  aU  the  forms  of  gambling  seen  so  far  as  many  others  of  its  own.  Thus  AN  et 
al.  state:  'In  combining  table  garnes  with  slot  machines,  modem  American  casinos  have I  K4 
created  the  most  nearly  universal  gambling  opportunity  in  historv  No  other  form  ot- 
commercial  gambling  is comparable'  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p133).  The  insulation  of  this  'Ideal 
type'  from  the  world  outside  and  its  accumulation  of  gambling  forms  inside  make  it  a 
Ophenomenological  centre';  the  site  of  a  'total  gambling  experience',  for  in  the  fleeting, 
inconsequential  moments  of  the  casino  floor  are  embodied  all  the  instances  of  the  entire 
history  of  gambling  itself. 
Based  on  the  very  different  societies  they  represent,  significant  differences  distinguish  the 
American  from  the  British  casino.  However  with  the  imminent  deregulation  of  the 
gambling  industry,  the  British  experience  is  gradually  moving  towards  the  American 
model. 
Societies  of  the  spectacle:  American  and  British  casinos  compared 
Consistent  with  a  historical  tradition  which  allowed  the  wealthy  to  gamble  but  forbade 
such  a  frivolous  waste  of  time  and  money  amongst  the  lower  orders,  the  British  casino 
attempts  to  recreate  the  air  of  exclusivity  of  the  private  clubs  of  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries.  To  this  end,  a  membership  requirement  and  formal  dress  code 
reinforce  class  distinctions  and  create  an  atmosphere  of  glamorous  refinement.  The  Stakis 
casino  chain  outlines  its  code  of  conduct  in  the  most  patrician  language,  stating  that  'Only 
Ladies  and  Gentlemen  of  good  social  position  and  over  the  age  of  18  years  are  eligible  for 
Membership  of  the  Club'  (Stakis  Members  Guide  1994,  p3).  Assuming  a  tacit  'gentleman's 
agreement'  between  member  and  management,  it  reminds  patrons  that  'to  maintain  the 
desired  atmosphere,  we  have,  naturally,  standards  regarding  dress  and  behaviour'.  These 
I standards'  are  the  standards  of  an  elite,  designed  to  insulate  them  from  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  backed  up  by  a  government  whose  residual  Puritanism  aims  to  protect  the 
gambler  -  and  especially  the  working  class  gambler  -  from  the  'vice'  of  playing.  Such  an 
attitude  is  apparent  in  the  innumerable  obstacles  that  are  placed  in  the  way  of  immediate 
play.  A  forty-eight  hour  rule  forces  the  potential  gambler  to  wait  two  days  after  joining  to 
enter  a  casino,  thus  creating  a  'cooling  off  period  in  which  he  can  reflect  and  come  to  a 
rational  decision  about  his  impulsive  desire  to  play.  Having  decided  he  does  in  fact  want  to 
Play,  the  potential  gambler  must  apply  for  membership  by  visiting  the  casino  in  person, 185 
have  a  physical  descnption  of  himself  taken  and  complete  a  form  detailing.  amongst  other 
things,  his  occupation.  A  strict  dress  code  of  jacket  and  tie  for  men  and  evening  dress  for 
women  further  restricts  spontaneous  play,  for  the  need  to  be  'approphately  dressed' 
generally  requires  planrung  and  makes  a  visit  to  the  casino  something  of  an  occasion.  in 
this  it  differs  markedly  from,  for  example,  the  betting  shop  which  can  be  'dropped  into'  on 
a  casual  basis. 
Casino  doormen  wearing  bow  ties  and  tails  welcome  members  in&,  idually  as  they  arri""e, 
taking  their  coats,  presenting  them  with  the  guest  book  to  sign  and  showing  them  to  the 
tables  in  an  antiquated  ritual  that  attempts  to  recreate  the  atmosphere  and  splendour  of  the 
, magnificent  rooms'  in  the  'luxurious  clubs'  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  relatilv-ely  limited 
facilities  of  the  British  casino  (most  clubs  have  no  more  than  four  different  types  of  game) 
are  licensed  for  approximately  twelve  hours  a  day,  and  the  gambler  is  bound  by  a  strict  set 
of  rules  while  he  uses  them.  He  is  required  to  wear  his  jacket  wMe  at  the  tables,  forbidden 
to  tip  the  dealers  or  bring  food  or  drink  into  the  segregated  gaming  area.  The  rules  of  the 
games  themselves  are  designed  to  encourage  moderation  and  sensible  play,  and,  unlike 
American  casinos,  in  British  ones,  players  are  aflowed  to  sit  at  the  gaming  table  without 
playing  and  are  permitted  to  consult  the  rules  of  play  which  are  printed  (with  tips  for  the 
gambler!  )  on  every  table.  The  roulette  wheel  has  only  one  zero,  and  'sucker  bets'  in 
blackjack  are  not  al-lowed.  Coffee  is  provided  free,  to  keep  players  alert  and  sentient, 
unlike  the  casinos  of  Las  Vegas,  where  a  steady  flow  of  alcohol  dulls  gamblers'  senses  and 
encourages  rash  bets. 
The  formalities  of  British  casinos  -  whilst  perhaps  not  in  reality  excluding  lower  socio- 
economic  groups  from  their  membership  -  are  nevertheless  indicative  of  an  overt  attempt 
to  attract  a  particular  class  of  clientele.  In  comparison  to  those  of  the  United  States,  British 
casinos  are  antiquarian  establishments  where  the  aura  of  tradition  and  social  hierarchý, 
emanates  from  every  deferential  doorman  and  every  subdued  fixture.  In  this  they  belong  to 
a  European  tradition  of  gambling  which  reached  its  nadir  in  the  aristocratic  play  of  Louis 
XIV,  and  which  today  is  exemplified  by  the  unashamed  elitism  of  Monte  Carlo.  Of  this 
Playground  of  the  rich  Tom  Wolfe  wrote:  'At  Monte  Carlo  there  is  sti.  11  the  plush 
mustiness  of  the  nineteenth  century  noble  lions...  At  Monte  Carlo  there  are  still  Wrong ISM 
Folks,  Deficient  Accents,  Poor  Tailoring,  Gauche  Displays,  Noveau  Richness,  Cultural 
Andity  -  concepts  unknown  in  Las  Vegas'  (Wolfe  198  1,  p26). 
Unlike  its  British  counterpart,  which  actively  works  to  reinforce  class  distinctions,  the 
Nevada  casino  is  'the  most  democratic  or  perhaps  simply  undiscfimýinatlng'  of  social 
organisations  (Skolnick  1980,  p46).  The  casinos  of  Airnefica  actually  elimMate  class 
distinctions  by  exposing  every  gambler  equaUy  to  chance.  Thus  Puzo  %kmites  of  the 
'immediate  ennoblement'  of  the  customer  as  he  enters  the  casino-  'One  of  the  greatest 
Vegas  tricks  is  to  make  every  gambler  a  King...  If  you  just  throw  the  dice  or  step  into  a 
casino,  you're  at  least  a  duchess.  The  customer  is  immediately  ennobled,  make  a  Kruight  of 
the  Garter,  A  Chevalier  of  the  Legion  of  Honour...  '  (Puzo  1977,  p82).  WHe  the  British 
gambler  has  already  to  be  a  noble  before  he  can  enter  the  casino,  the  Amenican  one  is 
ennobled  simply  by  virtue  of  being  there. 
True  to  the  pioneer  spirit  in  which  it  was  built  -  Bugsy  Siegel's  famous  'come  as  you  are'  - 
there  are  no  entrance  restrictions  in  Las  Vegas  casinos.  Literally  anyone  can  walk  in  off  the 
street  and  into  some  of  the  most  spectacular  buildings  in  the  world.  They  will  not  be  asked 
for  credentials  by  any  security  staff  and  no-one  will  notice  what  they  are  wearing  or  care  if 
they  are  eating  or  drinking.  Inside,  in  a  general  atmosphere  of  license,  alcohol  will  be  ftecly 
distributed  to  encourage  gamblers  to  indulge  their  every  desire  amongst  an  enormous 
variety  of  games,  in  this  vast,  twenty-four  hour  playground.  The  absence  of  licensing 
regulations  in  Vegas  casinos  contrasts  with  Britain's  paternalistic  temperance,  for  in  the 
former  players  are  encouraged  to  drink  as  much  and  as  often  as  they  like  at  the  tables. 
While  credit  and  debit  mechanisms  are  strictly  prohibited  in  British  casinos,  American  ones 
make  every  effort  to  relieve  the  player  of  his  money,  furnishing  their  interiors  with  so  many 
cashcard  machines,  phone-credit  lines  and  bureau  de  chwiges,  that  at  times  they  resemble 
enormous  banks.  The  decoration  of  these  Arcadian  palaces,  like  Las  Vegas  itself,  is  'a 
monument  to  American  classlessness  and  -  if  truth  be  told  -  tastelessness  too'  (Kwser  and 
Lowell,  in  Findlay  1986,  p203).  From  the  gaudy  carpets  and  plastic  statues  to  the 
rhinestone  chandeliers  of  the  central  gaming  hall,  the  star  attraction  of  the  Luxor  casino  is 
an  enormous  replica  of  the  mask  of  King  Tutenkhamen.  Called  'Tut's  Head'  it  to'.  kers  fifty 
feet  above  the  casino,  an  airbrushed  plastic  monolith  of  shiny  purple  and  yellow  whose IX 
luminous  laser  eyes  blink  every  few  seconds  in  an  expression  Of  surpnised  stupidit,  "  The 
tourist  brochure  is  proud  of  its  monument  to  k1tsch,  and  actually  celebrates  reproduction 
over  reality,  boasting  'UnUe  almost  any  Egyptian  display  outside  Egypt,  this  dlsplaý, 
features  reproduction  rather  than  Egypt's  treasures.  In  short,  the  Head  is  a  homage,  not  an 
exploitation'  (Las  Vegas  76day,  June  1994,  p32). 
This  melting-pot  of  kitsch  and  tastelessness  has  often  been  described  as  I  ironic'  by  British 
commentators;  an  attitude  which  reflects  a  heritage  of  centuries  of  repression;  of  the 
Protestant  work  ethic  and  of  the  Enhghtenment  quest  for  moderation  in  gambling 
behaviour.  Las  Vegans,  unencumbered  by  any  such  traditions,  and  the  equivocations  of 
irony,  can  simply  have  fun  gambling. 
A  vast  melting  pot  in  which  social  distinctions  are  dissolved  in  the  desire  to  gamble,  the 
Las  Vegas  casino  is  the  embodiment  of  the  American  ideal.  Its  laissez-faire  Policy  creates 
an  ambience  of  relaxed  intemperance  where  everyone's  dollars  are  welcome,  whatever  the 
station  of  their  owner.  This  American  dream  is  Simmel's  nightmare,  in  which  money  is 
truly  'the  ffightful  leveller'  (Simmel  197  1  c,  p3  29). 
Having  built  a  model  of  the  archaic,  class-bound  British  casino,  it  is  now  time  to  dismantle 
it,  just  as  the  government  is  dismantling  the  legislation  that  created  it.  The  deregulation 
that  is  set  to  change  the  physiognomy  of  the  gambling  economy  is  nowhere  more  apparent 
than  in  the  casino,  where  the  market  forces  that  created  Las  Vegas  out  of  American 
gambling  have  begun  to  make  themselves  felt.  As  the  1968  Act  is  relaxed,  the  British 
casino  is  about  to  be  transformed  by  longer  licensing  hours,  more  slot  machines,  and  the 
ability,  for  the  first  time,  to  advertise  itself  Membership  will  be  available  by  post  and  the 
forty-eight  hour  wait  to  play  will  be  halved.  Whether  or  not  the  British  casino  comes  to 
resemble  the  American  remains  to  be  seen:  what  is  apparent  is  that  Las  Vegas  appears  to 
be  the  model  towards  which  it  is  now  moving. I  SIX 
Las  Vegas:  capital  of  the  twentieth  century 
Las  Vegas  is  the  epitome  of  the  casino  and,  insofar  as  'casino  capitalism'  exists  as  a 
metaphor  for  post-modem  economies,  it  can  also  be  said  to  epitomise  the  condition  of 
post-modernity.  If,  for  Benjamin,  Paris  was  the  capital  of  the  nineteenth  centu  (Benjamin  I  ry 
1992),  then  Las  Vegas  is  the  capital  of  the  twentieth. 
The  form  and  organisation  of  Las  Vegas  is  the  form  and  organisation  of  the  casino  in 
macrocosm.  All  casinos  are  separate  sites:  'timeless,  hermetic  environments  of  elaborate 
unreality'  within  which  an  intense  concentration  of  play  takes  place  (Abt  et  al.  1985,  p79). 
Situated  in  the  middle  of  the  Mojave  desert  hundreds  of  miles  ftom  the  nearest  town,  Las 
Vegas  presents  such  separation  in  extreme  form.  Isolated  from  the  reality  of  the  everyday 
world,  the  city  appears  to  rise  out  of  nowhere;  a  giant  casino  where  the  concentrated  urge 
to  gamble  has  pushed  back  the  desert,  annihilating  its  aridity  in  a  flood  of  neon.  Its  remote 
location  in  such  a  hostile  environment  makes  the  city  a  uruquely  tangible  embodiment  of 
Huizinga's  abstract  notion  of  play:  'Play  is  distinct  from  ordinary  life  both  as  to  locality  and 
duration.  The  world  circumscribed  by  play  is  a  temporary  one,  a  magic  circle  within  which 
the  player  takes  on  new  roles  and  gives  up  his  own  ones.  The  play  world  is  secluded  and 
limited  with  its  own  internal  order  and  logic.  Most  importantly,  play  is  an  interlude  in  our 
daily  lives,  a'stepping  out'  of  real  life  into  a  temporary  sphere  of  activity'  (Huizinga  1949, 
p9).  Sirnilarly,  for  Caiflois  such  'abnormal  cities'  as  Las  Vegas  appear  as  'both  refuge  and 
paradise".  cloistered  'like  huge  secret  retreats  or  opium  dens',  where  the  time  passed  by 
their  nomadic  visitors  'is  merely  a  set  of  parentheses  in  their  ordinary  fives'  (Caillois  1962, 
p  117). 
The  visitor  to  Las  Vegas  'steps  out'  of  real  life,  and,  engulfed  by  the  city,  temporarily  'steps 
in'  to  a  new  world.  The  energy  of  a  city  sustained  by  play  surrounds  and  overwhelms  the 
individual  the  moment  he  arrives.  There  are  slot  machines  in  the  airport,  in  the  hotels,  in 
the  hospitals  and  sunk  into  the  bars.  People  play  the  souvenir  toy  machines  on  sale  in 
shops  and  keno  slips  nestle  between  the  salt  and  pepper  pots  in  restaurants.  In  this 
labyrinth,  all  the  relations  which  anchor  the  visitor  to  familiarity  and  routine  are  severed, 
and,  cast  adrift,  he  enters  a  play  world  of  illusion  and  unreality.  Mario  Puzo  knew  the INg 
sensation  well-  'It  is  all  a  dream.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  reality.  It  is  a  sanctuary  f-rom  the 
real  world...  and  it's  somehow  fitting  and  proper  that  the  city  of  Las  Vegas  is  surrounded 
by  a  vast  desert.  A  desert  which  acts  as 
,a 
cordon  swwaire,  (puzo  1977,  p2l).  It  is  easý,  to 
imagine  that  the  oasis  of  Las  Vegas  is  in  fact  a  partl  I  mirage  Looking  out  icularly  beguiling 
of  the  plane  minutes  after  take-off,  back  in  the  real  world,  the  visitor  sees  nothing  but 
desert. 
The  city  of  the  spectacle 
'The  present  age...  prefers  the  sign  to  the  thing  signified,  the  copy  to  the  original,  fancy  to 
reality,  the  appearance  to  the  essence...  1111'sion  only  is  sacred,  inith  profane.  Nay, 
sacredness  is  held  to  be  enhanced  in  proportion  as  truth  decreases  and  illusion  increases,  so 
that  the  highest  degree  of  illusion  comes  to  be  the  highest  degree  of  sacredness' 
(Feuerbach  1957,  xxxxix). 
Feuerbach's  comment  on  the  predilection  of  the  modem  age  for  the  illusory  over  the  real  is 
used  by  Debord  to  open  his  essay  on  Me  Society  of  the  Spectacle.  It  can  equally  well  be 
used  to  illustrate  the  spectacular  nature  of  Las  Vegas,  for  here,  the  spectacle  defines  the 
form  and  content  of  the  city. 
According  to  Lash  and  Urry,  the  trend  toward  a  'spectacular'  kind  of  nostalgia  is  typical  of 
the  post-modem  commodification  of  the  past  in  which  there  is  an  'increased  significance  of 
pastiche...  as  the  past  is  sought  through  images  and  stereotypes  which  render  the  'real'  past 
unobtainable  and  replace  narrative  by  spectacle'  (Lash  and  Urry  1994,  p247-8). 
In  Las  Vegas',  such  a  trend  derives  ftom  the  cities'  rapid  artificial  growth  and  its  internal 
constitution  which  is  made  up  of  a  tiny  resident  population  of  under  one  rniffion  and  a  huge 
transient  one  of  twenty-four  million  tourists  per  year.  Built  at  break-neck  speed  purely  for 
the  purpose  of  gambling,  it  is  less  than  a  hundred  years  old  and  has  no  conventional 
economic  infrastructure,  no  personal  taxation  and  no  existence  without  the  gambling 
economy  which  created  and  sustains  it.  As  such,  Las  Vegas  is  a  city  without  substance  and 
without  history;  its  profusion  of  neon  signs  concealing  the  fact  that  it  is  similar  to  the 190 
lirvisible  Ofies  described  by  Calvino  in  which-  'Memory  is  redundant:  it  repeats  signs  so 
that  the  city  can  begin  to  exist'  (Calvino  1979,  p  18). 
Lacking  an  indigenous  cultural  tradition  of  its  own,  Las  Vegas  nUmics  the  actl"ty  that 
gives  it  form,  and  so  the  repetition  of  play  corresponds  to  the  city's  repetition  of  other 
cultures  throughout  the  hotels  and  casinos  of  the  Strip.  Las  Vegas  as  an  entity  engages  in 
repetition  on  a  grand  scale  -  the  repetition  of  events  and  images,  plucked  out  of  historical 
narrative  and  recreated  in  the  form  of  spectacular  themed  resort  hotels.  These  'mira  worlds' 
provide  every  convenience  for  their  guests,  including  a  number  of  enormous  casinos:  a 
'total  illusion'  housed  under  one  huge  thematic  roof  In  1887  a  French  tourist  noted  what 
he  considered  a  particularly  American  trait,  writing  'Hotels  are  for  Americans  what 
cathedrals,  monuments  and  the  beauties  of  nature  are  for  us'  (in  Findlay  1986,  p161).  In 
the  century  since  he  wrote,  this  trait  has  developed  exponentially  and  surely  reached  its 
apogee  in  Las  Vegas,  where  hotels  now  boast  of  being  destinations  in  their  own  right  and 
tourists  talk  of  'going  to  Caesar's  Palace'  or  'going  to  Excalibur',  not  of  'going  to  Las 
Vegas'  itself 
In  its  creation  of  themed  worlds,  Las  Vegas  acts  as  a  giant  sponge,  absorbing  the  most 
fecund  images  fi7om  world  history  and  drawing  them  into  a  lush  playground  in  the  desert 
Its  indiscriminate  borrowing  results  in  a  bizarre  pastiche  of  cultural  appropnation-. 
medieval  England  in  Excalibur,  the  Roman  Empire  in  Caesar's  Palace,  ancient  Egypt  in 
Luxor  and  south  seas  piracy  in  Treasure  Island  Walking  through  a  thoroughly  modem 
laser  display,  the  individual  finds  himself  in  the  Roman  Empire,  surrounded  by  luscious 
fountains  and  piazzas.  Beyond  the  triumphal  arches  of  Greek  gods  rises  a  medieval 
fortress,  encircled  by  a  moat  and  dozens  of  jousting  knights.  The  horn  of  a  nineteenth 
century  New  Orleans  paddle  steamer,  festooned  in  neon  sounds',  interrupting  the  pre- 
recorded  battle  cries  of  pirate  galleons  fighting  in  a  climactically-controlled  Spanish 
lagoon.  Luxo?  s  life-size  sphinx  stares  out  impassively  across  the  cityscape,  its  pant  head 
surrounded  by  lasers  that  shine  so  high  they  interrupt  the  flight  of  local  planes.  In  this 
creation  of  fantasy,  the  illusion  Is  more  'real'  than  the  reality.  Las  Vegas  has  created  Itself 
from  a  spectacular  and  arbitrary  collage  of  historical  images,  proving  that  'technology  can 
give  us  more  reality  than  nature  can'  (Eco  1995  p44).  Like  Calvino's  Invisible  Cities,  the 191 
city  itself  'is  redundant-  it  repeats  itself  so  that  something  %vill  stick  in  the  mind'  (Calvino 
1979,  p  18). 
Play  Grounds 
In  these  miniature  worlds  of  play,  the  boundary  that  separates  inside  from  out,  night  from 
day  and  the  casino  from  the  city  breaks  down  in  a  city  so  saturated  with  gambling  that  it  is 
itself  a  giant  casino.  Inside  and  out  merge  into  a  vast  gaming  emporium,  so  that  like 
Benjamin's  Arcades,  Las  Vegas  casinos  are  'houses  without  exteriors'  (Benjamin,  in  Buck- 
Morss  1990,  p271).  See  the  breakdown  of  exterior  and  intenor,  night  and  day,  in  the 
dazzling  casinos  of  the  Strip  and  in  the  self-contained  universe  of  Excalibur,  in  Plates  Six 
and  Seven. 
Upon  entering,  the  gambler  becomes  disofiented  in  both  time  and  space,  and  his  sense  of 
the  passage  of  time  becomes  relative  to  the  nature  of  the  game  he  happens  to  be  playing. 
In  this  way,  the  rate  of  play  of  the  games  in  the  casino  measure  the  player's  perception  of 
time,  and  so  constitute  his  own  internal  'clock'. 
In  blending  the  immediacy  of  the  slot  arcade  with  games  like  keno  (a  concentrated  lottery), 
table  games  and  sports  betting,  no  single  rate  of  play  and  no  definitive  relation  between  the 
player  and  the  game,  exist  in  the  casino.  Instead,  both  are  contingent  on  the  specific  game 
being  played.  The  outcome  of  a  round  in  games  of  pure  chance  like  roulette,  baccarat  and 
craps  is  resolved  in  the  time  it  takes  for  a  wheel  to  spin,  cards  to  be  turned  over  or  dice  to 
be  rolled,  so  that  a  single  bet  can  be  won  or  lost  in  a  matter  of  seconds.  Games  of  skill 
such  as  poker  and  blackjack,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  last  longer,  due  to  their  greater 
degree  of  player  involvement.  Here,  a  round  is  lengthened  by  the  gambler  taking  time  to 
make  decisions  and  choose  between  alternatives,  so  that  a  game  of  poker  can  last  for 
hours,  blackjack  up  to  ten  minutes.  The  crowdedness  of  the  table  finiher  effects  the  length 
of  a  game,  simply  because  the  greater  the  number  of  players,  the  greater  the  time  taken 
dealing  cards,  collecting  bets,  making  payouts  and  so  on.  Up  to  fifleen  people  can  play 
baccarat',  so  that  by  the  time  all  fifteen  have  placed  their  bets,  dealt  and  turned  over  their 
cards,  a  game  can  have  lasted  three  or  four  minutes.  With  fewer  than  five  players,  a  game 'Ll  CJ  %L  -1  f-  ý% 192 
will  be  over  with  mercurial  swiftness  in  a  matter  of  seconds.  A  cro"ded  roulette  table  mav 
have  more  than  ten  people  counting  out  chips  and  shuffling  them  around  the  board  as  theN, 
make  up  their  minds  about  their  bets,  and  when  the  outcome  of  a  spin  is  resolved.  the 
dealer  will  have  to  remove  and  pay  out  chips  for  all  these  people.  Meanwhile,  at  a  less 
busy  table,  a  game  will  be  over  almost  as  quickly  as  it  takes  to  spin  the  wheel.  The  rate  of 
play  of  a  busy  roulette  table  is  around  60  spins  an  hour,  when  quiet,  it  is  nearer  120.  In  the 
timeless  void  of  the  casino,  the  length  (or  rate  of  play)  of  a  game  thus  becomes  the 
gambler's  measure  of  time  and  is  determined  by  factors  such  as  the  structure  and  degree  of 
skifl  in  a  game,  the  crowdedness  of  the  table  and  the  size  of  the  stake  in  relation  to  the 
player's  bankroll. 
The  heart  of  the  casino  -  the  gaming  hall  -  is  pure  spectacle,  a  dizzying  emporium  of  noise, 
movement  and  colour.  Upon  entering,  the  gambler  finds  himself  plunged  into  another 
world,  a  vast  playground  insulated  in  a  timeless  void  from  the  flow  of  everyday  life  outside 
it. 
Casino  light  is  not  susceptible  to  the  vicissitudes  of  night  and  day,  for  the  exclusion  of 
clocks  and  windows  banishes  daylight  and,  in  a  perpetual  twifight,  all  measure  of  time  is 
lost  and  the  time  of  the  casino  set  apart  from  that  of  the  everyday  world.  Artificial 
luminescence  obliterates  the  sense  of  time  passing,  and  disorients  the  gambler  in  both 
space  and  time,  contributing  to  what  Tom  Wolfe  called  the  cities'  'quixotic  inflammation 
of  the  senses'  (Wolfe  1981,  p20).  Such  an  'inflammation'  is  not  confined  to  Las  Vegas 
however,  but  is  characteristic  of  casinos  everywhere,  as  Scott  and  Venturi  explain.  '[The 
interior  of  the  casino]  never  connects  with  outside  light  or  outside  space.  This  disorients 
the  occupant  in  space  and  time.  He  loses  track  of  where  he  is  and  when  he  is.  Time  is 
limitless  because  the  light  of  noon  and  midnight  are  exactly  the  same.  Space  is  lifniitless 
because  the  artificial  light  obscures  rather  than  defines  its  boundaries.  Light  is  not  used  to 
define  space...  Space  is  enclosed  but  limitless...  Light  sources...  themselves  are 
independent  of  walls  and  ceilings...  The  fighting  is  antiarchitectural'  (Scott  and  Venturi 
1972,  p44). 19; 
Despite  their  direct  participation  in  table  games,  casino  gamblers  appear  to  each  other  as 
anonymous,  transient  individuals,  for  their  relation  is  with  their  in,,  lslble  opponent  in  everN 
game  -  the  casino  -  and  not  each  other.  No  inter-player  interaction  Is  required  in  an.  Ny  game. 
and  so  they  play  on,  oblivious  to  any  presence  but  their  own.  The  perpetual  twilight  and 
the  labyrinthine  organistion  of  the  casino  discourages  social  contact  and  contains  a  mass  of 
individuals  who,  although  noisy,  are  seldom  found  actually  communicating  with  each 
other.  When  not  playing,  gamblers  tend  to  wander  singly  from  table  to  table,  so  that  little 
contact,  beyond  that  regulated  by  play,  goes  on.  Even  the  social  focus  of  the  refreshments 
bar  is  dissipated  by  waitresses  serving  drinks  to  members  as  they  play.  Casino  design  itself 
works  to  reinforce  this  a-social  atmosphere,  creaturig  an  apparently  chaotic  and  disquieting 
landscape,  whose  confusion  is  mitigated  only  by  play.  Rows  of  tables  and  machines  run 
into  each  other,  forcing  the  gambler  to  retrace  his  steps  time  and  time  again  and  making 
travel  in  a  straight  line  impossible.  Since  no  'natural'  pathways  or  aisles  have  been  created 
to  assist  movement,  every  empty  space  appears  immeasurably  small  for  the  quantity  of 
people  trying  to  congregate  in  it.  There  is  nowhere  to  sit  -  the  only  seats  are  around  the 
tables  -  and  nowhere  to  stand  without  being  swept  along  by  a  tide  of  people  wandering 
haltingly  in  aH  directions.  Crowds  mill  around  in  chaos,  bumping  into  each  other  as  they 
side-step  machines,  squeezing  through  narrow  rows  of  slots  and  navigating  around  banks 
of  tables.  The  distraction  created  by  this  lack  of  organisation  and  design  make  it  very 
difficult  for  the  individual  to  do  anything.  He  may  enter  the  casino  with  a  purpose,  but  bý- 
simply  walking  through  the  gaming  arena,  relinquishes  any  hope  of  achieving  it.  In  his  ever 
more  vague  peregrinations  he  gradually  loses  his  sense  of  direction  and  time  as  his 
attention  is  fragmented  by  the  sensory  maelstrom  whirling  around  him. 
Both  the  labyrinthine  Organisation  of  the  casino  and  its  effect  on  consciouness  resemble  the 
nature  and  effect  of  what  Benjan-ýn  describes  as  the  metropolitan  experience-  the 
'distracted  manner'  and  'trancelike  dream  consciousness'  with  which  individuals  absorbed 
the  sensations  of  the  metropolis  and  the  department  stores  of  nineteenth  century  Pans 
(Benjamin,  in  Buck-Morss  1990,  p252).  Like  the  Paris  streets  which,  'with  their  uniform 
streets  and  endless  rows  of  buildings  have  realised  the  dreamed-of  architecture  of  the 
ancients:  the  labyrinth'  (Benjamin,  in  Buck-Morss  1990,  p254),  the  casino,  with  its 
uniform  slots  and  endless  rows  of  tables,  presents  another  phantasmagoric  landscape.  Its 194 
effect  on  consciousness  is  also  sinular.  For  Benjamin,  the  prototypical  nineteenth  Centur%,, 
urban  experience  was  to  be  found  in  the  Arcades  where  'the  commodities  are  suspended 
and  shoved  together  in  such  boundless  confusion  that  [they  appear]  like  images  out  of  the 
most  incoherent  dreams'  (Benjamin,  in  Buck-Morss  1990,  p254).  In  the  twentieth  century 
however,  such  an  intensification  of  experience  finds  its  most  extreme  form,  not  in  arcades 
filled  with  commodities.,  but  in  arcades  of  chance,  where  it  is  games  that  are  'suspended 
and  shoved  together'  in  a  'boundless  confusion'  that  resembles  the  imagery  of  dreams. 
The  gambler  is  disoriented  in  time  and  space,  cut  off  from  the  outside  world  and 
overwhelmed  by  a  barrage  of  impressions  which  descend  upon  him  with  lightening  speed, 
one  after  the  other,  never  lingering  long  enough  to  become  a  focus  of  attention. 
Stimulation  comes  at  him  from  all  angles;  the  rattle  of  the  slots  and  the  roar  of  the  tables  a 
cacophany  of  sound  against  a  backdrop  of  flashing  fights,  bright  colours  and  frenetic 
movement.  Nothing,  however,  remains  with  him  long  enough  to  create  a  lasting  effect, 
and,  as  his  attention  splinters  into  a  myriad  of  points,  he  is  unable  to  find  any  single  feature 
to  fix  onto  and  concentrate  on.  The  nature  of  the  casino's  'quixotic  inflammation  of  the 
senses'  is  fleeting  and  transitory,  and  creates  in  the  player  a  confusion  that  turns  to  fugue- 
like  distraction  as  he  gradually  stops  trying  to  engage  with  his  surroundings  and  allows 
himself  to  be  swept  along  by  the  commotion  that  threatens  to  overwhelm  him.  The 
experience  of  the  casino  is  similar  to  the  intensification  of  expenence  in  the  metropolis, 
which  Simmel  describes  as  the  'rapid  telescoping  of  changing  images 
...  and  the 
unexpectedness  of  violent  stimuli'  (Simmel  1971c,  p325).  The  'rapidly  shifting 
stimulations  of  the  nerves'  which  lends  to  mental  life  the  character  of  the  'shock 
experience'  (Simmel  197  1  c,  p329)  also  gives  rise  to  a  feature  of  modern  life  which  Simmel 
describes  as  'the  bla&6  attitude'.  This  occurs  when  the  over-stimulated  nerves  adjust  to  the 
profound  disruption'  of  the  metropolis  'by  renouncing  the  response  to  [ifl'  in  such  a  way 
that  the  stimuli  themselves  appear  'homogenous,  flat  and  gray'  with  nothing  to  distinguish 
one  from  another  (Simmel  1971  c,  p3  3  0). 
It  is  a  form  of  this  blas6  attitude  as  well  as  the  trancelike  dream  consciousness  described  by 
Benjamin  that  the  gambler  experiences  when  he  ceases  to  react  to  the  sensory  assault  of 
the  casino.  Unable  to  cope  with  its  continual,  violent  bombardment,  he  lapses  Into  a  daze Iý 
and,  as  if  on  'automatic  pilot',  no  longer  reacts  to  anything  at  all.  LIke  an  sleepWalker,  he 
wanders  through  the  labyrinth,  his  mental  faculties  blunted  in  a  protective  defence  against 
the  confusion  around  him. 
Slowly,  the  gambler  begins  to  sense  a  source  of  gravity  in  this  chaos.  Barely  perceptible  at 
first,  he  finds  himself  drawn  to  a  table,  watching  the  exquisite  skill  of  the  dealers  as  they 
deploy  a  steady  flow  of  cards  and  chips  and  organise  the  paraphernalia  of  play  into  elegant, 
repetitive  rituals.  These  highly  stylised  actions  become  ever  more  fascinating  to  the 
circulating  gambler  and  he  becomes  drawn  to  the  bold  simpficity  of  the  table  design  itself 
Boxes  and  squares  divide  the  green  baize  into  discrete  'spaces  of  play'  which  instruct  the 
novice,  in  simple  unambiguous  terms,  of  the  fundamental  rules  of  play.  The  committed 
gambler,  Jack  Richardson,  was  struck  with  the  mathematical  certainty  of  the  tables, 
writing:  'A  craps  table  is  like  a  medieval  chart  of  the  elements,  an  involved  design  that 
contains  all  the  categories  of  chance  a  pair  of  dice  can  create.  It  is  covered  with  squares 
within  squares,  numbers  within  boxes  and  circles  and  phrases  in  hermetic  jargon  that 
describe  the  nature  of  the  bet  each  area  of  the  table  accommodates'.  In  the  'classical  order' 
of  the  roulette  table  'thirty-six  variables  are  neatly  arranged,  coloured  and  classified  and... 
like  the  square  root  of  two  or  some  other  Pythagorean  embarrassment,  zero  and  its 
ambiguity  are  banished  outside  the  main  order  of  things...  '  (Richardson  1980,  p42-3). 
With  the  emergence  of  repetition,  the  world  becomes  ordered  again.  Chips  are  stacked,  the 
wheel  spins,  the  ball  is  released  -  it  spins  -  bounces  -  stops;  the  chips  are  swept  off  the 
table;  a  pause  and  the  action  begins  again;  repeated  without  variation  all  'day'  and  all 
'night'.  When  he  focuses  on  a  single  machine,  the  player  realises  that  even  the  amorphous 
babble  of  the  slots  is  made  up  of  distinct  voices,  each  with  its  own  tone.  The  coins  are 
dropped,  the  handle  pulled,  the  machine  lights  up  and  wheels  revolve,  stop,  and  the  action 
is  repeated,  interrupted  only  by  the  occasional  rattle  of  a  payout.  Although  initially,  the 
solemn  actions  of  blackjack  players  appear  to  the  novice  as  some  kind  of  esoteric  ritual,  he 
soon  realises  that  it  is  one  into  which  he  can  be  easily  initiated,  for  the  semicircular  table  is 
laid  out  with  geometric  simplicity.  squares  for  card  places,  circles  for  chips  and  insurance 
Payoff  odds  printed  in  crisp  white  on  the  smooth  surface.  Bets  are  placed  and  cards  dealt 
in  a  speedy  arc  to  players  evenly-spaced  around  the  crescent  table.  The  dealer  turns  over 196 
his  cards,  deals  more,  collects  and  pays  out  chips,  gathers  cards  and  then  begins  the  A  hole 
process  again. 
The  ritualised  action  of  the  tables  and  machines  and  the  fixed  expressions  of  dealers  and 
players  signifies  regularity  and  contrasts  sharply  with  the  chaotic  formlessness  of  the 
casino  floor.  Out  of  its  labyfinthine  confusion,  the  gaming  tables  emerge  as  oases  of  order 
with  a  hypnotic  appeal  of  their  own.  As  the  player  gravitates  towards  a  table  or  machine, 
his  attention  and  actions  become  focused  and  the  imperatives  of  the  game  gradually  relieve 
him  of  the  responsibility  of  deciding  what  to  do.  All  he  need  do  is  sit  down  and  play  and,  in 
the  simplicity  of  this  resolve,  his  world  becomes  ordered  again. 
SEPARATE  WORLDS 
After  looking  at  the  distinctive  atmospheres  of  the  various  phenomenological  sites,  it  is 
time  to  turn  to  those  features  which  create  an  experience  of  play  common  to  all. 
To  this  end,  we  must  look  again  at  separate  sites.  Such  sites  are  special,  for  they  provide  a 
concentrated  instance  of  a  gambling  environment  and  involve  a  physical  crossing  of  a 
threshold  out  of  the  ordinary  world  and  into  the  world  of  play. 
Moreover,  on  another  level,  all  sites  share  this  characteristic  of  'separateness'.  literally  in 
the  case  of  separate  sites  and  metaphorically  in  integrated  ones.  The  physical  act  of 
stepping  into  the  bookmakers  or  the  casino  has  its  counterpart  in  the  symbolic  stepping  out 
of  the  real  world  implied  in  the  participation  of  all  games  of  chance  '.  At  this  point  we  can 
turn  to  the  work  of  Huizinga  and  Caill-oý,  whose  delineations  of  the  formal  properties  - 
and  especially  the  separate  nature  -  of  play  are  strikingly  similar. 
Note,  for  example,  the  radical  sequestration  of  Hernian  Hesse's  ultiniate  ganie  of  chance,  The  G/av% 
Bead  Game. 19-1 
Huizinga  describes  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  ail  gamesý  'All  play  moves  and  has  its 
being  within  a  playground,  marked  off  beforehand,  either  materially,  or  ideal4v...  (Huizinga 
1949,  p  10).  Such  play  ha 
Is 
its  own  peculiar  nature.  It  is  not  "ordinary'  or  'real'  life,  but  is 
rather  a  stepping  out  of'real  life'  into  a  temporary  sphere  of  activity  with  a  disposition  all 
of  its  own'  (Huizinga  1949,  p8).  This  point  is  reiterated  by  Caiflois,  who  writes  that.  'Afl 
play  presupposes  the  temporary  acceptance  of  a  closed,  conventional  and  in  certain 
respects,  imaginary  universe'  (Caiflois  1962,  p19).  Similarly,  games,  for  Goffinan,  are  a 
sub-division  of  the  broad  category  of  encounters,  and  are  'world  building  activities'  whose 
events  constitute  'a  field  for  fateful,  dramatic  action,  a  plane  of  being,  an  engine  of 
meaning,  a  world  in  itself,  different  from  all  other  worlds...  '  (Goffinan  1961,  p25). 
Encounters  -  and  therefore  games  -  are  bound  by  'rules  of  irrelevance'  which  are  binding 
for  the  duration  of  the  encounter  and  create  a  kind  of  blindness  -  an  'effortless 
unawareness'  -  to  the  everyday  world  (Goffman  1961,  p24).  Goffinan  cites  the  fugue  of 
chess  players  as  an  example  of  'the  elegance  and  strength  of  this  structure  of  Miattention  to 
most  things  of  the  world'  (Goffinan  196  1,  p  19) 
Play  is  both  spatially  and  temporally  separate  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  Thus  secluded  'it 
is  played  out  within  certain  limits  of  time  and  space  being  distinct  from  ordinary  life  both 
as  to  locality  and  duration'  (Huizinga  1949,  p9).  Every  playground  -  and  every  gambling 
site  -  is  for  Fluizinga  a  'concentrated',  'forbidden'  spot,  'Isolated,  hedged  round,  hallowed, 
within  which  special  rules  obtain'  (Huizinga  1949,  p1O).  The  arena  of  play  is  strictly 
delineated  and  reserved  so  that  'the  game's  domain  is...  a  restricted,,  closed,  protected 
universe:  a  pure  space'  (Caillois  1962,  p7).  Such  concentrated  spaces  are  bound  by 
temporal  limits  too.  Play  'interpolates  itself  as  a  temporary  activity,  satisfying  in  itself  and 
ending  there'.  It  is  'an  intermezzo,  an  interlude  in  our  day  fives'  (Huizinga  1949,  p9), 
which,  for  Caillois,  changing  the  metaphor  'ends  as  inexorably  as  the  closing  of  a 
parenthesis'  (Caillois  1962,  p43).  This  limitation  in  time  has  its  counterpart  in  repetition. 
Every  game,  and  every  gambler,  can  be  repeated  ad  infinitum  either  irnmediately  upon 
completion  of  a  round,  as  in  slot  machine  play,  or  after  a  spell  has  elapsed,  as  in  the 
lottery.  In  the  faculty  of  repetition  'fies  one  of  the  most  essential  qualifies  of  play.  It  holds 
good  not  only  of  play  as  a  whole  but  also  of  its  inner  structure'  (Huizinga  1949,  plO). 
Gambling  in  general  can  be  endlessly  repeated  and  this  repetition  also  makes  up  the 19X 
structure  of  each  separate  round  in  each  separate  game'  (Huizinga  1949,  pIO).  As  the 
gambler  enters  the  world  of  play,  he  leaves  the  conventions  of  the  eý,  -eryday  Aorld  behind 
and  moves  into  a  uruverse  bound  by  a  different  set  of  rules.  The  nituals  of  play  make  the 
gambling  environment  a  cohesive,  structured  alternative  reality  the  ability  to  draw  the 
individual  in  and  create  a  (temporarily)  Viable  world.  The  'profound  affinity'  between  play 
and  order  arises  from  the  fact  that  play  'creates  order,  is  order.  Into  an  imperfect  world 
and  into  the  confusion  of  life  it  brings  a  temporary,  a  finifted,  perfection.  Play  demands 
order  absolute  and  supreme'  (Huizinga  1949,  p  10).  By  creating  rhythm  and  harmony,  play 
enchants  and  captivates,  'it  casts  a  spell  over  us'  (Huizinga  1949,  pIO).  In  the  'temporary 
abolition  of  the  ordinary  world'  a'stepping  out  of  common  reality  into  a  higher  order'  takes 
place  (Huizinga  1949,  p13).  In  this  higher  order,  the  rules  of  play  are  'absolutely  binding'- 
'Inside  the  circle  of  the  game  the  laws  of  ordinary  life  no  longer  count.  We  are  different 
and  do  things  differently'  (Huizinga  1949,  p  12). 
Just  as  the  magical  world  of  play  is  animated  by  a  set  of  rules  different  from  those  which 
govern  everyday  life,  so  the  player  himself  is  animated  by  a  different  set  of  motivations 
from  those  of  his  everyday  routines,  so  that  for  Caillois,  play  consists  of  'becoming  an 
illusory  character'  (Caiflois  1962,  p19).  With  the  interruption  of  habit  and  routine  and  the 
removal  of  familiar  surroundings,  the  reference  points  of  the  personality  disappear.  As  the 
traditional  categories  of  orientation  loosen  and  shift,  so  the  gamblers'  axes  of  identity 
become  less  fixed  and  allow  for  the  investigation  and  creation  of  new  roles.  As  Caillois 
explains,  when  the  player  leaves  the  everyday  world  behind  he  also  leaves  himseff  behind  - 
'In  one  way  or  another,  one  escapes  the  real  world  and  creates  another.  One  can  also 
escape  oneself  and  become  another'  (Caillois  1962,  p  19). 
As  we  have  seen  then,  as  worlds  of  play,  the  phenomenological  sites  are  separate 
universes,  limited  in  space  and  time  and  governed  by  a  peculiar  order.  Hav-mg  described 
the  physiognomy  of  these  sites  and  the  experience  of  gambling  peculiar  to  each,  it  is  time 
now  to  look  in  more  detail  at  the  features  which  are  common  to  the  experience  of  play  itt 
general.  This  will  be  the  subject  of  the  next  Chapter. CHAPTER  FOUR:  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  PIAN' 
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THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  PLAY 
The  gambling  arena  ffnparts  its  own  peculiar  qualities  to  consciousness.  The  setting  apart  of 
the  sphere  of  play  against  the  outside  world  of  utilitarian  aims,  just  like  that  of  the  sacred 
enclosure,  creates  a  rarefied  atmosphere  in  which  the  mental  world  of  the  gambler  assumes  a 
strange  new  physiognomy.  We  must  be  careful  to  note,  however,  as  Gadamer  does,  that  the 
play  world  is  no  mere  state  of  mind,  but  constitutes,  rather,  a  specific  mode  of  being.  Thus. 
tplay  does  not  have  its  being  in  the  consciousness  or  the  attitude  of  the  player,  but  on  the 
contrary  draws  the  latter  into  its  area  and  fills  him  with  its  spirit'  so  that,  ultimately,  'the 
player  experiences  the  game  as  a  reality  that  surpasses  him'  (Gadamer  1975,  p89). 
The  'normal'  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  world  is  mediated  by  the  conscious  experience  of 
the  categories  of  time,  space  and  cause  in  a  structure  which  gives  form  to  reality.  It  is 
important  to  recognise,  then,  that  'consciousness  is  not  a  thing,  it  is  a  stnicture'  upon  which 
experience  is  built,  so  that  'our  experience  gains  its  "actuality"  by  being  related  to  this 
structure'  (Ey  1978,  p87).  The  perception  of  the  categories  of  time,  space  and  cause  can  be 
seen  as  the  co-ordinates  upon  which  the  distinctly  architectural  structure  of  consciousness 
rests.  Organised  into  a  coherent  whole,  this  formation  comprises  a  Gestalt,  a  'total  structure 
of  experience'  (Ey  1978,  p94),  which  lends  to  perception  the  dimensions  of  a  spectacle  (Ev 
1978,  p  107).  The  phenomenolo.  gical  sites  can  assume  spectacular  form  both,  as  we  have  seen 
in  Chapter  Three,  in  their  physical  structure,  and  also  in  their  representation  in  the  field  of 
consciousness  of  the  gambler.  In  the  latter,  the  gambler  moves  through  his  field  of 
consciousness  as  if  bewitched,  for  1his  structure  of  perception  is  no  ordinary  one.  Ey  points 
out  that,  despite  their  dependence  on  perceptual  experience,  a  variety  of  conscious  states 2(m) 
exist.  Many  of  these  states  are  demruclured  ones,  a  result  of  the  destructura  i  tion  or 
disorganisation  of  their  perceptual  co-ordinates.  Ey  descnbes  such  a  destructuration  of 
consciousness  as  a  process  which  'draws  consciousness  into  an  increasingly  profound  collapse 
into  the  imaginary...  '  (Ey  1978,  p84).  This  type  of  process  is  the  central  interest  of  vanous 
phenomenologists'  attempts  to  peer  into  the  minds  of  schizophrenics,  marvic-depressives, 
children  and  'pfimitives',  and  although  the  terminology  of  the  authors'  descfiptions  may  vary, 
the  central  theme  remains  the  same. 
it  is  such  a  destructuration  that  the  gambler  is  subject  to  when  he  plays,  for  here,  as  we  shall 
see,  his  perceptual  co-ordinates  of  time,  space.,  cause  and,  (unique  to  the  gambling  world), 
money,  become  bewitched  in  a  magical  world  of  chance.  While  playing,  the  gambler  no  longer 
perceives  his  surroundings  in  the  ordered,  logical  manner  of  rational  consciousness,  but  as  a 
barrage  of  information;  to  use  Cassirer's  phrase,  in  a  'rhapsody  of  perception'  (Cassirer  1953, 
p2l).  To  apply  another  phenomenologist's  description  of  this  destructuration  to  the  gambler, 
we  can  quote  Straus  on  the  depressive:  'The  basic  structure  of  space  and  time...  is  altered. 
Familiar  surroundings  become  estranged,  everything  shows  a  new,  bewildering  physiognomy. 
The  relations  of  the  patient  to  the  world  are  changed'  (Straus  1966,  p290). 
For  Devereaux  the  'rhapsody  of  perception'  encountered  during  play  is  charactensed  by  an 
overwhelming  state  of  tension.  The  gambling  situation,  he  writes,  is  'full  of  promise,  but  it  is 
also  full  of  mystery  and  danger  and  meaning'.  Most  importantly  it  is  'ftaught  Wlith  strain.  the 
conflicting  valences  and  ambivalences  of  hope  versus  fear,  risk  versus  security  and  faith  versus 
doubt  are  playing  complicated  melodies  within  [the  gambler's  consciousness]'.  The  result, 
Devereaux  explains  'is  an  intolerable  -  but  not  wholly  unpleasant  -  state  of  tension' 
(Devereaux  1949,  p695).  One  gambler  described  the  sense  of  expectation  characteristic  of  his 
encounters  with  chance  in  a  particularly  vivid  metaphor-  'Imagine  going  into  a  dark  room. 
When  the  lights  are  turned  on  the  room  could  be  empty  or  it  could  be  filled  with  the  most 
extraordinary  objects  you've  ever  seen.  A  game  of  cards  is  like  that'  (in  1he  Observer  25-6- 
95,  p12).  It  was  a  similar  state  of  tension  upon  which  another  gambler's  experience  of  play 
was  founded:  'My  feelings  when  I  play  roulette  are  of  tension  -  partly  painful,  partly 2t  I 
pleasurable  and  expectant...  '  (in  Bergler  1970,  p83),  and  ýýhich  defined  the  exquisite  autony  ot 
Tolstoy's  relation  with  roulette,  of  which  he  wrote  'it  is  a  long  time  since  aný-thing  tormented 
me  so  much'  (in  Barnhart  1983,  pI  10). 
This  strange,  ambivalent  state  of  tension  is  conditioned  by  the  rate  of  play,  size  of  bet  and 
degree  of  chance  in  a  game.  It  begins  the  moment  the  bet  is  placed  and  ends  when  the 
outcome  of  the  round  is  known.  In-between,  the  gambler  waits  in  anticipation,  and  in  this  state 
of  suspended  animation  'the  conflicting  valences  of  fear  or  hope  run  in  tingling  arpeggios'  up 
and  down  his  spine  (Devereaux  1949,  p699).  This  constitutes  what  Bergler  calls  'the 
mysterious  thrill'  in  gambling,  a  sensation  which  we  can  see  is  not  a  uniform  experience,  but 
rather  is  dependent  on  the  formal  characteristics  of  a  game  outlined  above.  It  can  be 
protracted  over  a  long  period,  as  in  the  lottery,  or  experienced  as  a  series  of  peaks  and 
troughs,  like  the  bursts  of  excitement  generated  by  races.  The  player  can  be  gripped  in  a 
rigour  of  constant  tension  in  slot  machine  play,  or  held  in  thrall  through  a  rapid  succession  of 
peaks  in  games  like  roulette.  Common  to  all  these  games  is  a  peaking  of  tension;  an 
intensification  of  experience  into  which  are  crammed  all  the  sensations  of  gambling.  As  he 
awaits  the  turn  of  the  card  or  the  end  of  the  race,  the  player  experiences  a  sensory  maelstrom. 
A  racetrack  gambler  describes  the  cycle.  The  thrill  'hinges  on  the  last  few  minutes  of  the 
game...  Then  it  becomes  the  ultimate,  the  extreme  in  excitement...  As  soon  as  the  game  is 
over,  you  go  down  because  you've  experienced  everything  in  that  moment'  (in  Leiseur  1984, 
p45). 
Common  throughout  the  literature  on  the  experience  of  gambling  is  the  treatment  of  this  state 
of  tension  -  the  'thrill'  of  play  -  as  a  static  unitary  phenomenon  when  in  fact  it  is  a  proce.  u 
unfolding  through  various  degrees  of  intensity.  '  For  example,  when  Goffi-nan  writes  that  as  the 
individual  'releases  himself  to  the  passing  moment...  a  special  affective  state  is  likely  to  be 
aroused  emerging  transformed  as  excitement'  (Goffinan  1969b,  p137),  he  conflates  the 
This  error  is  avoided  most  notably  by  Martinez  (1976),  "-hose  notion  of  'conscious  moods'  as  idcritity-defining 
experiences  includes  risk-taking,  immediacy,  fantasy,  euphoria  and  mysticism  as  separate  stages  in  dynanuc 
interaction  %ith  each  other. 202 
dynamic  of  several  states  into  a  single  one  -  excitement  Bergson  on  the  other  hand, 
understands  the  multifarious  perception  of  intensity,  describing  it  as  a  'wholly  dynamic 
awareness  of  the  gradual  alterations  which  take  place  in  the  confused  heap  of  co-existing 
psychic  states'  (Bergson  19  10,  p9).  Such  states,  he  writes,  may  vary  in  degree  and  encompass 
both  affective  and  physical  dimensions,  but  always  remain  as  'so  many  varieties  of  a  single 
species'  (Bergson  1910,  p43).  The  thrill  of  gambling  is  not  so  much  a  'confused  heap'  as  a 
fluctuation  of  sensation  and  perception  in  the  consciousness  of  the  gambler.  As  a  Gestalt  it  is  a 
6rhapsody  of  perception'  composed  of  the  various  states  of  drearniness,  delirium,  vertigo  and 
transcendence,,  all  of  which  co-exist  as  'so  many  varieties  of  a  single  species'  -  the  experience 
of  intensity.  In  this  Chapter  these  will  be  described  separately  although  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  they  occur  more  or  less  simultaneously  and  are  experienced  by  the  gambler  as  an 
undulating,  repetitive  rush  of  sensation  for  the  duration  of  play. 
This  brings  us  to  a  methodological  problem  of  how  to  describe  something  as  intangible  as  a 
state  of  consciousness;  a  phenomenon  which  by  definition  we  have  no  access  to.  A  sirrillar 
problem  was  encountered  by  Otto  (1925)  in  his  description  of  religious  sensation,  an 
experience  he  defined  as  something  'Wholly  Other',  and  also  by  Storch  (1924)  in  his 
phenomenological  analysis  of  mental  states.  Both  authors  came  up  against  the  bias  towards 
rationalism  which  is  inherent  in  language  and  which  therefore  forces  description  of  any  state  - 
'rational'  or  otherwise  -  to  bend  to  its  strictures.  As  Storch  expresses  it-  'it  is  impossible  to 
undertake  a  formal  analysis  of  mental  experiences  or  thought  structures  w-ithout  making  use  of 
rational  forms  and  ideas 
...  even  though  the  context  of  the  phenomena  to  be  described  is 
predominantly  irrational'  (Storch  1924,  ix).  The  difficulties  faced  by  wnters  like  Storch  and 
Otto  when  trying  to  describe  something  which  is  'Wholly  Other'  are  similar  to  those 
encountered  in  our  attempt  to  penetrate  the  inner  world  of  the  gambler. 
A  route  out  of  this  methodological  impasse  has  been  suggested  by  Ey,  who  believes  a  partial 
solution  to  the  problem  of  description  lies  in  the  very  nature  of  the  thing  being  described-  the 
inaccessible  state.  The  tendency  to  create  spectacles,  he  points  out,  is  implied  in  the 
organisation  of  lived  spaCe  as  a  field  and  is  something  that  we  are  all  familiar  with.  This 20', 
fundamental  tendency  of  human  consciousness  can  thus  be  seen  as  a  kind  of  'bnd_e'  bet,.  k  p-  een 
an  inaccessible  mental  state  and  an  image  we  can  all  recognise.  To  %,  alidate  his  claim,  B- 
points  to  the  allusions  to  spectacle  in  the  work  of  poets  and  phenomenologists,  allusions 
which  we  can  recognise  because  'we  well  understand  how  speaking  of  consciousness  as  a 
representation,  a  scene,  inevitably  involves  us  in  a  sort  of  theatricality  or  drama  of  its 
spectacular  experience'  (Ey  1987,  p107).  Hence  the  effectiveness  of  one  gambler's  striking 
description  of  the  experience  of  play  as  a  spatial  panorama,  as  an  entering  of  a  room  filled 
either  with  wonderful  objects  or  nothing  but  darkness.  Thus,  Storch  applies  the  techniques  of 
cernotional  participation  and  sympathetic  understanding'  to  enter  the  world  of  the 
schizophrenic  (Storch  1924,  x),  while  phenomenologists  like  Straus  and  van  der  Leeuw  rely 
on  poets  and  writers  to  find  expression  for  what  is  unique  and  peculiar  in  language  "  hich 
nevertheless  finds  common  ground  in  the  experience  of  the  reader. 
In  this  study  we  too  shall  use  the  insight  of  phenomenologists  and  writers  (as  well  as  the 
comments  of  players  themselves)  to  describe  the  phenomenal  field  of  the  gambler  in  an 
attempt  to  render  that  which  is  Wholly  Other  intelligible  in  terms  of  everyday  experience.  We 
are  fortunate  in  that  the  phenomenal  world  of  gambfing  has  captured  the  literary  imagination 
of  many  great  writers,  including  Turgenev,  Pushkin,  Balzac,  Baudelaire  and,  of  course, 
Dostoevsky.  The  latter  is  perhaps  its  most  eloquent  spokesman,  for  as  well  as  being  a  great 
analyst  of  human  motivation,  Dostoevsky  was  an  inveterate  gambler  who  thus  wrote  from  the 
privileged  position  of  having  actually  experienced  first  hand  that  which  he  fictionalised.  This 
position  lent  his  description  of  the  gambling  experience  an  authenticity  and  verisimilitude 
absent  from  subsequent,  more  'scientific'  accounts. 
Dostoevsky's  disastrous  tour  of  the  gambling  capitals  of  Europe,  fictionalised  in  the  novel  Me 
Gambler,  was  described  as  'a  wrenching  of  biography  into  fiction'  (Wasiolek  1972,  xxwh), 
which  reveals  with  dramatic  insight  the  'rhapsody  of  perception'  experienced  within  the  magic 
circle.  All  the  urgency  of  play  is  compressed  into  Alesky,  a  typical  gambler  and  a 
representative  of  Dostoevsky  himself.  He  is  alive...  a  his  vital  sap,  A  his  energies,  rebellion, 
daring  have  been  channelled  into  roulette'  (Dostoevsky  1863,  in  Frank  and  Goldstein  1987, 21  ý4 
p  186).  Mesky  relates  his  actions  retrospectively  as  a  dream-h  ike  period  of  temporarý,  insan' 
Upon  arrival  at  Roulettenburgh,  he  underwent  a  'strange,  dramatic  and  miraculous'  episode 
which  'all  flashed  by  like  a  dream'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p225)-  In  the  ýkeeks  that  followed  he 
was  swept  through  the  casino  on  a  sensory  and  emotional  whirligig,  tossed  up  on  exuberant 
waves  of  winning  and  dashed  down  in  the  despair  of  losing.  He  describes  his  experience  of  the 
magic  circle  as  of  living  in  a  'whirlwind  which  caught  me  in  its  vortex  and  then  threw  me  out 
somewhere.  At  times  I  still  feel  as  if  I  am  spinning  round  in  that  vortex  and  that,  at  am, 
moment,  the  storm  will  come  tearing  by  again,  carrying  me  off  on  its  wings  as  it  passes  and 
once  again  I  will  lose  all  sense  of  order  and  proportion  and  I  will  start  spinning,  spinning, 
spinning...  '  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p225,6).  So  great  is  the  sensory  maelstrom  that  Alesky's 
frenzied  being  has  merged  with  the  game,  leaving  him  spinning,  disengaged  from  his 
surroundings  and  disorientated  in  space  and  time,  as  though  caught  in  the  very  rotation  of  the 
wheel  itself 
This  'rhapsody  of  perception'  is  a  paradigmatic  account  of  the  experience  of  gambling,  the 
separate  instants  of  which  Will  be  examined  next.  After  the  general  sensation  of  play,  the 
destructuration  of  the  specific  categories  of  time  and  space,  and  of  the  medium  of  the 
gambling  world,  money,  will  be  looked  at.  The  destructuration  of  the  perception  of  cause  will 
not  be  considered  here,  but  will  instead  form  the  subject  of  the  Fifth  Chapter. 
Intensity 
The  thrall  of  the  magic  circle  settles  on  the  gambler  like  a  haze  for  the  duration  of  play. 
Overtaken  by  the  'Spirit  of  Gaming',  he  succumbs  to  what  Balzac  describes  as  'a  passion 
more  fatal  than  disease'  that  exercises  a  'dazzling  fascination  over  the  senses'  (Balzac  1977, 
p22-26).  Preoccupied,  he  is  gradually  dissociated  from  reality  and  overcome  by  a  'ridiculous 
absence  of  mind'  (Steinmetz  1870,  p49),  in  which  he  becomes  engrossed  in  the  Intricacies  of 
play  to  such  an  extent  that  he  undergoes  a  destructuration  of  his  field  of  consciousness.  As  his 
field  of  attention  narrows  to  focus  fully  on  the  action  immediately  in  front  of  hirn,  his 
concentration  is  so  intense  'that  almost  all  else  is  blocked  out'.  As  Leiseur  puts  it  'It  is  a 205 
c4twilight  zone"  or  "dream  world"'  (Leiseur  1984,  p14).  Thus  possessed.  the  Rambler 
succumbs  to  a  dream  state;  a  sense  of  unreality  and  distance  from  his  surroundings,  described 
by  Baudrillard  as  a  'dream-like  situation,  where  one  moves  ftee  of  reality'  (Baudnilard  19,  -)0, 
p132).  Jacobs  (1988)  and  Brown  (1994)  have  described  this  feature  of  gambling  as  the 
experience  of  dissociated  states,  which  range  from  'mi-ld  dissociation  such  as  may  occur  in  the 
narrowing  of  attention  associated  with  preoccupation,  through  mystical  experiences,  ecstatic 
religious  states  deji  vu  experiences,  feelings  of  depersonalisation,  hypnotic  states,  trance 
states...  somnambulism  [and]  fugue  to  the  phenomena  (sic)  of  multiple  personality'  (Bro%vn 
1994,  p3).  Common  to  all  these  states  they  found  the  'quality  of  separateness  or  apartness, 
Idifferentness'  or  disconnection  from  the  normal  flow  of  mental  life'  (Brown  1994,  p3). 
We  can  regard  these  dissociated  states  as  a  specific  form  of  the  destructuration  of  the  field  of 
consciousness  which  Ey  caHs  'oneiric  states'  and  in  which  the  individual  is  in  a  condition  of 
'pathological  dreaming'.  Neither  asleep  nor  awake,  he  experiences  a  kind  of  'awake  dream' 
4which  unfolds  as  if  outside  of  himself  (Ey  1978,  p65).  Thus  'enchanted',  the  subject  feels 
disembodied,  and,  looking  on  at  himself  from  without,  he  'lives  a  spectacle  to  the  degree  that 
he  is  transformed  into  a  spectator'  (Ey  1978,  p65).  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Jacobs  found  a  large 
number  of  gamblers  who  reported  the  frequency  of  their  feeling  'outside'  of  themselves,  as 
though  in  a  trance,  watching  themselves  play  (Jacobs  1988).  It  is  clear  then,  that  the  gambler 
becomes  totally  absorbed  in  the  game,  and  this  is  part  of  the  nature  of  oneiric  states,  for  their 
experience  'demands  its  absorption  in  the  gaze  which  observes  it'  (Ey  1978,  p66).  Play  thus 
assumes  the  form  of  a  spectacle,  not  in  the  endlessly  self-referential  sense  of  Debord's 
spectacle,  but  as  that  which  is  perceived  when  the  consciousness  of  the  gambler  merges  with 
the  game  and  appears  as  an  entity  outside  of  himself  Such  a  spectacle  was  manifest  during  a 
horse  race  in  which  tension  was  so  great  that  spectator-gamblers  actually  experienced  a  sense 
of  absorption  into  the  event.  The  usual  individualism  of  gambfing  was  overcome  and 
something  approximating  a  group  experience,  a  coflective  conscience,  appeared.  Recollecting 
the  final  moments  of  the  race,  one  punter  said  'People  were  just  possessed  by  this  event.  The 
atmosphere  was  so  powerful  it  was  almost  eerie'.  This  spectacle,  ýnto  which  the  gambler  is 200 
absorbed  and  in  which  he  is  also  an  observer,  is  experienced  by  him  as  an  a"ake-dream  in 
which  various  other  mental  states,  such  as  vertigo  and  transcendence,  come  and  go. 
Entering  the  magic  circle  is  an  adventure  and,  as  Simmel  has  shown,  an  adventure  can  assume 
the  properties  of  a  dream:  'the  more  adventurous  an  adventure,  the  more  drearrflike  it 
becomes'  (Simmel  197  1  b,  p  188).  This  peculiarity  is  caused  by  the  occurrence  of  the  adventure 
outwith  the  usual  stream  of  life.  As  the  world  of  play  is  a  'stepping  out'  of  real  life  (Huizinga, 
1949)  so  the  adventure  is  a  'dropping  out  of  the  continuity  of  life'  (Simmel  197  1  b,  p  187).  The 
, otherness'  of  the  magic  circle  lends  to  it  the  quality  of  an  adventure,  while  the  strangeness  of 
the  stimuli  inside  contribute  to  the  dreamlike  nature  of  the  experience  within  it,  Entering  the 
casino  has  thus  been  described  as  a  'fantasy  trip'  (Boyd  1976,  p371)  in  which  the  gambler 
embarks  on  an  adventure  to  a  foreign  land.  The  soporific  effect  induced  by  this  deliberately 
exotic  environment  resembles  the  trance  states  induced  by  divination  ritual  where  communion 
with  the  sacred  induced  in  the  supplicant  strange  forms  of  consciousness. 
The  absence  of  mind  experienced  by  gamblers  in  the  oneiric  or  dream  state  is  in  fact  indicative 
of  an  absence  of  the  subject,  for  while  he  is  a  spectator  in  the  game  which  he  is  playing,  the 
subject  'is  there  without  being  there'  (Ey  1978,  p65).  One  horse-race  gambler  reported  such 
an  absence  of  the  self.  'You're  not  in  reality...  no  part  of  reality'  (in  Leiseur  1984,  p  15).  This 
'lived  experience',  Ey  writes,  is  like  that  of  dreams.  It  'will  not  be  retained  or  will  be  only 
poorly  retained  [and]  cannot  be  re-lived...  or  can  be  re-fived  only  with  great  difficulty'.  In  this 
way,  'the  "world"  of  oneiric  states  does  not  have  any  more  existence  than  that  of  dream 
states'  (Ey  1978,  p65).  As  he  succumbs  to  this  dream-like  absence  of  mind,  Dosteovsky's 
gambler  Alesky  also  loses  awareness  of  himself  as  subject,  and  cannot  recall  what  has  passed. 
He  relates:  'I  lost  track  of  the  amount  and  order  of  my  stakes.  I  only  remember  as  if  in  a 
dream'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p241).  This  dream-like  absence  of  subject  characterises  the 
experience  of  a  patient  of  Bergler,  who  recounted  'What's  really  uncanny  is  I  feel  as  fI  .k  ere 
in  a  daze'  (Bergler  1970,  p45).  Transfixed,  one  player  feels  separated  ftom  a  reality  he  can  no 
longer  comprehend:  'I  was  incapable  of  articulate  thought...  '  (Richardson  1980,  pI29).  An 
aspect  of  the  dream  state  is  the  dimension  of  amazement,  the  sensation  of  which  renders  the 20- 
gambler  immobile.  One  player  was  overcome,  in  this  state,  by  a  mixture  of  amazement.  horTor, 
dread  and  a  sense  of  inevitability,  saying  'it's  the  same  fII  eeling  you'd  get  ou  k  at  a  loo  ed 
statue  and  suddenly  saw  it  move'  (in  Bergler  1970,  p45).  Turgenev  recognised  the  Same 
feature  in  a  group  of  gamblers  whom  he  described  as  'figures  crowded  round  the  green  blazed 
tables  with  the  same  duH  and  greedy  look  of  something  between  amazement  and 
exasperation...  which  the  gambling  fever  imparts  to  all...  '  (Turgenev  1970,  p3).  Such  a  fever 
of  amazement  crashed  down  on  one  punter,  pinning  him  to  the  table-  'You  get  what's  called  a 
"red  mist".  You  caril  leave  the  table;  you're  frozen  to  the  table...  you  can't  move'.  According 
to  Bergson,  such  immobilisation  is  typical  of  the  sensation  of  extreme  intensity.  It  is 
recognisable  he  tells  us,  'by  the  irresistible  reflex  movements  which  it  incites'  and  by  the 
cpowerlessness  with  which  it  effects  us'  (Bergson  1919,  p4O). 
The  apex  of  the  gambling  experience  is  the  moment  when  the  gambler  is  gripped  by  the  fever 
of  play  and  plays  on  and  on,  unable  to  stop,  oblivious  to  his  surroundings,  to  his  losses,  to  the 
passage  of  time  and  even  to  himself.  Intoxicated,  he  plunges  into  the  game  again  and  again  in 
an  eternal  present  that  brings  him  to  the  edge  of  insanity.  This  is  the  experience  of  '%k-hat 
Caillois  calls  ilinx.  Derived  from  the  Greek  'whirlpool'  or'vertigo',  it  is  a  govemmg  principle 
of  Dionysian  or  pre-rational  societies,  and  can  also  be  found  in  a  type  of  play  which  consists  of 
an  'attempt  to  momentai-ily  destroy  the  stability  of  perception  and  inflict  a  kind  of  voluptuous 
panic  on  an  otherwise  lucid  n-find'.  It  is  a  'case  of  surrendering  to  a  kind  of  spasm,  seizure  or 
shock  which  destroys  reality  with  sovereign  brusqueness'  (Caillois  1962,  p23).  This  vertigo 
seizes  players  so  that  'they  are  no  longer  aware  of  fatigue,  and  are  scarcely  conscious  of  what 
is  going  on  around  them.  They  are  entranced  by  the  question  of  where  the  ball  wi.  11  stop  or 
what  card  will  turn  up'  (Caillois  1962,  p23).  Swept  along  by  the  frenzy  of  play,  the  gambler 
experiences  excitement  to  the  point  of  disorientation,  in  the  grip  of  a  vertigo  that  'paralyses, 
fascinates  and  maddens  the  player'  (Caillois  1962,  p23).  The  attraction  of  a  game  and  its 
seemingly  supernatural  hold  over  a  player  fies  in  the  seductiveness  of  this  vertiginous  flight. 
Baudrillard  describes  its  hypnotic  appeal:  'By  itself  each  throw  produces  only  a  moderate 
giddiness,  but  when  fate  raises  the  bid...  when  fate  itself  seems  to  throw  a  challenge  to  the 
natural  order  of  things  and  enters  into  a  frenzy  or  ritual  vertigo,  then  the  passions  are 208 
unleashed  and  the  spirits  seized  by  a  truly  deadly  fascination'  (Baudnilard  1990,  p  147)  in  this 
sensory  maelstroR  perceptions  of  time  and  space  are  shattered.  Time  freezes,  and  the  fjambler 
becomes  absorbed  in  a  total  orientation  to  the  immediate  Here  and  Now.  In  this  state,  he 
becomes  a  creature  of  sensation;  seeing,  but  not  really  aware  of  his  surroundings,  perceoing, 
but  not  truly  cognisant  of  what  is  going  on.  Turgenev  describes  a  gambler  in  this  condition, 
who,  seduced  by  the  game,  played  like  an  automaton,  with  'incomprehensible,  compulsive 
haste...  staring  blankly  in  front  of  him'  as  he  'scattered  with  a  perspiring  hand  gold  coins  on  all 
the  four  comers  of  the  roulette  table'  (Turgenev  1970,  p4).  Another  describes  his  thoughts, 
shattered  into  incoherence  by  the  intensity  of  the  game  4...  your  brain  or  your  way  of  thinking 
is  completely  nil...  You  can't  think  of  nothing  and  yet  you  can't  ease  your  rnind.  If  you  only 
knew  how  to  ease  it  for  one  half  second  you  could  get  your  senses  back.  Man,  your  mind  is 
blown'  (in  Martinez  1983,  p364).  As  a  creature  of  sensation,  the  gambler  apprehends  the 
world  only  through  feeling,  not  thought.  The  relation  between  sensation  and  reflection  is 
dissociated,  the  physical  feeling  of  an  event  separate  from  the  understanding  of  it.  Such  a 
phenomenon  is  illustrated  by  a  moment  in  Alesky's  play  when,  in  a  flash  of  insight,  he 
temporarily  reverts  to  lucid  comprehension-  'With  horror  I  felt  and  momentarily  reallsed  what 
it  would  be  like  to  lose  now'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p241).  Total  physical  turmoil  accompanies 
what  Martinez  calls  this  'peak  experience',  and  describes  as  'a  body  rapture  marked  by 
buoyancy  and  vigour'  (Martinez  1983,  p359).  When  tension  peaks  in  this  way,  pandemonium 
takes  over.  One  punter  felt  'everything  break  lose'  when  she  won  the  lotto,  while  another 
related:  'I  thought  I'd  gone  mad;  I'd  completely  flipped...  I  don't  think  I've  ever  come  close  to 
another  experience  that  produced  as  much  adrenaline...  it  was  a  near  death  experience'. 
Utyeshitelny,  in  Gogol's  Jhe  Gwnblers  described  a  sensation  of  similar  intensity,  saying-  'The 
loss  of  money  is  not  so  important  as  losing  one's  peace  of  mind.  The  mere  agitation 
experienced  during  play,  people  may  say  what  they  like,  but  it  obviously  shortens  one's  life' 
(Gogo11926,  p228). 
It  is  during  this  stage  that  physiological  changes  such  as  increased  respiration,  heart  rate, 
blood  pressure  and  adrenaline  have  been  found  to  occur  in  gamblers,  changes  which  provide 
the  strongest  evidence  for  the  notion  of  gambling  as  a  physiological  addiction.  Bergson  has 209 
identified  the  correspondence  between  the  experience  of  intense  emotion  and  that  of  physical 
sensation  (Bergson  1910,  p20-36)11  a  correspondence  frequently  found  in  gamblers'  reports  of 
sensations  like  flushes,  palpitations,  tremours  and  light-headedness.  Having  staked  -  and  ýk  on  - 
at  roulette,  Dostoevsky's  Alesky  experienced  a  degree  of  excitement  so  intense  as  to  be  a 
visceral  sensation-  'I  was  a  gambler;  I  felt  it  at  that  very  moment.  I  was  trembling  ftom  head 
to  foot,  my  head  was  throbbing'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p203).  Similar  physical  upheaval 
accompanýied  the  thri.  11  of  play  for  Disraeli's  Young  Duke-  'His  hands  and  feet  were  like  ice,  his 
brow  like  fire;  his  ears  rang  with  supernatural  roaring  and  a  nausea  had  seized  upon  him'  (in 
Steinmetz  1870,  p77).  Similarly,  when  Lucien  wins  at  roulette  in  Lost  Illusions,  'he  felt  as  if 
he  had  live  coals  inside  him'  (Balzac.  1976,  p43  1).  In  the  1949  film  of  Dostoevsky's  1he 
Gambler  (significantly  re-titled  Me  Great  Sinner!  ),  the  thrfll  of  play  is  given  an  explicitly 
physical  dimension  when  the  Alesky  character  narrates:  'At  last  I  was  beginning  to  feel  this 
passion.  It  was  almost  sensual.  I  would  see  a  number  -  eight  -I  desired  it,  I  placed  my  bet...  it 
had  to  come  to  me'.  When  it  does,  he  plays  on,  reeling  'I  was  numb,  blind,  dizzy'.  Finally, 
Dostoevsky  gives  perhaps  the  definitive  account  of  the  vertigo  of  play  in  AJesky's  penultimate 
bet  at  the  roulette  tables.  He  stakes  everything,  flinging  his  money  down  at  random;  then  there 
is  'one  moment  of  waiting  in  which  my  impressions  were  perhaps  similar  to  those  experienced 
by  Madame  Blanchard  when  she  plunged  to  the  ground  from  a  balloon  in  Pans'  (Dostoevsky 
1992,  p241). 
His  choice  of  the  plunging  analogy  is  revealing,  for  it  is  one  used  by  Caillois  to  describe  the 
sensation  of  vertigo.  Children's  spinning  games  and  whirling  dervishes,  he  writes,  create  states 
of  ecstasy,  disorientation  and  hypnosis  (much  like  those  of  the  ecstatics  and  diviners  we  saw  in 
Chapter  Two),  as  do  physical  activities  like  rapid  accelerations  and  'falling  or  being  projected 
into  space'  (Caidlois  1962,  p24).  Alesky's  feeling  of  hurtling  through  space  is  the  sensation  of 
such  vertiginous  disorientation;  a  mental  sensation  transposed  into  a  physical  one  and  caused 
not  by  physical  exertion  but  by  the  sheer  intensity  of  play.  This  sensation  can  be  regarded  as 
an  aspect  of  the  oneiric  states  we  saw  earlier.  The  loss  of  the  subject  which  is  inherent  in  such 
states  is  felt  as  a  peculiar  kind  of  disorientation  in  which  the  individual  falls  into  the  abyss 
which  has  opened  up  where  the  presence  of  the  subject  used  to  be.  Ey's  description  of  this 21() 
destructuration  of  consciousness  is  stnkingly  redolent  of  Dostoeý  sky's  fictionallsed  plunging 
He  writes  of  the  individuals'  'intoxicating  urge  to...  cease  being  someone,  to  keep  learung  until 
he  falls  outside  himself  and  likens  this  pathological  experience  to  a  more  routine  one, 
experienced  by  us  all,  the  moment  of  waking  when  'we  no  longer  know  who  or  where  we  are, 
and  for  an  instant  stand  aghast  before  this  gaping  abyss  of  nothingness'  (Ey  1978,  p66,67)  In 
such  moments  of  intense  physical  and  perceptual  disorientation,  the  gambler's  link  with  reality 
is  tenuous,  and  loosens  still  further  as  he  surrenders  himself  to  the  immediacy  of  the  present. 
For  Boyd,  he  is  'lost  in  a  world  of  his  own...  There  is  no  longer  an  outside  reality...  Even  time 
is  non-existent,  and  in  a  certain  sense  he  is  insane'  (Boyd  1976,  p372).  Alesky  certainly 
wonders  if  he  has  gone  mad,  so  intense  does  his  play  become.  'Had  I  taken  leave  of  my  senses 
at  that  time,  and  was  I  not  sitting  somewhere  in  a  madhouse  and  perhaps  that  is  where  I  am 
now...  '  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p225).  The  narrator  of  The  Mahabharata  observed  a  similar  effect 
on  gamblers  'drunk  with  playing  dice'  who  'prattle[d]  like  madmen  of  things  they  had  not  seen 
asleep  or  awake'  (1he  Mahabaharata  1975,  p136).  In  a  few  moments  of  play,  Alesky 
experiences  the  gamut  of  gambling  experience,  plunging  through  a  dream-like  state  of 
unreality,  physical  vertigo  and  the  perceptual  disorientation  of  time  and  space.  As  if  in  a  dream 
he  stakes  all  his  money.  'I  moved  the  whole  pile  of  money  onto  red  -  and  then  I  suddenly 
came  to  my  senses!  ...  an  icy  fear  crept  over  me,  making  my  hands  and  legs  tremble.  With 
horror  I  felt  and  momentarily  realised  what  it  would  be  like  to  lose  now!  My  whole  life  was  at 
stake!  '  Then,  when  he  wins,  in  a  state  of  euphoria,  he  feels  'fiery  goosepimples  breaking  out 
all  over  my  body'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p24  1). 
As  well  as  his  ffactured  senses,  his  perceptions  and  his  emotions,  the  very  core  of  the  gambler 
-  his  ego  -  is  sucked  into  the  whirlpool  of  play.  An  aspect  of  the  experience  of  'dissociated 
states'  is  the  'state  of  altered  identity'  in  which  the  gambler,  in  his  trance,  undergoes  a  shift  in 
persona  (Jacobs  1988,  p29).  In  this  sense,  gamblers  often  talk  of  becoming  someone  else 
when  they  play;  an  experience  inherent  in  the  nature  of  play  for,  as  Caiflois  has  pointed  out,  all 
games  consist  in  becoming  an  illusory  character.  'the  subject  makes  believe...  that  he  is 
someone  other  than  himself.  He  forgets,  disguises  or  temporarily  sheds  his  personality  in  order 
to  feign  another'  (Caillois  1962,  p19).  Rosenthal  found  such  an  alteration  of  identity  common 211 
amongst  pathological  gamblers,  many  of  whom  went  so  far  as  to  cafl  each  of  their  play  'sel%  es' 
by  a  different  name!  (Rosenthal  1986,  p  109). 
This  protean  gambling  identity  can  be  better  understood  Nvhen  we  situate  the  conception  of 
self  in  its  field  of  consciousness,  which  is  constructed  and  held  in  more  or  less  fixed  relations 
by  the  perceptual  parameters  of  time,  space  and  causation.  The  destructuration  of  these  ,  Ital 
orientations,,  which  we  shall  see  occur  in  the  course  of  the  gambling  event,  results  in  a  similar 
destructuration  of  the  parameters  of  selfbood;  the  organisation  of  the  ego.  Elv,,  descnbes  how, 
in  certain  pathological  states,  individuals  can  experience  peculiar  forms  of  self  perceptim  in 
which  they  'can  be  aware  of  themselves  only  in  the  mirrors  of  a  casino  or  of  a  fun  house  in 
which  only  the  fantasies  of  the  game  are  reflected.  Here,  'the  fluid  authenticity  of  their  selves 
arises  recklessly  in  their  non  self-conscious  being.  The  self,  then,  appears  Without  definite 
outlives  or  character'  (Ey  1978,  p218).  Thisfluid  authenticity'  is  typical  of  the  gambler  and  is 
cinematically  portrayed  in  Fritz  Lang's  eponymous  film  of  Dr  Alabuse,  Ihe  Gambler.  Mabuse 
is  portrayed  as  an  individual  With  no  fixed  character,  appearing  in  every  scene  in  disguise.  Just 
as  the  gambler  of  the  eighteenth  century  was  perceived  as  an  individual  of  'no  distinct 
physiognomy',  Mabuse's  constant  changes  reveal  his  chameleon-like  personality,  his  refusal  of 
any  fixed  characteristics. 
The  fluid  identities  of  the  gambler  in  play  are  ones  in  which  his  everyday  self  is  left  behind  and 
he  becomes  an  extraordinary  individual,  full  of  potential  and  self-assurance.  When  winning, 
this  confidence  is  vindicated  as  his  ego  becomes  buoyed  up  by  waves  of  transcendence.  In  the 
'conscious  mood'  which  Martinez  calls  fantasy,  the  gambler  finds  himself  imbued  with  a  special 
kind  of  power.  'It  is  literally  dream  power.  In  the  mind  of  the  deeply  involved  subject,  control 
over  destiny  becomes  possible  through  fantasy.  I  am  what  I  imagine  I  am  in  the  self-edifice 
that  emerges'  (Martinez  1983,  p357).  In  this  fantasy  the  mind  dreams  'luscious  dreams'  not 
usually  generated  by  everyday  routine  in  which  'a  surreal  fantasy  configuration  of  mind,  self 
and  society  is  created  which  renders  high  self  esteem  to  the  self  (Martinez  1983,  p357).  Such 
high  self  esteem  was  manifest  in  the  absolute  conviction  of  Alesky  that  he  would  win  -  had  to 
win  -  at  roulette:  'at  times  the  wildest  of  ideas,  the  most  impossible  looking  idea  becomes  so 212 
entrenched  in  one's  mind  that  in  the  end  one  assumes  that  it  is  feasible...  Moreover,  if  the  idea 
coincides  with  a  strong,  fervent  desire,  then  perhaps  one  may  accept  it  as  something  tated, 
inevitable,  pre-destined,  as  something  that  simply  must  be,  and  must  happen!  '  Such  absolute 
certainty  derives  from  an  enhanced  sense  of  the  self,  from  'some  kind  of  exceptional  strength 
of  will,  a  self-intoxication  by  one's  own  fantasy...  '  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p239).  It  is  this 
unshakeable  faith  that  removes  the  gambler  from  subjection  to  the  iron  laws  of  probabllltý, 
Alesky  considered  his  chances  of  winning  'not  as  a  chance  e,,,  ent  ýNhich  could  be  numbered 
among  others  (and  which  consequently  might  also  not  happen)  but  as  something  that  was 
absolutely  certain  to  happen'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p240).  In  such  a  state  of  grace,  the  gambler 
can  do  no  wrong;  like  Simmel's  sleepwalking  adventurer,  he  is  possessed  of  a  blind  certainty 
When  the  anticipated  outcome  occurs,  the  gambler  feels  completely  vindicated.  In  his  own 
private  world,  he  is  master  of  his  fate  for  his  ego  has  expanded  to  such  an  extent  that  anything 
is  possible.  Triumphant,  he  feels  like  a  great  hero.  Both  Dostoevsky  and  Richardson  express 
the  aftermath  of  such  a  vAn  in  remarkably  similar  terms.  On  win-rung  6000  flonns,  Dostoevsky 
wrote  'I  already  looked  like  a  conqueror.  I  was  afraid  of  absolutely  nothing'  (Dostoevsky 
1992,  p241).  For  Richardson,  the  walk  to  the  cashier's  booth  after  winrung  $500  xkas  'a 
conqueror's  road  in  which  I  could  stroll.  at  leisure'  (Richardson  1980,  p56).  Walking  home 
with  his  winnings,  Dostoevsky  writes  'my  mind  was  blank,  I  felt  only  some  sort  of  frightful 
delight  -  success,  victory,  power'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p244).  Richardson  left  the  casino  in  'an 
orgy  of  exultation',  a  'hallowed  and  overwhelmed  frame  of  mind'  (Richardson  1980,  p60). 
When  Balzac's  protagonist,  Raphael,  in  Me  Wild  Ass's  Skin  wins  a  game  of  cards,  the 
primary  sensation  is  one  of  relief.  great  waves  of  tension  are  released  and  he  feels  as  though 
he  has  been  granted  salvation:  'My  muscles  had  been  tensed  in  agony;  now  they  relaxed  in  joy. 
I  felt  like  a  condemned  man  who  meets  a  royal  procession  on  the  way  to  the  scaffold'  (Balzac 
1977,  p95).  The  enhancement  of  the  gambler's  ego  is  such  that  he  feels  a  supreme  sense  of 
control;  he  is  invincible,  ebullient,  superhuman.  Although  losing  filled  him  with  the  'blackest 
feefings',  Richardson  was  virtually  transcendent  when  he  won:  'I  felt  as  if  a  constellation  of 
my  image  should  appear  in  the  morning  sky'  (Richardson  1980,  p2l).  Steinmetz  relates  an 
incident  in  which  a  young  gambler  won  so  enormously  as  to  transcend  his  self,  'he  thought  he 11 
was  no  longer  an  ordinary  mortal',  and  required  his  valets  'to  do  him  extraordinary  honours, 
flinging  handfuls  of  gold  to  them'  (Steinmetz  1870,  p58). 
Having  left  the  confines  of  his  normal  personality  behind,  the  gambler  enters  a  state  of 
transcendence  in  which  his  ego  expands  to  fiU  the  cosmos,  or  at  least  the  casino.  This  is  what 
Balzac  describes  as  the  'delicious  sensation  which  comes  to  all  gamblers  once  their  temble 
excitement  is  over'  (Balzac  1976,  p43  1).  With  transcendence  comes  a  seme  of  order  and  weU- 
being;  a  realisation  of  the  self  He  is  sure  of  himself  and  of  his  place  in  the  scheme  of  thinvs, 
and  is  fulfi-Hed,  'centred'  and  serene.  Richardson  was  aware  of  being  'very  much  in  the  present' 
in  this  state,  telling  himself  in  an  inner  dialogue:  'You  are  more  in  the  world  at  this  moment 
than  you  have  ever  been  before'  (Richardson  1980,  p94).  Martinez  describes,  somewhat 
incoherently,  a  moment  of  great  intensity  'when  the  gambler  experiences  most  of  his  identity 
where  the  real  self  is  closest  at  hand'  (Martinez  1983,  p359).  More  lucid  for  having  lived  it, 
Richardson  relates:  'I  felt  I  had  truly  acquired  a  presence  that  drew  the  world  to  it,  and  the 
disjunctions  of  thought  and  surroundings,  of  my  past  and  location,  began  to  fade'  (Richardson 
1980,  p235).  In  the  sensation  of  immediacy,  the  world  coalesces  into  an  order  in  which  the 
gambler  is  at  the  centre.  He  has  being  in  the  world',  he  becomes  whole.  Richardson  was 
'certain  that  I  was  a  very  substantial  occupant  of  my  particular  time  and  space',  for  'weight, 
colour,  fever,  extension  and  aU  the  other  properties  about  which  the  imagination  builds  a 
persona,  were  self-evidently  mine'  (Richardson  1980,  p95). 
For  Dostoevsky,  such  feelings  of  transcendence  resulted  in  self-actualisation,  after  a  bout  of 
gambfing,  his  creative  energies  were  catharticafty  released  and  he  concentrated  ftilly  on  his 
work.  His  wife  wrote  that:  'after  these  exciting  emotions,  after  satisfýring  his  craving  for  risk, 
his  passion  for  gambling,  Fidor  would  return  home  calmed,  and...  then...  he  would  sit  down 
with  renewed  strength  to  his  novel,  and  in  a  couple  of  weeks  would  make  good  his  losses' 
(Mme  Dostoevsky,  in  Koteliansky,  ed  1926,  p  13  5). 
The  state  of  transcendence  is  thus  one  of  supreme  order  for  the  gambler.  He  is  calm  elevated, 
buoyant,  his  existence  is  confirmed. 214 
Boredom 
Just  beyond  the  'kind  of  pain'  of  play  hovers  another  kind  of  pain  -  boredom.  The  thrill  is 
short-lived,  for  a  sensation  of  such  intensity  can  only  be  sustained  for  a  few,  fleeting  moments, 
like  a  flame  which  bums  brightest  before  it  is  extinguished  altogether.  In  the  ne,  I  I  6tab  e  let- 
down  that  follows,  reality  appears  dull  and  colourless;  the  gambler  is  deflated,  for  the 
converse  of  the  vertigo  experienced  during  gambling  is  the  torpor  felt  when  not  at  play,  the 
existence  of  one  reinforcing  the  sensation  of  the  other.  Thus  Shohnev,  in  Gogol's  Me 
Gamblers,  describes  how,  between  games,  a  gambler  feels  'just  like  a  general  when  there  is  11o 
war!  It's  simply  a  deadly  interval'  (Gogol  1926,  p224). 
The  gambling  arena  appears  as  a  bright  spot  shrouded  by  the  drab  greyness  of  everyday  life. 
Stepping  outside,  the  player  finds  the  real  world  unutterably  dull  in  companson  to  the  one  he 
has  just  left.  Pascal  recognised  the  threat  of  boredom  that  lingered  behind  the  excitement  in 
games  of  chance,  warning  la  man  enjoying  a  happy  home-life  has  only  to  spend...  five  or  six 
pleasant  days  gambling.  )  and  he  will  be  very  sorry  to  go  back  to  what  he  was  doing  before' 
(Pascal  1987,  p5l).  That  is  why  for  Pascal,  gambling  was  such  a  useful,  but  dangerous, 
diversion  from  boredom;  useful  because  it  agitates  and  so  diverts  us,  dangerous  because  it 
exacerbates  the  tedium  of  the  initial  condition. 
Such  boredom  exists  as  a  perennial  problem  of  modernity;  a  state  that  'hovers  over  every 
secure  life  like  a  bird  of  prey'  (Schopenhauer  1970,  p53).  For  de  Jong,  the  problem  has  Its 
roots  in  the  nineteenth  century  when  the  breakdown  of  a  sense  of  metaphysical  order  gave 
birth  to  the  distinctive  feature  of  the  modem  age  -  the  syndrome  of  intensity.  The  desire  to 
experience  intense  sensation  -  of  which  gambling  is  typical  -  replaced  the  pursuit  of  meaningful 
activity  and  had  as  its  converse  the  existence  of  apathy  and  boredom  (de  Jong  1975). 
Benjamin  was  amongst  the  first  writers  to  realise  the  true  horror  of  this  contemporary  malaise, 
declaring  after  Strindberg.  'HeH  is  not  something  which  fies  ahead  of  us,  -  but  ihis  life,  here' 
(Benjamin  1985,  p50).  By  seculansing  it  and  changing  its  temporal  location  from  the 215 
remoteness  of  the  afterlife  to  the  immediacy  of  the  present,  Benjamin  brought  heli  to  earih  and 
announced  boredom  as  a  fundamental  condition  of  modemity. 
Boredom  is  charactensed  by  the  agony  of  slowness,  and  its  stasis  contrasts  with  the  speed  of 
modernity.  Since  today,  technology  means  that  'the  present  demand  Is  for  a  quick  torward 
movement,  for  a  summary,  for  life  at  the  speed  of  intensest  thought'  (Bello",  1975,  p  198)1-  the 
embodiment  of  boredom  by  slowness  is  all  the  more  acute. 
As  the  chief  poet  of  modernity,  Baudelaire  understood  very  well  the  existence  of  boredom  as 
hell  on  earth: 
'Nothing  is  slower  than  the  limping  days 
when  under  the  heavy  weather  of  the  years 
Boredom,  the  fi-uit  of  glum  indifference 
gains  the  dimension  of  eternity' 
(Baudelaire  1982,  p75) 
He  recognised  too,  the  desire  to  banish  its  aching  emptiness  in  its  polar  opposite  -  excitement, 
and  in  particular,  the  excitement  of  gambling.  His  gamblers  are  essentially  degraded 
characters,  and  desperate  to  feel  wiything  rather  than  nothing.  What  he  calls  these  'ancient 
whores'  with  their  'fipless  faces',  and  'toothless  jaws,  are  possessed  of  a  'stubborn  passion',  a 
'deadly  gaieW* 
'Horrible  that  I  should  envy  those 
who  rush  so  recklessly  into  the  pit, 
each  in  his  frenzy  ravenous  to  prefer 
pain  to  death  and  heU  to  nothingness!  ' 
(Baudelaire  1982,  pl.  01) 216 
Pushkin's  portrayal  of  P.  ugeite  Olleghi  also  draws  on  the  assoclatlon  bet",  een  P-ambline  and 
boredom.  Eugene  is  a  'superfluous  man'  who  has  no  place  in  the  rush  of  modem  tife  and 
despite  all  his  travels  and  distractions  finds  himself  supremely  bored. 
4nothing  caused  his  heart  to  stir 
and  nothing  pierced  his  senses  blur' 
(Pushkin  1983,  p52) 
Like  Baudelaire's  gamblers,  Eugene  occasionally  escapes  boredom  through  play,  his  'senses 
blur'  is  pierced  by  card  games: 
4  pursuits  of  a  monstrous  breed 
begot  by  boredom  out  of  greed' 
(Pushkin  1982,  p149) 
The  continued  association  between  boredom  and  excitement  is  encapsulated  in  gambling.  Just 
as  gambling  embodies  de  Jong's  intensity  cult,  so  it  embodies  the  converse  of  intensity 
boredom.  Play  itself  embodies  'life  at  the  speed  of  intensest  thought'  in  the  thrill,  and  'the 
agony  of  slowness'  in  the  aftermath.  Seeking  release  fi7om  monotony,  the  gambler  plunges  into 
the  intensity  of  the  game,  only  to  come  face  to  face  with  the  everyday  world  and  all  its 
attendant  tedium,  when  he  re-emerges  from  play. 
Repetition 
Kierkegaard  wrote  that  'all  life  is  a  repetition'  and  used  the  story  of  a  young  POet#s  doomed 
versi  love  affair  to  illustrate  the  point  in  both  its  particular  individual  and  uru  al,  human  forms. 
As  a  category  of  modem  human  existence,  repetition  gives  form  to  life  and  is  a  means  of  self- 
actualisation:  'when  one  says  that  fife  is  a  repetition,  actuality,  which  has  been,  now  comes 
into  existence'.  Without  it  'all  fife  dissolves  into  an  empty,  meaningless  noise'  (Kierkep-awd 
1983,  p149).  As  Ferguson  puts  it,  the  very  possibility  of  existence  'depends  on  a  continuall,, 2L 
renewed  "leap"  from  moment  to  moment'  so  that  'the  "self'  is  thus  a  continuous  and 
inexplicable  "repetition"  of  itself  (Ferguson  1995  p103).  In  this  way  the  act  of  repetiti  i  ion 
gives  both  form  and  content  to  life  by  continually  re-creating  the  future  from  what  has  gone 
before.  It  thus  gives  the  new  'absolute  significance  in  relation  to  what  has  gone  before,  is 
qualitatively  different  from  it'  (Kierkegaard  1983,  p307). 
Just  as  Kierkegaard  used  a  specific  event  to  illustrate  the  various  aspects  of  repetition,  so  the 
specific  phenomenon  of  gambling  can  be  regarded  as  an  instance  of  social  life  in  which  both 
the  particular  and  the  universal  nature  of  repetition  can  be  discerned.  In  this  section  we  will 
look  at  the  nature  of  repetition  insofar  as  it  relates  to  the  form  of  specific  games  of  chance, 
while  in  the  next  chapter,  its  broader  application  as  a  feature  of  the  human  condition  will  be 
exan-ýned- 
For  Gadarnar,  repetition  is  the  essence  of  play:  'The  movement  which  is  play  has  no  goal 
which  brings  it  to  an  end;  rather  it  renews  itself  in  constant  repetition'  (Gadamar  1975,  p93). 
This  fon-nal  structure  is  more  important  than  the  individual  who  is  involved  in  it-  'The 
movement  backwards  and  forwards  is  obviously  so  central  for  the  definition  of  a  game  that  it 
is  not  important  who  or  what  performs  this  movement...  it  is  irrelevant  whether  or  not  there  is 
a  subject  who  plays'  (Gadamar  1975,  p93).  This  structure  in  fact  takes  oi,  er  the  individual,  is 
greater  than  him,  and  makes  him  act  in  accordance  with  its  strictures.  Gadamar  writes-  'The 
structure  of  play  absorbs  the  player  into  itself,  and  thus  takes  from  him  the  burden  of  the 
initiative,  which  constitutes  the  actual  strain  of  existence.  This  is  seen  in  the  spontaneous 
tendency  to  repetition  that  emerges  in  the  player  and  in  the  constant  self-renewal  of  play' 
(Gadamar  1975,  p94). 
This  'constant  self-renewal'  is  a  necessary  feature  of  play,  for  its  fleeting  nature  requires 
constant  repetition.  The  gambler  plays  in  order  to  experience  the  breathless  moment  of 
expectation  that  constitutes  the  thrill,  but  because  it  is  over  almost  as  quickly  as  4  occurs,  it 
must  be  continually  repeated  to  maintain  the  sensation  of  play  as  an  experience  ",  th  some 
element  of  duration.  As  an  intrinsic  feature  of  a  game,  then,  repetition  'holds  good  not  only  of 21H 
play  as  a  whole  but  also  of  its  inner  structure',  making,  Huizinga  tells  us  'the  elements  of 
repetition  and  alternation...  like  the  warp  and  woof  of  a  fabnic'  (HulZinga  1949,  p  10.  See  also 
Caillois  1962,  p5).  The  phenomenological  sites  reverberate  to  the  drum  of  this  steady 
repetition.  In  the  casino  bets  are  made,  cards  shuffled,  dealt  and  collected  over  and  over  again, 
dice  are  shaken  and  rolled  ad  infinitum,  like  Nietzsche's  'Iron  hands  of  necessity'  shaking  -the 
dice  box  of  chance  for  an  infinite  length  of  time'  (Nietzsche  1982,  p8  1).  Roulette  wheels  spin 
for  eternity  on  unchanging,  regular  axes,  whfle  baHs  tumble  out  of  the  lottery  drum  week  after 
week  and  month  after  month  in  a  ritual  which,  like  all  those  of  the  phenomenological  sites,  is 
unflinching  in  its  exact  repetition  of  what  went  before. 
Baudriflard  sees  in  this  tendency  to  repeat  a  movement  which  annihilates  the  relation  between 
cause  and  effect  by  an  eternal  return  that  proceeds  directly  from  fate.  Like  the  authors 
considered  so  far,  he  too  regards  their  capacity  to  repeat  as  a  definitive  characteristic  of  games 
of  chance:  'Their  true  form  is  cyclical  or  recurrent.  And  as  such  they...  put  a  definite  stop  to 
causality...  by  the  potential  return  (the  eternal  return  if  one  will)  to  an  orderly  conventional 
situation'  (Baudrillard  1990,  p146).  This  eternal  return,  for  Baudrillard,  is  an  important  factor 
in  the  generation  of  vertigo.  Insofar  as  'the  game's  recurrence  proceeds  directly  ftom  fate',  the 
player  experiences  'the  vertigo  of  sechiction,  the  vertigo  that  comes  of  being  absorbed  in  a 
recurrent  fate'  (Baudriflard  1990,  p148).  Walter  Benjamin  shares  with  Baudrillard  the  image 
of  gambling  as  a  phenomenon  whose  fundamental  structure  denies  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect.  However,  the  implications  of  this  denial  are  very  different  for  Benjamin,  for  while 
Baudrillard  sees  a  seductive  vertigo  as  the  mode  of  experiencing  an  a-causal  universe, 
Benjamin's  universe  is  made  up  of  the  austerity  of  hard  work  and  the  divorce  of  the  gambler 
from  the  fi-uits  of  his  production.  Such  a  distinction  can  be  seen  as  analogous  to  the  different 
responses  of  the  Protestant-bourgeois  and  the  gambler  to  chance,  which  we  saw  at  the  end  of 
Chapter  Two.  For  Benjamin,  repetition  is  the  factor  which  connects  gambling  with  the 
production  fine.  The  former  shares  with  the  latter:  'the  futility,  the  emptiness,  the  inability  to 
complete  something  which  is  inherent  in  the  activity  of  a  wage  slave  in  a  factory.  Gambling 
even  contains  the  workman's  gesture  that  is  produced  by  the  automatic  operation,  for  there 
can  be  no  game  without  the  quick  movement  of  the  hand  by  which  the  stake  is  put  down  or  a 219 
card  picked  up'.  The  lines  of  slot  machine  players,  adeptly  operating  their  machines,  i is  a 
panorama  Benjamin  could  never  have  seen,  and  yet  it  is  the  visual  apotheosis  of  his 
companson.  He  goes  on-  'The  jolt  in  the  movement  of  a  machine  is  like  the  so-called  coup  in  a 
game  of  chance.  The  manipulation  of  the  worker  at  the  machine  has  no  connection  with  the 
preceding  operation  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is  its  exact  repetition.  Smce  each  operation  at 
the  machine  is  just  as  screened  off  from  the  preceding  operation  as  a  coup  in  a  game  of 
chance  is  from  the  one  that  preceded  it,  the  drudgery  of  the  labourer  is,  in  its  own  wav,  a 
counterpart  to  the  drudgery  of  the  gambler.  The  work  of  both  is  equally  devoid  of  substance' 
(Benjamin  1977,  p179).  Although  he  effectively  highlights  its  repetitive,  insubstantial  nature, 
Benjamin  is  mistaken  in  equating  the  drudgery  of  work  with  the  excitement  of  play.  For  him, 
all  gambling  is  like  the  punishment  inflicted  on  Claudius:  'useless  labour...  an  illusory  hope  of 
gratifying  some  desire'  (Seneca  1986,  p232).  Benjamin's  mistake  stems  from  his  implicit 
conflation.  of  games  of  chance  with  those  based  on  skill  for,  as  we  shall  see,  if  anything  it  is  the 
calculation  and  self-restraint  involved  in  games  of  skill  that  represent  such  drudgery. 
Certainly,  both  unskilled  labour  and  games  of  chance  involve  repetition,  but  here  the  similarity 
ends,  for  games  of  chance  are  animated  by  the  affective  excitation  of  the  thrilL,  a  sensation 
entirely  lacking  from  the  dull  routine  of  factory  labour.  Thus,  the  category  of  repetition  does 
not  bring  gambling  into  the  realm  of  work,  since  such  work  as  Benjanun  outlines  and  the 
structure  of  gambling  share  only  their  repetitive  fonns.  The  subjective  response  to  each  is 
quite  different,  and,  as  Kierkegaard  has  pointed  out,  repetition  contains  the  qualities  of  self- 
realisation  and  transcendence,  making  it  amenable  to  a  response  of  seductive  vertigo  rather 
than  austere  drudgery.  This  former  option,  as  outlined  by  Kierkegaard  and  Baudriflard,  will  be 
considered  further  in  Chapter  Five. 
THE  CATEGORIES  OF  PLAY 
In  the  magic  circle,  the  articulation  of  the  gambler's  field  of  consciousness  breaks  down  so  that 
perception  of  the  fundamental  categories  of  space  -  according  to  Kant,  the  form  of  our  'outer 
experience',  time  -  the  form  of  our  'inner  experience',  cause  and  money  are  distorted.  In  the IN 
arena  of  chance,  as  though  under  the  sway  of  a  magnetic  field,  the  passage  of  time  fi-eezes  into 
repetition,  space  contracts  and  the  value  that  accrues  to  money  is  obliterated.  The  basic 
categories  of  the  gambler's  world  thus  become  enchanted,  and  assume  a  beAildenng  ne-ýk 
physiognomy,  which  constitutes  a  perceptual  Gestalt  and  ultimately  sustains  the  state  of  play- 
in-itself  The  examination  of  the  categories  of  time  and  money  will  show  how  this  state  is 
brought  about,  the  analysis  of  the  perception  of  time  Ulustrating  how  its  empty,  repetitive 
nature  is  maintained  by  the  gambler's  urge  to  continue  the  pursuit  of  play  as  an  end  in  itself, 
and  the  analysis  of  money  showing  that  the  gambler  plays  not  for  pecuniary  gain  but  again,  for 
the  sensation  of  play-in-itself 
Time 
In  the  magic  circle,  the  gambler's  perception  of  time  is  radically  distorted  in  a  manner  which 
both  affects  and  is  affected  by  his  experience  of  play. 
It  is  a  phenomenological  axiom  that  the  experience  of  time  is  a  medium  for  experience  in 
general.  Thus,  for  Straus,  changes  in  temporal  experience  'deter-mine  other  kinds  of 
experience,  thoughts,  actions  and  affects  through  their  dependency...  on  such  modifications' 
(Straus  1966,  p3).  This  insight  was  made  possible  by  Bergson's  distinction  between  two 
different  'types'  of  time  -  'homogenous  and  independent  Time'  and  ýtrue  duration,  lived  by 
consciousness'  (Bergson  1911,  p275).  The  former  absolute,  Newtonian  time  is  the  time  of  the 
physicist.  It  is  'that  homogenous  and  impersonal  duration,  the  same  for  everything  and  every 
one,  which  flows  onward,  indifferent  and  void,  extemal  to  all  that  endures.  This  imaginary, 
homogenous  time  is...  an  idol  of  language,  a  fiction...  '  (Bergson  1911,  p274).  The  lived  time, 
the  durie,  which  we  experience,  is  quite  different  however:  'In  reality  there  is  no  one  rhythm 
of  duration;  it  is  possible  to  imagine  many  different  rhythms  which,  slower  or  faster,  measure 
the  degree  of  tension  or  relaxation  of  different  kinds  of  consciousness'  (Bergson  1911,  p275). 
Thus  Bergson  opens  up  a  relativistic  notion  of  time,  the  experience  of  which  is  contingent  on 
different  states  of  consciousness. 221 
The  case-studies  of  phenomenological  psychologists  such  as  Minko,  ýk  ski  and  Straus  illustrate 
the  non-homogenous  nature  of  personal,  'lived'  time.  It  can  pass  quickly  or  slo%kly  depending 
on  the  situation,  actions  and  mood  of  the  subject.  A  'discordance'  exists  between  'the  variable 
order  of  our  historical  becoming'  and  'the  uniform  time  of  the  clock'  (Straus  1966,  P-193) 
Everyone  has  experienced  such  a  discordance-  'On  a  boring  day,  times  passes  slo"]y,  but,  in 
retrospect  the  day  appears  to  be  short.  On  an  eventful  day,  time  passes  quickly,  but  the 
distance  between  morning  and  night  appears  to  be  long'  (Straus  1966,  p293).  The  perception 
of  time  bas  an  active  and  an  affective  component;  how  we  experience  it  depends  on  what  we 
Ifill'it  with,  what  we  are  doing,  and  how  we  feel  about  it.  In  turn,  experience  itself  'receives  its 
specific  significance,  its  specific  value,  from  its  temporal  position'  (Straus  1966,  p292). 
Experience  in  general,  and  the  particular  experience  of  time  exist  in  a  dynanuc  relation,  each 
one  containing  and  effecting  the  other.  As  an  example  of  the  effect  of  temporal  position  on 
experience,  Straus  cites  imminent  death;  the  night  preceding  a  battle  or  a  condemned  man's 
last  dawn.  'With  such  transitions  from  indefiniteness  to  finality,  everything  changes  its 
physiognomy'  (Straus  1966,  p292).  He  does  not  elaborate,  but  we  know  from  Raskolkinov's 
walk  to  give  himself  up  in  Crime  and  Punishment,  that  the  subject,  seeing  the  world  for  the 
last  time,  is  fully  aware  of  its  every  detail,  avidly  drink-ing  in  the  minutiae  of  life  and  engrossed 
in  every  fleeting  second  (Dostoevsky  195  1,  p53  5-6).  Minkowski  relates  another  perception  of 
time,  this  one  relative  to  the  experience  of  life  in  the  trenches.  Cut  off  from  'the  continuity  and 
usual  routines  of  life'  his  brigade  forgot  the  date  and  day  of  the  week.  Since  such  facts  were  of 
no  relevance  to  them  anyway,  '-we  substituted  another  'calendar'  for  them,  more  appropriate  to 
the  situation:  we  simply  counted  the  days  that  had  passed  since  we  came  to  the  front  and  those 
which  separated  us  from  our  return  to  the  rest  camp'  (Minkowski  1970,  p14).  Minkowski  also 
describes  a  case  in  which  a  patient  identified  his  personal  time,  his  durie,  with  homogenous 
time,  and,  regarding  his  watch  as  the  literal  embodiment  of  the  latter,  shot  it  with  a  revolver  in 
order  to  'kill'  time!  (Minkowski  1970,  p  15).  This  gesture,  which  we  would  regard  as  symbolic, 
highlights  the  distinction  which  we  take  for  granted  between  the  two  ýypes'  of  time  separated 
by  Bergson. 222 
The  'normal'  experience  of  time,  Straus  tells  us,  occurs  In  Individuals  v*ho  are  in  a  state  of' 
becoming.  However,  when  their  temporal  perception  becomes  so  disoriented  that  'the  conte\t 
and  continuity  of  time  crumbles'  then  a  disjunction  between  the  individual  and  his  orientation 
to  the  world  is  opened  up,  and  a  'pathology  of  becoming'exists  (Straus  1966,  p293), 
Like  any  other  individual,  the  gambler's  time  is  'true  duration,  lived  by  consciousness,  and  its 
nature  is  dependent  on  what  he  doing  and  his  emotional  state  whfle  he  is  doing  it.  In  turn,  his 
experience  of  play  receives  its  specific  value  from  its  temporal  position.  The  gambler's 
perception  of  his  time  is  central  to  his  experience  of  play,  for  'time  is  the  material  into  which 
the  phantasmagoria  of  gambling  has  been  woven'  (Benjarnin  1992,  p  13  7). 
The  nature  of  time  in  the  magic  circle  of  play  is  two-fold.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  a  perception 
in  the  mind  of  the  individual  gambler,  measured  by  his  rate  of  play  and  dependent  on  factors 
such  as  the  type  of  game  he  is  playing,  the  size  of  the  stake  in  relation  to  his  total  bankroll  and 
the  crowdedness  of  the  table.  As  we  have  seen,  a  gambler  with  a  limited  bankroll,  playing  high 
stakes  at  a  deserted  roulette  table  will  have  a  shorter  experience  of  play  than  one  with  a  large 
bankroll,  playing  low  stakes  at  a  busy  blackjack  table.  Since  the  experience  of  time  is  coloured 
by  the  situation  of  the  subject,  he  will  perceive  it  moving  quickly  or  slowly  depending  on  the 
length  of  his  period  of  involvement  in  play.  Such  a  perception  of  time  is  unique  for  each 
gambler,  distinguished  ever  so  slightly  from  all  his  other  games  and  those  of  all  other 
gamblers'by  the  particular  combination  of  many  factors. 
Over  and  above  the  specific  nature  of  time  in  each  game  played  can  be  discerned  a  general 
experience  of  time-,  a  set  of  characteristics  that  come  to  fight  through  the  frequent  playing  of 
many  games.  This  perception  of  time,  common  to  all  gamblers  in  all  games,  is  of  a  constant 
repetition  of  afleeting  present. 
In  play,  the  gambler  experiences  the  mmedacy  of  the  now;  the  concentrated  t,  me  of  a 
moment  so  super-charged  with  intensity  that  self  consciousness  is  lost  in  a  surge  of  vertigo 
(de  Jong  1975,  p142).  This  is  the  moment  Benjanýn  talks  about,  in  which  'gambling  converts time  into  a  narcotic'  (Benjarnin  1992,  p54),  and  in  which  the  time  of  the  gambler  Is  closest  to 
that  of  the  adventurer,  where  the  'perspective  on  the  future  [is]  wholly  obliterated  in  the 
rapture  of  the  moment'  (Simmel  197  1  b,  p,  190) 
The  concentrated  instant  is  a  present  in  which  one  fives  and  feels  more  fully,  as  if  all  life  were 
crammed  into  one  moment.  Benjamin  quotes  a  gambler  for  whom  this  sensation  of  intensity  is  I 
paramount.  The  pleasures  of  play  'come  too  quickly  to  make  me  weary,  and  there  are  too 
many  for  me  to  get  bored.  I  live  a  hundred  lives  in  one'  (Benjamin  1992,  p  13  8). 
Straus  has  described  how  the  context  of  experience  effects  the  perception  of  time,  so  that 
when  death  is  imminent,  a  state  of  heightened  awareness  and  intensity  prevails.  The 
condemned  man  notices  every  blade  of  grass  and  every  passer-by  on  his  way  to  execution,  just 
as  Richardson  was  aware  of  every  sound  in  the  casino  when  playing.  Flitting  out  from  beneath 
the  turmoil  of  play,  he  experienced  a  sudden  clarity,  an  extraordinary  sensory  sensiwity-. 
'Now  my  senses  were  opened-  I  could  hear  every  sound  in  the  casino,  discern  every  face  that 
was  watching  the  play  at  the  table'  (Richardson  1980,  p  126-7).  As  we  saw  earlier,  Raphael  in 
Me  Wild  Asses'Skin  experienced  such  a  moment  of  intensity  in  which  he  felt  as  if  he  had  just 
escaped  certain  death.  Irm-nediately  after  this  sensation,  he  underwent  a  moment  of  clarity 
similar  to  the  one  described  by  Richardson.  Despite  the  noise  of  the  casino  -  'the  buzz  of 
voices',  'the  chink  of  coins'  and  'the  strains  of  the  orchestra'  -  Raphael  related  that-  'thanks  to 
a  privilege  accorded  to  the  passions  which  gives  them  the  power  to  annihilate  space  and  time, 
I  could  distinctly  hear  what  the  players  were  saying'  (Balzac  1977,  p95)  Dostoevsky  too, 
described  these  moments  of  lucidity  during  intense  play,  and,  as  someone  who  had 
experienced  such  moments  of  finality  during  his  mock  execution  as  a  political  prisoner,  was 
well  placed  to  relate  the  two  experiences  to  each  other.  Ms  description  of  gambling  is  imbued 
with  the  sense  of  urgency  and  intensity  he  would  have  felt  during  what  he  thought  were  his 
final  moments;  a  sensation  he  re-created  at  the  gambling  table. 
The  'Now'  the  gambler  fives  in  during  play  is  the  experience  of  the  eternal  present.  It  Is  not  the 
present  of  physics  -  'that  inaccessible  point',  but  the  present  of  expenence  -a  single  stretch  of 224 
consciousness-  'The  real  present  for  us  is  an  act,  a  state  of  a  certain  complevty  which  ýke 
grasp  in  a  single  act  of  consciousness...  There  is  a  mental  faculty  %Ahich.  one  can  call 
'presentification'  and  which  consists  in  making  present  a  state  of  nund  and  a  group  of 
phenomena'  (Janet,  in  Minkowski  1970,  p34). 
Each  round,  each  draw,  each  race  is  utterly  absorbing  and  self-sufficient.  Each  one  is 
independent  of  any  context  and  exists  as  an  island  in  time.  Immersed  in  the  isolation  of  this 
island,  the  gambler  remains  in  a  state  of  'presentification';  a  state  of  intensified  reality. 
Richardson  felt  he  'existed  in  a  sharp,  exhilarating  present  that  refreshed  itself  over  and  over 
again'  (Richardson  1980,  p86).  He  fives  entirely  in  the  present,  in  the  instantaneous  Now.  The 
past  is  of  no  interest  to  him,  for  its  outcome  has  no  bearing  on  the  future,  it  is  past-,  and  the 
future  has  not  yet  arrived.  The  field  of  his  attention  is  defined  by  the  unfolding  of  the  event  on 
which  he  has  his  stake.  However  long  the  rate  of  play,  the  resolution  of  the  risk  is  over  in  an 
instant.  It  is  the  moment  the  lottery  ball  bounces  out  of  the  drum,  the  moment  the  dice  fall,  the 
moment  the  roulette  baU  slips  into  the  pocket.  In  an  instant,  the  uncertain  becomes  known,  the 
future  becomes  the  present.  It  is  this  instant  that  the  gambler  lives  in;  this  is  the  Now  of  the 
eternal  present.  This  breathtaking  expectation  is,  for  Minkowski,  'only  a  flash,  an 
instantaneous  suspension  of  life'.  In  it,  he  writes  'I  live  instantaeity...  I  live  only  for  the  future, 
which  as  such,  tends  to  become  present'  (Minkowski  1970,  p89).  Expectation  resembles  the 
phenomenon  of  sensory  pain  (Minkowski  1970,  p88);  it  is  one  half  of  the  ambler's  'pleasure- 
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pain'equation;  and  is  a  sensation  of  temporality.  It  'englobes  the  whole  living  being,  suspends 
his  activity  and  fixes  him,  anguished,  in  expectation.  It  contains  a  factor  of  brutal  arrest  and 
renders  the  individual  breathless.  One  might  say  that  the  whole  of  becoming  concentrated 
outside  of  the  individual  swoops  down...  attempting  to  annihilate  him'  (Minkowski  1970, 
p87).  This  state  of  perennial  expectation,  in  which  the  future  is  compressed  into  the  present,  is 
an  instance  of  what  Straus  would  call  a  'pathology  of  becoming'.  Because  it  is  always 
collapsing  into  the  present,  the  experience  of  the  future  is  rendered  inaccessible,  and  because 
its  content  has  no  bearing  on  the  present,  the  past  is  irrelevant  to  the  expenence  of  the  round 
being  played.  In  the  frozen  instant,  in  which  the  gambler  fives  only  for  the  moment,  time  has 
lost  its  articulation. 225 
Because,  as  we  have  seen,  the  experience  of  the  future  is  always  more  or  less  immediate.  and 
because,  in  games  of  chance  the  past  has  no  bearing  on  the  present,  the  experience  of  the  Now 
in  gambling  is  of  an  insubstantial,  isolated  and  fleeting  moment.  Almost  as  soon  as  the 
uncertain  future  collapses  into  the  present,  then  it  passes  on  into  the  past.  Here,  the  once- 
uncertain  event  loses  its  mysterious  appeal  as  it  becomes  the  object  of  knowledge.  The 
gambler  immediately  loses  interest  and  focuses  on  the  new  present  that  quickly  takes  its  place. 
The  instant  which  the  gambler  inhabits  is  thus  a  fleeting,  transient  one. 
Baudelaire  captures  this  fleeting  moment,  which  is  the  essence  of  gambling,  and  also,  for  him, 
of  modernity,  in  Me  Clock: 
'Thirty  six  times  in  every  hour 
The  second  whispers:  Remember!  and  Now  replies 
In  its  maddening  mosquito  hum:  I  am  Past, 
who  passing  lit  and  sucked  your  life  and  left!  ' 
(Baudelaire  1982,  p82). 
The  problem  of  the  fleetingness  of  the  present  has  occupied  philosophers  since  Augustine, 
remaining  Virtually  unchanged  since  Censorinus's  expression  of  it  in  the  seventeenth  centuryý 
'the  past  is  without  entrance,  the  future  without  exit,  while  the  intermediary  present  is  so  short 
and  incomprehensible  that  it  seems  to  be  nothing  more  than  the  conjunction  of  past  and  future, 
it  is  so  unstable  that  it  is  never  the  same  and  whatever  it  runs  through  is  cut  away  from  the 
future  and  carried  over  to  the  past'  (De  die  natah,  in  Elias  1992,  p77). 
Bergson  partially  resolved  the  problem  with  his  notion  of  dur&.  This  'lived  time'  contains  the 
past,  as  memory,  within  the  future.  His  duree  involves  both  'past  and  present  melting  into  one 
another  and  forming  an  organic  whole'  (Bergson  1910,  p  128).  The  past  survives  in  the  pre-sent 
because  'Perception  is  never  a  mere  contact  of  the  mind  with  the  object  present-,  it  is 
impregnated  with  memory  -  images  which  complete  it  as  they  interpret  it'  (Bergson  1911, 226 
p170).  For  Bergson  the  present  is  not  an  isolated  instance,  but  part  of  an  org  ic  'melt, 
- 
am  ing'  of 
past,  present  and  future-  'a  perception  of  the  immediate  past  and  a  determination  of  the 
immediate  future'  (Bergson  1911,  p  177).  The  role  of  memory  is  ,I 
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instrumental  in  this  process. 
for  it  is  the  mechanism  by  which  'the  past  tends  to  reconquer,  by  actualising  itself  the 
influence  it  had  lost'  (Bergson  1911,  p  169). 
Unfortunately,  Bergson's  solution  is  completely  inapplicable  to  the  gambler.  'ýVhjlst  at  play,  the 
latter's  experience  of  time  lacks  the  historical  element  of  durýe,  for  in  games  of  chance, 
Bergson's  afl-important  past  has  no  place.  Each  act  is  an  island,  Independent  of  the  one  that 
went  before;  a  perception  of  time  made  up  of  a  succession  of  unrelated  instants  and  absolutely 
opposed  to  the  flowing  organicism  that  is  the  lived  time  of  the  Ar&  In  Bergson's 
formulation,  the  gambler  is  the  man  of  impulse:  'To  live  only  in  the  present,  to  respond  to  a 
stimulus  by  the  immediate  reaction  which  prolongs  it,  is  the  mark  of  the  lower  animals,  the 
man  who  proceeds  in  this  way  is  a  man  of  impulse'  (Bergson  1911,  p  198). 
The  past  can  never  'actualise'  itself  in  gambling,  for  it  requires  the  operation  of  memory  to  do 
so,  and  the  abolition  of  time  in  gambling  means  the  abolition  of  memory  too.  In  a  world  of 
chance,  the  past  has  as  little  relevance  for  the  future  as  the  filture  does  for  the  past.  The  only 
thing  which  can  transcend  the  timelessness  of  this  contingent  world  is  the  passage  of  time 
itself,  whereupon  the  law  of  large  numbers  can  take  effect  and  some  semblance  of  order  be 
restored.  This  uncompromising  law  of  probability  is  given  lyrical  expression  by  Baudelaire.  - 
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Remember!  Time,  that  tireless  gambler,  wins  on  every 
tum  of  the  wheel.  That  is  the  law' 
(Baudelaire  1982,  p82) 
The  gambler,  however,  caught  in  the  particular  instant,  is,  by  his  simple  corporeality,  demed 
such  a  vantaged  position.  Forever  bound  to  the  outcome  of  a  single  round,  of  a  single  moment 
of  play,  he  exists  as  an  individual  without  memory;  'a  creature  entirely  unmoved  by 
experience'  (Bergler  1970,  p3).  The  nature  of  chance  means  that  'gambling  in-validates  the , Y)  - 
standards  of  experience'  and  that  betting  works  as  'a  device  for  givim,  events  the  character  of 
a  shock,  detaching  them  from  the  context  of  experience'  (Benjamin  1992,  p  136).  Iks  a  result. 
the  gambler's  Irame  of  ryfind  is  such  that  he  cannot  make  much  use  of  experience'  (Beniarrun 
1992,  p136).  Simmel  recognises,  in  his  lack  of  memory  and  invalidation  of  experience,  the 
uniquely  modem  nature  of  the  gambler.  As  a  type  of  adventurer,  he  is  'the  extreme  example  of 
the  ahistorical  individual,  of  the  man  who  lives  in  the  present.  On  the  one  hand,  he  is  not 
determined  by  any  past  ...  nor  on  the  other  hand,  does  any  future  exist  for  him'  (Simmel 
197  1  b,  p  196). 
Experienced  in  a  timeless  void,  the  thrifl  of  gambling  is  an  essentially  iiLs-ubsfaiihal  sensation, 
and  one  which  leaves  no  traces  for  the  gambler  to  hold  on  to  and  recollect.  Thus  'the  price  the 
gambler  pays  for  his  paradisiac  condition  of  eternal  present  is  zero  recall'  (de  Jong  1975, 
p163).  Nothing  is  produced,  nothing  changes,  nothing  really  happens,  -  there  is  therefore 
nothing  to  anchor  memory  on  to  in  play.  It  is  because  of  this  feature  that  Mr  Astley  observes 
of  Alesky  by  the  end  of  1he  Gwnbler:  "'You've  become  dull...  you've  not  only  renounced 
every  aim  whatsoever  in  your  life,  you've  even  renounced  your  memories"'  (Dostoevsky  1992, 
p269).  But  then  this  is  aU  part  of  the  appeaL  part  of  the  enchantment  of  gambling.  For 
Baudriflard,  the  game's  fascination  is  this  'crystalline  passion  that  erases  memory  traces  and 
forfeits  meaning'  (Baudrillard  1990,  p  13  5). 
The  advertising  campaign  of  the  British  Lottery's  scratch  cards  utifises  the  appeal  of  this 
feature  in  a  particularly  apposite  slogan.  'Forget  it  all  for  an  instant[s]'  which  encapsulates  the 
instantaeity  of  the  gambling  experience  in  tones  of  hedonistic  abandon. 
The  repetition  of  the  ever-same  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler  corresponds  to  the  repetition  of  the 
ever-same  in  the  economic  realm  of  play.  Nothing  is  ever  produced  in  gambling,  and  in  lieu  of 
any  such  creative  activity  we  have  the  endless  circulation  of  money.  Money  changes  hands, 
but  nothing  substantial  is  ever  produced,  and  the  endless  cycle  of  this  money  in  the  economic 
sphere  is  perceived  as  an  endless  cycle  of  the  ever  same  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler.  The 
constant  repetition  of  the  ever-same  in  the  magic  circle  implies  a  cycle  of  no  real  change. 22M 
Nothing  occurs  to  distinguish  one  night  in  the  casino,  one  day  at  the  bookmakers,  from  any 
other.  Nothing  out  of  the  ordinary  disturbs  the  ebb  and  flow  of  winning  and  losing,  no 
landmarks  appear  to  signify  change  in  the  monotonous  sea  of  repetition.  IXIth  no  real  change. 
it  becomes  impossible  to  measure  the  passage  of  time,  and  so  play  goes  on,  suspended  in  a 
timeless  void.  The  narcotic  effect  of  gambling  Benjamin  talks  about  is  experienced  as  an 
escape  ftom,  time. 
This  state  of  timelessness  reaches  its  apogee  in  the  removal  of  clocks  from  the  casino.  Clocks 
exist  as  markers  of  a  shared,  objective  temporal  consensus,  imposing  order  on  the  flux  of 
human  relations  and  their  surroundings.  In  this,  they  symbollse  the  victory  of  absolute 
Newtonian  time  over  human  time.  However,  the  order  of  such  scientific  time  is  absent  from 
the  casino,  banished  since  the  nineteenth  century  as  a  distraction  from  the  world  outside.  In  a 
London  club  of  this  period,  a  couple  of  gamblers  playing  ecarle  were  asked  to  leave  after 
closing  time.  'Their  only  answer  was  to  stop  the  clock,  an  irritating  reminder  of  the  fleeting 
hours'  (Neville  1909,  p19).  With  the  removal  of  the  clock  went  the  last  vestige  of  the  outside 
world,  and  the  last  ftagment  of  memory  tying  the  gamblers  to  it.  In  the  twentieth  century,  no 
such  removals  have  to  be  made,  for  clocks  are  never  present  in  casinos.  Their  absence  signifies 
the  breakdown  of  temporal  articulation  altogether.  Unchartered  by  measurement  and  with 
nothing  to  differenfiate  it,  the  expefience  of  time  is  of  an  eternal  present,  recurring  at  vanous 
speeds,  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler.  In  giving  license  to  the  experience  of  subjective 
temporalities,  the  casino  exists  as  a  physical  embodiment  of  the  dramatic  action  of  the  patient 
who  shot  his  watch  with  a  revolver  in  order  to  kill  time. 
In  the  magic  circle,  the  gambler  has  closed  off  the  outside  world,  shed  his  personality  and 
forgotten  his  past,  thus  freezing  himself  in  a  present  which,  without  reference  to  the  past  and 
without  enjoying  real  change,  is  empty.  He  occupies  this  insubstantial  moment  of  time  as  the 
supreme  example  of  the  ahistorical  individual.  His  is  the  experience  Benjamin  was  concerned 
with  when  he  described  how  an  'unconscious  expression  of  social  forces'  was  distorting  the 
experience  of  temporality,  creating  'empty  time,  a  discrete  present  cut  adrift  from  past  and 2  29 
future'.  Genuine  expenence  was  thus  being  eroded,  replaced  ýkith  an  expenence  of  a  present, 
ca  Now  which  is  incessantly  emptying,  always  already  past'  (Spencer  1985,  p6  1). 
The  insubstantial  time  of  the  gambler  is  an  extreme  instance  of  the  empt,,,  time  of  modemiltv, 
and  is  perceived  more  as  Schopenhauer's  'succession  of  transient,  present  moments' 
(Schopenhauer  1970,  p53)  than  as  the  organic  wholeness  of  Bergson's  dur& 
Space 
in  games  of  chance,  space,  the  form  of  our  'outer  experience'  undergoes  a  destructuration 
coeval  with  that  of  time,  the  form  of  our  'inner  experience'.  Hence  Ey  wntes.  -  'The 
psychopathologies  of  lived  space  and  temporality  are  inseparable.  Nothing  is  lived  as  a  spatial 
dimension  without  being  integrated  into  the  process  which  gave  rise  to  the  temporalitly, 
configurations  in  this  space'  (Ey  1978,  p78).  For  us  then,  the  cessation  of  duration  has  its 
counterpart  in  the  contraction  of  space  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler.  Just  as  time  freezes  and 
loses  its  articulation,  so  space  shrinks  and  loses  its  articulation  in  a  destructuration  of 
consciousness  in  which  the  Now  is  conjoined  with  the  Here. 
Spatial  perception  is  a  fundamental  mode  of  existence  which,  according  to  Merleau-Ponty 
resides  at  the  core  of  the  subject's  being  and  provides  'a  communication  NIVIth  the  world  more 
ancient  than  thought'  (Merleau-Ponty  1981,  p254).  Like  time,  our  perception  of  space  is  not 
homogeneous,  for  'lived  space  is  not  the  homogeneous  space  of  the  world  of  objects'  (Ey 
1978,  p347),  and,  contrary  to  the  Cartesians  who  spoke  of  a  'natural  geometry',  spatial 
perception  must  be  graspedftom  within.  There  are  a  great  many  ways  of  experiencing  this 
kind  of  space,  which  Merleau-Ponty  conceives  as  existing  in  an  essentially  dynamic  relation 
with  the  individual:  'To  experience  a  structure  is  not  to  receive  it  into  oneself  passively-  it  is  to 
live  it,  to  take  it  up,  assume  it  and  discover  its  immanent  significance'  (Merleau-Ponty  198  1, 
p258).  Lived  space  is  not  geometrical  space  then,  but  can  be  conceived  as  a  'field  of 
consciousness',  or  to  use  Husserl's  term  an  'inner  horizon':  'that  zone  of  indeternunacy  and 
ambiguity  found  in  lived  experience'  (Ey  1978,  p9O). 2.3  ,  1) 
The  gambler's  experience  of  space  is  conditioned  by  the  parameters  of  the  present.  hi.  %  inner 
horizon  stretches  no  further  than  the  circumference  of  the  roulette  wheel.  In  the  intensity  of  a 
game,  his  perception  of  space  contracts  to  encompass  no  more  than  the  physical  dimensions  of 
the  highly  charged  area  of  play.  Such  spatial  disorientation  is  inherent  in  the  sensation  of 
intensity  itself,  the  latter  of  which  contains,  for  Bergson,  'the  image  of  a  present  contraction 
and...  of  a  compressed  space'  (Bergson  1910,  p4).  This  intense  concentration  destroys  the 
harmony  of  perspective  to  the  extent  that  the  centre  of  the  visual  field  is  magnified  and  the 
surrounding  space  of  the  periphery  obfiterated.  This  is  the  'sudden,  intense  gramation'  of 
space  in  play,  'which  implodes  in  a  flash  to  become  so  dense  that  it  escapes  the  traditional 
laws  of  physics  -  its  entire  course  spiralfing  inwards  towards  the  centre  where  the  density  is 
greatest'  (Baudrillard  1990,  p135).  All  that  is  perceived  is  that  which  contains  the  action,  and 
it  is  because  the  gambler's  gaze  is  so  fimited  in  this  way  that  the  stage  upon  which  the 
spectacle  of  gambling  is  played  out  is  so  correspondingly  small. 
What  we  can  call  this  'gambling  space'  is  not  the  typical  experience  of  space,  for  the  former  is 
predicated  on  the  unique  conditions  of  play  and  the  gambler's  experience  of  time,  and  is  thus 
subject  to  what  can  be  described  as  a  'pathology  of  being'.  The  nature  of  such  a  pathology 
becomes  clearer  when  we  are  made  aware  by  Merleau-Ponty  that  the  contours  of  the  inner 
horizon  are  defined  by  the  situation  of  the  body  in  time,  and  its  dynamic  movement  in  space. 
He  writes  that  'if  the  world  is  aton-ýised  or  dislocated,  this  is  because  one's  own  body  has 
ceased  to  be  a  knowing  body  and  has  ceased  to  draw  together  all  objects  in  its  one  grip;  and 
this  debasement  of  the  body  into  an  organism  must  itself  be  attributed  to  the  collapse  of  time, 
which  no  longer  rises  towards  a  future  but  falls  back  on  itself  (Merleau-Ponty  198  1,  p282-3). 
Ey  describes  the  same  thing,  in  more  metaphorical  language,  writing  'the  representation  which 
plays  upon  the  scene...  can  borrow  its  space  only  ftom  the  kaleidoscope  of  a  succession  which 
has  been  cinematised  in  time'  (Ey  1978,  p  104). 
Just  as  time  needs  the  unfolding  of  events  to  mark  its  passage,  space  requires  points  of 
orientation  to  delimit  its  parameters,  for  an  empty  space  is  also  a  formless  space.  However, I 
with  everything  external  to  the  action  obliterated,  the  gambler  Is  oblivious  to  the  passage  of 
IM  time,  to  his  surroundings  and  even  to  hi  self  Absorbed  to  such  an  extent  in  the  (-Yame,  he  is 
subject  to  a  degree  of  indissociation  with  his  surroundings,  a  phenomenon  which  is  apparent 
in  one  individual's  description  of  the  experience  of  the  play-world  in  general-  'You  are  so 
involved  in  what  you  are  doing,  you  aren't  thinking  of  yourself  as  separate  from  the  Immediate 
activity...  you  don't  see  yourself  as  separate  from  what  you  are  doing'  (in  Csikszent-trnihaki 
1975,  p46).  The  gambler  has  no  sense,  as  in  the  normal  structure  of  consciousness,  of  the 
presence  of  other  bodies  in  space,  or  of  the  physical  dimensions  of  his  own  corporeality.  In 
fact,  he  is  stimulated  by  an  antithetical  sensation  -  the  urge  to  'cease  being  someone" 
altogether  (Ey  1978,  p66).  The  disorientation  endemic  to  play  which  we  saw  described  as  the 
experience  of  'plunging'  is  a  manifestation  of  the  loss  of  perspective  and  of  self  awareness, 
which  are  characteristic  of  the  destructured  consciousness.  Involved  in  play  to  the  extent  that 
the  distinction  between  the  game  and  himself  breaks  down,  the  gambler  loses  his  'centre  point', 
his  spatial  co-ordinates  and  is  swept  along  With  the  game,  whirling  inside  the  roulette  Nvheel 
and  tumbling  along  with  the  dice.  This  was  the  experience  of  Alesky  when,  engrossed  in  the 
game,  he  lost  track  of  his  non-nal  perceptual  co-ordinates  and,  rootless  in  space  and  time, 
found  himself  in  a  'whirlwind  which  caught  me  in  its  vortex...  spinning,  spinning,  spinning... 
(Dostoevsky  1992,  p225,6). 
Since  spatial  perception  is  a  primary  mode  of  existence  and  guarantees  the  secuntY  of  the 
body  in  space,  when  it  breaks  down  or  becomes  destructured,  disorder  reigns  and  the 
sensation  of  plunging,  so  common  to  gambling,  is  experienced.  Merleau-Ponty  describes  how 
the  instability  of  perception  'produces  not  only  the  intellectual  experience  of  disorder,  but  the 
vital  experience  of  giddiness,  and  nausea,  which  is  the  awareness  of  our  contingency  and  the 
horror  with  which  it  Us  us'  (Merleau-Ponty  1981,  p254).  With  no  physical  reference  points, 
the  gambler's  space  is  devoid  of  everything  except  action  which  is  played  in  a  timeless, 
perspective-less  void,  for  perspective  is  created  in  relation  to  things  and  'when  the  world  of 
clear  and  articulate  objects  is  abolished,  our  perceptual  being,  cut  off  from  its  world,  evolves  a 
spatiality  without  things'  (Merleau-Ponty  1981,  p283).  The  gambler's  'cinema'  then,  is  a  blank 
screen  which  no-one  is  watching! 232 
The  primacy  of  movemeni  in  the  field  of  spatial  orientation  has  been  emphasised  by  many 
phenomenologist  s,  but  is  given  perhaps  its  simplest  expression  by  EV  when  he  states  that 
space  is  in  movement...  is  nothing  but  movement'  (Ey  1978,  p104).  Physical  motility  is  a 
means  of  orientating  oneself  and  establishing  a  direct  spatial  relation  with  the  world,  and  as 
such  'is  on  the  same  footing  as  perception'  (Merleau-Ponty  1981,  pI  11).  However,  one  of  the 
most  striking  features  of  gamblers  in  action  is  their  indifference  to  their  surroundings  and  to 
their  own  physical  comfort;  an  indifference  manifest  in  immobility.  Most  will  not  tolerate 
interruption  and  ignore,  with  single  minded  concentration,  the  distractions  of  the  world  around 
them.  At  one  time,  legend  has  it,  Las  Vegas  almost  became  the  scene  of  a  disaster  when 
players,  oblivious  to  fire  alarms,  had  to  be  forcibly  removed  ftom  a  burning  downtown  casino  I 
Slots  players  are  frequently  so  stationary  for  long  periods  that  when  they  eventually  move  they 
suffer  excruciating  cramps  and  dizziness.  Adding  to  this  picture  of  immobility  is  one  black-jack 
player  whom  I  have  seen  have  a  drink  spilled  accidentally  and  violently  on  his  leg.  His  eyes 
did  not  leave  the  table,  nor  did  he  move  or  in  any  way  acknowledge  the  rrushap,  continuing  to 
play  on  until  the  end  of  the  round  whereupon  he  got  up  and  absently  dried  himself  off 
We  can  see  from  all  this  that  gamblers'  space  is  not  a  dynamic  one  conditioned  by  movement, 
but  is  rather  characterised.  by  a  breakdown  of  such  movement  (witness  the  gambler  who  was 
persistently  'frozen  to  the  table');  by  stasis.  This  is  a  part  of  the  breakdown  of  the  articulation 
of  space  in  which  space  shrinks  into  a  single  point  and  loses  its  extensity. 
Such  a  breakdown  of  lived  space  is,  for  Merleau-Porty,  fundamental  in  the  breakdown  of 
sanity,  and  the  character  of  the  breakdown  he  describes  is  exactly  that  of  the  gambler's 
destructuration:  'What  protects  the  sane  person  against  delirium  or  hallucination  is  not  his 
critical  faculty,  it  is  the  structure  of  his  space...  Like  myth,  hallucination  is  brought  about  by 
the  shrinking  of  fived  space'  (Merleau-Ponty  1981,  p291).  We  have  already  seen  that  the 
gambler  becomes  temporarily  insane  in  the  intensity  of  play,  an  intensity  of  the  order  of  what 
Ey  calls  the  'defirious  event'.  The  author  then  goes  on  to  give  us  a  wonderfully  eloquent 
description  of  the  breakdown  of  the  articulation  of  space  in  such  an  event,  a  breakdown  of 233 
which  the  gambler's  shrinking  of  space  is  a  part.  The  delirious  event,  he  explains.  'tinfolds  as  a 
flow  of  the  fantastic  which  thwarts  the  logic  of  space...  Indefinite  spatial  divisions  re&aCt  and 
reflect  an  infinite  multiplicity  of  mirrors,  of  ricochets  and  of  echoes.  In  this  telescoping  of  sizes 
and  perspectives,  all  its  symbolic  metaphors,  allegories  and  images  advance,  Withdraw,  merge 
together,  fade,  weave,  hide,  rise  or  fall  in  the  unreality  of  their  unprecedented  modality'  (Ey 
1978,  p68).  The  perception  of  space  is  related  to  other  modes  of  experience,  and  in  particular 
the  pathological  shrinkage  of  space  effects  the  perception  of  causation.  This  is  apparent  in  the 
gambling  arena  when,  in  the  frenzy  of  the  moment,  the  usual  relations  between  cause  and 
effect  become  disjointed  in  the  gambler's  mind.  The  particular  form  of  this  disjunction  A  ill  be 
considered  in  the  next  section;  for  now  it  is  sufficient  to  entertain  it,  after  Merleau-Ponty,  as  a 
possible  mode  of  perception.  'The  shrinkage  of  lived  space...  leaves  no  room  for  chance.  Like 
space,  causality,  before  being  a  relation  between  objects,  is  based  on  my  relation  to  things. 
The  'short  circuits'  of  delirious  causality,  no  less  than  the  long  causal  chains  of  methodical 
thought,  express  ways  of  existing...  '  (Merleau-Ponty  198  1,  p286).  The  gambler  does  not 
move  and  does  not  avert  his  gaze  from  the  immediate  spectacle  of  the  action  in  front  of  him, 
with  the  result  that  the  surrounding  space  loses  its  extensity  and  its  articulation.  Insofar  as  he 
is  a  part  of  such  space,  the  gambler  too  loses  his  extensity,  becoming  absorbed  in  that  upon 
which  he  gazes,  until  he  'ceases  being  someone'  and  has  no  presence  at  all. 
In  this  sense,  the  gambler's  destructuration  of  space  can  be  c"ed  a  'pathology  of  being'. 
Money 
Although  Benjanun  thought  that  'it  is  obvious  that  the  gambler  is  out  tovAn'  (Benjamin  1992, 
p  136),  gamblers  do  not  in  fact  play  to  win.  2  Nor,  as  psychoanalytic  theory  would  have  it,  do 
they  play  out  of  a  masochistic  desire  to  lose.  The  intentions  of  the  gambler  are  not  to  be  found 
between  these  two  extremes,,  for  he  is  altogether  indifferent  to  the  possibility  of  winning  or 
Cheating  is  an  exception.  This  is  the  pursuit  of  pure  profit,  a  form  of  worik  which  attempts  to  impose  a 
rational  order  on  chance.  Its  calculative  attitude  removes  it  from  the  sphere  of  play,  and  so  cheating  can  be 
disregarded  as  gambling  proper.  Caillois  (1962)  discounted  it  as  a  'perversion'  of  the  spint  of  chance,  as  did 
Baudrillard  (1990),  for  A,  hom  it  was  a  'refusal  of  the  vertigo  of  seduction'. 24 
losing  per  se.  The  aim  of  the  gambler  is  simply  to  experience  the  thnll  of  play  itself  and  so  his 
main  goal  is  thus  the  indefinite  continuation  of  play.  As  Spanier  expresses  it  '%kin  or  lose, 
everyone  feels  the  thrill'  (Spanier  1992,  p  13). 
Because  nothing  tangible  is  ever  produced  in  play,  the  desire  to  experience  the  thrill  is 
manifest  in  an  endless  round  of  consumption,  whose  object  is  the  continued  experience  of  the 
instant  of  play.  This  unequivocal  purpose,  although  straightforward  in  itself,  lends  complexity 
and  ambiguity  to  the  role  of  money  in  the  magic  circle  of  play.  The  perception  of  money  in  the 
mind  of  the  gambler  is  distorted;  its  value  and  use  radically  altered  as  though  viewed  throuP  a  gh 
prism.  In  the  course  of  play,  money  is  devalued,  its  usual  deification  in  the  capitalist  economy 
debased  as  it  becomes  subservient  to  the  higher  goal  of  the  experience  of  the  thrill  in  ever- 
repeated  play.  ' 
Despite  its  devaluation,  the  presence  of  money  in  play  is  important.  Having  overtaken  the  gold 
and  land  of  the  feudal  nobility  around  the  seventeenth  century,  the  money  of  the  capitalist 
bourgeoisie  became  the  measure  of  value  in  the  modem  west.  Correspondingly,  it  became  the 
medium  through  which  the  gambler  registered  his  involvement  in  a  game.  In  modem 
gambfing,  money  is  both  a  means  of  communication  and  a  tangible  symbol  of  the  player's 
presence.  The  ritual  of  risk,  penalty  and  reward  is  couched  in  the  language  of  money  so  that  in 
games  like  poker  it  eloquently  expresses  'every  subtle  nuance  of  meaning'  (Alvarez  199  1, 
p174).  In  this  sense,  its  presence  is  vital  for  the  unfolding  of  a  game,  for  it  is  the  universal 
equivalent,  the  dynamo  of  play.  Money  is  necessary  for  the  generation  of  the  affective  tension 
-  the  thrill  -  in  games  of  chance,  for  at  stake  in  a  game  is  not  simply  the  financial  value  of  the 
gambler's  wager,  but  what  it  represents  -  his  opinion,  his  judgement,  his  very  ego.  In  this  way 
'the  stake  is  a  summons,  the  game  a  dual-  chance  is  summoned  to  respond,  obliged  by  the 
playees  wager  to  declare  itself  either  favourable  or  hostile'  (Baudrillard  1990,  p  143).  With  the 
3A  possible  exception  to  this  rule  is  the  instance  of  the  lottery,  "-here  players  often  buy  tickets  in  the  hope  of 
winning  a  fortune.  However,  despite  their  overt  intention,  and  given  the  astrononucal  odds  against  them  and 
the  uses  to  which  their  ticket  money  could  be  put,  it  could  be  argued  that  for  these  gamblers  too,  mone-,  is 
deValued.  Supporting  such  a  claim  is  the  existence  of  lottery  "'Inners  who  continue  to  play  after  %4-inmng 
enormous  jackpots!  Thus  in  America  we  have  the  improbable  existence  of  micc-ovcr  multi-million  dollar 
winners,  while  in  Britain  the  most  common  use  of  a  110  prize  is  reinvestment  in  more  tickets. "3  *ý 
placement  of  his  bet,  the  gambler  becomes  vicariously  involved  in  the  game  the  fate  of  his 
wager  becomes  a  test  of  character  and  a  player  who  manages  to  control  himself  and  shrue  off 
his  losses  in  the  face  of  adversity  demonstrates  strength  of  will  or  what  Goffman  calls,  Tace' 
(Goffman  1969a). 
The  gambler  experiences  his  vicarious  involvement  in  play  via  his  wager  -  without  it.  there  is 
no  tension,  no  thrifl.  A  casino  owner  explains:  'Gambling  is  a  manufactured  thrill  -  Nou 
intensify  the  anticipation  of  the  event  by  putting  money  on  it...  once  you  insert  your  money  the 
outcome  becomes  very  important  to  you'  (Jack  Binion,  in  Alvarez  199  1,  p  12  1  ).  Without  the 
involvement  of  money,  the  gambler  would  have  no  presence,  no  representative  in  play.  Any 
game  can  be  played  with  a  measure  other  than  money,  but  the  thrill  will  not  be  experienced. 
Playing  poker  for  matchsticks  is  perceived  as  child's  play  because  without  the  existence  of  an 
authentic  measure  of  value,  the  gambler  cannot  enter  wholeheartedly  into  the  game.  As  a 
measure  of  the  degree  to  which  he  is  prepared  to  back  his  opinion,  the  wager  is  a  measure  of 
the  gambler's  integrity,  and  so  must  be  represented  by  something  worthy  of  him  -  hence 
Richardson  regarded  his  chips  as  the  embodiment  of  himself,  his  'tokens  of  specialness' 
(Richardson  1980,  p12  I).  To  have  himself  embodied  in  something  as  worthless  as  matchsticks 
would  be  demeaning  to  the  gambler,  for  it  would  be  to  render  himself  equally  as  worthless,  an 
object  of  ridicule.  Insofar  as  money  exists  as  a  measure  of  self  esteem  then,  winning  it 
validates  the  gambler's  self  worth.  It  is  in  this  sense  that  Rosenthal  writes  'the  more  money 
one  has,  the  more  substance  to  oneself,  the  more  one  is'  (Rosenthal  1986,  p  112).  Without  a 
subjectively  valuable  stake,  the  game  will  be  substantially  less  meaningful.  A  veteran  poker 
player  explains  the  necessity  of  money  thus:  'If  there's  no  risk  in  losing,  there's  no  high  in 
winning'  (in  Alvarez  199  1,  p  123). 
The  role  of  money  in  gambling  however,  is  ambiguous.  On  the  one  hand,  it  can  be  seen  to  be 
vital',  both  as  the  language  of  play  and  as  a  constituent  of  the  thrill.  On  the  other,  it  is  not  a 
sufficient  reason  for  play  itself  and,  paradoxically,  once  in  a  game,  it  becomes  instantly 
devalued.  Such  a  contradiction  led  Baudrillard  to  state  thac  'The  secret  of  gambling  is  that ',  I(, 
money  does  not  exist  as  value'  (Baudrillard  1987,  p86).  What  then  d(h,.  s  it  exist  as"  To  ans%Aer 
this,  we  must  look  at  the  effect  of  money  on  the  gambler  at  play, 
Dostoevsky  was  adamant  that.  'The  main  thing  is  the  play  itself  I  swear  that  greed  for  moneN- 
has  nothing  to  do  with  it'  (Dostoevsky  1867,  in  Mayne  1914,  p  119),  while  Richardson  gi-V  es  a 
more  considered  account  of  his  relation  to  money,  writing  that  gambling  had  invested  it  Aith 
'the  quality  of  a  medium  necessary  to  the  conditions  of  fife.  It  was  not  that  I  wanted  to  do 
anything  with  it,  any  more  than  I  wanted  to  do  something  with  oxygen  or  sunlight.  it  was 
simply  that  cash  had  become  the  element  I  needed  for  my  personal  evolution'  (Richardson 
1980,  p75). 
It  would  appear  then  that  gamblers  do  not  play  to  win  but  play  with  instead  offor  money,  In 
fact,  whcn  they  continue  to  win  in  games  that  offer  little  real  challenge,  they  become  quickly 
bored.  Jack  Richardson  went  through  such  a  period  of  playing  poker  solely  for  gain.  The 
result?  -  'I  grew  tired  of  winning  every  day...  The  game  had  become  nothing  but  empty 
labour'  (Richardson  1980,  p201).  Without  the  element  of  chance,  the  risk  of  losing  all,  the 
game  lost  its  thrill  and  became  mere  monotonous  work.  This  effect  is  evident  in  the  behaviour 
of  top  poker  players  who,  after  winning  large  sums  of  money  through  concentrated  effort  and 
rational  play  at  games  of  skill,  go  out  and  destroy  it  betting  on  things  they  have  no  control 
over'  (Myers,  in  Alvarez  199  1,  p3  7).  4 
Pascal  was  well  aware  of  the  ambiguity  of  money  in  games  of  chance,  realising  that  it  was  not 
only  the  money  or  only  the  play  itself  that  made  gambling  such  an  effective  antidote  against 
boredom.  In  the  Pensees  he  imagines  a  hypothetical  life  in  which  boredom  lurks  at  every 
comer.  'A  given  man  fives  a  life  free  from  boredom  by  gambling  a  small  sum  every  day.  Give 
him  every  morning  the  money  he  might  win  that  day,  but  on  condition  that  he  does  not  gamble 
and  you  will  make  him  unhappy.  It  might  be  argued  that  what  he  wants  is  the  entertairu-nent  of 
'  Such  actions  contradict  Benjamin's  assertion  that  games  of  chance  emst  as  the  counterpart  to  the  drudgerý  of 
the  machine  labourer.  If  anything,  as  we  have  already  stated,  it  is  the  calculation  and  self-restraint  invoh-ed  in 
games  of  skill  that  represent  such  drudgery. 4_  / 
gaming  and  not  the  wrinings.  Make  him  play  then  for  nothing,  his  interest  'AIII  not  be  fired  and 
he  will  become  bored,  so  it  is  not  just  entertainment  he  wants  either'  (Pascal  1987,  p70). 
Money  must  be  present  in  games  of  chance,  but  it  cannot  be  important.  In  fact,  contrary  to  its 
apprehension  in  the  outside  world  as  a  desirable  medium  of  value,  in  play,  money  is 
apprehended  as  a  thing  that  is  virtually  worthless  in  its  own  fight.  As  such,  it  is  devalued  in  the 
mind  of  the  gambler.  In  order  to  play  without  reserve,  the  gambler  must  be  unconcerned  with 
money  for  its  own  sake.  As  he  plays,  a  gulf  opens  up  in  his  mind  between  the  value  of  money 
in  the  world  outside  and  its  value  (or  lack  of)  in  play.  As  this  gap  vAdens,  and  the  'real'  value 
of  money  recedes  ever  further  from  the  game,  the  gambler  plays  with  increasing  insouciance. 
Chip  Reese  explains  the  mechanism  of  this  devaluation-  'Money  means  nothing.  If  you  really 
cared  about  it  you  wouldn't  be  able  to  sit  down  at  a  poker  table  and  bluff  of  $50,000.  If  I 
thought  about  what  that  could  buy  me  I  wouldn't  be  a  good  player.  Money  is  just  the  yardstick 
by  which  you  measure  your  success.  You  treat  chips  like  play  money  and  don't  think  about  it 
'til  it's  over'  (in  Alvarez  199  1,  p42). 
This  devaluation  is  one  of  the  'tricks'  gambling  plays  on  value,  and  it  is  in  this,  according  to 
Baudrillard,  that  its  truth  is  to  be  found.  Gambling  is  'immoral'  because  'it  bears  no  relation  to 
the  reality  of  money...  in  the  heat  of  the  moment,  the  idea  of  winning  or  losing  is  relatively 
unimportant  compared  to  the  seductive  sequence  of  events'  (Baudn'llard  1987,  p86-7).  This  is 
the  crucial  relation  for  'In  gambling,  money  is  seduced...  [it  is]  no  longer  a  sign  or 
representation  once  transformed  into  a  stake.  And  a  stake  is  not  something  one  invests...  '  but 
as  we  have  seen,  something  which  is  presented  as  a  challenge  to  chance  (Baudnilard  1990, 
p139).  Removed  from  the  realm  of  material  necessity,  money  becomes  a  part  of  the  means  of 
play;  a  plaything  devoid  of  econon-fic  value.  Its  seduction  is  even  embodied  in  the  language  of 
gambling  where  stakes,  wins  and  losses  are  always  euphemistically  couched  in  the  neutral 
adjectives  of  volume  and  weight  as  'heavy',  'large'  or  'small',  thus  avoiding  the  harsh 
imperatives  of  economic  reality,  of  financial  profit  and  loss. 2 
Such  devaluation  is  instrumental  in  creating  the  sense  of  unreality  that  is  a  feature  of  the 
general  thrill  of  play,  and  the  use  of  chips  in  the  casino  is  the  apotheosis  of  this  devaluation 
Money  is  changed  into  chips  at  the  beginning  of  play,  and  chips  back  into  money  at  the  end  In 
the  interim  the  chip  is  the  unit  of  value.  A  piece  of  plastic,  with  no  exchange  value  outside  the 
casino,  in  the  casino  it  is  nevertheless  the  medium  of  play,  the  currency  of  chance.  Money  -  the 
ultimate  measure  of  value  in  the  world  outside  -  is  dethroned  in  the  gambling  exchange.  It  is 
worthless,  its  magical  effects  on  the  everyday  world  are  redundant  here  and,  its  role  thus 
inverted,  it  must  be  transformed  into  chips  for  play  to  commence.  The  act  of  changing  money 
into  chips  changes  the  way  the  gambler  thinks  about  the  latter  for  the  duration  of  play.  As  if 
by  magic,  the  arena  of  play  transforms  the  sober,  prosaic  and  familiar  character  of  money  into 
something  fun,  fantastic  and  strange.  Alvarez  describes  this  magical  transformation  of  money 
in  the  casino-  'The  chip  is  like  a  conjurer's  sleight  of  hand  that  turns...  a  necessity  of  life  into  a 
plaything,  reality  into  illusion.  Players  who  fireeze  up  at  the  sight  of  a  $50  bill,  thinking  it 
could  buy  them  a  week's  food  at  the  supermarket,  Will  toss  two  green  chips  into  the  pot 
without  even  hesitating  if  the  odds  are  right'  (Alvarez  1991,  p44-5).  The  \.,  alue  of  the  real 
world,  measured  in  drab  green  and  brown  paper  becomes  a  toy  of  the  play  world  measured  in 
shiny  bright  plastic.  Looking  at  the  chips  on  the  table  in  fi7ont  of  him  Richardson  'felt  for  a 
moment  that  they  were  radiant  things.  Gold,  green,  orange,  they  encased,  like  pearls  in  amber, 
rusty  undulations  of  colour  beneath  their  surface,  gay  fusions  of  light  and  shadow  that  made 
one's  thoughts  reckless  and  playful'  (Richardson  1980,  p254).  The  manufacture  of  these 
magical  discs  from  plastic  is  a  particularly  suitable  combination,  for  plastic  itself  is  'the  stuff  of 
alchemy'  (Barthes  1973,  p97).  In  his  essay  on  its  metaphysical  properties,  Barthes  wrote  that 
plastic  is  a'miraculous  substance'  which,  like  the  chip  as  a  temporary  representative  of  value, 
has  no  real  character  of  its  own.  It  is  a  uniquely  modem  substance  for  it  has  no  ong  ns  and  s 
thus,  according  to  Barthes  auniversal  equivalent'just  as  the  chip  is  the  universal  equivalent  of 
value  in  the  casino. 
The  less  'real'  the  chip  seems,  the  less  real  the  world  it  operates  in  appears  to  the  gambler.  As 
one  player  explains:  'The  better  adjusted  to  them  you  are,  the  further  reafity  recedes'  so  that 
eventuafly  playing  with  them  I  is  no  longer  a  business  transaction,  it  is  magic'  (in  Alvarez  1919  1, 239 
p45).  At  the  same  time,  the  outside  world  seems  immeasurably  distant,  t1or  as  the  perception 
of  the  value  of  money  recedes,  so  the  world  that  money  is  efficacious  in  recedes  from  the 
gambler's  nund. 
The  gambler's  orientation  to  the  chip  as  a  measure  of  value  is  to  a  plaything,  something  that  is 
not  quite  real.  As  a  result  he  loses  track  of  the  value  of  the  flow  of  coloured  discs  streaming 
through  his  hands.  When  money  is  turned  into  plastic  it  is  no  longer  perceived  as  an 
efficacious  part  of  the  real  world  but  an  inconsequential  counter  in  a  play  world,  and  so  he  lets 
go  of  his  usual  pecuniary  reserve  and  abandons  himself  to  the  flow  of  play.  fie  plays 
extravagantly,  no  longer  regarding  money  as  a  practical  tool  of  his  everyday  life,  but  as  just 
another  piece  of  the  paraphernalia  of  play.  Its  use  is  directed,  not  by  an  awareness  of  needs 
which  may  arise  in  the  future,  but  by  the  imperatives  of  the  next  round  of  play. 
In  the  moment  of  staking,  the  economic  value  of  money  is  far  outweighed  by  the  excitement  it 
creates  in  play.  Here  the  gambler  is  like  Simmel's  spendthrift,  for  whom  'the  attraction  of  the 
instant  overshadows  the  rational  evaluation  of  either  money  or  commodities'  (Simmel  197  1  a, 
p182).  For  Simmel  the  immoderation  of  the  miser  and  the  spendthrift  stems  from  the  same 
source,  the  same  'daemonic  formula'  whereby  every  pleasure  attained  increased  the  desire  for 
more  in  a  spiral  that  can  never  be  satisfied.  Such  a  formal  identity  suggests  a  'capricious 
interplay'  between  the  two  tendencies,  which  explains  why  'miserliness  and  prodigality  are 
often  found  in  the  same  person,  sometimes  in  different  areas  of  interest  and  sometimes  in 
connection  with  different  moods'  (Simmel  1971a,  p186).  This  is  a  tendency  found  in 
gambling,  where  the  invertion  of  its  value  lends  a  dual  nature  to  money  in  the  mind  of  the 
player-  a  'capricious  interplay'  of  miserliness  and  prodigality.  Gamblers  frequently  refuse  to 
'waste'  money  on  necessities,  instead  hoarding  every  penny  to  save  enough  for  enormous  bets 
on  games  of  chance.  This  orientation  was  recognised  by  Richardson,  who  wrote  of  himself  A 
began  taking  a  strange  attitude  toward  money.  Though  I  would  carelessly  toss  it  away  in  a 
game  of  poker,  I  began  to  keep  meticulous  records  of  where  each  bit  of  daily  expense  went' 
(Richardson  1980,  p2  1).  Balzac  also  noficed  this  tendency,  describing  the  'strange  indifference 
to  luxury'  in  people  who  came  to  the  casino  to  'perish  in  their  quest  of  the  fortune  that  can 241, 
buy 
* 
luxury'  (B 
i 
alzac  1977,  p23).  Such  a  blend  of  parsimony  and  extravagance  is 
institutionalised  in  Las  Vegas,  where  casinos  absorb  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  dollars 
saved  for  high  stakes  play  by  gamblers  fiving  in  budget  hotels  and  eating  ordy  the  cheapest 
food. 
In  games  of  chance  money  loses  its  intrinsic  value  and  becomes  instead  a  measure  of  play.  In 
the  capitalist  economy,  the  accumulation  of  money  is  pursued  as  an  end  in  Itself,  but  in  the 
gambling  economy,  money  is  only  desired  insofar  as  it  allows  continued  play.  it  is  a  means  to 
an  end  -  ever  repeated  play.  'Money  is  no  longer  money  to  the  professionals-I  it  is  like  a 
wrench  to  a  plumber  -a  tool  of  the  trade'  (Alvarez  1991,  p44).  Caillois  relates  an  incident  in 
which  a  group  of  children  robbed  local  stores  for  money  to  play  slot  machines.  They  stole 
$1000,  but  were  only  interested  in  dimes  and  nickels,  which  could  be  used  in  the  machines. 
Bills  were  used  merely  for  wrapping  the  coins  and  were  later  thrown  away  as  refuse.  (Caillois 
1962,  p183).  The  value  of  money  was  irrelevant  to  this  group,  and  the  coins  that  were 
retained  were  kept  purely  for  theirfunctiotial  use. 
The  aim  of  most  gamblers  is  not  to  win  per  se  but  to  win  enough  to  enable  the  indefinite 
continuation  of  play.  Ostensibly,  they  play  to  win,  but  only  because  winning  facilitates  further 
play  and  not  as  an  end  in  itself.  The  repetition  of  play  is  evidence  of  this  goal  for  even  when 
winning  vast  amounts,  gamblers  play  on,  swept  along  by  the  sensation  of  intensity.  As  we 
have  seen,  repetition  is  an  intrinsic  element  of  both  the  form  and  the  content  of  play,  and  one 
that  prevails  whether  the  outcome  of  a  round  is  loss  or  gain.  A  common  sight  in  slot  machine 
arcades  and  the  casinos  of  Las  Vegas  is  slot  machine  players  emptying  their  winnings  from  a 
previous  round  back  into  the  machine,  thrusting  handfuls  of  coins  in  as  fast  as  they  pour  out, 
in  the  pursuit  of  further  play.  Even  million  dollar  lottery  winners  play  on,  one  remarking 
wistfully:  'it'd  be  nice  to  get  one  more  win'.  Money  is  only  a  means  of  staying  in  the  game. 
According  to  top  poker  player  Doyle  Brunson  'In  order  to  play  high  stakes  poker  you  need  to 
have  a  total  disregard  for  money.  It's  just  an  instrument  and  the  only  time  you  notice  it  is  when 
you  run  out'  (in  Alvarez  1991,  p43).  A  gambler  explains-  'The  whole  point  of  money  is  to 241 
allow  you  to  remain  in  the  action.  Once  you  have  no  money,  it's  axiomatic  You're  out  of  the 
action'  (in  Martinez  1983,  p361). 
0 
As  a  measure  of  play,  money  is  also  a  measure  of  time,  for  the  two  exist  in  an  intimate 
relation.  As  seen  earlier,  low  intensity  play  (le  long  games  with  low  stakes)  makes  the 
gambler's  money,  and  therefore  his  playing  time,  last  longer.  Leaving  aside  the  -6clssitudes  of 
luck,  a  player  can  gamble  longer  at  a  table  which  costs  $1  a  game  than  at  one  which  demands 
$500.  This  is  strikingly  evident  in  slot  machines,  where  minimums  range  from  25  cents  to 
$100.  Nothing  interrupts  the  gaze  of  the  enraptured  player  until,  forced  to  look  down,  he  sees 
there  are  no  coins  left  in  his  basin,  and  play  is  over.  Here,  money  measures  time-  the  more  he 
has,  the  longer  the  gambler  plays.  This  relation  is  strikingly  evident  in  the  casinos  of  Las 
Vegas,  who  reward  time  spent  at  play  with  a  sfiding  scale  of  free  goods  and  services.  At  the 
Flamingo,  breakfast  is  free  for  the  gambler  who  has  played  a  $5  slot  machine  for  an  hour  or  a 
25  cent  machine  for  eight  hours.  He  is  presented  with  a  complimentary  hotel  room  after  four 
hours  on  the  $8  machine  or  twenty  hours  on  the  25  cent  one.  Table  awards  range  ftorn  a 
complimentary  room  for  placing  $10  bets  for  four  hours,  to  free  room,  food,  beverage  and 
health  spa  for  the  gambler  and  his  guests  for  playing  for  four  hours  at  a  table  which  takes  $500 
bets.  The  casino  draws  attention  to  its  poficy,  and  inadvertently  articulates  the  conflation  of 
time  and  money  in  play:  'Excess  playing  time  reduces  the  average  bet  requirement  and  higher 
average  bets  reduce  the  playing  time  requirement.  Consideration  for  airfare  reimbursements 
are  based  on  a  minimum  of  twelve  hours  playing  time'  (]he  Plamingo  (,  asino  Guide). 
It  can  be  seen  then  that  money  is  necessary  in  gambling  as  the  dynamo  of  play.  As  the 
currency  of  the  magic  circle,  money  itself  assumes  magical  properties,  becoming  an 
insubstantial  chimera  that  contributes  to  the  sense  of  unreality  and  the  affective  tension 
experienced  by  the  gambler  during  play.  Once  in  play  however,  it  is  immediately  devalued  in 
the  mind  of  the  gambler,  becoming  merely  a  means  of  sustaining  or  prolonging  play.  Without 
this  mental  devaluation,  the  gambler's  reckless  plunge  into  the  game  is  inhibited  by  the 
rational,  parsimonious  behaviour  money  enforces  upon  him  in  the  world  outside. 242 
Like  the  aristocratic  gambler  of  the  seventeenth  century,  or  the  Roman  %kith  his  Inglius.  the 
modem  gambler  does  not  play  to  vAn,  but  for  the  sheer  sensation  of  play  in  itself 
The  seventeenth  century  gambler  played  with  an  inner  insouciance  that  displayed  his  contempt 
for  money  and  projected  an  ostentatious  image  of  honour.  The  nonchalance  with  which  he 
handled  large  sums  of  money  -  especially  when  losing  -  demonstrated  his  contempt  for  the 
petty  pecuniary  values  of  the  bourgeoisie,  and  his  status  as  a  true  aristocrat.  Despite  the 
victory  of  the  money  relation  in  modem  western  society,  represented  in  the  figure  of  Dangeau, 
in  modem  gambfing,  money  has  no  intrinsic  value  and  is  only  required  at  all  insofar  as  it  is  a 
means  to  a  more  important  end. 
Alvarez's  description  of  the  role  of  chips  in  play  encapsulates  their  function.  not  as 
representations  of  pecuniary  value,  but  as  embodiments  of  the  gamb  er  s  honour.  Ch  ps  e:  I  ar 
'the  final,  purest  expression  of  the  [high  rollers]  attitude  to  money'.  They  are  '11k-e  rapiers  in  a 
fencing  match  -  instruments  to  attack,  parry,  counterthrust  until  one  or  the  other  of  the 
duellists  delivers  the  coup  de  grace'  (Alvarez  1991,  p74).  His  fencing  analogy  Is  particularly 
appropriate,  for  the  aristocratic  code  of  honour  was  bound  up  with  gambling  and  duelling  as 
means  by  which  the  noble  could  demonstrate  his  moral  superiority  to  bourgeois  notions  of 
value  and  legality.  It  is  in  this  light  that  Mme  Dostoevsky's  reminiscence  of  how  her  husband 
took  twenty  gold  pieces  'which  he  wanted  to  lose  in  order  to  show  that  he  did  not  go  there 
with  the  object  of  winning,  but  in  order  to  stake  big  amounts  and  to  lose'  (Mme  Dostoevsky, 
in  Koteliansky,  ed  1926,  p88)  should  be  understood. 
The  devaluation  of  money  makes  the  gambler  play  recklessly,  unconcerned  for  his  future 
needs  and  motivated  only  by  his  inunediate  desires.  This  orientation  highlights  one  of  the  most 
striking  characteristics  of  play;  its  essentially  unproductive  and  non-utilitarian  nature.  No 
wealth  or  goods  are  ever  created  in  its  endless  circulation  of  money  and  in  this  sense  'Play  is 
an  occasion  of  pure  waste,  waste  of  time,  energy,  skill  and  often  money...  '  (Caillois  1962,  p5). 
Despite  the  tone  of  residual  Puritanism  in  many  statements  about  its  unproductive  nature,  it  is 
undeniably  true  that  with  its  flamboyant  squandering  of  devalued  money,  gambling  is  such  an 24 
occasion  of  pure  waste,  or  what  Bataille  calls  'unproductive  expenditures',  actiNities  (like  the 
pollach)  which  are  pursued  for  their  own  sake  and  whose  pnnciple  is  waste  Contrar-ý'  to 
bourgeois  rationality  which  recognises  'the  fight  to  acquire,  to  conserve  and  to  consume 
rationally'  (Bataille  1985,  p  117)  exists  the  notion  of  non-productive  expenditure  -  the  wasie, 
destruction  or  conspicuous  consumption  of  wealth  in  activities  which  have  no  end  beyond 
themselves.  'A  certain  excitation'  arnmates  these  activities  which  is  'comparable  to  toxic  states' 
and  'can  be  defined  as  the  illogical  and  irresistible  impulse  to  reject  material  or  moral  goods 
that  it  would  have  been  possible  to  utilise  rationally  (in  conformity  with  the  balancing  of 
accounts)'  (Bataille  1985,  p128).  Such  'economicafly  non-utilitafian  expenditure'  describes  the 
role  of  money  in  gambling,  and  the  toxic  states  of  excitation  which  accompany  It  are  the 
economic  corollary  to  the  affective  frenzy  of  the  thrill  of  play.  This  expenditure  exists  as  the 
converse  of  creation  and  production  and  represents  the  fundamental  human  need  to  'use  up' 
wealth  (Bataille  1985,  p  12  1).  Bataille  cites  sacfifice,  poilach  and  gambling  as  examples  of  this 
broadly  non-utilitarian,  anti-bourgeois  approach  to  wealth.  The  obligation  to  expend 
accompanies  the  possession  of  wealth,  and,  he  says,  the  two  have  always  existed 
harmoniously  until  the  'fairly  recent'  ascendancy  of  the  bourgeoisie  in  econormc  life,  when 
such  obligations  broke  down  as  the  principle  of  'restrained  expenditure'  began  to  dominate. 
Now  'everything  that  was  generous,  orgiastic  and  excessive'  has  disappeared,  overtaken  by  a 
bourgeoisie  who  'having  obtained  mediocre  or  minute  fortunes,  have  managed  to  debase  and 
subdivide  ostentatious  expenditure,  of  which  nothing  remains  but  vain  efforts  tied  to  tiresome 
rancour'  (Bataille  1985,  p124). 
By  'restrained  expenditure'  Bataille  means  the  rationalist  orientation  developed  by  the 
bourgeoisie  in  the  seventeenth  century,  corning  to  power  out  of  the  humiliating  shadow  of  a 
more  powerful,  noble  class.  This  orientation  defined  the  nature  of  the  bourgeoisieý  'This 
rationalism  meant  nothing  other  than  the  strictly  economic  representation  of  the  world'  with 
the  result  that  their  hatred  of  expenditure  became  'the  raison  d'Ore  and  the  justification  for 
the  bourgeoisie'  (Bataille  1985,  p124).  Such  economic  rationality  opposed  those  passions  and 
excitations  unleashed  in  the  once-general  unproductive  expenditures.  Their  narrow  rationalltv 
made  the  existence  of  the  bourgeoisie  'a  sinister  canceflation'  of  all  that  had  gone  before,  'the 244 
shame  of  man',  Their  character  was  reflected  in  'a  sordid  face,  a  face  so  rapacious  and  lacking 
in  nobility,  so  ffighteningly  smal-I  that  all  human  life,  upon  seeing  it,  seem(ed]  degraded' 
(Bataifle  1985,  p  125). 
Bataille's  notion  of  expenditure  is  the  economic  counterpart  to  the  affectiýe  thnil  of  the 
gambling  frenzy.  It  represents  the  desire  to  'plunge',  realised  in  Primitive  and  feudal  social 
groups,  and  negated  in  the  economic  utilitarianism  of  bourgeois  society.  The  ascendance  of 
the  bourgeoisie  and  of  the  money  relation  in  the  seventeenth  century,  is  inverted  in  the  magic 
circle  of  gambling,  an  atavistic  pocket  within  modem  society  where  a  non-capitalist  disregard 
for  money  prevails.  While  in  the  gambling  arena,  the  player's  orientation  to  wealth  is 
contained  in  the  notion  of  'unproductive  expenditure'.  Without  concern  for  the  rational 
accumulation  of  wealth,  he  plays  intensely  in  the  moment.  In  not  holding  back  in  this  way,  he 
reveals  himself,  for  without  reserve  and  calculation  he  is  more  fully  human  than  ever  before. 
The  seventeenth  century  noble  demonstrated  honour  in  his  wholehearted  pursuit  of  play,  and 
in  his  disinterest  in  its  base,  pecuniary  potential.  In  the  same  vein,  the  modem  gambler 
demonstrates  character  and  reallses  his  self  in  his  pursuit  of  play  as  an  unproductive 
expenditure;  an  activity  in  itself. 
Bataille's  description  of  such  expenditure  is  a  description  of  the  gambling  economy  'if  I  am 
no  longer  concerned  about  "what  will  be"  but  about  "what  is",  what  reason  do  have  I  to  keep 
anything  in  reserve?  I  can  at  once,  in  disorder,  make  an  instantaneous  consummation  of  all 
that  I  possess.  This  useless  consummation  is  what  suits  me,  once  my  concern  for  the  morrow 
is  removed.  And  if  I  thus  consume  immoderately,  I  reveal  to  my  fellow  beings  what  I  am 
intimately:  Consummation  is  the  way  in  which  separate  beings  communicate.  Everything 
shows  through,  everything  is  open  and  everything  is  infinite  between  those  who  consume 
intensely'  (Bataille  1988,  p59). 245 
ASPECTS  OFTHE  THRILL 
Plunging  into  intensity  is  not  the  automatic  response  of  all  garnblersý  NAe  only  have  to 
remember  Dangeau  and  his  'bourgeois'  play  at  the  court  Of  Louis  XIV  to  be  aw-are  that 
different  styles  of  play  exist,  each  with  its  own  rationale  and  social  affiliation 
The  polarisation  between  'bourgeois'  and  'aristocratic,  play  which  emerged  in  the  seventeenth 
century  produced  a  form  of  gambling  based  on  a  patrician  disdain  for  money,  as  well  as  a 
'bourgeois'  mode  of  play  whose  aim  was  pecuniary  gain.  In  the  nineteenth  century  wave  of 
commercial  and  democratic  expansion,  another  style  of  play  emerged  whose  dynarruic  was 
based  neither  on  winning  nor  on  the  ostentatious  display  of  wealth,  but  simply  on 
participating  in  the  game.  As  we  have  seen  this  latter  style  of  play  is  present  in  the 
contemporary  gambler's  attitude  to  money.  A  distinctively  'aristocratic'  mode  is  also  present 
however,  for,  ironically,  by  playing  simply  for  the  pleasure  of  participation,  that  gambling  style 
that  emerged  out  of  a  wave  of  deniocratisation  appears  in  action  as  an  attitude  akin  to  the 
patrician  disdain  for  money  once  held  by  the  seventeenth  century  aristocrat. 
Dosteovsky  is  illustrative  of  the  opposition  between  what  can  be  termed  bourgeois  or 
utilitarian  play  for  financial  gain,  and  what  appeared  first  as  aristocratic  and  later,  and  with 
different  motivations,  as  'democratic'  play  for  its  own  sake,  for  although  he  was  involved  in 
the  latter  camp,  he  remained  unaware  of  the  existence  of  such  an  opposition.  At  first  he 
appears  to  demonstrate  a  remarkable  lack  of  awareness  of  the  laws  of  probability,  and  even  of 
the  rules  of  gambling  themselves,  for  he  is  convinced  that  with  prudence  and  calculation  he 
can  win  and  that  it  is  only  when  he  becomes  excited  that  he  gets  'carried  away'  and  loses.  This 
may  be  useful  advice  for  those  playing  games  of  skifl,  but  Dostoevsky  was  playing  roulene 
where  such  tactics  would  have  made  absolutely  no  impression  on  the  outcome  of  a  game.  This 
gambler's  (mis)  appfication  of  the  betting  ethos  to  games  of  chance  which  can  only  be  plc,,  jvd 
is  interesting,  less  for  what  it  tells  us  about  his  knowledge  of  probability  than  for  what  it 
reveals  about  his  notion  of  the  nature  of  play  itself.  In  the  catalogue  of  disaster  that  is  the 
content  of  his  published  letters,  Dostoevsky  explains  the  infaffibility  of  his  systemý  'I  have 24() 
observed  as  I  approached  the  gaming  table  that  if  one  plays  cooliv,  calmly  and  VVIth  calculation 
it  is  quite  impossible  to  lose!  I  swear  -  it  is  an  absolute  impossibilityl  It  is  blind  chance  pitted 
against  my  calculation,  hence  I  have  an  advantage  over  it...  If  you  gamble  in  small  doses  ever-N 
day,  it  is  impossible  not  to  win.  That  is  true,  absolutely  true  and  experience  has  proved  it  to 
me  twenty  times  over'  (Dostoevsky  1867,  in  Frank  and  Goldstein  1987,  p345,6).  Dostoevsk-v 
is  convinced  of  the  efficacy  of  his  system:  to  win  one  must  simply  remain  calm  and  rational, 
his  problem  is  that  he  quickly  loses  his  reason  when  he  plays,  instead  of  holding  back,  plunges 
into  the  game  -  and  into  disaster.  Having  won  a  small  amount  by  staking  one  or  two  gulden  at 
a  time  and  sensibly  allowing  his  profits  to  accumulate,  he  reflects  'that  was  the  moment  to 
have  stopped  and  left...  so  as  to  calm  one's  excited  nerves'.  But  he  cannot  restrain  himself  A 
lost  my  composure,  became  tense,  started  to  take  chances,  became  exasperated,  laid  rny  bets 
haphazardly  because  my  system  had  broken  down  -  and  lost  (because  anyone  who  plavs 
without  a  system,  relying  on  sheer  chance  is  a  madman)'  (Dostoevsky  1867,  in  Frank  and 
Goldstein  1987,  p246). 
Dostoevsky  aspired  to  the  success  of  Dangeau  -  'the  scientific  man,  the  average  man,  the 
economic  man'  -  and  thought  he  knew  how  he  could  achieve  it.  By  maintaining  the  bourgeois 
imperative  of  reason  in  the  face  of  disorder  and  passion,  he  believed  everything  would  fall  into 
place  and  the  world  and,  more  importantly,  the  gwne,  would  become  as  ordered  as  he  was. 
The  advice  of  Robert  Houdin  epitomises  this  bourgeois  approach  to  play:  'A  player  should 
approach  the  gaming  table  perfectly  calm  and  cool  -  just  as  a  merchant  or  tradesman  in  treaty 
about  any  affair'  (in  Steinmetz  1879,  p255). 
The  problem  for  Dostoevsky  was  that  he  could  never  play  in  this  way,  for  he  despised  such 
bourgeois  mentality',  and  was  overcome  every  time  by  his  aristocratic  disregard  for  Winrung 
and  desire  for  sensation.  Lamenting  his  losses  to  Anna  Suslova.  he  wrote:  'What  could  I 
possibly  have  done  to  deserve  this?  Is  it  my  disorderly  ways?  I  agree  I  have  let  quite  a 
disorderly  life,  but  what  is  all  this  bourgeois  morality!  '  (Dostoevsky  1865,  in  Frank  and 
Goldstein  1987,  p219).  He  sees  this  distinction  in  the  casino,  and  although  he  cites  it  as  a 
distinction  between  games,  it  is  in  fact  a  difference  between  two  types  of  play;  one  is 247 
cgentlemanly  and  the  other  plebeian,  mercenary,  the  game  for  any  sort  of'  riff  raft-  In  the 
latter,  he  abhors  'their  respect  for  the  occupation,  the  seriousness,  even  reverence  %kith  which 
they  cluster[ed]  round  the  tables'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p137).  The  true  gentleman,  he  believed, 
plays  4  simply  for  the  sake  of  the  game  itself,  only  for  amusement...  not  out  of  a  plebeian  desire 
to  win'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p  138).  Another  Russian  -  also  a  gambler,  Turgenev  -  %A-as  sensitive 
to  the  distinction  in  playing  styles;  and,  like  Dostoevsky,  reduced  it  to  the  class  of  the 
participants.  In  his  description  of  a  game  of  cards  at  Baden  Baden,  the  magnanimity  and 
aristocratic  status  of  the  players  is  evident  in  their  every  move,  and  contrasts  sharply  with 
those  of  their  bourgeois  opponents-  'Human  language  has  no  words  to  express  the  dignity 
with  which  they  dealt,  won  tricks,  led  clubs,  led  diamonds...  they  were  statesmen  indeed! 
Leaving  to  the  small  fiy,  aux  bourgeois,  the  jokes  and  proverbial  sayings  usual  at  cards,  the 
generals  uttered  only  the  strictly  necessary  words'  (Turgenev  1970,  p  129). 
Dostoevsky  could  never  stick  to  a  'system'  which  embodied  the  values  of  that  which  he  hated 
so  much.  When  Alesky  cannot  decide  which  is  more  repulsive  Russian'lack  of  discipline  or  the 
German  method  of  saving  money  by  honest  work'  (Dostoevsky  1972,  p34),  we  know  which 
side  he  is  on,  for  nothing  is  more  repugnant  to  him  than  a  nation  of  shopkeepers. 
Consequently,  he  is  almost  proud  of  the  heroic  scale  of  his  loss  of  control  for  it  vindicates  his 
'aristocratic'  nature.  This  orientation  means  that  Dostoevsky  will  always  plunge,  always  lose 
control  and  experience  the  thrill  of  gambling  instead  of  remaining  aloof,  holding  back  and 
coofly  calculating  his  gains.  He  chooses  (as  does  any  gambler  who  experiences  the  thrill)  the 
sensation  of  play-in-itself  over  pecuniary  gain,  abandon  over  restraint,  the  aristocratic  over  the 
bourgeois  ethic. 
In  this  aristocratic  plunging,  we  see  a  disregard  for  money,  an  affirmation  of  chance  and  a 
realisation  of  the  self  values  which  are  encapsulated  in  Nietzsche's  allegOncal  'd1ce  throw'.  In 
a  pMosophy  which  rejects  as  slavish  the  values  of  bourgeois  morality  and  which  upholds  the 
masterfid  ones  of  aristocratic  excess,  the  dice  are  thrown  onto  the  earth  and  fall  into  the  sky, 
'for  the  earth  is  a  table  of  the  gods...  trembling  with...  the  dice-throws  of  the  gods'  (Metzsche 
1969,  p245).  These  two  tables  are  the  two  moments  of  the  player  who,  when  plaý-ing, 24X 
temporarily  abandons  life  in  order  to  fix  his  gaze  upon  it  from  above  (Deleuze  198).  p25)  3 
The  good  player  must  be  as  anti-rational  as  Nietzsche  himself  repudiating  reason  and  logic 
and  actively  courting  chance  itself,  for  'to  play  from  formula  or  mathematical  speculatiom  is  I 
the  opposite  of  gambling  as  a  calculus  to  chance'  (Bataille  1992,  p86).  Rules  and  systerns 
must  be  abolished  and  chance  affirmed  in  one,  single,  heroic  throw.  Inspired  by  Nietzsche's 
master-slave  morafity,  Batadle  declares  'Any  activity  whose  object  is  simply  what  can  be 
wholly  measured  is  powerful  but  slavish'  (Bataille  1992,  pIll).  Thus  the  gambler  whose 
object  is  precise  pecuniary  gain  is  subject  to  the  slave  mentality,  while  he  who  plunges  into 
chance  with  abandon  is  the  master.  Since  'chance  needs  to  be  gambled  away,  fisked  in  its 
entirety...  ',  then  life  is  'a  leap,  an  impulse  whose  strength  is  chance.  At  this  stage...  if  I  lack 
chance,  I  collapse'  (Bataifle  1992,  p90  and  p  113,4).  To  know  how  to  affirm  chance  is  to  know 
how  to  play  and  will  necessarily  produce  the  winning  number.  Players  lose  because  they  do 
not  affirm  strongly  enough,  counting  on  a  great  number  of  sensible,  cautious  throws  to  win. 
'Timid,  ashamed,  awkward  like  a  tiger  whose  leap  has  failed-  this  is  how  I  have  often  seen  you 
slink  aside...  A  throw  you  made  had  Wed.  But  what  of  that,  you  dice  throwers!  You  hav-e  not 
learned  to  play  and  mock  as  a  man  ought  to  play  and  mock'  (Nietzsche  1969,  p303). 
Gambling  in  twentieth  century  Las  Vegas,  Richardson  displays  an  almost  intuitive 
understanding  of  his  role  as  a  modem  dice  thrower.  Whflst  ostensibly  aware  of  probabilities 
and  odds,  in  a  more  profound  sense  he  feels  that  real  winning,  as  opposed  to  the  vanous 
rational  calculations  which  ultimately  only  ever  amount  to  loss  minimisation,  can  only  be 
achieved  by  a  single,  brave  gamble.  In  keeping  hold  of  himself,  he  writes  'I  thought  I  was 
displaying  admirable  self  contTol  but  I  was  really  afraid  to  face  the  risk  of  a  large  gamble,  to 
submit  again  to  the  full  force  of  chance  and  feel  my  entire  being  at  stake  in  the  encounter' 
(Richardson  1980,  p153).  He  cannot  find  the  strength  to  affirm  chance  strongly  enough  A 
kept  demanding  to  win,  but  still  could  not  find  the  courage  to  make  winning  possible' 
(Richardson  1980,  p168).  Thus  he  loses,  over  a  period  of  days,  his  entire  bankroll. 
In  a  sense,  then  Nietzsche  is  right.  given  finite  funds  in  commercial  games  of  chance,  one  all- 
or-nothing  bet  at  least  contains  the  possibility  of  a  big  win.  Otherwise,  the  longer  a  gambler 249 
plays  with  small  stakes,  the  longer  the  house  edge  has  to  eat  into  his  bankroll,  gradually  taking 
its  cut  and  reducing  him  to  penury.  One  large  bet  at  least  has  the  chance  of  ýkinruniz  a  sum 
untouched  by  this  steady,  relentless  erosion. 
Those  who  have  'collapsed'  in  such  an  unheroic  bourgeois  manner  as  Richardson  are  showered 
with  contempt  by  Zarathustra:  'For  I  would  rather  have  noise  and  thunder  and  storm  curses 
than  this  cautious  uncertain  feline  response;  and  among  men  too,  I  hate  most  all  soft  walkers 
and  half-and-halfers  and  uncertain,  hesitating  passing  clouds'  (Nietzsche  1969,  p185).  Such 
hesitant  calculation  is  typical  of  the  slave  mentality  the  bourgeois  moralists'  ixhom 
Dostoevsky  despised  so  much.  They  are  fearful,  worried  and  nervous.  Like  the  tiger  Nvhose 
leap  has  failed,  'the  bourgeois  tries  to  shrink  back  and  is  still  constantly  afraid  of  something' 
(Dostoevsky  1955,  p93).  As  a  class  as  a  whole  'servility  seeps  increasingly  into  the  very 
nature  of  the  bourgeois  and  is  increasingly  taken  for  virtue'  (Dosteovsky  1955,  p88).  These 
are  'self  appointed  moralists  who  first  and  foremost  advise  the  necessity  of  self  control... 
Unable  to  trust  instinct  or  spontaneity,  they  are  always  on  the  defensive...  how  unbearable 
even  to  themselves  they  are  -  how  impoverished,  how  isolated  from  the  soul's  utter  and  lovely 
randomness...  For  indeed  we  must  lose  ourselves  for  a  time  so  as  to  learn  about  existences 
that  we  AREN'T...  '  (Nietzsche,  in  Bataille  1992,  p  145). 
Opposing  this  collapse  is  an  heroic,  aristocratic  rising  to  chance;  a  movement  which  those 
with  the  'greatest  souls',  'the  largest  souls'  partake  of  Dostoevsky,  with  his  passions  and 
generosities,  is  a  soul  of  this  kind.  In  a  letter  to  Maikov  he  writes  'I  have  a  vile  and  overly 
passionate  nature.  Everywhere  and  in  everything  I  drive  myself  to  the  ultimate  firrut,  an  my  life 
I  have  been  overstepping  the  line'  (Dostoevsky  1867,  in  Frank  and  Goldstein  1987,  p  252), 
and  in  Me  Gwnbler:  'I  am  not  mean;  I  think  I  am  even  extravagant'  (Dostoevsky  1992, 
p267).  These  souls  are  the  antithesis  of  the  calculation  that  plots  outcomes,  they  plunge 
bravely,  affirming  chance  and  redeeming  themselves  in  the  process.  These  are  the  critena  by 
which  top  poker  player  Jack  Strauss  judges  other  players.  Not  mathematical  ability  but  heart' 
-  'the  courage  to  bet  all  their  money'  -  when  the  odds  are  in  their  favour  are  the  qualities  that 
make  a  great  player  (Alvarez  199  1,  p3  1). 2  io 
Dostoevsky  speaks  like  Zarathustra  when  Raskolnikov  says  'He  who  dares  such  is  nght  and 
he  who  dares  more  than  anyone  else  is  more  fight  than  anyone'  (Dostoevsky  195  1,  p43  1).  It 
is  this  daring  that  redeems  Alesky,  for  Dostoevsky  writes  of  him  that  'deep  down  he  feels  that 
he  is  despicable  although  the  need  to  take  riskv  enables  him  in  his  own  eyes'  (DostoevskV 
1863,  in  Frank  and  Goldstein  1987,  p186).  He  is  ennobled  by  his  aristocratic  plunging,  his 
(successful)  affirmation  of  chance.  When  at  his  lowest  ebb,  Alesky  risks  his  last  60  gulden  and, 
staking  again  and  again  wins  1700  gulden  in  less  than  five  minutes.  H-is  heroic  affirmation  of 
chance  is  rewarded.  'I  had  achieved  this  at  the  risk  of  more  than  my  life,  I  had  dared  to  take 
the  fisk  and  now  I  was  once  again  among  the  ranks  of  men!  '  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p2bT  my 
italics). 
Such  ennoblement  is  only  reallsed  in  the  aristocratic  mode  of  play;  by  plunging  into  the 
intensity  of  play,  into  'disequflibfium,  intoxication,  dementia',  and  redeeming  the  self  in  the 
radical  affirmation  of  chance  (Bataille  1992,  p85).  Plunging  is  a  mark  of  greatness:  Jo  risk  is 
to  touch  life's  fimit,  go  as  far  as  you  can,  live  on  the  edge  of  gaping  nothingness!  '  (Bataille 
1992,  p86),  and  'the  essence  of  the  dramatic  hero  is  a  welling  up,  a  rising  to  [this]  chance' 
(Bataille  1992,  p110).  This  willingness  to  take  risks  is  expressed  by  Gogol's  UtyeshiteIny, 
who  declares.  'the  chief  zest  lies  in  the  risk.  Where  there  is  no  risk,  anyone  is  bra-ve,  if  the 
result  is  certain,  any  paltry  scribbler  is  bold 
... 
'  (Gogol  1926,  p236).  The  careful,  rational  play 
of  the  bourgeois  cannot  ennoble  the  player  in  such  a  fashion.  Rather,  it  makes  him  an  object  of 
contempt  -  'bleary  eyed,  bent  over,  ever  holding  back,  lacklustre,  accepting  infinities  of 
boredom,  lacking  pride  -  that  is  what  you  do  with  possibility...  you  love  possibility  in  books 
but  I  see  in  your  eyes  a  hatred  for  chance'  (Bataille  1992,  p95-6).  By  not  risking  all,  this 
gambler  wiH  never  lose  all,  but  not  will  he  ever  gain  anything  of  value.  His  greatest  reward 
will  be  a  few  pennies,  carefully  won  in  an  eternity  of  sensible,  cautious  play. 
Despite  the  victory  of  the  bourgeois  ethos,  represented  in  the  seventeenth  century  by  the 
winnings  of  Dangeau,  subsequent  generations  of  gamblers  like  Dosteovsky  and  Richardson 
have  not  played  to  win,  but  rather  for  the  continued  experience  of  plunglng,  for  the  thrill  Of 251 
play-in-itself  The  orientation  of  the  modern  gambler  can  be  seen  to  be  an  essentially  chance- 
affirming  one,  inspired  not  by  the  bourgeois  goal  of  financial  gain,  but  rather  by  eN  er-rene"  ed 
play.  Thus  the  abandonment  of  reason  embodied  in  Dostoevsky's  plunging  parodied  the 
bourgeois  style  of  play;  a  style  eternally  constrained  by  the  discipline  of  self-consciousness 
over  oblivion  and  restraint  over  excess. 
The  attitude  embodied  in  the  modem  gambler  is  a  combination  of  elements  which  have 
appeared  in  earlier  historical  manifestations.  On  the  one  hand,  we  see  traces  of  the 
extravagance  and  disregard  for  pecuniary  gain  typical  of  the  seventeenth  anistocrat.  On  the 
other,  the  desire  for  ever-continued  play  reveals  a  different  expression  of  the  same  disregard 
for  money,  this  one  originating  in  the  nineteenth  century  institutional  i  sat  ion  of  gambling  as  a 
commercial  leisure  pursuit. 
PLAY-tN-ITSELF 
The  rationale  of  the  repetition  of  play,  and  the  fundamental  aim  of  the  gambler,  is  the  ever- 
continued  pursuit  of  play.  He  attempts  to  sustain  the  fleeting  sensation  of  the  thrill  by 
repeating  his  actions,  striving  for  a  state  that  cannot  be  -  the  confitrual  sensation  of  the  thrill. 
For  Gadarner,  the  essence  of  all  play  is  that  it  is  divorced  fi7om  the  realm  of  utifitanan  ends  and 
pursued  entirely  for  its  own  sake.  Thus  'the  being  of  all  play  is  always  realisation,  sheer 
fulfilment,  energia  which  has  its  telos  within  itself  (Gadamer  1975,  p  10  1).  Win  or  lose,  play  is 
all;  it  is  an  end  in  itself  and  so  the  goal  of  the  gambler  is  simply  to  remain  in  play.  The  outcome 
of  a  game  is  not  so  important  as  the  possibility  of  its  being  brought  to  a  conclusion,  for  this 
means  that  that  particular  round  is  over.  So,  having  won  or  lost,  the  gambler  is  fi-ustrated  by 
having  brought  the  game  to  an  end  and  to  recreate  the  sensation  of  play  must  repeat  his 
actions  again  and  again.  The  repetition  of  such  activity  so  engrosses  the  gambler  that  his  very 
beiiig  becomes  absorbed  in  it;  as  Steinmetz  puts  it,  'the  gamester  lives  only  for  the  sensation 
of  gaming...  All  the  rays  of  [his]  existence  terminate  in  play;  it  is  on  this  centre  that  his  very 
existence  depends'  (Steitunetz  1909,  p49). 252 
In  trying  to  hold  on  to  the  elusive  sensation  of  play,  the  gambler  is  caught  in  the  etemad 
repetition  of  the  ever-same.  Time  freezes,  space  contracts,  and  the  player  hangs,  it  could  be 
said,  in  a  state  of  suspended  animation.  He  possesses  no  past,  and  is  unable  to  consider  the 
future  beyond  the  next  round  which  is  collapsing  into  the  present.  Caught  in  a  'patholou",  of 
becoming',  he  presents  an  image  of  an  a-historical  individual  suspended  in  a  timeless, 
unchanging  void.  Forever  pursuing  the  fleeting  sensation  of  play  -a  sensation  which  varushes 
almost  as  soon  as  it  is  reached  -  the  gambler  is  caught  in  a  state  akin  to  Schopenhauer's  state 
of  becoming  and  never  being.  For  Schopenhauer,  it  is  not  the  end  but  the  sensation  of  striong 
for  it  that  satisfies  us.  Any  pleasure  we  experience  ceases  as  soon  as  we  reach  our  goal  and  so 
pleasure  can  only  be  found  in  striving.  Hence  the  more  distant  the  goal  the  better,  for  its  verv 
distance  gives  us  the  illusion  that  its  eventual  attainment  would  satisfy  us.  He  writes  that  'we 
take  no  pleasure  in  existence  except  when  we  are  striving  after  something  in  which  case 
distance  and  difficulties  make  our  goal  look  as  if  it  would  satisfy  us  (an  illusion  which  fades 
when  we  reach  it)'  (Schopenhauer  1970,  p54). 
Thus  by  the  time  a  game  has  been  won  or  lost,  it  is  over,  the  thfill  is  dissipated  and  the 
gambler  must  begin  again  to  recreate  it.  In  this  he  repeats  a  cycle  of  continual  desire  thout 
satisfaction,  in  a  state  of  'continual  becoming  Without  being'  (Schopenhauer  1970,  p5  1).  The 
gambler  experiences  a  moment  of  'being)  in  the  state  of  euphoric  transcendence  which  is  a 
component  of  the  thrill,  but  the  sensation  is  unstable  and  fleeting,  for  he  is  chasing  a  sensation 
which  fades  as  soon  as  he  reaches  it.  Such  a  tantalising  predicament  was  understood  by  Balzac 
when  he  described  one  gambler  as  a  'modem  tantalus,  one  of  those  men  who  five  just  out  of 
reach  of  the  enjoyments  of  their  times...  a  kind  of  reasoning  madman  who  consoles  himself  by 
nursing  a  chimera...  '  (Balzac  1977,  p25).  This  state  of  perpetual  becoming  demonstrates 
Schopenhaer's  'vanity  of  existence',  and  it  also  describes  features  of  the  gambler's  existence 
It  is  revealed  in  'the  fleeting  present  as  the  sole  form  which  actually  exists-,  the  contingency 
and  relativity  of  all  things;  continually  becoming  without  being,  continual  desire  without 
satisfaction;  the  continual  ftustration  of  striving  of  which  fife  consists'  (Schopenhauer  1970, 
p5  1). 2  ;,  -, 
In  the  temporal  nature  of  desire,  which  'opens  up  the  future'.  Minkowski  sa"-  a  similar 
tendency  which,  in  its  forceful  simplicity,  gives  form  to  life  itself  In  the  thnill,  the  gambler 
feels  this  metaphysical  desire  with  the  utmost  intensity-  'if  desire  opens  up  the  future..,  at  the 
same  time  it  surpasses  the  particular  sphere  of  the  latter  in  always  going  beyond.  I  cannot 
desire  what  I  have  at  hand,  I  cannot  desire  what  I  already  have  and  as  long  as  I  live  I  desire 
more  than  I  have  -  this  is  the  true  meaning  of  fife'  (Minkowski  1970,  p96). CHAPTER  FIVE:  THE  MAGICAL-RELIGIOUS  WORI.  DN'IFNN' 
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THE  MAGICAL:  RELIGIOUS  NVORLDVIEW 
THE  REJECTION  OF  PROBABILITY 
We  have  already  seen  the  destructuration  of  the  experience  of  time,  space,  money  and,  . kithin 
the  category  of  repetition,  of  causation,  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler.  Now  we  shall  turn  to  look 
in  more  detail  at  the  nature  of  the  breakdown  of  the  relation  between  cause  and  effect,  and  at 
its  relation  to  the  experience  of  play  as  a  whole.  Strange  modes  of  thought  overtake  the 
gambler  in  the  magic  circle  of  play,  for  here  his  mental  life  is  uniquely  adapted  to  the  peculiar 
nature  of  his  environment.  Thoughts  banished  from  the  outside  world  as  superstitious  and 
irrational  are  here  given  credence  and  provide  a  framework  which  orgarnises  and  explains  the 
vagaries  of  play  and  the  gambler's  perceptual  and  sensational  disorientation.  The  magic  circle 
of  play  affects  not  only  the  way  the  gambler  experiences  his  surroundings,  the  way  he  feels 
and  the  way  he  acts;  it  affects  also  the  way  he  thinks.  The  most  obvious  feature  of  the 
gambler's  cognitive  outlook  is  his  rejection  of  that  tool  of  gambling  practice  -  probability 
theory.  Despite  the  insights  it  provides,  gamblers  continue  to  play  when  the  odds  are  against 
them,  behaving  as  though  they  could  influence  games  of  pure  chance  and  stubbornly  expecting 
to  win  in  the  n-ýdst  of  catastrophic  defeat. 
The  rejection  of  probability  has  caused  consternation  amongst  psychologists  trying  to  uncover 
some  rationale  for  gamblers'  behaviour.  The  latter's  determined  disregard  for  modem 
mathematics  flies  in  the  face  of  conventional  rationality,  with  the  result  that  gamblers  have 
been  accused  of  suffering  from  a  variety  of  'irrational  beliefs'  (Gadboury  and  Ladoceur  1989), 
including  an  'illusion  of  control'  (Langer  1975)  and  a  'biased  evaluation  of  outcomes' 
(Gilovich  1983).  From  a  functionalist  perspective,  Devereaux  has  suggested  that  the  gambler's 
superstition  exists  'to  fill  the  gaps  in  positive  knowledge...  and  hence  overcome  the  inhibiting 
anxieties  induced  by  a  feeling  of  ignorance  and  helplessness'  (Devereaux  1949)  These 255 
kpathology'  models,  which  treat  gambling  belief  as  an  individual  disorder  of'  cognition 
designed  to  'cope'  with  an  untenable  situation,  do  not  address  the  fact  that,  firstIV  most 
gamblers  are  aware  of  the  conditions  of  play  and  are  not  ridden  with  'gaps  of  knowledge',  and, 
secondly,  that  the  overriding  impression  one  gets  firom  gamblers  at  play  is  one  of  certaintv  and 
confidence.  The  determination  of  most  players  actually  stems  from  their  firm  conviction  of  the 
possibility  of  winning  -  certainly  not  from  feelings  of  ignorance  and  helplessness. 
Far  from  being  simply  and  prosaically  'irrational',  the  mental  life  of  the  gambler  appears  as  a 
concatenation  of  beliefs  encompassing  magical  notions  of  the  efficacy  of  dreams  and  omens, 
'primitive'  ideas  described  by  anthropologists  as  the  notions  of  animism  and  mana,  and  a  range 
of  broadly  religious  beliefs  about  the  existence  of  a  single  omnipotent  Deity. 
Two  broad  currents  of  belief  can  be  discerned  running  through  this  labyrinth  one  magical,  the 
other  religious.  These  are  not  strictly  separate,  but  often  merge  into  one  another,  their  spheres 
of  efficacy  overlapping  in  an  inchoate  flux  which,  typical  of  magical  belief  in  general,  forms  'a 
living  mass,  formless  and  inorganic'  whose  'vital  parts  have  neither...  fixed  position  nor... 
fixed  function'  (Mauss  1972,  p88).  Contrary  to  the  evolutionist  assumptions  of  those  who 
consider  magic  a  'primitive'  form  of  religion  (e.  g.  Taylor,  Veblen),  it  can  be  safely  asserted  that 
in  general,  and  particularly  in  gambling,  the  two  constitute  components  of  a  single  belief  To 
this  effect  Levi-Strauss  has  described  religion  as  the  anthropomorphism  of  nature  and  magic 
of  the  physiomorphism  of  man.  Thus  'there  is  no  religion  without  magic  any  more  than  there 
is  magic  without  at  least  a  trace  of  religion'  (Levi-Strauss  1989,  p22  1). 
The  magical  component  of  this  worldview  is  concerned  with  efficacý-  in  general  and  the 
efficacy  of  the  individual  gambler  in  particular.  Such  efficacy  refers  to  the  impersonal  power  of 
the  subject  which  exists  in  an  indissoluble  relation  with  its  surroundings.  The  power  of  the 
individual  participates  in  the  world,  and  is  most  obvious  in  the  notions  of  mana  and  the 
omnipotence  of  thoughts.  The  religious  aspect  of  the  gambler's  worldview  is  concerned  ýkith 
the  operation  of  power  outwith  the  subject,  who  exists  as  an  entity  separate  from  its 
surroundings.  In  this  orientation,  power  is  regarded  as  a  thing  imbued  with  moral  properties, 2 
not  merely  as  impersonal  force.  The  operation  of  such  force  is  laden  "ith  metaphN,  sical 
significance,  and  in  this  respect,  the  religious  dimension  of  gambling  belief  Is  concerried  ýkith 
being.  These  two  currents  converge  in  their  habitation  of  the  realm  of  the  sacred,  a  realm 
which,  according  to  Otto,  is  grounded  in  a  sui  generis  existential  state  which  is  impenetrable 
to  rational  analysis.  The  apprehension  of  the  sacred  or  the  holy  cannot  be  strictly  defined,  and 
certainly  not  rationafised:  aftempts  to  do  so  are  only  indicative  of  our  and  I Intel  lectuali  sing 
tendency',  the  subject  of  Luther's  rage  against  the  'whore  Reason'  (Otto  1925,  pl-3).  In 
contrast  to  the  inadequate  intellectual  understanding  of  the  sacred  stands  its  emotional 
apprehension.  Here,  nothing  is  without  meaning  and  even  the  accidental  and  the  fortuitous  are 
possessed  of  significance.  In  such  a  worldview,  real  meaning  lies  elsewhere-  'Things  and 
events  do  not  now  simply  signify  themselves  but  have  become  an  indication  of  something 
t4othee'  something  "transcendent"'  (Cassirer  1953,  p252). 
It  is  in  this  postulation  of  some  transcendent  realm  that  the  gambler  finds  a  worldview  so 
emotionally  compelling  as  to  allow  the  full  scale  rejection  of  the  procrustean  force  of 
probability  theory.  For  the  gambler,  as  for  his  historical  predecessors  engaged  in  religious 
divinatory  drama,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  chance.  The  random  event,  the  unexpected  and  the 
unusual  is  taken  as  a  sign,  and  both  groups  search  for  its  meaning  and  ultimate  significance 
outwith  the  immediately  given.  The  gamblers'  interest  in  the  gambling  event,  as  we  saýk  in 
Chapter  One,  is  In  the  unit  event,  the  next  round,  the  specific  individual  outcome  of  a  game 
and  its  relation  to  his  wager.  However,  probabdity  theory  speaks  only  of  the  general,  the  many 
and  the  long  term  and  is  'forever  mute'  as  to  what  is  most  crucial  -  what  will  happen  next. 
Because  it  tells  the  gambler  nothing  about  what  he  most  wants  to  know,  probabifity  theory  - 
the  rational  scientific  victor  in  the  struggle  to  tame  chance  -  has  a  hollow  triumph  in  the  field 
of  its  greatest  application,  and  the  individual  to  whom  it  should  be  indispensable,  disregards  it 
entirely.  As  Baudrillard  says,  in  tones  of  condescending  disbelief,  'only  our  culture  has 
invented  the  possibility  of  a  statistical  response...  [a]  dead  response'  to  chance.  This 
hypostatisation  of  chance,  is,  he  says,  quite  simply  'demented'-  'When  one  thinks  about  it,  the 
assumption  of  a  contingent  universe...,  the  idea  that  the  world  of  things  is  subjected  to  a 
molecular  and  objective  disorder...  is  insane'  (Baudrillard  1990,  p  145-6). 257 
Probability  creates  order  out  of  randomness,  but  not  for  the  gambler.  Since  it  cannot  predict 
any  single  outcome,  its  secular  insight  is  ultimately  just  as  emotionally  meaningless  as  the 
chaotic  operation  of  pure  chance.  Consequently,  the  gambler  rejects  Its  explanatory  force, 
regarding  the  gambling  event,  not  scientificaUy  as  an  unexceptional  occurrence  within  a  broad 
dispersal  of  indifferent  occurrences,  but  as  an  exceptional  individual  event  imbued  w-ith 
meaning  in  its  own  right.  The  former  outlook  is  representative  of  the  scientific  rational 
consciousness  which  has  banished  the  mystery  of  chance  with  its  iron  laws  of  probability.  The 
latter  is  representative  of  the  magical-religious  consciousness  for  which  the  piecemeal, 
singular  explanations  of  probability  theory  are  insufficient. 
In  his  monumental  work,  Religion  in  Essence  and  Manifestation,  van  der  Leeuw  describes  the 
latter  orientation  which,  as  well  as  being  religious  in  the  broadest  sense,  also  encompasses  the 
'magical  attitude'  by  virtue  of  its  definitive  characteristic  of  participation.  The  principle  of 
participation  opposes  the  rational,  scientific  approach  to  the  world.  Here  things  do  not 
encounter  each  other  'solidly  in  space',  but  have  some  share  in  one  another  and  may  mingle 
with,  and  appear  in  place  of,  each  other.  Accordingly,  man  does  not  conduct  himself 
'objectively  towards  the  world'  but  'he  participates  in  it,  just  as  it  does  in  him'  (van  der  Leeuw 
1967,  p543).  This  world  is  a  world  of  indissociation,  in  which  elements  are  not  separated. 
Rather  'a  single,  undivided  totality  is  represented  -a  totality  in  which  there  has  been  no 
'dissociation'  of  separate  factors,  particularly  of  the  factors  of  objective  perception  and 
subjective  feelings'  (Cassirer  1953,  p46).  The  consciousness  involved  in  this  worldview  is  not 
concerned  with  dissection  or  abstraction,  'but  deals  with  the  whole,  grasps  it  concretely, 
connects  together  its  essentials  and  experiences  participation'  (van  der  Leeuw  1938,  p544). 
Each  part  of  the  world  participates  in  every  other  part,  and,  most  importantly  'There  is  in  fact 
no  other  in  any  actual  sense,  just  as  there  is  no  such  thing  as  chance'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967, 
p381). 
The  lack  of  differentiation  of  the  constituent  elements  of  the  world  has  far  reaching 
implications  for  notions  of  causafity,  for  since  a  'true  indifference'  between  the  whole  and  its 25h 
parts  exists,  neither  can  be  singled  out  and  granted  causal  pnonty.  In  examining  these  notions, 
we  shall  see  how  their  foundation  in  the  consciousness  of  the  gambler  implies  his  rejection  of 
the  rational  causation  behind  probability  theory,  and  his  alternative  understanding  of  the  world 
I 
through  magical  notions  of  causation. 
Empirical  thought  (of  which  probability  theory  is  a  branch),  is  directed  towards  establishing  an 
'unequivocal  relation  between  specific  causes  and  specific  effects'  and  in  so  doing  'dissects  an 
event  into  constant  elements  and  seeks  to  understand  it  through  the  complex.,  mingling, 
interpretation  and  constant  conjunct  of  these  elements'  (Cassirer  1953,  p47).  Such  an 
orientation,  of  which  probability  theory,  with  its  procrustean  'taming'  of  the  diversity  of  chance 
events,  is  a  prime  example,  subsumes  the  diversity  of  the  world  to  the  homogeruising  force  of 
universal  explanation. 
As  we  saw,  however,  its  solution  to  the  problem  of  chance  leaves  out  that  which  we  most 
want  to  know,  for  in  its  creation  of  general  laws,  empirical  thought  obliterates  the  individual 
and  the  specific.  It  is  this  latter  that  concerns  the  contents  of  magical-religious  thought.  With 
its'true  indifference'of  the  relation  of  the  whole  to  the  part,  this  orientation  is  concerned  only 
with  the  individual,  which  at  the  same  time,  is  both  whole  and  part,  general  and  specific. 
Whereas  scientific  thought  takes  an  'objective'  attitude  towards  its  object,  the  magical 
consciousness  knows  no  such  opposition  and  therefore  addresses  every  entity  as  a  singular 
occurrence-  'Instead  of  being  bound  by  the  schema  of  a  rule,  a  necessary  law,  each  object  that 
engages  and  fills  the  mythical  consciousness  pertains,  as  it  were,  only  to  itself,  it  is 
incomparable  and  unique.  It  lives  in  an  individual  atmosphere  and  can  only  be  appreciated  in 
its  uniqueness,  its  immediate  here  and  now'  (Cassirer  1953,  p74).  This  is  precisely  the 
orientation  of  the  gambler's  consciousness  as  he  awaits  the  outcome  of  a  game.  The  unfolding 
of  any  game  is  'incomparable  and  unique',  and,  as  we  have  seen,  can  only  be  apprehended  in 
the  immediate  here  and  now.  The  understanding  that  follows  from  this  consciousness  is 
similarly  directed  towards  the  individual.  In  contrast  to  this  we  find  the  generality  of  scientific 
thought  which,  in  the  example  Cassirer  gives  of  the  death  of  a  man,  is  emotionally  unsatisfying 259 
because  of  its  failure  to  address  the  specific  instance,  SO  leaving  unexplained  'precisely  what 
holds  the  interest  and  attention  of  myth,  namely  the  here  and  now  of  the  parlicular  case,  the 
death  of  precisely  thi's  man,  at  this  Particular  time'  (Cassirer  1953,  P49).  It  is  this  type  of 
knowledge  that  concerns  the  gambler  -  the  outcome  of  this  game  at  this  time  -  and  so  he  looks 
away  from  the  explanations  offered  by  scientific  thought,  inclining  mstead  towards  that  which 
grasps  the  specific  as  well  as  the  general,  the  magical-refigious  consciousness.  Because,  in  this 
worldview,  individual  events  become  understandable  only  when  they  are  reduced  to 
'something  no  less  individual,  to  a  personal  act  of  the  wiH  which...  requires  and  is  susceptible 
of  no  further  explanation'  (Cassirer  1953,  p49)  chance  once  again  becomes  mearlingfill  as  a 
sign  of  a  higher  wifl.  In  the  'insanity'  of  a  secular,  disenchanted  universe,  games  of  chance 
operate  to  deny  the  very  existence  of  chance,  replacing  it  with  an  'inter-connected, 
propitious...  and  non-contingent  universe  -a  charmed  universe...,  a  universe  of  seduction' 
(Baudrillard  1990,  p144).  Thus,  the  gambler  disregards  probability  theory,  v4thin  whose 
formulae  modem  chance  became  a  meaningful  constituent  of  the  world.  Removing  it  from  the 
equation  that  gave  it  ontological  status,  and  so  removing  it  from  the  mundane  here  and  now, 
he  personalises  the  outcome  of  a  game  and  elevates  chance  to  transcendental  significance. 
Instead  of  retaining  an  'objective'  distance  from  the  aleatory,  and  using  the  insights  of 
probability  as  a  tool  upon  it,  the  gambler  engages  in  a  direct,  personal  relationshipVA'th  what 
is  no  longer  'an  abstract  expression  of  statistical  coefficient,  but  a  sacred  sign  of  the  favour  of 
the  gods'  (Caillois  1962,  p126).  Far  from  existing  as  mere  secular  randomness,  chance  is  here 
indicative  of  a  strict  order  which,  according  to  Cassirer,  replaces  the  'purely  causal  principle' 
with  the  'principle  of  purpose'  -  the  notion  that  nothing  happens  by  accident,  but  rather  by 
conscious  purpose.  Such  purposiveness  is  the  'lawfulness  of  the  accidental'  (Cassirer  1953, 
p49),  and  is  a  feature  noted  by  Sirnmel  when  he  describes  the  method  whereby  gambling 
superstition  draws  chance  into  a  teleological  system  'thus  removing  it  fi7orn  its  inaccessible 
isolation  and  searching  in  it  for  a  lawful  order,  no  matter  how  fantastic  the  laws  of  such  an 
order  may  be'  (Sinnnel  1971b,  p191).  Within  the  'principle  of  purpose'  chance  regains  its 
ancient  function  as  a  cypher;  an  earthly  sign  of  some  transcendent,  conscious  purpose.  By 
wholeheartedly  plunging  into  a  world  where  rationaL  scientific  explanation  cannot  follow,  the 
gambler  plunges  into  another  order  in  the  search  for  a  different  level  of  knowledge,  a  more 2O 
profound  understanding.  He  leaves  behind  a  system  of  thought  ýN,  hich  has  'conquered 
particularity  without  affording  us  the  totality'  (Straus  1966,  p323).  Insofar  as  he  rejects  the 
particularism  of  probability  theory,  the  gambler  rejects  the  rational,  secular  framework  upon 
which  it  is  based  in  favour  of  a  broader  one  more  pertinent  to  his  situation.  -  'Homo-  religio  su  s 
thus  betakes  himself  to  the  road  to  omnipotence,  to  complete  understanding,  to  ultimate 
meaning'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p680).  In  this,  he  continues  the  quest  of  human  thought 
which  bears  'witness  to  man's  mcessant  struggle  to  secure  a  grasp  on  the  whole,  to  rise  above 
particularity  and  tentativeness'  (Straus  1966,  p321). 
THE  MAGICAL  WORLDVIEW:  PARTICIPATION 
The  specifically  magical  aspect  of  the  gambler's  worldview  is  concerned  with  the  efficacy  of 
individual  entities  and  events  and  their  indissoluble  relations  with  each  other.  In  this  way. 
Levi-Strauss  characterises  magic  as  the  belief  'that  man  can  intervene  in  natural  determinism 
to  complete  or  modify  its  course'  (Levi-Strauss  1989,  p221).  Thus,  the  'core  of  the  magical 
worldview'  is  'saturated  with  this  atmosphere  of  efficacy,  which  is  u'ideed  nothing  more  than  a 
translation  and  transposition  of  the  world  of  subjective  emotions  and  drives  into  a  sensuous, 
objective  existence'  (Cassirer  1953,  p157).  Because  everything  in  the  magical  worldview 
submits  to  the  omnipotence  of  thought  and  desire,  'the  I  exerts  almost  unlimited  sway  over 
realitY:  it  takes  all  reality  back  into  itself  (Cassirer  195  3,  p  15  7). 
This  worldview  is  not  peculiar  to  the  gambler-  it  characterises  the  consciousness  of  the 
primitive  (Levy-Bruhl),  the  child  (Piaget),  the  compulsive  (Freud),  the  poet  (van  der  Leeuw), 
and  even  ourselves,  when  we  dream  (Straus).  The  participation  that  it  is  based  on  is  an 
attitude  'deeply  rooted'  in  human  nature,  and  is  indicative  of  an  active  attitude  which  is 
4  oriented  towards  the  world  in  contrast  to  merely  observing  it'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p544). 
The  idea  that  'I  can  influence  the  world  therefore  just  as  the  world  can  influence  me'  is  an 
attitude  which,  in  its  magical-archaic  form,  exists  as  'an  underlying  current  of  waking-daý, 
thinking'  within  every  modem'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p545).  It  Is  also  a  current  in 261 
unconscious  thought,  and  in  this  we  all  have  experience  of  the  world  of  participation,  for  as 
Straus  points  out,  the  world  of  magic  is  the  world  of  the  dream-.  'Like  the  dream,  the  %orld- 
view  of  magic  and  magical  techniques  are  situated  in  that  intermediate  realm  of 
correspondences  between  hidden  and  manifest  characteristics  -  the  realm  of  their  analogous 
confusions  and  exchanges.  In  the  magical  world,  the  typical  indeterminacy  of  hidden 
characteristics  becomes  ubiquity,  while  the  lack  of  spatial  boundaries  results  in  a 
transcendence  of  all  distances'  (Straus  1966,  p323).  van  der  Leeuw  is  careful  to  point  out  that 
the  magical  attitude  is  no  mere  survival  -  it  is  not  'a  structure  of  the  spiritual  life  merely  of  the 
past,  of  which  only  meagre  vestiges  now  persist  for  us;  nor  again  is  it  a  degeneration  nor 
childish  malady;  it  is  neither  primitive  science  nor  elementary  technique'.  Rather,  it  is  a  'primal 
attitude...  as  vital  among  ourselves  as  it  ever  was  and  as  evidence,  van  der  Leeuw  cites  its 
recurrence  under  certain  conditions  among  children  and  neurotics  (van  der  Leeuw  1967, 
p543).  Of  course,  the  gambler  in  his  magic  circle  of  chance  presents  us  with  perhaps  the  ideal 
instance  of  such  a  predominance  of  the  magical  attitude. 
The  notion  that  'everything  has  something  in  common  with  everything  else  and  everything  is 
connected  with  everything  else'  (Mauss  1972,  p73)  makes  possible  the  befief  in  the  efficacy  of 
dreams,  omens  and  lucky  times,  places  and  things.  In  a  kind  of  'magical  pantheism'  the  world 
is  animated  by  unseen  powers  which  have  dispositions  that  are  sometimes  favourable, 
sometimes  unfavourable,  to  the  individual.  Because  everything  participates  in  the  whole,  signs 
of  the  orientation  of  these  powers  may  appear,  and  may  be  influenc(A  by  lucky  entities  imbued 
with  similar  power. 
It  is  to  interplay  of  these  magical  powers  that  we  now  turn.  They  will  be  treated  separately, 
although  it  should  be  borne  in  mind,  after  Mauss,  that  the  'vital  partsý  of  magical  belief  'have 
neither  a  fixed  position  nor  a  fixed  function'  but  'merge  confilsedly  together'(Mauss  1972, 
p88) 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that,  despite  the  apparent  homogenelty  of  these  behefs,  every 
gambler  has  his  own  special  relation  with  chance;  a  private  contract  in  which  he  tries  to 26ý 
fathom  the  secrets  hidden  in  the  random  play  of  alewory,  events.  Thus,  the  gambling  sites 
reverberate  with  a  thousand  private  rituals  and  secret  incantations  muttered  under  the  breath 
of  every  gambler:  the  magical  undercurrent  that  activates  play. 
In  the  following  sections,  we  examine  firstly,  the  efficacy  of  dreams,  omens  and  mysterious 
forces,  followed  by  the  belief  in  animism  and  the  omnipotence  of  thought.  The  belief  in  the 
various  forms  of  luck  is  examined  next,  before  turning  to  their  relation  with  the  dynamic  of 
gambling  itself  -  the  religious  postulation  of  a  deity  whom  the  gambler  faces  dunng  play. 
Dreams  and  Omens 
In  his  'magical  pantheism',  the  gambler  inhabits  a  world  in  which,  for  him,  as  for  the  primiti've 
'Every  accident  is  a  revelation,  for  there  is  nothing  fortuitous  and  the  slightest  departure  from 
ordinary  occurrence  shows  that  occult  forces  are  at  work'  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p  123).  Along 
with  the  paranoiac,  the  player  sees  meaning  everywhere;  nothing  is  as  it  seems  'everything...  is 
full  of  significance,  everything  can  be  interpreted'  (Freud  1939,  p318). 
The  gambler  fives  surrounded  by  a  miasma  of  forces  which,  due  to  his  transposition  of 
subjective  emotions  into  objective,  sensuous  existence,  assume  qualities  favourable  or 
unfavourable  to  the  success  of  his  wager.  These  forces  are  rendered  tangible  in  their 
manifestations  as  dreams  and  omens.  As  they  can  appear  at  any  time,  the  player  must  study 
the  minutiae  of  the  gambling  situation,  ever  alert  to  clues  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  game.  Since 
the  dream  is  'a  revelation  coming  from  an  unseen  world'  and  omens  are  'revelations  which  are 
produced  spontaneously'  (Levy-Bruhl,  1966,  p109,122)  these  two  forms  of  communication 
from  the  immaterial  realm  are  of  particular  interest  to  the  gambler  and  he  ponders  their 
appearance  with  fanatical  assiduity. 26  1 
Omens 
The  gambler  plays  in  a  state  of  hyper-charged  sensitivity,  his  senses  straining  to  apprehend  the 
interplay  of  the  mysterious  powers  around  him.  Such  a  state  of  heightened  avareness  is  an 
intrinsic  part  of  the  gambling  experience  and  distinguishes  the  magical  perception  of  the 
gambler  from  the  mundane  awareness  of  other  individuals.  Richardson  boasts.  'although  a 
rational  mind  must  insist  that  the  grimace  of  a  stranger  or  a  moment  of  intestinal  agony  has  no 
causal  fink  to  the  way  the  cards  will  fall 
,  it  is  nevertheless  true  that  a  gambler's  instinct 
comprehends  relations  that  are  perhaps  too  subtle  for  ordinary  modes  of  observation' 
(Richardson  1980,  p127).  Such  mystical  sensitivity  is  manifest  in  the  gambler's  perception  of 
currents  and  powers  that  animate  the  world  with  a  magical  causality,  and  his  belief  uii  his  own 
intuitive  awareness  of  the  order  of  things,  the  'connections'  between  events. 
A  sudden  win  on  the  slots  just  as  he  was  about  to  stop  gambling  altogether  convinced 
Richardson  he  was  the  recipient  of  an  ex  machina  intercession:  'Naturally,  it  was  not  the 
amount,  but  the  way  of  obtaining  it,  that  made  me  feel  certain  I'd  been  given  the  sign  I'd 
waited  for  during  the  weeks  of  slow,  grinding  descent'  (Richardson  1980,  p  170).  Omens  can 
also  indicate  the  course  a  game  will  take,  and  to  this  effect  the  gambler  makes  associations 
between  some  symbolic  event  or  action,  which  is  indissolubly  linked  as  a  sign  to  the  outcome 
of  play.  Like  the  diviner  he  views  the  satisfaction  of  certain  ritualistic  cnteria  as  prophetic  for 
the  future  course  of  events  -  'if  x  happens,  then  I'll  Win,  if  y,  I  won't'. 
The  literature  on  gambling  is  littered  with  examples  of  this  tendency.  One  bettor  declares  'if  I 
see  a  car  from  New  York  I'll  bet  the  Giants  tomorrow.  If  I  don't,  that's  a  bad  omen.  Don't  bet 
em.  Sick'  (in  Leiseur  1984,  p32).  Cohen  describes  a  player  whose  decision-making  ritual 
bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  the  Azande's  consultation  of  the  termite  oracle.  The  gambler 
would  place  a  spider  in  a  matchbox,  one  side  of  which  was  painted  red,  the  other  black.  He 
then  backed  whichever  colour  the  spider  crawied  out  of  In  a  similar  procedure,  the  Azande 
would  dig  a  stick  into  a  termite  mound,  and  depending  on  whether  the  ternutes  ate  it  or  not, 
interpret  their  answer  accordingly  (Evans-  Pritchard  1991,  p165).  It  is  not  only  the  primitive 264 
with  whom  the  gambler  shares  a  belief  in  the  efficacv  of  these  prophetic  rituals,  for  Pla-get  has 
shown  that  they  are  common  to  the  child,  who  also  inhabits  a  magical  world  of  parlicipation 
Like  the  gambler,  the  child  frequently  associates  the  outcome  of  an  activity  ýkith  the  Ufilment 
of  some  later  condition.  Piaget  quotes  one  individual  who,  as  a  child,  to  succeed  in  some 
activity  such  as  winning  a  game,  would  test  himself  by  engaging  *in  a  certain  pattern  of 
behaviour.  If  successful  in  this,  he  felt  assured  of  success  in  the  other,  more  important  area.  -I 
would  hold  my  breath  and  if  I  could  count  up  to  ten...  I  felt  sure  of  gaining  what  I  wanted' 
(Piaget  1977,  p160).  In  these  examples,  the  operation  of  counting  is  both  sign  and  cause,  just 
as  it  is  for  the  gambler  who  set  'walking  races'  with  unwitting  individuals  on  the  way  to  the 
betting  shop.  Like  the  child  who  failed  to  reach  his  number  and  therefore  was  denied  the  great 
secret,  the  gambler  censures  his  bet  if  he  loses  his  race.  'If  the  rival  reached  a  preset  point... 
before  the  gambler  then  the  selected  horse  would  lose  and  the  bet  was  not  placed'  (Brown 
1993,  pI  I). 
For  the  gambler,  the  fulfilment  or  non-fulfilment  of  his  nte  is  both  sign  and  cause.  As  we  have 
seen,  in  the  magical  consciousness  'cause'  and  'effect'  are  not  distinguished  and  so  these  ntes 
or  omens',  function  as  both  cause  wid  effect  at  the  same  time.  The  prophetic  ritual  and  the 
event  it  is  concerned  with  exist  in  an  indissoluble  relation  so  that  what  happens  in  one  Mll 
happen  in  the  other.  Using  our  terminology  of  cause  and  effect,  Levy-Bruhl  explains  how 
omens  function  as  both  in  the  primitive  consciousness.  A  desired  situation  possesses  the 
qualities  of  an  omen  in  the  world  of  the  primitive,  and,  as  good  omens  'not  only  announce  the 
desired  success;  they  are  a  necessary  condition  of  it.  They  guarantee  it  and  they  effect  it' 
(Levy-Bruhl  1936,  p47),  so  that  important  ventures  will  not  be  undertaken  until  the  requisite 
signs  have  appeared.  The  good  omens  upon  which  the  gambler  bases  his  decisions  are 
important  then,  not  simply  because  they  reveal  what  will  happen,  but  rather  because  what 
happens  would  not  take  place  without  them. 
The  gambler,  the  child  and  the  primitive  share  the  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  omens,  derived  ftom 
the  magical  worldview  of  participation,  and,  with  our  continued  enactment  of  what  Huiziniza M 
calls  the  'futile  auguries'  of  childhood,  so  do  we.  Piaget  lists  instances  of'spontaneous  magical 
ideas'  in  adults  (Piaget  1977,  p184-9),  while  Rousseau  is  prey  to  one  he  descnbes  someýkhat 
shamefacedly  as  both  childish  and  insane,  in  his  Cojlfes.  q-ons.  One  day,  throxving  stones  at 
trees,  he  decided  to  draw  'a  sort  of  omen'  from  it,  to  allay  his  anxiety  about  the  course  of  his 
life.  If  he  hit  the  tree,  he  decided,  all  would  go  well  with  the  rest  of  his  life,  if  not,  it  would  not 
(Rosseau  1967,  p23  1).  In  a  similar  fashion,  the  judge  in  TolstoYs  Res-urrection  carried  out  a 
magical  ritual  which  he  deemed  prophetic.  As  he  walked  into  the  courtroom,  he  told  himself 
that  he  would  be  free  of  stomach  pains  that  day  if  he  reached  his  seat  Aith  a  certain  number  of 
steps  (in  Huizinga  1949,  p57). 
To  succeed  in  the  situation  we  have  set  up  for  ourselves  is  the  fulfilment  of  a  ntual  which  is 
indissolubly  linked  with  the  successfid  realisation  of  a  more  important  one  -  for  the  gambler, 
the  outcome  of  a  game.  The  success  'becomes  the  sign  that  the  thing  desired  wdl  happen'. 
Then,  because  the  gambler  lives  in  a  world  of  magical  participation,  'the  symbolical  action 
takes  on  powers  of  its  own,  insofar  as  these  signs  are  all  regarded  as  one  with  the  things  they 
signify'  (Piaget  1977,  p180). 
Because  this  symbolic  action  or  omen  is  a  part  of  the  unseen  world,  and  because  it  causes  as 
well  as  announces  an  event,  the  gambler's  reliance  on  omens  to  guide  his  actions  is  a  reliance 
on  the  efficacy  of  the  powers  of  the  transcendental  realm.  fEs  faith  that  the  outcome  signified 
by  the  omen  will  occur  is  as  absolute  as  if  he  had  been  told  so  by  God  himself, 
Dreams 
Tatyana  shared  with  fufi  conviction 
the  simple  faith  of  olden  days 
in  dreams  and  cards  and  their  prediction 
(Pushkin  1983,  pl.  34). 2(,  4, 
The  belief  in  the  significance  of  dreams  and  the  practice  of  oneiromancy  is  ubiquitous, 
occurring  throughout  history  in  almost  every  part  of  the  world.  In  the  modem  %korld 
Nietzsche  was  aware  of  the  'archaic  ftagments  Of  primitive  life  which  persist  in  dreams'  (in 
Storch  1924,  vii),  while  Freud  directed  us  towards  the  relation  of  dreams  to  the  subconscious 
mind.  Since  the  content  of  a  dream  was  befieved  to  derive  fi7om  outv  th  the  self,  its  ture  was  A  na 
apodictically  more  problematic  and  more  significant  than  the  experiences  of  waking  life. 
Coming  from  the  immaterial  realm  of  forces  and  spirits,  the  dream  was  regarded  as  a  direct 
message  from  the  gods  and  SO  Played  an  important  part  in  inductive  divination.  When  the  bod", 
slept,  the  will  relaxed  and  allowed  the  soul  to  enter  communication  with  the  transcendent 
realm.  In  sleep,  the  dreamer  was  fi7eed  from  the  restrictions  of  consciousness  and  could  pass 
easily  into  the  sacred.  In  a  world  in  which  involuntary  gestures  and  'accidental'  occurrences 
were  regarded  as  being  imbued  with  deeper  significance,  the  dream  was  thus  the  vehicle  of 
supernatural  meaning  par  excellence. 
J 
Because  of  their  intimate  association  N"th  the  spirit  world,  and  the  befief  'in  their 
corresponding  possession  of  privileged  and  predictive  information,  the  interpretation  of 
dreams  is  regarded  as  providing  information  of  the  same  order  as  that  of  signs  and  omens,  and 
has  existed  throughout  history  alongside  the  activity  of  gambling. 
As  we  saw  in  Chapter  Two,  the  Huron  Indians  would  fast  before  playing  games  of  chance  in 
order  to  induce  a  dream  in  which  the  winner  would  be  revealed.  The  individual  who  dreamt  he 
had  won  was  certain  of  doing  so,  for  his  dream  was  regarded  as  a  prophetic  revelation  from 
the  realm  in  which  such  matters  were  decided.  Thus  a  dream  of  winning  'is  equal  to 
possession  of  a  charm  which  will  assure  success'  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p.  123). 
In  Pushkin's  Queen  of  Spades,  Hermann  is  similarly  convinced  of  success  when  the  dead 
Countess  Fedotovna  appears  to  him  in  a  drearn-fike  visitation  and  gives  him  the  secret  of  the 
winning  cards.  In  the  waking  world  of  life,  nothing  would  compel  the  Countess  to  reveal  the 
secret;  it  is  only  in  the  twilight  world  of  dreams  and  the  dead  that  she  finally  does  so. 2o', 
A  lottery  player  believed  himself  subject  to  a  similarly  prophetic  dream  in  ýkhjch  his  dead 
daughter  told  him,  'I'd  like  to  bring  you  a  little  happiness,  why  not  plav  the  numbers"' 
Believing  her  party  to  privileged  information,  he  did  so,  and  was  convinced  of  the  efficacy  of' 
I 
the  dream  when  he  won  on  her  ticket  (Me  IntertlatiOtIal  Lottery,  Maga:  me  No.  2,  p3  0) 
As  messages  from  the  beyond,  the  contents  of  dreams  are  pored  over  by  gamblers,  in  an 
attempt  to  prise  the  secrets  of  winning  from  their  bewildering  anages.  Few  dreams  are  as 
obliging  to  the  gambler  as  Hermann's  in  which  the  Countess  simply  appeared  and  recited  the 
winning  combination,  and  so  the  technique  of  dream  interpretation  has  been  developed  almost 
into  an  art  form.  Significance  can  still  be  found  in  a  dream  which  does  not  specifically  refer  to 
gambling,  by  translating  its  individual  images  into  inimbers  which  are  then  deemed  efficacious 
in  number  games  like  lotteries.  The  British  lottery  magazine  hints  suggestively  at  the 
possibility:  'Perhaps  you  HAVE  seen  those  winning  numbers  before  -  in  your  sleep!  '.  'Dream 
books'  realise  the  'meaning'  of  dreams,  by  'interpreting'  them  and  converting  their  v1sual 
representations  into  numbers,  which  are  believed  propitious  for  the  dreamer  in  games  of 
chance.  The  form  of  these  books  has  remained  virtually  unchanged  since  the  very  earliest  list 
of  dreams  and  their  interpretations  which  were  used  around  the  second  century  A.  D.  for 
divinatory  purposes  (Cryer  1994,  p220-1).  The  seventeenth  century  explosion  of  numeracy 
saw  the  assignation  of  specific  numbers  to  dream  images,  and  the  establishment  of  the 
definitive  form  of  dream  books  for  the  next  three  centuries. 
Despite  Freud's  insight  that  dreams  do  in  fact  have  a  meaning  that  can  be  interpreted  -  albeit 
one  that  is  to  be  found  within  the  dreamer  -  in  the  twentieth  century  the  group  most  ready  to 
attribute  meaning  to  their  dreams  still  search  for  their  significance  outwith  the  self  Dream 
books  for  lottery  and  policy  players  are  published  throughout  the  western  world,  and  a  myriad 
of  methods  for  'calculating'  the  numbers  of  dreams  exist.  In  a  worldview  in  which  every 
@rneaning'  is  reducible  to  number,  these  books  offer,  for  the  personal,  fleeting  images  of 
dreams,  knowledge  expressed  in  the  quantifiable  universals  of  number;  a  process  which  one 
dream  book  boasts,  takes  the  'raw'  dream  and  realises  its  significance  in  a  'sophisticated 
computer  algonthm'  (The  California  Lottery  Dream  Book  1994,  p3). 16X 
Animism  and  the  Omnipotence  of  Thought 
Animism 
Because  they  inhabit  a  world  of  magical  participation,  animated  by  'a  homogeneity  of  essence 
in  all  persons  and  things'  (Levy-Bruhl  1936,  p92),  gamblers  are  aware  that  they  are 
surrounded  by  unseen  forces,  possessed  of  dispositions  or  natures.  These  'dispositions'  reside 
in  all  the  material  paraphernalia  of  play  -  cards,  dice,  tickets,  roulette  wheels  and  slot  machines 
-  which  the  gambler  subsequently  regards  as  fiving  and  even  as  possessing  human 
characteristics.  In  the  former,  we  find  an  instance  of  animism,  the  later,  anthropomorphism  ý 
both  are  a  result  of  the  gambler  granting  'to  the  lifeless  and  soulless  object  Will  and  Form' 
which  'together  constitute  personality'(van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p89). 
Freud  considered  this  animism  the  first  human  Weltanschauung,  and  cites  Hume's 
identification  of  it  as  a  fundamental  trait  in  human  thought.  In  his  Natural  History  of  Religioti 
Hume  writes  'There  is  a  universal  tendency  among  all  mankind  to  conceive  all  beings  like 
themselves,  and  to  transfer  to  every  object  those  qualities  with  which  they  are  familiarly 
acquainted  and  of  which  they  are  intimately  conscious'  (in  Freud  1985,  p  134). 
Having  animated  the  objects  around  him,  the  gambler  proceeds  to  attempt  to  influence  them 
by  talking  to  dice;  cajoling  cards  and  reprimanding  a  whole  range  of  gambling  equipment  as 
though  it  were  alive  and  responsive  to  his  will. 
Henslin  studied  a  group  of  craps  players  who  believed  that  'It  is  possible  to  control  the  dice  by 
verbal  and  non-verbal  gestures,  by  words  and  actions'  (Henstin  1967,  p319).  Such  control  Is 
possible  through  the  influence  the  gambler  can  exert  on  the  ullls  of  the  dice.  To  get  the  point 
(number)  he  wants,  a  player  must  persuade  the  dice  to  supply  it.  One  advises  Henslin,  'Talk  to 
lem!  Talk  to  'em  when  ya  shoot!  '  Sometimes  the  dice  will  comply  but  sometimes  they  become 2og 
contrary'  and  refuse  to  Yi  I  I  eld  the  desired  point  (Heslin  1967,  p319),  It  is  throuh  his 
knowledge  of  their  capricious  natures  and  moods  that  the  player  can  attempt  to  control  them. 
for  the  dice  are  granted  a  will,  inclinations  and  the  rudiments  of  character.  As  such  they  are  as 
much  the  subject  of  anthropomorphic  as  animistic  belief,  indicated  in  a  statement  from  Pierce 
'The  die  has  a  certain  'would-be'...  a  property  quite  analogous  to  any  habit  that  a  man  might 
have'  (in  Mellor  197  1,  p66).  Slot  machines  are  notoriously  subject  to  the  most  eX-t  .  reme  forms 
of  animism  and  anthropomorphism,  as  is  vividly  apparent  in  this  comment  from  Hansant: 
'What  is  more,  they  assume  human  traits,  like  the  greedy  mouth,  the  pot  belly  and  the 
sphincter  from  which  spifls  a  diarrhoea  of  coins'  (in  Walker  1992,  p68).  Such  personification 
is  apparent  in  the  attribution  of  character  to  machines.  Some  are  regarded  as  generous  -  'hot', 
some  parsimonious  -'cold',  in  their  payouts.  As  he  stares  at  it,  the  alert  gambler  gradually  'gets 
to  knoV  its  nature-  manifestations  of  the  iron  laws  of  probability  become  idiosyncrasles  of  an 
entity  which  reveals  its  personality  in  the  outcome  of  every  spin.  Players  ftequently  talk  to 
their  machines,,  and  attribute  motivations  to  them.  'The  machine's  laughing  at  me  now  , 
"I  t 
knows  what  I'm  thinking'  (Griffiths  1990a).  After  a  long  sequence,  one  gambler  ",  as 
convinced  the  devil  was  in  the  machine  and  had  spefled  out  SATAN  on  the  screen!  (Walker 
1992,  p74).  After  a  fime,  gamblers  can  develop  a  'rapport'  with  their  machine,  believing  it 
surrounded  by  an  aura  and  zealously  guarding  it  from  other  players  (Griffiths  1990a). 
Animism  (and  anthropomorphism)  is  a  general  tendency  shared  by  the  gambler  with  primitives 
and  children,  and  sometimes  even  exercised  by  ourselves,  for  'even  the  reflective  man, 
returning  for  the  moment  to  his  instinctive  state,  loses  his  temper  with  the  table  into  which  he 
bumps'  (Ribot,  in  Piaget  1977,  p265). 
The  animism  of  the  child  is  such  that  'anything  may  be  endowed  with  both  purpose  and 
conscious  activity  (Piaget  1977,  p242).  Like  the  gambler,  the  child's  tendency  to  regard 
objects  as  living  and  endowed  with  will  gives  purpose  to  those  wills  so  that  objects  such  as  the 
I contrary'  dice  of  Henslin's  craps  players  act  'to  suit  their  pleasure  and  nothing  is  impossible  to 
them'  (Piaget  1977,  p259). 270 
Freud  attributes  animism  to  projection  'To  project  internal  perceptions  outside  is  a  pnmiti%e 
mechanism,  which  our  sensory  perceptions  for  example  undergo  in  the 
.1 
same  waN.  and  %kh1ch 
consequently  plays  a  principal  part  in  our  representation  of  the  extemal  world'  (in  Piaget 
1977,  p265-6)  although  Piaget  disagrees  and  offers  another  explanation  of  animism  based  on 
the  idea  of  participation.  Put  simply,  he  argues  that  projection  can  only  take  place  . khen 
boundaries  between  the  self  and  the  world  exist.  In  the  world  of  participation  however,  there 
are  no  such  boundaries  for  as  we  stated  earlier,  )  man  does  not  conduct  himself  'objectl,,  -ely 
towards  the  world;  but  participates  in  it,  just  as  it  does  in  him'.  In  individuals  who  participate 
in  this  orientation  the  objective  and  the  subjective  worlds  are  not  distinguished.  Piaget  terms 
this  phenomenon  indissociation,  which  takes  a  primary  and  a  secondary  form.  Primary 
indissociation,  which  we  shall  turn  to  later,  occurs  when  names  and  the  thing  named  are  not 
dissociated  in  the  child's  mind.  Secondary  indissociation  refers  to  arumism  and  'consists  in 
attributing  to  things  characteristics  similar  to  those  which  the  mind  attributes  to  itself  (Piaget 
1977,  p268).  Projection  cannot  then  be  said  to  occur  in  a  consciousness  which  regards  the 
world  'as  a  continuous  whole  that  is  both  psychical  and  physical  at  the  same  time'  (Piaget 
1977,  p267).  The  development  of  self-consciousness  means  the  cud  eventually  abandons 
animism.  As  he  becomes  aware  of  himself  the  subjective  and  objective  worlds  become 
separated,  and  'he  refuses  to  allow  a  personality  to  things'  (Piaget  1977,  p269). 
While  playing,  the  consciousness  of  the  gambler  resembles  this  state  of  secondary 
indissociation.  In  the  various  stages  of  the  thrill  he  loses  track  of  his  surroundings,  of  time  and 
orgets  even  of  himse?  f  In  the  'dissociated  states'  that  we  saw  in  Chapter  Four,  the  gambler  f 
who  he  is  and  sheds  his  personality  until,  during  the  phase  we  called  'transcendence',  his  ego 
diffuses  throughout  the  material  world  around  him.  When  his  personality  merges  with  the 
game  in  this  way  'there  is  no  longer  an  outside  reality;  his  consciousness  blends  into  his 
surroundings,  and  magical  participation  is  possible.  The  boundary  between  the  objective  and 
subjective  worlds  dissolves,  leaving  'an  absence  of  differentiation  between  the  world  and  the 
self,  from  which  arises  'the  feelings  of  participation  and  the  magical  mentality  that  results' 
(Piaget  1977,  p367). 21 
The  Omnipotence  of  Thought 
The  corollary  of  the  attribution  of  wills  to  inanimate  objects  is  the  possibility  of  influencing 
those  objects  by  words  or  magical  thoughts,  for  as  Freud  put  it.  'the  technique  of  the  animistic 
mode  of  thinking,  is  the  principle  of  the  omnipotence  of  thoughts'  (Freud  1985,  p  143). 
Such  influence  is  made  possible  by  the  magical  power  of  the  gambler's  words,  thouOts  and 
wishes.  Like  the  primitive  when  he  acts  on  his  environment,  the  gambler,  when  he  plavs  acts 
as  a  magician  imbued  with  power,  so  that  'his  words,  his  gestures,  his  glances,  even  his 
thoughts  are  forces  in  themselves'  (Mauss  1972,  p.  33). 
As  well  as  participating  in  the  world,  he  attempts  to  mould  it  to  his  desiresý  'through  the 
magical  omnipotence  of  the  will  the  I  seeks  to  seize  upon  all  things  and  bend  them  to  its 
purpose'  (Cassirer  1953,  p158).  Because  there  is  nothing  that  can  withstand  the  omnýipotence 
of  thought  and  desire,  'the  I  exerts  almost  unlimited  sway  over  reality-  it  takes  all  reality  back 
into  itself  (Cassirer  1953,  pI  57). 
The  magical  power  of  the  I  is  expressed  in  language,  hence  the  efficacy  of  the  utterances  of 
Henslin's  craps  players.  Their  most  effective  verbalisation  is  to  command  the  dice  to  deliver 
the  point  by  uttering  the  desired  number  -  "'Five  it"  or  "Six  it"  or  "Eight  it  Dice!  "'  (Henslin 
1967,  p320).  The  power  of  language  is  manifested  in  articulated  sound,  where  each  word 
41  governs  a  specific  realm  of  being,  over  which  it  may  be  said  to  exert  unlimited  and  sovereign 
power'  (Cassirer  1953,  p40).  Consonant  with  this  tendency,  Richardson  observed  a  roulette 
player  who  leant  over  the  wheel  and  'would  scream  orders  at  the  small  white  ball  as  it 
bounded  along  the  numbered  grooves;  shouting  last  minute  warnings  and  reminders'. 
(Richardson  1980,  p246).  Such  specific  directions  rely  on  the  omnipotence  of  words  within 
what  Mauss  calls  'sympathetic  magical  rites'in  which  'it  is  only  a  matter  of  naming  the  actions 
or  things  in  order  to  bring  about  the  sympathetic  reaction'  (Mauss  1972,  p54).  The  garnbler 
exerts  his  will  over  the  objects  of  play;  thus  he  will  bet  less  money  after  the  fall  of  the  dice. 2  '2 
without  knowing  the  result,  than  beforehand  (Strickland  et  al.  1966)  for  once  it  has  fallen,  the 
opportunity  to  influence  it  no  longer  exists.  Because  the  omnipotence  of  words  exerts  an 
influence  on  animistic  objects,  the  possibility  of  propitiating  and  cajoling  the  properties 
resident  in  those  objects  exists.  So,  if  a  player  is  having  difficulty  making  his  point,  it  is 
sometimes  necessary  to  persuade  the  dice  to  yield  it  by  making  them  a  promise.  HenslinWntes 
that  'The  shooter  is  promising  a  future  bet  to  the  dice  and  is  in  a  sense  buying  their  favour...  It 
is  as  if  the  dice  do  not  need  to  respond  and  therefore  if  they  respond  it  is  gralia,  and  this 
carries  with  it  a  reciprocal  obligation  in  the  subsequent  betting'  (Henslin  1967,  p322). 
When  Richardson's  game  was  not  going  well,  he  tried  to  prevent  total  bankruptcy  through 
magical  words:  'I  created  incantations  in  my  mind,  serni-audible  dronings  that  I  hoped  would 
protect  me  from  further  misfortune'  (Richardson  1980,  p  130).  His  dronings  are  'the  enigmatic 
mutterings  of  spoken  rites'  whose  aim  Mauss  describes  as  'to  coerce  actions  and  locutions' 
(Mauss  1972,  p58). 
Levy-Bruhl  was  struck  by  the  attribution  of  power  to  words  and  thoughts  among  the  Huron 
Indians;  a  habit  which  led  him  to  consider  the  role  of  the  wish  in  such  power.  He  quotes 
Preuss's  description  of  the  natives:  'They  attribute  quite  extraordinary  power  to  words  and 
thoughts...  Everything  that  is  done  is  referred  not  merely  to  external  activity  but  considered  as 
the  result  of  reflection  also...  Words  are  regarded  not  merely  as  a  means  of  expression  but  as  a 
method  of  influencing  the  gods'  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p346).  He  then  draws  attention  to  Preuss's 
use  of  the  German  Machdenken  and  Gedanke:  reflection  and  thought,  words  both  designated 
by  'wish'  in  English  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p347).  Obviously  the  desire  for  something  to  happen 
lies  behind  attempts  to  make  it  happen,  and  it  is  the  potency  of  his  wishing  in  a  world  in  which 
everything  is  a  part  of  everything  else  that  motivates  the  gambler's  magical  thought  power  - 
'the  I  knows  no  barrier  that  it  does  not  strive  to  leap  -  sometimes  successfully'  (Cassirer  1953, 
p222).  In  Me  Great  Sinner,  Fedja  is  overcome  by  an  almost  sensual  desire  for  his  number  to 
win,  and  concentrates  his  will  with  such  force,  that  it  appears  to  him  that  it  has  no  option  but 
to  come  up.  'I  would  see  a  number  -  eight  -I  desired  it...  eight  -  eight  -  eight  -  it  had  to  come 
to  me'. 2 
Plaget  noticed  a  similar  tendency  among  children:  the  idea  that  reality  can  be  modified  by  a 
word,  a  thought,  or  a  look.  This  is  a  case  of  primary  indissociation  mentioned  earlier,  where 
4participation  is believed  to  exist  between  things  and  thoughts,  between  names  and  the  thing 
named...  '  (Piaget  1977,  p164).  In  his  famous  example,  Plaget  cites  the  childish  belief  that  it  is 
possible  to  make  the  sun,  the  moon  and  the  clouds  move  merely  by  14,111Mg  then  to  do  so 
(Piaget  1977,  p169).  He  also  records  the  tendency  of  cMdren  deliberately  to  think  the 
opposite  from  what  they  want  'as  if  reality  made  a  point  of  intentiontay  foiling  their  desires' 
(Piaget  1977,  p165).  Gamblers  behave  in  the  same  way,  wooing  the  caprice  of  Fate.  Scodel 
interviewed  one  who  would  try  to'trick'Fate,  saying  'If  I  pretend  that  I  am  going  to  lose,  Fate 
will  be  placated  and  will  be  kind  and  I  will  win'  (Scodel,  in  Herman  1967,  p  162).  1 
For  Freud.,  the  belief  in  the  omnipotence  of  thought  is  attributable  to  desire,  and,  ultimately,  to 
narcissism.  Underlying  all  magic  he  suggests  is  a  special  affective  quality  -  desire  -  coupled 
with  extreme  egotism.  This  characteristic  is  found  among  obsessional  neurotics,  who,  along 
with  children,  believe  they  only  have  to  think  of  something  to  make  it  happen.  The  basis  of 
such  an  attitude  is  'the  narcissistic  overvaluation  of  one's  own  psyche  and  one's  power  to 
determine  events'  (Neu  1991,  p273).  In  this  formulation,  the  desire  that  lies  behind  the  words 
of  the  gambler  is  ultimately  reducible  to  narcissism.  But  we  know  that  the  gambler  experiences 
the  fragmentation  and  dissolution  of  his  ego  during  play,  how,  then  can  he  be  accused  of 
narcissism?  Piaget  has  a  sirnilar  problem  for  the  child,  and  his  criticisms  of  Freud  on  behalf  of 
the  latter  are  also  valid  for  the  gambler.  Piaget  points  out  that  Freud's  theory  attributes  adult 
self-consciousness  to  the  child  'as  if  the  infant  could  clearly  distinguish  his  self  from  others' 
(Piaget  1977,  p  175).  But,  as  we  have  seen,  the  child  and  the  gambler  participate  in  a  world  in 
which  the  boundary  between  the  self  and  the  external  world  does  not  exist.  'The  enhanced 
feeling  of  self  which  expresses  itself  in  the  magical  worldview  is  not  egotism,  for  'it  indicates 
actually  that  at  this  stage  there  is  as  yet  no  true  self.  The  self  is  in  fact  'still  totally  dominated, 
Adults  indulge  in  the  same  kind  of  magical  ideas:  piagct  lists  five  pages  of  examples.  ncludng  the  specific 
case  of  card  players  (Piaget  1977,  p184-9).  See  also  Storch  on  the  Omnipotence  of  thought  in  schizophrenics, 
(Storch  1924,  p24  and  37). J-74 
totally  'possessed'  by  things'  (Cassirer  1953,  p158).  Neither  the  infant  nor  the  gambler 
distinguish  'between  a  self  that  commands  and  a  not  self  that  obeys'  (Piaget  1977,  p1  "7  8) 
What  prevents  us  from  expecting  the  automatic  reallsation  of  our  desires  is  the  fact  Ae  have 
self  consciousness:  we  know  our  desires  are  subjective  and  distinct  from  the  objective  order  of 
the  world.  The  child  and  the  gambler  make  no  such  distinction.  In  a  %vorld  in  ýkhich  'scarcely 
any  tension  is  felt  to  exist  between  the  simple  desire  and  the  object  toward  which  it  is  directed' 
(Cassirer  1953,  p212),  they  assume  the  ubiquity  of  desire  in  a  world  of  primary  mdissociation. 
The  belief  in  the  omnipotence  of  thought  in  the  participatory  worldview  implies  a  reversal  of 
Humean  causation.  According  to  Cassirer,  magical  notions  of  causation  are  nourished  by 
man's  experience  of  the  world  around  him  and  in  the  influence  he  exerts  over  the  movements 
of  his  own  body.  This  type  of  causation  posed  a  problem  for  Hume,  who,  advocating  instead  a 
series  of  constant  conjunctions,  declared  that  it  was  no  more  comprehensible  to  assert  that  my 
will  moves  my  arm  than  it  is  to  state  that  it  stops  the  moon  in  its  course  (Cassirer  1953,  p212). 
The  magical  worldview  reverses  the  radical  separation  implied  in  constant  conjunction-. 
'because  my  will  moves  my  arm,  there  is  an  equally  certain  and  equally  understandable 
connection  between  it  and  all  other  happenings  in  'outward'  nature'.  The  mere  act  of  v,  Illing 
immediately  apprehends  the  result  of  the  willing,  and  links  the  two  together.  It  is  only  as  these 
two  factors  move  apart  that  a  'separating  medium  intervene[s]  between  wish  and  fulfilment' 
(Cassirer  1953,  p212). 
When  he  plays,  the  consciousness  of  the  gambler  merges  into  his  surroundings:  into  the  other 
players  and  into  all  the  material  paraphernalia  of  the  game.  For  him,  there  is  no  separating 
medium'between  wish  and  fulfilment.  1-fis  wdl  flows  outwards  in  a  single  participatory  gesture 
to  embrace  all  of  reality.  Unaware  of  any  gulf  between  his  self  and  the  external  world,  he  acts 
as  if  everything  around  him  were  as  amenable  to  his  will  as  his  own  body.  For  the  child,  as  for 
the  gambler:  'If  he  is  in  love  with  himselt  it  is  not  because  he  knows  his  self,  but  because  he 
ignores  all  that  is  outside  his  dreams  and  his  desires'  (Piaget  1977,  p  17  5). )-  . 71 
The  Belief  in  Luck 
Of  all  the  magical  notions  involved  in  gambling,  the  belief  in  luck  is  perhaps  the  most 
pervasive.  The  notion  of  luck  is  the  centre  around  which  magical  notions  of  efficacý,  graýitate- g 
and  it  is  luck  which  guides  the  gambler  through  every  game  he  plays,  absolutely  certain  that 
this  time  he  will  win.  His  belief  in  the  power  of  his  own  luck  is  a  tireless  guide  and  support  to 
the  gambler  who  knows  that  the  laws  of  probability  are  stacked  against  him,  but  also  in  a 
more  profound  sense  knows  that  his  magical  good  fortune  can  overturn  them. 
We  can  distinguish  two  broad  forms  of  the  belief  in  luck  -  the  belief  in  the  lucky  properties  of 
material  and  immaterial  things,  and  the  befief  in  the  lucky  properties  of  individuals.  These 
forms  overlap  and  coalesce  into  a  belief  in  the  efficacy  of  luck  in  general. 
luck'  can  be  invoked  to  explain  aspects  of  gambling  behaviour  otherwise  described  as 
'irrational  beliefs';  the  literature  on  which  is  considerable.  '  However,  since  it  is  also 
misleading,  I  will  outline  it  only  briefly  before  going  on  to  look  at  the  notion  of  luck  in  more 
detail. 
Langer  defined  the  'illusion'  of  control"  as  'an  expectancy  of  personal  success  probability 
higher  than  the  objective  probabifity  would  warrant'  (Langer  1975,  p313).  Such  expectancy  is 
an  illusion  generated  by  misperceiving  opportunities  for  the  intervention  of  skilled  behaviour 
in  games  of  chance.  Subjects  in  her  experiments  believed  themselves  more  likely  to  win  when 
they  were  allowed  to  participate  (and  therefore  presumably,  imagine  they  were  effecting  some 
kind  of  control)  in  a  game.  Thus,  subjects  given  active  involvement  in  games  believed  they 
could  effect  a  game  by  physical  manipulation;  those  given  passive  involvement  believed  they 
could  still  exercise  control,  albeit  by  'thinking'  and  'developing  strategies'  (Langer  1975, 
P318-22). 
2  See  for  example,  Walker  (1992),  Langer  (1975),  Gadboury  and  Ladoceur  (1988).  Griffiths  (1995).  Gilovich 
(1983). 2 
The  overestimation  of  skill  is  concom-itant  with  the  illusion  of  control,  since  it  is  through  his 
supposed  skill  that  the  gambler  believes  he  can  influence  a  game.  %lanN,  plaý,  ers,  then,  act  as 
though  they  could  influence  the  outcome  of  games  of  chance  by  their  o"n  skiHs  alone 
(Fumham  and  Lewis  1983).  Griffiths  found  this  tendency  particularly  marked  among  fruit 
machine  players,  who  believed  a  variety  of  'skills'  were  relevant  to  p1m,  (Griffiths  1993e. 
plool  .3 
Linked  to  the  overestimation  of  skill  is  what  is  described  by  Gilo  iII  vich  as  a  'biased  evaluation  of 
outcomes'  (1983).  The  author  found  that  gamblers  attributed  different  causes  to  the  outcome 
of  races  depending  on  whether  they  had  lost  or  won.  Wins  were  attributed  to  skill  and  effort 
whereas  losses  were  put  down  to  factors  outwith  his  control,  for  example  distractions  and  bad 
luck. 
While  these  studies  contribute  to  our  understanding  of  individual  gamblers'  behaviour,  they 
provide  only  piecemeal  explanations  for  actions  which  inevitably  appear  as  sporadic,  ad  hoc 
solutions  to  difficult  situations  the  gambler  'finds'  himself  in.  Such  impulsive  reactions  can 
only  appear  irrational.  However,  we  know  that  the  gambler  does  not  simply  'fall  into'  the 
gambling  situation,  but  actively  seeks  it  out  and,  moreover,  through  systematic  action,  expects 
to  win  whilst  he  is  in  it.  A  more  comprehensive  framework  must  be  sought-,  a  'cognitive  map' 
in  which  the  various  actions,  expectations  and  beliefs  of  the  gambler  can  be  located.  The 
notion  of  luck  -  or  mana  -  can  be  used  as  a  co-ordinate  upon  which  to  situate  these 
phenomena. 
3, 
fie, 
A  recent  study  by  Ladouccur  (1995)  demonstrates  the  problem  common  to  much  research  in  this  i  d.  He 
found  that  subjects  neither  ýperccived!  nor  'conceived-  randomness,  and,  beheving  random  eýents  to  be  non- 
independent,  relied  on  past  outcomes  to  make  future  decisions.  From  the  prensc  of  the  obr%-,  ous  (and 
widespread)  existence  of  the  misapprehension  of  the  stochastic,  Ladouccur  leaps  to  the  conclusion  of  ffic 
existence  of  a  (completely  unproven)  'illusion  of  control'.  Many  psychologists  do  this,  and  it  should  be  pointed 
out  each  time  that  the  misapprehension  of  randomness  (a  trait,  incidentally,  not  confined  to  gamblers)  does  not 
autornatically  imply  the  orientation  to  action  which  is  the  illusion  of  control. 277 
Mana 
The  anthropological  notion  of  matw  describes  the  vital  aspects  of  the  gambler's  belief  in  luck 
First  used  by  a  nineteenth  century  missionary  to  describe  4a  power  or  influence,  not  physical 
and  in  a  way  superriatural',  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p24),  it  has  since  passed  into  common 
anthropological  usage,  referring,  for  van  der  Leeuw,  to  the  embodiment  of  Power  and  for 
Mauss,  to  the  embodiment  of  the  sacred.  For  the  latter,  maiw  rests  at  the  apex  of  a  hierarchy 
of  magical-religious  notions,  so  that  it  is  'an  idea  of  the  same  order  as  the  order  of  the  sacred' 
(Mauss  1972,  p]  19).  The  force  of  mana  is  a  powerful  influence  on  the  world.  Among  the 
ancient  Germans,  hamingia,  the  guidance  of  an  unseen  hand,  or  the  power  of  life  or  luck,  was 
a  'quantitative  potency'.  Men  fought  by  inciting  their  luck  against  their  enemy,  and  only  lost 
because  their  hwningia  had  deserted  them  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p24).  Alwia  then,  operates 
as  an  indiscriminate  power.  It  can  be  positive  or  negative,  signifýing  good  or  bad  luck,  and  can 
be  possessed  in  varying  quantities.  It  can  also  reside  in  both  animate  and  inanimate  objects, 
and  be  passed  on  from  one  to  the  other  as  though  it  were  contagious.  With  these  properties,  it 
is  quite  distinct  fi7om  animism,  whose  embodiment  of  the  'conscious,  psychic  or  personal'  is 
cutterly  neutral'  towards  the  'powerful,  effective,  productive'  (Cassirer  1953,  p]  59) 
Ludy  People 
Like  the  ancient  Germans  defending  their  enemies  with  the  power  of  their  hamingia,  the 
gambler  believes  the  force  of  his  luck  can  overcome  the  odds  against  him.  The  power  we  saw 
him  imbued  with  in  Chapter  Four  is  the  manifestation  of  this  personal  mana.  When  gamblers 
feel  themselves  filled  with  the  magical  efficacy  of  mmia,  they  behave  as  if  games  of  pure 
chance  with  astronomically  high  odds  against  them  can  be  influenced  -  and  therefore  won  -  by 
the  exercise  of  their  magical  force.  This  is  'the  special  kind  of  power'  through  which  'control 
over  destiny  becomes  possible'  that  we  saw  earlier  as  a  component  of  the  thrill.  Although,  on 
one  level,  the  gambler  'knows'  his  chances  of  winning  are  slim  and  that  he  cannot  alter  the 
course  of  a  game,  when  he  plays,  another  more  profound  and  magical  level  of  reasoning  takes 
over  and  he  knows  that  in  fact  he  wil/  win;  the  game  will  bend  to  his  powers.  In  a  surge  of 2"S 
charismatic  efficacy,  he  believes  that  for  his  unique  self  normal  laýks  of  reasoning  no  longer 
apply:  the  usual  ebb  and  flow  of  existence  temporarily  abates.  Bolen  likens  the  gambler's  state 
of  mind  to  that  of  the  magician  in  which  both  are  full  of  magic,  sacred  Powev  'The  modem 
gambler  behaves  as  though  he  subjectively  believes  that  he  can  control  or  contradict  the  laws 
of  probabdity  by  certain  types  of  thought  or  action.  He  is  not  unlike  the  sorcerer  ýkho  has 
similar  ceremony  and  paraphernalia'.  The  object  of  his  magical  power  is  different,  though,  for 
'the  deities  to  which  the  modem  gaimbler  directs  his  appeals  are  fickle  Lady  Luck  and  purutv.  e 
Father  Fate'  (Bolen  1976,  p8).  Like  the  magician,  for  whom  the  laws  of  gravity  no  longer 
apply,  the  basic  laws  of  probabflity  are  held  in  abeyance  for  the  gambler.  Whilst  playing, 
Spanier  was  'sustained  by  a  conviction,  akin  to  mystical  belief  that  I  was  endowed  with  an 
extraordinary  inner  power  -  an  abflity  to  reverse  the  iron  laws  of  probability'  (Spanier  1992, 
pl).  Players  possessing  powerfid  mana  are  filled  with  conviction,  a  self-esteem  that  derives 
from  certain  knowledge.  One  gambler  befieves  'I've  always  been  a  lucky  person...  I  feel 
special,  as  if  someone  up  there  favours  me'  (  Ae  Observer  19  February  95,  p22).  We  Will 
examine  the  religious  overtones  of  this  statement  later;  for  now  it  is  enough  to  conceive  it  as 
the  encapsulation  of  Power. 
Dostoevsky  presents  us  with  a  figure  who  always  believed  winning  was  due  to  himself  alone. 
11is  wife  laments  his  belief  in  his  own  powers,  which  was  so  often  to  drag  her  to  penury,  when 
he  had  promised  to  win  a  certain  amount  one  night  'in  a  tone  of  complete  conviction,  as  if  his 
winning  or  not  winning  depended  on  him  alone'  (Mme  Dostoevsky,  in  Kotellansky  1926, 
p867).  Even  mathematical  laws  are  susceptible  to  the  direction  of  the  gambler's  mmia,  and  are 
forced  to  exclude  him  from  their  relentless  determination  of  the  world,  thus  leaving  him  ftee  to 
tamper  with  the  workings  of  the  game  at  will.  Winning  is  no  longer  the  impersonal  outcome  of 
the  distribution  of  a  probabilistic  equation,  but  the  uniquely  personal  expression  of  the 
individual  gambler's  power.  In  the  case  of  the  former,  the  winner  could  be  anyone,  in  the 
latter,  it  can  only  be  him.  4 
'  See  Wagenaar.  for  whom  luck  is  a  force  which  pr(nides  the  gambler  with  foreknowledge  of  the  outcorm  of  a 
game.  Powerful  enough  to  overcome  chance,  such  luck  is  essentially  an  order  of  knowledge  and  iniplics  a 
uture  Outcomes  maY  deterimne  choices'  (Wagenaar 
reversal  of  causation  in  time:  'a  belief  that  through  luck,  f 
1988,  p102). 2'9 
Although  it  cannot  be  deliberately  shared  or  exchanged,  the  good  and  bad  luck  that  resides  in 
people  can  sometimes  emanate  &om.  them  in  a  force  that  influences  those  around  them.  In  this 
way,  mana  can  be  passed  on  involuntarily,  and  can  be  said  to  be  conitigious.  This  belief  in  the 
contagious  properties  of  mana  can  encourage  individuals  to  attach  themselves  to  lucky  people 
and  avoid  unlucky  ones.  In  all  primitive  communities,  writes  Levy-Bruhl.  -  'the  natives  range 
themselves,  as  if  instinctively,  on  the  side  of  the  man  favoured  by  fortune.  They  think  that  they 
can  thus  participate  in  his  good  luck,  and  the  favourable  influences  exercised  on  his  behalf  NNIII 
extend  to  his  companions.  The  mere  fact  of  being  With  him  implies  such  participation'.  (Le,,,  -y- 
Bruhl  1966,  p55). 
Amongst  gamblers,  this  belief  is  manifest  in  the  perceived  attraction  of  lucky  people  -  usually 
winners,  or  those  who  are  involved  in  some  way  with  winning.  The  case  of  Charles  Wells, 
who  broke  the  bank  at  Monte  Carlo,  in  a  typical  instance  of  one  such  chanismatic  winner, 
After  a  series  of  spectacular  wins,  Wells'  table  ran  out  of  money,  whereupon  huge  crowds 
gathered  and  surged  around  him,  trying  to  touch  him  'for  luck'  (A-11cock  1985,  p  186).  Slot 
machine  players  behave  in  a  similar  fashion,  encouraging  winning  players  to  touch  their 
machines  to  pass  on  their  luck,  whilst  discouraging  losers  from  doing  the  same.  Physical 
contact,  however,  is  not  always  necessary  for  the  transmission  of  mwia-.  mere  presence  can 
suffice,  as  Dostoevsky  reported  when  he  had  a  run  of  luck.  His  wife  wrote  that  'Behind  him 
stood  an  Englishman  who  staked  on  the  same  numbers  that  Fed  .a  did,  and  Fedja  observed  that 
each  time  he  made  a  stake  and  looked  at  the  Englishman,  he  won  without  fail:  Such  a  lucky 
face  that  man  has.  Fedja  says  that  the  Englishman's  face  is  so  good  and  kind  that  it  is  bound  to 
bring  luck'  (Mme  Dostoevsky  in  Koteliansky  1926,  p82).  Hence  Dostoevsky  engages  in  a 
sublimated  form  of  divination,  for,  in  'reading'  in  the  players  face  signs  of  good  fortune,  he 
participates  in  what  Benjamin  identifies  as  the  interpretation  of  fate  through  physiognomic 
signs,  a  process  in  which  'modem  physiognomics  reveals  its  connection  with  the  old  art  of 
divination'  (Benjamin  1979,  p  13  1). The  negative  matia  possessed  by  certain  individuals  can  also  influence  a  game,  diSruptinp,  "hat 
Richardson  mystically  refers  to  as  its  "propitious  flows  and  patterns'.  He  identifies  these 
individuals  as  'witches',  and  describes  the  mechanism  by  which  their  mmia  enters  a  game. 
Initially,  'they  manage  to  emanate  a  subtle  psychic  disturbance  that  draws  the  rrnind  awaý  from 
the  game'.  From  then  on,  the  game  is  lost  as  the  pernicious  influence  of  the  witch  mvades  the 
game  via  its  stake.  'Invariably  if  one  is  betting  hundreds  the  witch  pointedly  risks  only  a  dollar 
or  two,  just  enough  so  that  its  power  will  penetrate  into  the  game.  And  the  attuned  gambler 
knows  that  once  this  power  has  him  as  its  object,  that  its  dollar  is  conjoined  to  his  hundreds  in 
some  dark  way,  and  that  unti.  1  he  can  recapture  his  own  ego  his  fate  is  going  to  be  directed  by 
an  unpitying  crone  who  will  manipulate  him  at  its  pleasure'  (Richardson  1980,  ploo).  The 
existence  of  mystical  currents  -  'propitious  flows  and  patterns'  -  which  we  find  beginning  to 
emerge  out  of  the  notion  of  contagious  mana  is  closely  connected  with  notions  of  personal 
destiny,  which  we  will  turn  to  in  more  detail  later. 
Lucky  Things 
The  lucky  powers  of  fetishes  is  distinct  from  the  wills  that  reside  in  the  objects  of  an-imistic 
belief,  for  the  mana  of  the  former  is  an  impersonal  power  which  can  influence  a  game,  while 
the  latter  have  more  complex  natures  which  determine  their  own  actions.  As  Cassirer  pointed 
out,  the  impersonal  efficacy  of  mana  is  'utterly  neutral'to  the  personal  forces  of  animism.  The 
mana  of  lucky  objects  such  as  mascots  and  charms  is  an  instance  offelishism,  whose  essence 
'lies  in  the  idea  that  power  resides  in  a  thing  and  emanates  from  it'.  Anything  can  be  a  power- 
bearer  in  this  way,  and  van  der  Leeuw  cites  Rilke  who,  in  one  of  his  'stories  of  God'  made 
children  decide  a  thimble  shall  be  God:  'anything  may  be  God.  You  have  only  to  tell  it  to  be'. 
This,  he  says,  'is  the  frame  of  mind  behind  Fetishism'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p37).  Levy-Bruhl 
records  the  fetishistic  use  of  items  which  are  full  of  positive  mwia  and  which  resemble  the  use 
of  lucky  objects  or  mascots  among  gamblers.  If  the  divination  of  the  natives  of  Rwanda 
yielded  favourable  results,  the  object  which  had  been  used  to  'cast  the  lot'  would  be  used  for 
making  amulets  which  were  considered  especially  efficacious  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p  189). 
Gamblers  frequently  display  a  desire  to  play  with  items  that  have  just  won,  and  although  this 281 
may  be  in  some  part  a  demonstration  of  the  contagious  properijes  of  the  mana  kkithin  the 
object,  it  is  also  a  demonstration  of  the  frame  of  mind  behind  fetishism.  Such  a  tendencN-  %kas 
noted  as  early  as  1708  by  the  probabilist  Montmort,  who  wrote-  *There  are  those  Aho  AA 
play  only  with  packs  of  cards  with  which  they  have  won,  with  the  thought  that  good  luck  is 
attached  to  them'  (in  David  1969,  p143).  These  kinds  of  beliefs  belong  to  the  worl&iew  of 
magical  participation,  which  the  gambler  shares  with  children.  In  a  recollection  by  Piaget,  we 
see  a  striking  similarity  between  the  two  groups.  The  child  in  question  would  attempt  to  win 
at  a  game  of  marbles  by  playing  with  the  marble  which  had  last  won.  It  was,  Piaget  inforins  us 
'-as  if  the  player's  skill  gave  the  marble  permanently  good  qualities  or  as  if  the  marble  was 
made  particularly  good  by  the  player's  luck'  (Piaget  1977,  p166).  van  der  Leeuw  recognises 
evidence  of  contemporary  fetishism  in  the  use  of  mascots,  which  possess  a  potency  that 
derives  from  their  incarnation  'purely  and  simply  as  things'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p40). 
Gamblers  also  carry  a  vast  array  of  such  'lucky  mascots'-  lucky  coins,  clothes  or  toys.  One 
woman  always  wears  a  necklace  of  tiny  dice  when  she  plays,  another,  white  gloves,  and  one 
player  always  places  an  upturned  cup  on  his  slot  machine.  As  well  as  the  personal  mascots 
unique  to  their  owners  are  the  standardised  ones  of  gambling  folklore  -  such  as  borrowed 
money  and  four  leaf  clovers.  The  design  of  Fitzgerald's  casino  in  Las  Vegas  is  of  a  giant  fetish 
-  an  architectural  reification  of  the  idea  of  luck.  Its  neon  sign  prorruses  'luck  available',  while 
its  interior  resembles  a  museum  of  lucky  artefacts  -  fifteen  thousand  four-leafed  clovers  carpet 
a  special  enclosure,  surrounded  by  giant  horseshoes  and  beaming  'lucky'  leprechauns! 
In  the  frame  of  mind  behind  fetishism,  gamblers  attribute  causal  efficacy  to  their  lucky  objects, 
seeking  out  'hot'  dice  and  slot  machines  and  lucky  mascots,  as  if  the  objects  themselves  were 
responsible  for  the  outcome  of  the  game.  ObJJects  which  continue  to  bring  luck  in  this  way 
come  to  be  regarded  as  especially  efficacious,  and  hence  become  the  object  of  fetishism. 
LucAyHaces 
Many  gamblers  prefer  to  play  in  their  favourite  places  which  they  consider  luck-v-  and  feel 
uneasy  if  forced  to  sit  or  play  somewhere  else.  Downes  et  al.  (1976)  found  that  lottery  players 2X2 
usually  have  one  specific  kiosk  or  news-stand  from  which  they  buy  their  tickets  because  ofits 
'lucky'  properties.  Shops  which  have  sold  winning  tickets  are  instantl)  I  -  perceied  as  the 
subjects  of  a  hierophany  by  subsequent  players  who  flock  bnefly  to  the  sanctified  spot, 
convinced  of  its  latent  powers.  One  newsagent  testifies  that  when  someone  buys  a  Winning 
ticket  from  his  shop,  neighbours  stream  in  over  the  following  days  to  buy  more  tickets  from 
this  lucky  place. 
Certain  seats  in  casinos,  bingo  halls  and  slot  arcades  are  sought  out  by  gamblers  for  their  luckv 
properties  time  and  time  again.  The  affinity  between  a  gambler  and  'his'  place  represents  a 
propitious  combination  of  which  he  is  made  aware  by  an  ofiginal  win,  or  some  early  run  of 
luck,  while  positioned  there.  One  bingo  player  who  always  sits  in  the  same  place  states-  'When 
I  changed  seats  after  my  first  win,  I  lost  and  went  back  to  my  old  position  and  won  again,  so 
I'm  not  taking  any  more  chances'  (7he  Observer  19  February  1995,  p22).  The  negative  power 
residing  in  certain  places  compelled  gamesters  to  move  even  in  the  seventeenth  century,  when 
Pepys  observed  'the  different  humours  of  gamesters  to  change  their  luck  when  it  is  bad  -  how 
ceremonious  they  are  as  to  call  for  new  dice  -  to  shift  their  places  -  to  alter  their  manner  of 
throwing;  and  that  with  great  industry,  as  if  there  was  anything  in  it'(Pepys,  I  January  1668,  in 
Latham  and  Mathews  1976,  vol  9,  p3).  Such  places  are  not  merely  'places'  to  the  gambler. 
One  seat  or  one  kiosk,  is  not  identical  with  any  other  but  is  imbued  with  significance.  It  is  not 
simply  one  of  a  number  of  interchangeable  places,  but  is  the  only  one  of  its  kind,  and  is  sought 
out  by  the  gambler  for  its  unique  possession  of  power,  of  mana. 
Eliade,  Cassirer  and  van  der  Leeuw,  amongst  others,  have  demonstrated  what  the  gambler 
intuits  -  that  space  is  not  perceived  as  a  homogeneous  mass,  but  as  a  thing  possessed  of 
differing  qualities.  The  non-homogenous  experience  of  time  corresponds  to  the  non- 
homogeneous  experience  of  space  during  play  or  parts  of  space,  like  instants  of  time  'have 
., 
f 
their  specific  and  independent  value'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p393).  What  Cassirer  calls 
primitive'  or  'mythical'  space  (Cassirer  1944  and  1953)  is  a  space  of  action,  fraught  Nkith 
emotional  and  affective  elements.  Such  space  is  syncreticafly  bound  up  with  its  subject,  and 
so,  far  from  being  objective,  geometrical  and  abstract,  exhibits  egocentric  and 2h  11 
anthropomorphic  characteristics.  The  heterogeneous  nature  of  space  is  partlculariN,  evident  for 
Eliade  in  the  distinction  between  its  sacred  and  profane  forms.  While  the  latter  exists  as 
Ifortriless  expanse',  without  structure  or  consistency,  the  f1  ru  ormer  is  strong  and  sig 
giving  for-m.  to  the  world.  Thus,  the  sacred  empowers  space  by  organising  its  parts  and 
creating  order  (Eliade  1957).  In  the  sacred  arena  of  the  gambling  sites,  the  manifestation  of 
such  sacred  spaces  are  perceived  by  the  gambler  as  lucky  places;  as  centres  of  order.  At  this 
point,  we  can  recollect  the  creation  of  order  by  the  phenomenologica.  ]  'centres'  of  play  -  the 
tables,  machines  and  fixtures  of  gambling  that  exert  a  gravitational  pull  on  the  homogenous 
flux  of  individuals  wandering  around  them.  These  centres  differentiate  the  surrounding 
profane  space  by  giving  it  a  focus,  a  point,  an  orientation.  Out  of  'the  chaos  of  the 
homogeneity  and  relativity  of  profane  space,  the  discovery  or  projection  of  a  fixed  point  -  the 
centre  -  is  equivalent  to  the  creation  of  the  world'  (Eliade  1957,  p22).  This  empowerment  and 
ordering  of  the  phenomenological  sites  is  perceived  by  the  gambler  as  the  empowerment  of  his 
own  personal  space.  The  table  or  kiosk  at  which  he  stands  is  organised  and  familiar  -  it  'makes 
sense'to  him  in  a  way  others  of  its  kind  do  not.  In  this  way,  it  is  possessed  of  mwia,  or,  to  use 
van  der  Leeuw's  expression,  it  is  a  position.  A  position  is  an  area  of  sacred  space  which  is 
chosen  by  the  individual  for  its  possession  of  power,  and  which  he  then  orients  himself 
towards.  It  is  'not  some  arbitrary  point  in  space,  but  a  resting  place  in  universal  extensity;  a 
position  which  [the  individual]  recognises  and  towards  which  [he]  directs  himself  (van  der 
Leeuw  1967,  p393).  Such  positions  assume  their  select  status  'by  the  effects  of  power 
repeating  themselves  there,  or  being  repeated  by  man'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p393).  In 
gambling,  the  'effects  of  power'  are  felt  in  the  occurrence  of  winning.  The  momentary 
empowerment  of  the  ego  that  derives  from  winning  a  game  creates  a  moment  of  supreme 
order  and  harmony  for  the  gambler  and  everything  around  him.  In  this  way,  the  bingo  player 
who  attributed  her  luck  to  her  seating  became  aware  of  the  'winning  power'  of  her  space, 
henceforth  perceiving  it  as  a  position.  The  creation  of  order  by  the  securing  of  a  'position', 
specially  demarcated  within  sacred  space,  grounds  the  gambler  in  a  uruquely  empowered  place 
which  is  then  regarded  as  particularly  lucky  for  him.  Once  aware  of  the  power  around  them, 
gamblers  are  understandably  reluctant  to  give  up  their  places  and  will  try  to  occupy  them 
every  time  they  play,  with,  for  example,  slot  machine  players  becoming  notoriously  agitated  if 284 
prevented  from  doing  so.  Because  of  the  efficacy  that  is  believed  to  accrue  to  place,  .ke  can 
understand,  van  der  Leeuw  says,  'why  man  clings  with  such  obstinate  tenacity  to  the  positions 
he  has  once  adopted'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p393).  This  tenacity  was  abundantly  e"Ident  in 
the  1981  poker  final,  when,  in  the  full  glare  of  media  attention,  the  world's  most  skilled  poker 
players,  playing  for  hundreds  of  thousands  of  doflars,  petulantly  refused  to  change  seats 
Eventually  they  were  persuaded  and  moved  reluctantly,  muttering  and  indignant,  for  Alvarez 
confides,  every  one  was  'obscurely  afraid  of  what  a  new  seat  at  a  new  table  mýight  do  to  them' 
(Alvarez  199  1,  p  162). 
Ludy  Times 
Lucky  people,  places  and  things  exist  imbued  with  the  power  of  mana,  but  their  existence 
alone  is  not  sufficient  to  assure  luck,  for  they  are  dependent  for  their  efficacy  on  opportune 
moments.  Like  space,  time  is  not  a  homogenous  mass  but  is made  up  of  separate  intervals, 
each  with  its  own  unique  value.  Certain  times  therefore  are  more  favourable  than  others  and 
for  luck  to  befafl  a  player  it  is  important  that  it  occurs  at  the  fight  time. 
As  we  saw  in  Chapter  One,  this  notion  of  `timeliness'  is  designated  by  the  Greek  kairos-  'the 
time  of  the  due  situation:  the  time  of  grace'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p384).  The'due  situation'  Is 
the  time  of  the  unfolding  of  luck,  and  the  gambler  must  be  present  when  it  occurs,  otherwise 
his  own  luck  and  that  of  the  things  around  him  will  be  redundant.  The  power  of  the  propitious 
moment  overrides  that  of  the  mana  in  things,  for  it  must  be  present  for  the  latter  to  have 
efficacy. 
Richardson  is  well  aware  of  the  effects  of  inopportune  moments  on  a  player.  Most  gamblers, 
he  writes,  know  when  it  is  not  their  lucky  day,  and  they  ignore  this  intuition  at  their  peril 
Should  a  player  do  so,  he  will  be  gambling  wHe  'disconnected  from  propitious  flows  and 
patterns',  stubbornly  trying  to  force  a  return  of  the  luck  he  enjoyed  earfier.  When  this  happens 
'he  becomes  nothing  but  an  item  of  desperation,  someone  doomed  to  be  unloved  by  fortune 
and  destroyed  by  mathematics'  (Richardson  1980,  p127).  On  the  other  hand,  most  players 2X5 
have  a  strong  sense  of  when  it  is  their  lucky  time,  manifest  in  notions  of  the  'lucky  streak-', 
run  of  luck  and  being  'on  a  roll'.  In  this  state,  having  won  once  or  mice,  theN,  feel  certain 
they  Will  continue  to  do  so  until  their  time  passes.  How  andwhat  they  play  during  this  time  is 
irrelevant:  when  kairos  prevails,  their  every  action  will  result  in  ýkinning.  One  punter  ýkas 
convinced  of  the  potency  of  these  lucky  times,  saying.  'if  it's  our  night  we've  won  a  fortune  on 
stupid  things,  but  if  it's  not  our  night...  can't  do  a  thing'.  When  immersed  in  this  time  of  grace, 
gamblers  play  on,  convinced  its  influence  will  safeguard  their  every  move,  and  eager  to  make 
the  most  of  it  before  it  runs  out.  When  a  woman  had  a  lucky  run  at  craps,  vAnning  several 
throws  in  a  row,  an  envious  bystander  described  'the  streak  a  gambler  spends  his  '-vaking 
hours  trying  to  find  and  fide  to  glory'  (Vinson  1988,  p57). 
Just  like  the  gambler  who  finds  a  lucky  place  and  has  a  posifion,  the  gambler  who  finds 
himself  immersed  in  a  lucky  moment  finds  a  sittuition.  In  the  mythical  time  of  the  due  situation 
time  stands  still.,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  ceases  to  pass,  but  in  the  sense  that  'every  'when'  has 
become  a  matter  of  sheer  indifference'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p385).  For  the  woman  enjoying 
'her  moment'  at  craps,  duration  has  ceased.  The  awe-struck  onlooker  continued  his 
commentary:  'she  stopped  time  for  one  mythical,  magical  moment,  and  saw  everything  fall 
into  place'  (Vinson  1988,  p57).  The  experience  of  the  cessation  of  duration  we  saw  in  Chapter 
Four  thus  has  more  than  secular  significance,  for  it  is  also  the  apprehension  of  the  power  of 
the  due  situation;  a  power  which  brings  the  passage  of  time  to  a  standstill. 
This  cessation  of  duration  has  for  van  der  Leeuw  'the  religious  designation  of  eternity,  which 
provides  the  background  for  the  religious  celebrations'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p385).  The 
individual  who  celebrates  shares  vital  characteristics  with  the  one  who  gambles;  both 
ceremonies  are  performed  by  the  same  type;  one  'who  stands  stationary  in  the  midst  of  time 
because  he  finds  the  'situationl  and  who  does  not  therefore  simply  surrender  to  duration  but 
firmly  plants  his  feet,  and  for  one  moment  concentrates  both  himself  and  time'  (van  der  Leeuw 
1967,  p385).  When  man  encounters  Power,  van  der  Leeuw  writes,  he  must  halt.  When  the 
gambler  encounters  the  power  of  the  due  moment,  he  must  surrender  to  it  for  as  long  as  it 
lasts.  When  he  does  so,  time  fi7eezes;  his  Ar&  comes  to  a  standstill.  'Duration  then  is  the 26 
great  stream  flowing  relentlessly  on-  but  man,  encountering  Power  must  halt'  (van  der  Leeuý% 
1967,  p385),  The  gambler  stops  everything  to  indulge  in  the  Moment  -  which  he  knows  is 
fleeting.  He  plays  on  and  on  for  as  long  as  he  perceives  it  to  last,  spurred  on  by  the  potential 
of  his  imapned  winnings,  and  not  by  the  reality  of  his  just  as  frequent  losses.  The  i4ambler  for 
whom  time  has  frozen,  shows  that  'he  declines  the  given  as  such,  and  seeks  possibUit.  y'  (%,  an 
der  Leeuw  1967,  p385). 
Lucky  Numbers 
The  phenomenon  of  gambling  is  saturated  with  numbers.  The  trend  which  saw  the  emervence 
of  highly  numerical  types  of  wager  in  the  seventeenth  century  and  the  development  of  games 
of  chance  along  similarly  arithmetical  principles  in  the  nineteenth  is  continued  today,  with 
number  forming  the  basis  of  all  modern  commercial  gambling  forms. 
Gambling  can  be  said  to  represent  the  apogee  of  our  modem  obsession  with  enumeration,  and, 
moreover,  the  dual  nature  of  this  obsession;  for  both  the  scientific  and  the  mystical  forms  of 
knowledge  afforded  by  number  converge  here.  The  mechanics  of  play  -  the  calculation  of  odds 
and  distributions  of  wagers  -  is  governed  by  the  theory  of  probability,  and  lies  within  the 
domain  of  objective  scientific  knowledge.  However,  the  relation  of  the  gambler  to  play  is 
governed  by  a  different  order  of  knowledge  altogether.  Just  as  he  rejected  the  predictive 
insights  of  probability  theory,  so  he  rejects  the  building  blocks  of  that  insight  -  the  objective 
apprehension  of  number. 
Since  most  of  his  attention  during  play  is  concentrated  on  specific  numbers,  the  latter  come  to 
assume  enormous  significance  in  the  gambler's  subjective  map,  and,  more  than  any  other  facet 
of  play  are  regarded  as  imbued  with  magical  significance  and  specific  powers,  or  mwia.  In 
most  games,  possession  of  the  correct  number  or  series  of  number  is  the  key  to  winning,  and 
so  players  are  constantly  searching  for  that  elusive  digit  in  which  winning  ma?  ia  is  stored x 
In  Chapter  Two  we  saw  how  both  scientific  and  mythical  systems  of  number  attempted,  in 
their  different  ways,  to  explain  and  organise  the  contents  of  the  world.  In  the  scientific 
worldview,  like  the  phenomenon  of  chance,  number  is  regarded  as  an  explanatory  force  in 
itself,  whilst  in  the  mythical,  it  signifies  something  else.  What  the  scientific  mind  sees  as  a 
secular,  explanatory  power,  the  mythical  one  perceives  as  a  sacred  sign  of  the  ýkorklngs  of 
some'foreign  demoniac  powet'  (Cassirer  1953,  p  144). 
The  importance  of  number  to  the  gambler  cannot  be  overstated  -  as  that  which  determines  the 
outcome  of  a  game,  its  significance  reaches  other-worldly  dimensions,  a  position  which  befits 
its  status  in  the  mythical  worldview.  Here,  according  to  Cassirer,  'not  only  number  as  a  whole 
but  every  particular  number  is,  as  it  were,  surrounded  by  an  aura  of  magic  "hich 
communicates  itself  to  everything  connected  with  it'  (Cassirer  1953,  p  143).  In  his 
sanctification  of  number,  the  gambler  participates  in  a  long  western  tradition,  originating  in  the 
classical  world  where  Philolaus  sought  the  'nature'  of  number  in  all  human  as  well as  in  all 
divine  acts  and  works.  In  this  project,  number  became  'the  great  intermediary  by  which  the 
earthly  and  divine,  the  mortal  and  immortal'  communicated  with  each  other  (Cassirer  1953, 
pI44).  From  divine  messenger  to  divine  harmoniser,  for  the  Pythagoreans  order  was 
ultimately  reducible  to  number.  Observation  of  the  heavens  led  to  the  concept  of  a  celestial 
order  that  was  mirrored  on  earth  quantifiable  amounts.  Everything  in  the  universe  could  be 
expressed  in  the  language  of  mathematics,  for  'the  cosmos  is  isomorphic  with  pure 
mathematics'  (Schimmel  1993,  p13).  In  Pythagorean  number  mysticism,  the  universe  was 
divided  into  numerical  categories,  each  with  different  'natures'  or  attributes.  Odd  and  even 
numbers  were  regarded  with  particular  fascination;  for  Plato,  aH  even  and  all  perfect  numbers 
were  an  ill-omen.  Such  an  empowerment  of  number  was  described  critically  by  Aristotle  when 
he  wrote  that  the  mystical  Pythagoreans  'believed  the  entire  vault  of  heaven  to  be  harmony 
and  numbers'  (in  Schimmel  1993,  p  15).  It  is  in  this  tradition  that  the  gambler  is  engaged  Nvhen 
he  studies  numbers  as  bearers  of  power  and  meaning.  Keenly  aware  of  the  mysterious 
properties  resident  in  certain  digits,  he  is  engaged  in  a  constant  search  for  the  number  that  is 
right  for  him  in  this  particular  game.  A  variety  of  methods  of  number  selection  exist,  most 
operating  on  the  Pythagorean  assumption  that  every  earthly  phenomenon  can  be  expressed  as 298 
a  number  and  that  the  relations  between  numbers  produced  this  way  ýk  I  in  Possess  a  cerla, 
harmony.  The  dream  books  that  translate  dreams  into  numbers  also  transform  events  and 
objects  into  a  sefies  of  digits  imbued  with  metaphysical  meaning.  Drake  and  Clayton  descnbe 
such  a  translation  for  an  American  lottery-  'People  want  'hot'  numbers  Numbers  and 
combinations  of  numbers  defived  from  lucky  situations  are  much  more  powerful,  have  much 
more  of  what  anthropologists  call  mana  than  ordinary  run-of-the-MI'll,  garden  variet"', 
numbers'  (Drake  and  Clayton  1967,  p7).  Numbers  may  also  appear  of  their  own  accord, 
announcing  their  presence  with  their  own  peculiar  qualities  or  natures.  Thus,  Puerto  Rican 
lottery  players,  like  the  Pythagoreans,  attfibute  charactefistics  such  as  beautiful'  or  'u  to 
them  (Sulfivan  1972,  p83).  Simýilarly,  the  brothers  in  Paul  Auster's  Ihe  Music  of  Chatice  are 
very  aware  of  the'natures'of  numbers.  Stone  explains  that  cafter  a  while  you  begin  to  feel  that 
each  number  has  a  personality  of  its  own...  A  twelve  is  very  different  from  a  thirteen  for 
example...  It's  all  very  private,  but  every  accountant  I've  ever  talked  to  has  always  Said  the 
same  thing.  Numbers  have  souls  and  you  can't  help  but  get  involved  with  them  in  a  personal 
way'  (Auster  1990,  p73).  They  select  their  numbers  in  a  manner  that  utilises  their  harmonious 
balance,  and  so  unleashes  their  mysterious  power.  Like  the  Pythagoreans,  the  brothers  favour 
prime  numbers;  'It  was  all  so  neat  and  elegant.  Numbers  that  refuse  to  co-operate,  that  don't 
change  or  divide,  numbers  that  remain  themselves  for  all  eternity...  3,7,13,19,23,31 
... 
It 
was  the  magic  combination,  the  key  to  the  gates  of  heaven'  (Auster  1990,  p73-4). 
The  perception  of  harmony  is  also  the  expression  of  what  Cassirer  calls  'affective  tonality', 
typical  of  the  apprehension  of  numbers  in  mythical  thought.  'because  of  the  particular  intuitive 
content  and  the  particular  feeling  tone  attaching  to  specific  quantities,  the  diverse  numbers  do 
not  seem  absolutely  uniform  but  take  on  the  appearance  of  highly  differentiated  entities,  each 
having  a  sense  its  own  tonality'.  Such  tonality  contrasts  with  the  'purely  conceptual,  abstract- 
logical  determination  of  number',  and  is  perceived  in  the  mythical  consciousness  as  being  of 
far  greater  significance  than  the  mere  determination  of  quantity'  (Cassirer  1953,  p142).  %lanv 
gamblers  believe  in  their  ability  to  intuit  this  'affective  tonality';  an  ability  which  depends  on  the 
personal  significance  of  a  number  marking  it  out  from  the  undifferentiated  insigruificance  of  all 
others.  Numbers  which  have  some  association  with  the  player's  life  are  recognised  as  ha,.  ing 28"ý 
peculiar  qualitiesfor  thal  play,  er,  which  will  be  carfied  into  the  game  as  an  executive  power 
In  this  way,  'lucky'  numbers,  calculated  ftom  phenomenon  which  possess  personal 
significance  such  as  birthdays,  ages  and  telephone  numbers,  are  powerful  in  combination  with 
the  individual  for  whom  they  are  important.  An  instance  of  this  is  demonstrated  in  the  case  of 
one  gambler,  Angela  V,  who  became  reluctantly  aware  of  the  mysterious  forces  in  numbers 
when  numbers  that  were  significant  for  her  began  'appearing'  in  her  life.  The  number  in 
question  was  226  -  the  abbreviated  form  of  February  26  -  her  mother's  birthday.  The  night 
before  the  birthday,  she  dreamed  of  her  mother,  and  the  fol-lowing  day  saw  the  number  four 
times.  Initially,  she  was  worried  by  the  coincidence  'that  bothered  me...  I  was  upset',  but, 
becoming  aware  of  the  hidden  significance  contained  in  the  digits,  decided  to  play  the  number 
in  the  lottery.  After  she  won,  numbers  flooded  into  her  consciousness,  and,  highly  sensitised, 
she  was  in  no  doubt  as  to  their  significance  and  began  to  act  on  what  she  regarded  as  their 
prophetic  quality:  'other  numbers  began  to  bother  me  in  the  same  way...  I  would  see  them 
three  or  four  times  in  a  couple  of  days  and  I  would  bet  the  number  and  win...  I  was  afraid,  I 
thought  it  was  some  kind  of  an  omen,  a  message'  (in  Custer  and  Milt  1984,  p  151-2). 
For  Freud  (himself  intensely  superstitious  about  numbers),  the  significance  of  lucky  numbers 
could  be  explained  by  their  displacement  onto  the  external  world  in  the  mind  of  the  subject. 
Although  their  meaning  is  to  be  found  in  the  subconscious,  the  gambler,  like  all  superstitious 
people,  sees  their  significance  emanating  from  outside  the  self  For  this  individual,  meaning  is 
external:  'everything  he  observes...  is  full  of  significance,  everything  can  be  interpreted'.  The 
difference,  Freud  writes,  between  himself  and  a  superstitious  person  in  his  selection  of 
numbers  is  that  'first,  he  projects  outwards  a  motivation  which  I  look  for  within,  secondly,  he 
interprets  chance  as  due  to  an  event  while  I  trace  it  back  to  a  thought'  (Freud  1939,  p320). 
The  external  significance  which  the  gambler  interprets  in  number  has  its  source  in  the  relation 
of  the  individual  number  to  the  realm  of  the  transcendent,  where  all  is  'harmony  in  numbersi. 
Number  is  considered  by  the  gambler  as  it  was  by  Philolaus,  like  chance,  as  an  agent  of  some 
higher  meaning,  a  sign  whose  significance  derives  from  its  otherworldly  origin.  Hence  the 21A) 
'sacred  awe'  which  surrounds  lucky  numbers  connects  the  individual  momentan*IN.  Aith  the 
sacred,  and  is  revealed  in  the  mysterious  harmony,  or'affective  tonality',  of  the  number  itself 
Mana  and  the  Total  Representation  Of  Magic 
For  Mauss,  the  'total  representation'  that  is  magic  is  part  of  the  participatory  worldview, 
where  cause  and  effect  are  interchangeable  (Mauss  1972,  p63).  Fundamental  to  this 
worldview  is  the  belief  that  there  is  a  certain  relationship  between  the  persons  and  the  thIlIg.  v 
involved  in  ritual.  There  exist  many  ways  of  conceiving  this  relationship,  Mauss  writes,  but 
generally  it  implies  the  notion  that  something  is  shared.  'There  is  a  distinct  idea  that  there  is  a 
kind  of  continuity  between  the  agents,  the  patients,  the  materials,  the  spirits  and  the  end  object 
of  a  magic  rite'  (Mauss  1972,  p62).  Thus  mww  is  only  active  and  powerful  in  combination 
with  the  right  elements.  Any  number,  place  or  time  can  be  lucky,  but  only  for  a  given  player: 
the  same  number,  place  and  time  could  be  quite  ineffective  for  any  other  gambler.  Devereaux 
describes  the  importance  of  this  relation,  and  in  so  doing,  articulates  the  total  representation  of 
magic  in  relation  to  gambling.  Discussing  bettors'  notions  of  luck,  he  writes  that  they  'usually 
seem  to  involve  some  mysterious  connection  between  the  horse  and  something  which  the 
gambler  associates  with  himself  This  is  taken  as  a  sign  that  this  is  the  horsefor  him,  a  sort  of 
private  tip'.  For  the  gambler,  as  for  the  native,  'such  mystical  connecting  links  are  not  hard  to 
find.  In  a  flash  of  insight  he  recognises  that  the  jockey  of  a  given  horse  has  his  own  initials,  or 
that  the  colours  of  some  entry  are  his  coflege  colours,  or  that  the  post  position  and  the 
jockey's  weight  add  up  to  his  year  of  birth'  (Devereaux  1949,  p625).  The  associations  are 
perceived  as  the  mystical  forces  which  connect  the  gambler  to  that  thing  which  is  uniquely  his, 
and  which  he  recognises  by  this  'aura',  whether  it  is  the  sacred  aura  of  a  number,  a  time,  a 
place  or  a  thing. 
When  we  consider  the  involvement  of  the  notion  of  maw  within  the  total  representation  of 
magic,  the  behaviour  of  players  described  as  labouring  under  an  'Illusion  of  control',  and  other 
'irrational  cognitions',  becomes  clearer.  The  possession  of  mwia  allows  the  gambler  to 
influence  a  game  in  his  favour,  and,  within  the  participatory  worldview,  such  influence  is 291 
passed  on  from  its  possessor  to  the  outcome  of  a  game,  since  'there  is a  kind  of  continwtv 
between  the  agents...  the  materials...  and  the  encl  object...  '  of  the  game.  Rather  than  an 
, illusory  control'  over  throwing  dice  or  selecting  tickets,  the  gambler  lWou,  s  that  if  he  picks  his 
I 
ticket,  it  will  win,  for  the  conjunction  of  his  mana  and  that  of  the  ticket  that  find  each  other 
will  cause  this  to  happen.  In  this  case  then,  the  'end  object'  is  a  winning  ticket,  an  object 
which  will  only  be  effective  for  the  specific  player  if  he  is  allowed  to  realise  his  relationship  as 
the  'agent'  with  the  'materials'  -  the  ticket  -  and  the  'end  object'  -  winning. 
THE  RELIGIOUS  WORLDVIEW:  TRANSCENDENCE 
The  worldview  of  the  gambler  is  a  complex  one.  On  the  one  hand,  he  is  absorbed  in  a  world  of 
magical  participation  whose  efficacy  derives  fi7om  within  himself  and  exists  in  an  indissoluble 
relation  with  his  surroundings.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  also  concerned  with  the  operation  of  a 
power  that  fies  outwith  the  self,  and  which  determines  the  course  of  events  in  general  and  his 
life  in  particular  from  a  distant  and  all-powerful  transcendental  realm.  The  distinctions 
between  these  two  orders  of  belief  are  often  not  clear  cut  and  their  spheres  of  efficacy  can 
overlap  so  that  most  of  the  phenomena  so  far  designated  as  magical  also  possesses  quasi- 
religious  connotations.  It  is  to  this  specifically  religious  dimension  of  gambling  belief  that  we 
now  turn. 
The  Dualism  of  Luck 
This  dualism  is  perhaps  clearest  in  the  notion  of  maw,  which  exists,  somewhat  ambiguously, 
in  the  n-dnd  of  the  gambler  both  as  a  neutral  power  residing  in  things,  and  also  as  something 
else  -a  power  which  is  bestowed  from  without;  an  immaterial  sign  from  the  gods.  It  has  thus 
both  magical  and  theistic  connotations.  The  idea  of  mystical  'currents  and  flows'  which  we 
found  surrounding  the  notion  of  mwia  already  hinted  at  the  presence  of  another  set  of  beliefs 
operating  alongside  those  of  magical  efficacy.  Looking  back  to  the  first  mention  of  mana,  we 
will  remember  that  it  was  described  as  being  'in  a  way  supernatural'  and  that  for  %lauss  it 292 
embodied  absolute  power,  and  was  of  the  same  order  as  the  'order  of  the  sacred'  Mauss 
further  emphasised  the  transcendental  dimension  of  mwia  when  he  wrote  of  the  maggician  'if 
he  thinks  about  it,  he  may  even  come  to  the  conclusion  that  his  magical  powers  are  ýpmtc 
separateftom  him'  (Mauss  1972,  p138,  my  italics).  The  externality  of  the  power  of  mam  is 
most  evident  in  its  formulation  as  hamingia  -  the  guidance  of  an  unseen  hand. 
This  'guiding  hand'  is  a  constituent  element  of  gamblers'  conceptions  of  their  own  luck,  a 
semiconscious  apprehension  of  a  guiding  force.  The  idea  of  power  resident  within  them  is  still 
there,  but  its  origin  is  outwith  themselves.  For  the  gambler  in  E.  T.  A  Hoffinan's  G'ambler's 
Luck,  its  source  is  the  very  power  of  fate  itself,  for  luck  is  here  'the  most  terrible,  most 
insidious  enticement  of  the  hostile  power  of  fate'  (Hoffinan  1963,  p219).  A  patient  of  Bergler 
feels  sure  of  himself  when  he  plays,  but  this  is  not  simply  the  apprehension  of  his  own  mana, 
but  rather  'a  strange  sensation  that  I  am  an  executive  agent  of  something  beyond  my  control' 
(Bergler  1970,  p45). 
It  is  the  same  guiding  force  that  the  gambler  who  'threw  fistfuls  of  chips  at  random  on  the 
table,  accepfing  where  they  came  to  rest  as  fateful  places'  trusted  in  (Richardson  1980,  p232)). 
Like  the  ancient  diviner  with  his  bundle  of  divining  sficks  or  aýtrqgali,  this  individual  believed 
in  the  significance  inherent  in  the  random  pattern  made  by  his  chips,  for  he  believed  in  the 
mysterious  intentions  of  the  power  that  put  them  there. 
When  the  grandmother  in  Dostoevsky's  Me  Gambler  won,  she  too  attributed  her  luck  to  an 
external  force:  "Look,  look",  grandmother  quickly  turned  to  me,  all  radiant  and  happy.  "You 
know  I  told  you,  I  told  you.  And  it  was  the  Lord  himself  who  gave  me  the  Idea  of  betting  two 
gold  pieces"'  (Dostoevsky  1992,  p202).  The  'guiding  hand'  is  more  literal  for  another  punter 
and  is  again  specificafly  identified  as  God.  Recafling  how  she  watched  the  ball  bounce  out  of 
one  pocket  and  into  another,  this  lottery  winner  enthused  how  'it  was  like  God  took  it  out  of 
that  50,000  pocket  and  put  into  the  milhon  [pockeff. 29" 
An  image  of  this  guiding  hand  is  exploited  in  the  British  National  Lottery  advertisement  As  a 
constellation  of  stars  in  the  shape  of  a  giant  hand  descends  from  the  heavens,  this  literal 
depiction  of  the  hand  of  fate  extends  an  enormous  finger  to  one  lucky  individual  and  thunders 
its  celestial  pronouncement  -  'it's  YOU'. 
The  Apprehension  of  Power 
Amongst  the  various  forces  confronted  by  the  gambler  in  the  magic  circle,  ca  power  opposed 
to  the  seeming  omnipotence  of  the  I  makes  itself  felt'  (Cassirer  1953,  p233).  This  is  the 
apprehension  of  what  Otto  calls  the  'Wholly  Other',  that  indefinable  perception  of  the  sacred 
which  is  quite  beyond  'the  sphere  of  the  usuaL  the  intelligible,  the  farnifiar...  filling  the  mind 
with  blank  wonder  and  astonishment'  (Otto  1925,  p26).  Although  mere  adjectives  can  barely 
contain  the  sense  of  such  an  overwhelming  entity,  van  der  Leeuw  nevertheless  makes  the 
attempt,  describing  it  firstly  as  existing  alotigside  primitive  ideas  of  spirits  and  fetishes,  and 
secondly,  as  possessing  neither  Will  nor  Form,  but  being  Power  incarnate  (van  der  Leeu" 
1967,  p184).  Otto's  'Wholly  Other'  is  equivalent  to  this  'Power'  of  van  der  Leeuw,  in  both 
cases  it  is  absolutely  powerful:  'the  force  that  here  and  this  moment,  binds  me  [to  this  %-ery 
life,  this  very  time  and  place],  the  law  according  to  which  I  have  come  into  being...  The  fiddle 
as  to  why  I  was  bom  and  why,  just  here  and  now,  my  ffe  rolls  on  is  insoluble-  it  is  just  my  lot 
and  the  Power  apportioning  it  my  fate'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p  183). 
It  is  this  formless  Power  that  the  gambler  faces  when  he  plays,  and  is  contained  in  what  Gogol 
calls  the  'higher  mysteries'  of  cards  (Gogol  1926,  p216).  Conceived  variously  as  Fate, 
Destiny,  Fortune,  or  by  more  conventional  Christian  players  as  God,  this  is  the  impersonal 
force  that  fies  behind  events  in  the  gaming  arena,  and  determines  the  order  of  the  world 
outside.  It  is  to  this  that  Duryodhana  refers  when  he  declares  in  Me  Mahabharata-  'if  we 
gamble,  the  heavenly  gate  will  be  nearer'  (Ae  Mahabharata  1975,  p123).  The  Chevalier 
Menars  in  Hoffinan's  Gambler's  Luck  also  describes  such  a  force  when  he  advises  his  ffiend  to 
make  the  most  of  its  favourable  orientation  to  him  by  gambling:  "'Fate"',  he  said,  "Drops  hints 
to  us  as  to  the  path  along  which  we  should  seek  and  find  our  salvation.  The  higher  power  that 294 
rules  over  us  has  whispered  in  your  ear-  if  you  wish  to  acquire  money  and  goods  go  and 
gamble,  otherwise  you  will  remain  forever  poor,  indigent,  dependent..  "'  (Hoffman  1963. 
p222).  It  is  this  force  that  the  gambler  is  most  keen  to  propitiate,  since  It  is  this  that 
deternunes  his  fate  in  any  particular  round  ,  in  any  game  -  and  more,  for  such  an  othem-orldly 
Power  determines  the  balance  of  his  whole  life  and  the  order  of  his  very  existence.  In 
participating  in  a  game,  the  gambler  enters  the  realm  of  the  sacred,  the  arena  of  Pow'er.  His 
relation  to  it  is  fundamental  to  the  experience  of  play  and  is  a  vital  constituent  of  the  thrill,  for 
it  is  the  sensation  of  the  sacred  that  underlies  the  ambivalence  of  all  religious  experience. 
This  characteristic  is  fundamental  to  the  sensation  of  the  Wholly  Other,  and  has  been 
extensively  depicted  in  the  religious  phenomenologies  of  writers  like  Cassirer,  Otto,  and  van 
der  Leeuw.  For  the  latter,  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  Power  'is  always  simultaneouslN,  a 
being  attracted  and  a  being  repelled...  both  tremor  and  fascination'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967, 
p509),  while  for  Cassirer  it  is  a  combination  of  'fear  and  hope,  awe  and  admiration'  (Cassirer 
1953,  p78)  and  for  Otto,  a  mixture  of  horror  and  dread,  longing  and  attraction  (Otto  1925).  A 
pecuhar  kind  of  fear  dominates  each  of  these  relations,  not  fear  in  the  sense  of  alarm,  but 
rather  the  experience  which  Kierkegaard  calls  dread  and  which  the  gambler  experiences  as  a 
panicularform  of  dread  -  the  uncanny.  As  always,  this  Kierkegaardian  dread  is  ambivalent.  A 
constituent  aspect  of  being-in-the-world,  it  is  'a  mode  of  the  very  state  in  which  one  subsists' 
(van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p463),  and  is  a  condition  intermediate  between  being  repelled  and  being 
attracted.  For  Otto,  such  'peculiar  dread'  is  experienced  as  a  shudder  where  the  soul 
'trembles  inwardly  to  the  furthest  fibre  of  its  being'  (Otto  1925,  p  17).  He  also  cites  its  'eene  I, 
I weird'  and  specificafly  uncanny  aspect,  and  it  is  this  which  interests  us,  for  the  gambler's 
experience  of  the  sacred  is  the  experience  of  the  uncanny.  5  The  dread  sensation  of  the  uncanny 
can  overcome  him  at  play,  and  even  while  he  is  thinking  about  playing.  Its  horror  is  articulated 
by  one  gambler's  description  of  his  gambling  'daymares'-.  'I  sometimes  find  myself  apparently 
thinking  of  nothing.  I  am  roused  from  that  state  by  a  feeling  of  horror  and  uncanniness.  Then  I 
am  startled  and  try  to  recall  what  I  had  been  thinking  about.  A  few  of  these  times,  I  was  just 
'  It  is  this  sensation  of  uncanniness  that  is  conveyed  (intentionally  or  otherv6se)  in  the  cenly  atmosphenc  tales 
of  gambling  by  ariters  like  Balzac,  Dostoevsky.  Pushkin,  Hoffman  and  Baudelaire. 20 
rehearsing  a  roulette  game  I  had  played  the  day  before.  Why  should  that  harmless  thou  ht  be  L. 
so  temfying?  '  (in  Bergler  1970,  p45). 
Why  indeed?  Freud's  analysis  of  this  basic  aspect  of  the  religious  experience  traces  the  answer 
to  the  animist  conception  of  the  universe.  In  his  essay  on  Me  Utwwwj%  he  explains  ho1A  we 
attribute  an  uncanny  quality  to  impressions  that  confirm  our  animistic  mode  of  thinking.  even 
after  a  time  'at  which  in  our  judgement,  we  have  abandoned  such  beliefs'  (Freud  1955,  p24  I) 
Two  specific  situations  which  can  stimulate  this  sense  of  the  uncanny  are  identified:  the 
recurrence  of  coincidence,  and  the  uncertainty  as  to  whether  an  object  is  alive  or  not.  This 
latter  case  can  also  occur  when  an  inanimate  object  becomes  too  much  like  a  five  one,  sending 
a  shudder  of  horror  through  the  onlooker.  One  punter,  referred  to  in  Chapter  Four, 
experiences  this  form  of  the  uncanny  when  sitting  at  the  garning  table,  overcome  by  a  mixture 
of  amazement,  horror  and  fascination.  He  related  'It's  the  same  feeling  you'd  get  if  you  looked 
at  a  statue  and  suddenly  saw  it  move'.  Freud  tells  us  that  the  sensation  of  the  uncanny  is  also 
associated  with  the  repetition  of  coincidences.  A  secret  'meaning'  can  be  ascribed,  for  example, 
to  the  recurrence  of  a  number  throughout  the  day.  The  continued  appearance  of  that  number 
is  then  perceived  as  uncanny  -  witness  the  obvious  uneasiness  in  the  testimony  of  Angela  V 
who,  aware  of  the  repeated  occurrence  of  the  number  226  over  the  course  of  a  single  da-, 
became  unnerved,  upset  and  finally  afraid  by  its  uncanny  appearance.  Freud  explains  the  fear 
engendered  by  such  recurrence  as  an  aspect  of  the  compulsion  to  repeat  -a  compulsion  which 
overrides  the  pleasure  principle  and  lends  to  certain  aspects  of  mind  their  'demoniac 
character'.  Thus  'whatever  reminds  us  of  this  inner  compulsion  to  repeat  is  perceived  as 
uncanny'  (Freud  1955,  p238). 
It  must  be  remembered  that  the  sensation  of  the  uncanny  need  not  necessarily  be  unpleasant, 
on  the  contrary,  a  certairiftisson  of  pleasure  can  be  derived  from  exposure  to  it,  and  it  is  in 
this  sense  that  we  can  understand  the  'potent  attraction'  of  the  'repeated  shudder'  of  horror 
stories  heard  again  and  again'  (Otto  1925,  p16)  The  gambler  experiences  the  same  ffisson 
when  the  card  he  has  been  waiting  for  does  come  up,  when  the  numbers  he  has  been  made 
aware  of  all  day  continue  to  appear  and  when  he  does  not  bet  because  he  Inovvs'  the  horse 2k 
vAll  not  win  that  particular  round.  van  der  Leeuw  maintains  'man  loves  his  dread  and  becomes 
fascinated  by  it',  in  the  way  that  someone  who  gazes  into  a  stream  for  a  long  time  becomes 
'fascinated  by  the  horror  of  the  water'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p465).  In  the  arena  of  play,  this 
is  felt  as  the  sensation  of  the  uncanny  sweeping  over  the  gambler.  He  becomes  almost  'pulled 
in'  by  his  dread,  and  in  this  sense,  the  player  who  is  transfixed  by  the  rhythm  of  a  game  shares 
the  experience  of  the  individual  gazing  at  the  water.  One  such  punter,  who  we  saw  in  Chapter 
Four,  underwent  such  an  uncanny  almost  visceral,  experience,  and  was  rendered  immobile  by 
an  uncanny  force.  As  he  described  it:  'You  can't  leave  the  table,  you're  frozen  to  the  table' 
This  dread,  writes  van  der  Leeuw  comprises  the  sense  of  'unrestricted  possibility',  the  'vertigo 
of  liberty'  and  as  such  represents  the  'existential  tension  between  man  and  the  sacred'.  It  can 
also  be  conceived  as  the  dread  of  anticipation,  for  the  unlimited  possibility  implied  in  the 
existence  of  an  absolute  Power  concerns  the  determination  of  personal  destiny  (van  der  Leeuw 
1967,  p465). 
In  supplicating  the  realm  of  the  sacred,  the  gambler  is  questioning  this  destiny,  asking  a 
question  which  holds  the  potential  for  limitless  possibility,  as  well  as  finite  nothingness.  The 
possibility  of  salvation  or  damnation  opens  up  in  front  of  him  in  a  panorama  of  dread  and  awe 
In  the  face  of  Power,  the  query  'will  I  winT  takes  on  cosmic  significance,  far  transcending  the 
outcome  of  the  mere  game  and  amounting  to  the  gambler's  questioning  of  the  basis  of  his  very 
existence  and  his  place  in  the  universe.  According  to  Devereaux,  for  the  player  who  asks  'am  I 
lucky?  ':  'the  answer  seems  somehow  to  promise  a  solution  to  the  whole  problem  of  his 
personal  relation  to  the  supernatural  powers  that  govern  the  universe  (Devereaux  1949, 
p98  1). 
The  luck  conceived  as  the  personal  possession  of  power  or  mwia  here  takes  on  religious 
significance  as  a  sign  of  external  favour.  The  gambler  wants  simply  to  /Olow  his  status.  In  an 
inner  dialogue,  Richardson  debates  his  motives  for  gambling-  "'I  want  to  know,  I  finallv  want 
to  knoV',,  he  asks,  and  his  inner  voice  retorts  "what  do  you  so  badly  want  to  know9"  And  I 
would  answer,  "whether  I  am  to  have  any  grace  in  this  fife"'  (Richardson  1980,  p2s).  Since 
the  realm  of  the  sacred  cannot  be  influenced  by  magical  means,  to  find  out  his  status,  the 29' 
gambler  must  simply  play,.  To  this  end,  the  formal  structure  of  a  gamble  creates  an  arena  for  a 
ritualised  dialogue  with  the  sacred.  The  true  gambler  is  therefore  one  who  simply  %kants  to 
enter  into  communication  with  the  sacred,  playing  in  a  quest  for  metaphysical  satistaction  with 
no  thought  of  pecuniary  gain.  Hoffinan's  Chevalier  describes  one  such  a  player,  who  %&  ould  sit 
alone  in  his  room  for  days  on  end,  playing  banque  and  staking  against  himself  in  an  attempt  to 
reach  the  transcendental  realm.  In  his  description  of  the  game,  the  fundamental  dynarruc  of 
gambling  is  revealed:  'the  rule  of  the  higher  power  emerges  clearly,  and  it  is  just  this  that 
stimulates  our  spirit  to  stir  its  wings  and  try  whether  it  cannot  soar  into  the  dark  kingdom.  into 
the  fateful  workshop  of  that  higher  power  and  eavesdrop  on  its  workings.  '(Hoffman  1963, 
p223).  In  these  'ritualised  dialogues',  we  see  evidence  of  the  oracular  origins  of  gambling,  and 
are  reminded  of  the  ontogenesis  of  games  of  chance  in  refigious  ritual. 
Just  as  the  modem  phenomenological  sites  can  be  said  to  resemble  the  specially  demarcated 
magic  circles  of  the  ancient  diviners,  so  the  instigation  by  the  diviner  of  an  action  whose 
outcome,  guided  by  the  divinity,  could  only  be  one  of  two  meaningful  alternatives  can  be  said 
to  resemble  the  gambler's  plunging  into  an  activity  which  can  have  only  one  of  two  outcomes  - 
win  or  lose  -  considered  as  the  unambiguous  verdict  on  his  fate.  As  we  saw  in  Chapter  Four, 
the  gambler's  wager  represents  himself  and  by  staking  it  he  is  offering  it  -  and  vicariously, 
himself,  up  to  Power  to  dispose  of  at  will.  The  outcome  of  the  game  determines  whether  he 
loses  his  wager  or  is  rewarded  by  winning  more  money-  whether  he  is  deserted  or  favoured  by 
Fate.  By  hosting  this  confrontation,  the  gambling  site  becomes  the  arena  of  a  fitualised 
encounter,  where  gambling  itself  becomes  a  symbolic  activity  in  which  'the  player  asks  for  a 
decision  that  assures  him  the  unconditional  favour  of  destiny'  (Caillois  1962,  p73). 
Freud's  analysis  of  Dostoevsky's  passion  for  gambling  was  founded  on  the  assumption  that  the 
activity  ftinctioned  as  a  cycle  for  the  purgation  of  guilt,  with  losses  masochistically  courted  by 
the  gambler  as  punishment  for  his  sins.  Reik's  comments  on  the  article  developed  Freud's 
analysis  into  a  more  compelling  argument  which  took  into  account  the  oracular,  religious 
dimension  of  gambling  belief  Reik  postulated  that  the  overriding  concern  of  the  gambler  was 
not  that  he  had  sinned,  but  the  uncertainty  as  to  whether  or  not  he  would  be  punished  for  it. 2,  )8 
His  concern  then,  simply  became  to  Imou,  his  fate,  and  so  his  actions  assumed  the  forin  of  a 
question  addressed  to  destiny.  Ultimately,  gambling  became  a  divinatory  activity  'a  modem 
form  of  consulting  the  oracle'  (Reik,  in  Halliday  and  Fuller  1974,  p8O  )_6  A  patient  of  Berv-ler 
confirmed  this  theoretical  perspective  when  he  outlined  what  for  him  was  the  dynamic  of  piaN- 
'For  me,  gambling  is  a  question  I  ask  Fate.  The  question  is  simple  -  am  I  your  favounte9,  (in 
Bergler  1970,  p83).  For  Richardson,  writing  from  within  the  Protestant  tradition.  the 
expression  is  slightly  different  '...  gambling  provides  the  answer  to  what  all  men  want  to 
know,  namely  which  of  us  are  the  elect'  (Richardson  1980,  p2l-2).  The  answer  is 
communicated  unambiguously  in  the  outcome  of  a  game.  'Winning  means  that  Fate  nods 
approvingly  with  her  head  and  sn-ffles  lovingly.  Loving  means  a  warning  and  threatening 
finger'  (Bergler  1970,  p230).  Both  players  want  the  certitude  of  the  lucky  lottery  winner, 
speciafly  chosen  from  millions  of  others  by  the  starry  rnýiasma  erupting  from  the  cosmos.  For 
one  moment,  the  heavens  open  and  the  gambler  is  assured  of  his  status  and  bestowed  with 
beatitude  and  grace.  For  Bergler,  such  beliefs  are  yet  another  instance  of  the  gambler's 
megalomaniacal  egotism.  'He  believes  that  Fate  has  singled  him  out  from  the  other  two  billion 
inhabitants  of  the  earth  and  communicates  with  him  by  means  of  small  signs  indicating 
approval  and  approach'  (Bergler  1970,  p230).  Organisers  are  keen  to  encourage  these  kinds 
of  beliefs,  as  were  those  of  a  lottery  held  in  1572  in  Paris  who  spelled  out  Divine  favour  on 
winning  tickets.  Dieu  vous  a  e1u:  'God  has  chosen  you'  was  the  phrase  written  on  winning 
tickets;  Dieu  vous  console:  'God  comforts  you  1),  on  losing  ones  (in  Brenner  and  Brenner  1990, 
P9). 
The  player's  faith  in  his  'direct  communion'  with  fate  is  the  transcendent  or  religious  dimension 
of  the  confidence  inspired  by  his  belief  in  the  magical  efficacy  of  his  own  malia.  The  maiia  of 
the  magician  is  the  state  of  election  of  the  gambler.  We  can  see  the  clear  conjunction  of  these 
two  interpretations  in  the  dice  game  of  huarpi,  played  by  the  Canelo  of  Ecuador.  The  game, 
which  we  described  in  Chapter  Two,  involves  throwing  dice  over  the  corpse  at  a  death  ,,  -igil.  A 
6  Certain  writers  in  the  psychoanaINlic  tradition  (e.  g.  Greenson.  France,  Lindncr)  have  made  much  of  the 
oracular  origins  of  gambling,  but  have  interpreted  the  idea  of  fate  as  a  father  figure  at  the  centrc  of  Oedipal 
conflicts,  thus  making  the  fundamental  dynamic  of  play  not  religious  but  sexual.  (See  Halliday  and  Fullcr 
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particularly  lucky  player  is  believed  to  be  favoured  by  the  dead  man,  an  unluck-,  -  one  disliked 
by  him.  Although  favour  is  bestowed  here  not  by  our  pure  nameless  Poýker,  but  bý  ancestor 
spirits,  the  principle  behind  the  notion  of  luck  is  the  same-  the  source  of  individual  luck,  or 
mana,  is  outwith  the  self,  emanating  from  the  transcendental  realm  of  unseen  powers  and 
manifest  in  the  winning  of  a  game. 
A  kind  of  circular  causation  similar  to  that  encountered  earlier  permeates  the  notion  of  luck  as 
the  favour  of  fate  or  state  of  election.  If  a  gambler  wins,  it  is  because  he  is  lucky,  and  if  he  is 
lucky,  he  will  win.  Within  this  tautological  system,  luck  or  favour,  once  bestoNýed,  are 
impossible  to  lose.  Conversely,  they  are  also  impossible  to  attain  if  not  bestowed.  Pluerto 
Rican  lottery  players  adopt  a  philosophical  approach  to  this  dilemma,  saying  'if  a  person  Is 
meant  to  have  luck,  it  wifl  find  him.  If  he's  not  there's  no  use  looking  for  it'  (in  Sullivan  1972, 
p83).  When  the  gambler  is  singled  out,  he  can  do  no  wrong.  As  a  roulette  player  we  saw 
earlier  stated,  once  (your  time  is  up',  you  can  act  with  impunity,  secure  in  the  knowledge  that 
you  cannot  lose.  This  punter's  statement  can  now  be  revealed  in  full  to  indicate  the 
transcendental  origin  of  such  empowerment:  'Wefl,  I  think  it's  'im  up  there  and  if  'e  says  It's 
your  night,  it's  your  night  and  whatever  you  do  you  can't  lose...  if  it's  my  night  I've  won  a 
fortune  on  stupid  things,  but  if  it's  not  my  night...  can't  do  a  thing'.  In  the  same  wav,  Flower 
describes  his  luck  after  winning  the  lottery-  'Good  luck  continued  to  come  our  way.  No 
matter  what  we  do,  everything  seems  to  turn  out  fight...  It's  as  though  God  has  singled  us  out 
from  other  men.  He's  showered  us  with  good  fortune  and  hfted  us  to  the  heights  of 
happiness...  at  times  I  feel  that  we've  become  immortal'  (Auster  1990,  p75).  This  notion  of 
invincibility  was  codified  in  a  British  State  Lottery  of  1569,  where,  in  addition  to  a  first  pnze 
of  L5000  there  existed  a  prize  which  rendered  the  winner  free  from  arrest  for  seven  days, 
except  for  major  crimes!  (in  Brenner  and  Brenner  1990,  pIO)  Favour  becomes  literal 
immunity! 
It  is  in  this  favoured  state  that  the  gambler  feels  able  to  reverse  the  laws  of  probability,  for  the 
power  bestowed  by  election  means  he  can  do  no  wrong.  Such  favour  is  perceived  as  luck,  as  a 3(X) 
bingo  player  reiterates-  'I've  always  been  a  lucky  person,  I  feel  special,  as  if  someone  up  there 
favours  me'. 
I 
The  efficacy  that  derives  from  this  state  of  electioný  unlike  the  power  of  mana,  can  be 
completely  unwilled.  Like  the  Protestant  who,  owing  to  the  omnipotent  and  transcendental 
nature  of  his  God,  cannot  effect  his  status  in  the  afterlife  by  worldly  activity,  gamblers  caiinot 
rid  themselves  of  their  select  status  when  it  is  upon  them.  The  protagonist  Slegfied  in 
Hoffinan's  Gambler's  Luck  presents  us  with  the  unusual  instance  of  a  reluctant  winner  who 
actually  wants  to  lose.  However,  he  can  do  nothing  to  prevent  his  favoured  status  being 
demonstrated  in  every  game:  'He  went  to  the  bank  with  the  firm  resolution  of  losiný 
... 
but  1  .4 
even  in  gambling,  the  luck  which  stood  by  him  in  everything  he  undertook  remained  true  to 
him.  Every  card  he  chose  won  ... 
He  could  change  cards,  he  could  carry  on  with  the  sarne  ones, 
it  made  no  difference,  he  always  won.  The  Baron  displayed  the  rare  spectacle  of  a  punter  who 
is  beside  himself  because  the  cards  come  out  favourably  to  him'  (Hoffman  1963,  p215). 
As  the  external  favour  of  omnipotent  Power,  luck  cannot  be  cultivated  by  the  gambler.  Just  as 
the  Protestant  had  a  duty  to  consider  himself  elect,  so  the  gambler,  to  play  with  confidence 
and  to  truly  plunge  into  the  game,  also  has  to  presume  his  chosen  status.  To  play  poker,  one 
regular  declares:  'You  have  to  believe  in  your  luck,  in  your  special  relationship  with  fate,  in 
the  possibility  that  you  are  somehow  chosen  or  blessed'. 
The  Religious  Experience  of  Power 
Quesdoning 
In  Chapter  Four  we  looked  at  the  gambler's  experience  of  play,  defining  various  aspects  of  the 
thrill  as  the  state  of  dream-like  dissociation,  the  frenzied  plunging  and  the  mystical  state  of 
transcendence  encountered  when  winning.  It  is  now  time  to  turn  to  another  dimension  of  this 
experience  for,  wWe  his  comprehension  is  engaged  in  a  world  of  magical  causation  and 
religious  significance,  the  gambler's  affective  apprehension  of  play  is  imbued  "ith  elements  of (i  I 
a  mystical-religious  nature.  This  dimension  was  alluded  to  in  Chapter  Four,  and  tbrrns  a 
constituent  element  of  the  experience  of  dissociation,  namely  those  aspects  iný,  olving 
Lmystical  experiences,  ecstatic  religious  states...  and  phenomena  of  possession'  (Brown  1994) 
As  he  awaits  the  outcome  of  a  game,  the  gambler  awaits  the  resolution  of  his  life,  an  issue  of 
such  cosmic  significance  as  to  create  in  him  an  altered  state  of  consciousness,  similar  in  many 
respects  to  that  experienced  by  prophets  and  diviners,  and  described  variously  as  mystical  and 
ecstatic  states.  According  to  Screech,  such  states  exist  in  a  variety  of  forms,  ranging  from 
prophetic  madness  (the  Greek  manitke)  and  dream-like  torpor  to  states  of  spiritual  possession. 
Fundamental  to  this  diversity  is  the  ecstatic  state  of  amazement  or  stupour,  from  the  ,  erb 
existemi  meaning  to  amaze  or  astonish.  This  'acute  distraction'  is  the  sensation  of  religious  fear 
or  awe;  a  dread  brought  about  by  ffight  (Screech  1980).  Hence  we  are  once  more  brought  to 
a  consideration  of  that  central  feature  of  all  religious  experience  -  the  sensation  of  dread, 
directly  apprehended  by  the  gambler  as  the  uncanny  -  and  ftom  this  basis  ecstatic  mental  state 
to  the  existence  of  others,  experienced  by  the  gambler  as  a  dream-like  state  and  a  ftenzý-. 
Dream  State 
Inherent  in  this  morbid  amazement  is  a  state  of  dream-like  quafity,  in  which  the  ecstatic  neither 
knows  what  he  is  doing  nor  remembers  it  afterwards,  except  as  through  a  cloud  or  dream 
(Screech  1980,  p193).  Although  characterised  by  distraction  and  amnesia,  such  a  state  is 
frequently  sought  out  by  prophets  for  the  profound  illumination  its  removal  of  the  subject  to 
the  realm  of  the  sacred  is  thought  to  afford.  For  this  reason,  the  Huron  Indians  utifise  the 
dream  state  in  order  to  induce  sacred  insights  before  playing  games  of  chance.  Before  such 
games,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  Two,  they  fast  to  facilitate  entry  into  the  sacred  realm, 
whereupon  the  result  of  the  games  will  be  revealed.  The  Esquimaux  medicine  man  enters  a 
similar  trance  in  order  to  undertake  the  divining  process.  His  dream-state  is  like  that  of  the 
Huron,  and,  in  its  dissociative  aspects,  also  like  that  of  the  gambler.  Levy-Bruh]  describes  the 
'hypnotic  slumber  or  cataleptic  or  ecstatic  trance'  in  which  he  enters  the  realm  of  unseen 
powers.  Ifis  experience  is  like  that  of  a  dream  which  is  induced...  '  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p216). 
This  trance-state  is  the  condition  that  the  gambler  involuntarily  enters  when  he  begins  to  play, 302 
In  the  phase  that  we  called  the  'dream-state',  he  is  overcome  by  an  absence  of  mind  'A  hich  he 
experiences  as  though  in  a  daze  (Bergler)  or  a  dream  (Dostoevsky).  This  dream-state  is  the 
sensation  of  entering  another  world,  the  crossing  over  into  the  realm  of  the  sacred.  The 
subject  is  dislocated  from  one  reality  as  he  begins  to  encounter  another.  It  is  the  initial 
apprehension  of  the  existence  of  Power.  The  ecstatic  prophets  of  the  New  Testament 
experienced  similar  states  in  their  confrontation  with  God,  'in  which  thought  and  volition 
cease'  (Guillaume  1938,  p293).  Guillaume  describes  their  transport  as  beginning  "when 
thought  ceases,  to  our  consciousness,  to  proceed  from  ourselves.  It  differs  from  dreaming 
because  the  subject  is  awake...  it  is...  a  temporary  enhancement,  not  a  partial  disintegration,  of 
the  mental  faculties'  (Guillaume  1938,  p293). 
This  is  the  state  Richardson  was  in  when  he  'was  incapable  of  articulate  thought'.  At  the  same 
time  he  experienced  a'temporary  enhancement'of  perception,  when  his  senses  were  opened  to 
let  the  impressions  of  the  casino  flood  over  him  with  the  utmost  clarity.  Will  and  thought  left 
him  so  that  he  became  a  creature  of  sensation,  pul-led  along  by  the  functioning  of  the 
subconscious  mind.  Echoing  Guiflaume's  analysis,  Richardson  described  this  condition.  'It  is 
an  unconscious  self-consciousness  like  the  functioning  of  the  rational  mind  in  a  dream  when 
the  normal  response  of  the  waking  mind  operates  even  while  the  subconscious  mind  carries 
the  dreamer  along  the  path  of  imagination'  (Richardson  1980,  p294). 
Frenzy 
The  state  of  frenzy,  in  which  the  gainbler  loses  track  of  the  passage  of  time,  his  surroundings 
and  the  parameters  of  his  ego,  represents  a  peaking  of  the  experience  of  play.  According  to 
Caillois,  this  state  of  'inexorable,  total  frenzy'  is  often  found  in  the  play  world,  and  it  is  this 
which  brings  that  world  into  the  orbit  of  the  sacred.  The  conjunction  makes  play  'naturallý 
pan  of  the  sphere  of  the  sacred,  perhaps  providing  one  of  the  principal  bases  for  the  terror  and 
fascination  of  the  sacred'  (Caillois  1962,  p76).  Linking  the  sacred  with  the  profane,  this'divine 
frenzy'  is  indicative  of  the  dual  nature  of  both  games  and  ritual  we  saw  in  Chapter  One,  and,  as 
such,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  it  appears  in  gambbg  games  as  well  as  in  religious 303 
ritual.  Guillaume  describes  how  the  tiabli  prophets  inspired  themselves  to  ecstasy  by  dancing 
and  drumming,  rousing  themselves  into  such  a  fever  or  excitement  'that  they  were  for  hours 
oblivious  to  their  surroundings'  (Guillaume  193  8,  p  114).  In  simýar  fashion,  the  Azande  ýk  ould 
continue  their  ritual  until  they  had  danced  themselves  into  'a  condition  bordering  on 
dissociation'  (Evans-Pritchard  1991,  p87).  In  these  kinds  of  ritual,  participants  are  overcome 
by  a  delirium  bordefing  on  temporary  insanity;  what  the  Greeks  caRed  mwna  orfiiror  -  di,,  ine 
madness.  From  this  comes  the  Platonic  notion  of  the  affinity  between  ecstasy  or  divine 
possession  and  madness.  7 
When  playing,  the  gambler  passes  through  various  stages  of  dissociation  that  culminate  in  a 
delirium  not  unlike  the  one  outlined  above.  In  the  state  of  vertigo  or  ilinx  which,  as  we  have 
seen  destroys  the  stability  of  perception  with  'sovereign  brusqueness',  the  gambler  loses  track 
of  his  surroundings  and  the  passage  of  time.  In  what  are  called  'dissociated  states',  he  feels 
separate,  disorientated  and  disconnected  from  himself  -a  condition  he  sharesVAth  the  Azande 
who  have  danced  themselves  into  dissociation.  As  the  intensity  of  play  reaches  its  peak,  the 
gambler  undergoes  a  period  of  temporary  madness,  during  which  'in  a  certain  sense,  he  is 
insane'.  Dostoevsky's  Alesky  wondered  if  he  had  taken  leave  of  his  senses,  and  indeed  he  had, 
for  the  experience  of  insanity  is  integral  to  such  an  experience  of  the  sacred. 
Accompanying  these  transports  of  madness  is  the  physical  sensation  of  vertigo  in  which 
prophets  and  mystics  become  oblivious  to  pain,  frequently  losing  one  or  more  of  their  senses, 
and  hallucinating,  imagining  bizarre  noises  and  visions.  As  the  gambler  awaits  the  decision  of  a 
game,  he  too  is  seized  by  physical  turmoil,  as  was  Disraeli's  Young  Lhike  who  played,  gripped 
with  nausea,  his  ears  ringing  with  'supernatural  roaring'.  This  turmoil  of  anticipation  is  the 
sensation  of  vertigo,  which  gives  way,  when  tension  peaks,  to  a  dissociated  state  of  temporary 
insanity  as  the  gambler  finally  enters  the  reah-n  of  the  sacred.  At  last,  the  interlocutor  is 
enlightened  and  he  is  swept  away  to  communion  with  the  divine.  For  a  moment,  his  being 
merges  with  the  sacred  in  a  sublime  moment  of  transcendence.  Such  communion  is 
'See  Plato's  Phaedrus  and  Ion;  also  Guillaume  (1938). 31)4 
expefienced  by  the  gambler  as  well  as  the  prophet  as  the  sensation  of  plunging.  'Ahen  'The 
interval  between  object  and  subject  is...  completely  annulled,  and  the  absolute  otherness,  the 
transcendence  of  Power,  can  persist  only  in  the  feeling  of  plunging  'Aithin  the  urmerse'  (van 
der  Leeuw  1967,  pI85).  This  plunging  is  what  Dostoevsky  felt  when  he  wondered  if  his 
experience  of  play  was  anything  like  Madame  Blanchard's  plunge  from  the  balloon  It  is  also 
the  mystical  sensation  of  the  unio  mysfica  of  the  Lutherans  -  the  loss  of  the  ego  and 
communion  with  God  in  a  'feeling  of  actual  absorption  in  the  Deity'  (Weber  1990,  p  112),  In 
the  direct  apprehension  of  Power,  the  individual  is  delirious  and  filled  with  power  himself  The 
sensafion  is  of  'the  expansion  of  life,  the  collapse  of  all  limitations,  so  that  it  seems  as  though 
the  whole  world  were  moving  with  oneself  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p488).  In  this  state, 
Richardson  feels  that  he  is  more  'in  the  world'  than  he  has  ever  been  before-  through  his 
transcendence  and  communion  with  the  divine,  he  has  acquired  ontological  pre.,  vence. 
According  to  Cassirer,  this  union  between  God  and  man,  common  to  mystical  religious 
experience,  can  be  descfibed  as  the  moment  when  'man  becomes  a  god  and  the  god  becomes 
man'  (Cassirer  1953,  p230).  It  is  this  very  transformation  that  makes  Richardson  feel 
superhuman,  and  that  convinces  Steimmetz's  young  gambler  'he  was  no  longer  an  ordinarý- 
mortal'.  As  the  gambler  experiences  the  transcendence  of  play,  his  ego  merges  with  the  world, 
resulting  in  a  state  of  indifferentiation  between  the  world  and  his  self  The  magical 
indissolution  of  subject  and  ob  ect  is  thus  also  a  constituent  part  of  the  reli  ious  experience  of  j  91 
play.  The  well  documented  egotism  of  the  gambler  (for  example,  in  Bergler  1970)  can  now  be 
seen  as  a  state  in  which  the  ego  actually  dissolves  in  the  communion  with  the  divine.  What 
appears  as  egotism  is  merely  a  means  to  an  end;  the  end  being,  in  Sartre's  words,  nothing  less 
than  the  project  of  mankind:  'Man  makes  himself  man  in  order  to  be  God,  and  selffiess, 
considered  from  this  point  of  view,  can  appear  to  be  egotism'  (Sartre  1957,  p92).  As  he  plays, 
the  gambler  loses  awareness  of  time,  place  and  self,  caught  in  an  undifferentiated  ever-present 
that  reflects  the  state  of  the  sacred  in  which  he  is  immersed.  Leuba  describes  this  experience  of 
the  divine  thus-  'Simultaneously  with  the  loss  of  taste  and  hearing,  the  body  had  completely 
lost  its  sense  of  orientation.  It  seemed  as  though  it  were  nowhere  at  all,  but  were  simply 
hovering  in  space'  (in  van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p488).  This  mystical  'disembodiment'  is 
experienced  by  the  gambler  in  his  moment  of  transcendence,  for  it  is  the  experience  of  the 305 
divine.  Cassirer  outlines  the  conditions  necessary  for  such  an  experience  and  in  so  doing, 
outlines  the  timeless,  formless  parameters  of  the  experience  of  play.  'In  order  to  apprehend 
the  divine  we  must  first  cast  off  all  the  conditions  of  finite,  empirical  being,  the  -,  Ahere-,  the 
"'when"  and  the  "what"...  '  for  the  divine  'has  no  "where"'...  and  all  difference  and  contrast  of 
time  -  past,  present  and  future  -  are  extinguished  in  Him-  His  eternity  is  a  present  now  that 
knows  nothing  of  time'  (Cassirer  1953,  p250).  Hence  the  gamblees  oblivion  to  his 
surroundings  and  to  the  passing  of  time  as  he  aspires  instead  to  the  realm  of  the  divine  in 
which  such  phenomena  do  not  exist. 
Answering 
For  the  gambler,  the  various  states  of  the  thrill  culminate  in  a  condition  whose  affective  tone 
varies  depending  on  whether  he  is  winning  or  losing  -  blessed  or  damned.  The  caprice  of  such 
a  condition  is  intimately  associated  with  the  state  of  the  ego,  and,  for  van  der  Leeuw,  is  typical 
of  the  ambivalence  of  mystical  experience  in  general  which  'circles  around  the  impenetrability 
of  the  ego  itself  at  one  moment  it  may  become  the  most  extravagant  self-glorification,  but 
also  at  any  time  the  most  abysmal  consciousness  of  nuflity'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p507). 
When  winning,  the  gambler  experiences  his  state  of  election  as  a  transcendental  commumon 
with  the  Divine.  However,  when  losing,  he  is  not  bestowed  with  favoured  status.  His  loss 
1  signifies  reproval  and,  like  Richardson,  he  is  filled  with  the  blackest  feelings'  (Richardson 
1980,  plO).  There  exists  'a  harmonious'  and  at  the  same  time  'a  discordant'  'state  of  being 
beside  oneself  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p488),  and  this  is  experienced  by  the  gambler  as  either 
the  state  of  harmony  or  discord  -  the  total  breakdown  of  order  within  the  universe. 
Losing 
When  losing,  the  order  created  by  play  breaks  down.  The  gambler  is  given  the  harshest 
possible  sign  of  his  insignificance:  he  is  not  favoured,  or  special,  or  elect,  and  has  no  relatIon 
with  the  powers  of  the  immanent  realm.  This  is  an  aspect  of  the  experience  of  the  Whollý- -I(X) 
Other,  which  Otto  descnbes  as  the  element  of  'over-power-ingness'  or  Maje.  sla%  and  betbre 
which  the  individual  is  crushed  by  self-deprecation  and  hun-fflity  (Ono  1925, 
pA- 
0) 
I 
In  a  world  of  participation,  where  no  dissociation  between  objective  perception  and  subjective 
feeling  exists,  the  player's  surroundings  assume  affective  characteristics.  Assailed  of  the 
Vackest  feelings',  the  breakdown  of  order  is  inevitable. 
in  the  poker  game  in  The  Music  of  Chance,  Pozzi  finds  himself  winning  handsomelN-  and 
attributes  his  success  to  the  presence  of  his  friend  Nashe  standing  behind  him.  However,  ýk  hen 
Nashe  leaves,  the  propitious  forces  that  were  generated  by  him  are  destroyed,  and  Pozzi 
begins  to  lose.  Pozzi  blames  his  losing  streak  on  the  actions  of  his  fhendl  actions  which  he 
sees  as  instrumental  in  initiating  the  coflapse  of  order.  'It's  like  committing  a  sin  to  do  a  thing 
like  that,  it's  like  violating  a  fundamental  law.  We'd  come  to  the  point  where  everything  , k,  as 
turning  into  music  for  us,  and  then  you  have  to  go  upstairs  and  smash  all  the  instruments.  You 
tampered  with  the  universe  my  fiiend,  and  once  a  man  does  that,  he's  got  to  pay  the  price, 
(Auster  1990,  p138).  The  'music  of  chance'becomes  discordant,  when  Pozzi  beg:  Ins  to  lose  a 
disequifibrium  sets  in  that  is  apparent  in  every  feature  of  the  gambler's  surroundings,  His  lack 
of  favour  is  obvious  in  everything  he  sees.  When  Richardson  was  losing,  'he  saw  In  every  inch 
of  the  table's  betting  surface  a  sly,  pervasive  danger.  Numerals,  squares,  le"ers  -  all  took  on 
the  contours  of  treachery'  (Richardson  1980,  p247).  His  surroundings  became  imbued  with 
menace  and  foreboding  that  spoke  eloquently  of  his  disjunction  with  the  universe.  When  he  is 
not  favoured,  he  has  no  place  and  no  real  significance  in  the  world.  He  was  aware  of  'a  sudden 
strangeness,  an  odd  imbalance  to  everything  around  me.  There  was  a  subtle  danger  now  in 
every  person  I  looked  at,  as  if  I  and  those  at  the  table  with  me  no  longer  shared  the  same  laws 
of  matter.  Costumes,  movements,  faces,  sounds  -  all  were  now  discordant  and  disjointed 
human  data,  out-of-joint  images  that  my  mind  could  not  mend.  I  could  not  tell  whether  a  spell 
had  been  lifted  or  put  on  me.  I  knew  where  I  was,  but  no  longer  the  reason  for  my  being 
there'  (Richardson  1980,  p240).  Richardson  is  lost:  'rootless  and  vulnerable'  uncomprehending 
and  despairing.  Meaning  has  vanished  as  the  order  of  the  world  breaks  down-,  the  music  of chance  has  become  discordant.  This  is  the  state  of  disonentation  in  which  he  experiences 
most  abysmal  consciousness  of  nullity'. 
Winning 
Winning  is  the  assurance  of  favour.  When  winning,  the  gambler's  ego  momentarily  merges 
with  the  Divine  and  the  sense  of  an  Absolute  Order,  a  sublime  being  at  one  with  the  universe 
washes  over  him.  This  is  the  apprehension  of  grace,  or  election,  which  Otto  describes  as  a 
'beatific  experience  of  Deity'  (Otto  1925,  p3l),  and  Screech  as  'a  momentary  glimpse  of 
bliss...  a  beatific  vision'  (Screech,  1980,  p  173).  When  Richardson  won,  as  we  saw  in  Chapter 
Four,  he  felt  fulfilled,  centred,  and  very  aware  of  having  a  'place'  in  the  scheme  of  things.  In 
this  state,  he  told  himself  'You  are  more  in  the  world  at  this  moment  than  you  have  ever  been 
before'.  ffis  oceanic  feelings  of  triumph  are  a  consequence  of  his  feeling  that  the  world  has 
become  ordered,  and  that  he  has  a  place  in  it.  Assuaged  by  a  tranquil  confidence,  his  existence 
is  confirmed.  The  favour  of  the  Divine  is  the  bestowing  of  luck,  and  lucky  people  times,  places 
and  things  are  caught  in  the  propitious  flows  that  signify  this  favour.  For  the  poker  player  in 
Auster's  novel,  such  currents  reveal  the  favour  of  unseen  powers  -  'the  music  of  chance'.  When 
favour  is  bestowed,  the  world  coalesces  into  order  and  winning  is  inevitable.  A  kind  of 
Pythagorean  harmony  reigns:  'Once  your  luck  starts  to  roll,  there's  not  a  damn  thing  that  can 
stop  it.  It's  like  the  whole  world  suddenly  falls  into  place.  You're  kind  of  outside  your  body 
and  for  the  rest  of  the  night  you  sit  there  watching  yourself  perform  miracles.  1i  doe.  vni  really 
have  anything  to  do  with  you  anymore.  It's  out  of  your  control...  '  When  winning  'everything 
is  in  harmony...  everything  turns  into  music'  (Auster  1990,  p137,  my  italics).  Metaphysical 
order  reigns.  'We  had  everything  balanced,  afl  the  wheels  were  turning,  it  was  beautiful'.  This 
creation  of  Divine  order  and  the  sensation  of  ecstatic  tranquillity  it  inspires  are  intrinsic  to  the 
experience  of  winning.  Caillois  described  the  motivation  of  the  individual  who,  when  winning 
at  slots,  had  'expressed  his  irritation  with  reality  and  made  the  world  behave'  (Caillois  1962, 
p84).  A  similar  satisfaction  was  discovered  by  the  woman  who,  having  a  lucky  run  at  craps, 
'for  one  mythical,  magical  moment  saw  everything  fafl  neatly  into  place'  (Vinson  1988,  p57). 
Another  female  gambler  became  immersed  in  what  can  only  be  described  as  a  beatific  serenity when  winning.  Filled  with  a  sense  of  otherworldly  efficacý-,  she  relates  A  Just  kept  on  betting, 
and  winning,  and  I  was  convinced  I  couldn't  lose,  that  God  had  given  me  some  kind  of 
power...  '  A  great  feeling  of  rectitude,  that  everything  was  in  its  place  and  all  NA-as  right  wth 
the  world  washed  over  her:  'I  just  saw  it  [VAnning]  as  a  natural  happening,  the  ýkay  other 
things  in  my  life  had  come,  good  things  and  bad  things,  and  just  accepted  it  without  get-ting  all 
excited'.  All  was  well  in  this  state  of  tranqufl  resignation  'If  that  is  what  God  wanted  for  me, 
then  that  is  how  it  is'  (in  Custer  and  Mflt  1984,  p152).  When  favoured  in  this  way,  the 
gambler  can  do  no  wrong,  for  he  has  transcended  the  confines  of  mere  existence  and  merged 
mornentarfly  with  the  realm  of  the  sacred.  Now  the  special  order  of  the  world  becomes 
apparent,  it  is  imbued  with  meaning  and  what  is  more,  the  gambler  has  a  place  in  it.  Previous 
wins  and  losses  and  the  unpredictable  unfolding  of  all  previous  games  are  now  'explained'  - 
and  not  by  probability  theory.  In  his  privileged  state  of  election,  the  exceptional  now  becomes 
explicable  to  the  gambler  who  has  transcended  the  narrow  confines  of  probability  theory  and 
adopted  an  elevated  vantage  point  which  takes  account  of  the  individual  case  without 
subsuming  it  under  the  broad  generalisafions  of  what  is  merely  'probable'.  Like  the  all-seeing 
Divine  presence  described  by  Boethius,  in  his  state  of  election  the  gambler  embraces 
(  simultaneously  the  whole  of  unending  fife  as  present'  (Boethius  199  1,  p5  I  ).  N  ow,  t  he  broad 
dispersal  of  individual  outcomes  becomes  emotionally  meaningful  as  signs  of  favour  and 
disapproval,  and  not  as  mathematical  expressions  of  average  distributions.  In  the  religious 
worldview  then,  order  and  harmony  reign  supreme-  but  this  is  an  order  and  harmony  of  a 
sacred,  not  a  rational  kind. 
Repedlion 
We  saw  in  Chapter  Four  how  the  gambler  plays  over  and  over  again  whether  winning  or 
losing  and  now,  within  the  context  of  his  communion  with  the  Divine,  we  can  develop  the 
broader  religious  significance  of  this  repetition  for,  as  Kierkegaard  wrote,  not  only  is 
repetition  a  category  of  existence  in  its  own  fight,  but  it  'is  and  remains  a  religious  category' 
(Kierkegaard.  1983,  p326).  The  world  is  formed  through  repetition,  for  'If  God  himself  had 
not  willed  repetition,  the  world  would  not  have  come  into  existence...  the  world  continues log 
because  it  is  a  repetition'  (Kierkegaard  1983,  p133).  That  ýkhich  is  repeated  is  made  into 
something  new,  thus  there  is  'no  meaningless  repetition,  but  a  repetition  of  such  a  nature  that 
the  new  has  absolute  significance  in  relation  to  what  has  gone  before,  is  qualitatively  different 
ftom.  it'  (Kierkegaard  1983,  p307).  The  movement  of  repetition  is  manifest  in  the  continual 
raising  of  consciousness  and  the  realisation  of  the  self,  for  the  more  one  wills  repetition,  the 
more  fully  human  one  becomes.  The  will  to  repetition,  like  the  Nietzschean  will  to  power, 
becomes  for  Kierkegaard  a  measure  of  humanity-  'He  who  win  merely  hope  is  cowardly,  he 
who  will  merely  recollect  is  voluptuous;  he  who  wil-Is  repetition  is  a  man,  and  the  more 
emphaticafly  he  is  able  to  realise  it,  the  more  profound  a  human  being  he  is'  (Kierkegaard 
1983,  p132). 
In  his  ever-repeated  questioning  as  to  whether  or  not  he  is  favoured,  the  gambler  embodies 
this  'will  to  repetition'  in  play.  At  work  is  the  dynamic  between  fear  and  faith  -  the  certainty 
he  is  favoured  alongside  the  simultaneous  fear  he  is  not.  This  is  an  aspect  of  the  ambivalence 
of  the  refigious  experience  we  mentioned  before:  the  being  attracted  and  repelled  by  Power 
'both  tremor  and  fascination'. 
When  losing,  the  player  knows  he  is  not  favoured;  the  Deity  frowns  on  him  and  he  experiences  it 
the  'blackest  feelings'  and  the  breakdown  of  order. 
The  decision  of  the  game  is  final.  He  cannot  challenge  it  but  nor  can  he  accept  it,  so  his  only 
option  is  to  repeat  it  in  the  hope  that  propitious  flows  may  begin  to  work,  and  so  change  his 
status  in  the  realm  of  the  transcendent. 
The  gambler's  repeated  supplication  of  the  Deity  in  the  face  of  rejection  resembles  the 
behaviour  of  diviners  and  augurs  when  they  fail  to  attain  the  answer  they  require.  van  der 
Leeuw  pointed  out  that  the  inquirer  does  not  necessarfly  want  to  know  what  wffl  happen  next, 
but  simply  whether  what  he  wtuits  to  happen  will  occur,  wMe  Levy-Bruhl's  e-vidence  indicated 
that  natives  try  to  solicit  a  good  omen  which,  when  received,  negates  all  those  that  %A-ent 
before.  Like  the  outcome  of  individual  games,  the  decision  on  individual  oracles  remain 310 
independent  of  one  another,  and  a  favourable  decision  oum,  ehp!  . -hs  all  unfaý'ourable  previous 
ones.  So,  the  gambler  assumes,  along  with  the  diviner,  '...  if  one  waits  a  bit  and  tries  again  the 
answer  may  be  different...  '  (Cryer  1994,  P  119).  Here  Levy-Bruhl  draws  a  direct  analogy 
between  the  state  of  mind  of  the  diviner  and  the  gambler.  The  aim  of  the  ritual  of  the  fornler  is 
to  make  known  on  which  side  there  are  sacred  rights.  The  diviner  must  concur  with  its  ý-erdlct, 
but  he  may  not  agree  with  it.  The  'cufious'  state  of  mind  behind  this  activity,  Levy-Bruhi  says, 
'is  not  unlike  that  of  gamblers.  They  too  solicit  the  verdict  of  dice  or  cards.  If  the  play  has 
been  fair,  the  loser  may  be  vexed,  dejected  or  furious,  but  he  does  not  protest  against  the 
verdict.  The  only  way  he  can  reopen  the  question  is  to  begin  a  new  game...  and  put  his  fate  to 
the  touch  once  more...  "  (Levy-Bruhl  1966,  p229). 
Thus,  in  the  hope  that  in  a  later  game  the  divine  pronouncement  will  be  changed  and  he  will  be 
favoured,  the  gambler  simply  repeats  his  questioning  until  the  desired  result  is  eventuallv 
bestowed  upon  him.  The  thoughts  behind  Rousseau's  divinatory  stone-throwing  could  be 
those  of  any  gambler.  The  motivation  for  his  actions  was  the  uncertainty  of  his  status  'In  what 
state  am  I  inT  he  asks  himself,  'If  I  were  to  die  at  this  moment  should  I  be  damned?...  Being 
always  fearfuL  and  now  a  prey  to  this  cruel  uncertainty,  I  resorted  to  the  most  ludicrous 
experiments  to  overcome  it'  (Rousseau  1967,  p23  1).  Ks  tryst  with  the  stones  then  begins  'I 
am  going  to  throw  this  stone'  he  decides  "'at  the  tree  facing  me.  If  I  hit  it,  it  is  a  sign  that  I  arn 
saved;  if  I  rniss  it  I  am  damned'  (Rousseau  1967,  p23  1).  Rousseau's  quest  for  salvation  is 
accompanied  by  all  the  physiological  discord  of  the  gambler  -  trembling  hands  and  'a  terrible 
throbbing  of  the  heart',  until  he  hits  the  tree  and  is  finally  relieved  of  his  anxiety. 
When  winning  however,  the  gambler  is  no  better  off,  for  he  is  dogged  by  perennial 
uncertainty,  forever  unsure  as  to  whether  his  favour  is  permanent.  The  deflation  of  mood  after 
the  intensity  of  play  has  a  more  dramatic  quality  than  the  mere  expenience  of  boredom  outlined 
in  Chapter  Four;  for  the  end  of  a  game  signifies  the  end  of  favour,  and  the  loss  of  meaning. 
van  der  Leeuw  describes  how,  as  soon  as  his  ecstatic  transport  ceases,  the  mystic  expenences 
recoil  when  it  seems  that  God  has  forsaken  him  again:  'it  is  fike  a  bitter  taste  in  his  mouth  and 
he  feels  himself  twice  as  impotent  and  abandoned  as  before'  (van  der  Leeuw  1967,  p491), iI 
The  foundation  of  the  order  induced  by'lArinning  is  tenuous,  and  collapses  completely  as  soon 
as  uncertainty  begins  to  creep  in.  Despite  his  confidence  in  his  favoured  status,  the  gambler's 
relation  with  the  Divine  is  ambivalent  -  how  can  he  be  sure  preference  has  not  been  re-aligned 
and  that  he  is  still  the  favourite?  He  is  insecure  and  suspicious,  and  so  repeats  a  cycle  of 
supplication,  repeating  his  question  over  and  over  again  for  'a  repeatedly,  confirmed  statement 
[is]  more  foolproof  than  a  single  assurance  (Bergler  1970,  p83) 
Baudelaire's  story  1he  Generous  Gambler  illustrates  the  operation  of  faith  and  uncertainty  in 
play  in  a  tale  about  a  gambler  who  makes  a  Faustian  pact  with  the  Devil,  He  stakes  his  soul 
and  loses,  but  nevertheless  the  DevH  promises  to  pay  him  as  if  he  had  won.  In  the  Devil's 
description  of  these  winnings  is  encapsulated  what  is  at  stake  in  all  gambling  -  what  will  befall 
every  gambler  who  is  favoured:  'I  shall  give  you  the  same  stake  you  would  have  won  if  chance 
had  been  with  you;  that  is  the  possibility  of  alleviating  and  overcoming  for  your  entire  life  that 
strange  disease  of  Boredom...  Never  shall  you  formulate  a  wish  that  I  Will  not  help  you  to 
realise,  you  shall  dominate  your  fellow  countrymen,  flattery  will  be  yours...  fairy  palaces  shall 
come  seeking  you  out  begging  to  be  accepted  without  you  having  to  fift  a  finger  to  obtain 
them...  you  shall  know  all  the  intoxication  of  pleasure  without  satiety...  '  (Baudelaire  1970, 
p60).  This  is  the  imagined  reward  of  the  gambler  favoured  by  Fate,  and  Baudelaire's  gambler 
is  guaranteed  it  forever,  for  he  has  staked  his  soul  and  been  personally  assured  it  by  the  Devil, 
But,  typically,  he  is  tortured  by  uncertainty  and  by  nightfall  goes  to  sleep  anxiously  muttering 
'Oh  my  God,  A  my  God!  Make  the  Devil  keep  his  promise!  '  (Baudelaire  1970,  p6O). 
Eventual-ly,  he  resorts  to  playing  again,  for  even  though  he  has  won  the  ultimate  game,  he  is 
still  not  satisfied  that  his  favour  will  continue. 
In  a  case  study,  Reik  presents  a  woman  who  played  cards  as  a  modem  consultation  of  the 
oracle,  telling  herself  if  she  won  'this  or  that  for  which  I  hope,  wiII  happen;  if  not...  my  wish 
will  not  be  fulfilled'.  However,  the  powers  of  destiny  were  regarded  as  particularly  'malicious 
and  treacherous',  so  that  even  when  she  won,  she  was  still  plagued  with  doubt  as  to  whether 312 
'Fate  will  not  realise  its  evil  and  secret  intentions  just  when  one  thin  -s  one  is  a  (Reik  19ý  ks 
p168,  p175). 
This  perenmal  uncertainty  is  the  predicament  of  the  gambler.  Straus  found  a  similar  stnving, 
for  certainty,  yet  inabflity  to  escape  uncertainty,  among  compulsive  patients  whose  'pathology 
of  compulsion'  was  also  founded  on  the  dynamic  between  faith  and  uncertainty. 
Such  patients  seek  absolute  order  and  the  removal  of  all  spontaneity,  and  often  find  it  in  the 
certitude  of  numbers,  which  are  'well-defined,  exactly  determinable  individuals'  (Straus  1966, 
p319).  However,  this  security  does  not  last:  'For  the  certitude  afforded  by  the  full  meaning  of 
the  single  number  is  soon  placed  in  doubt  by  the  multitude  of  numbers'  (Straus  1966,  p319). 
Likewise,  the  certitude  afforded  the  gambler  by  a  favourable  sign  that  he  is  favoured  is  soon 
placed  in  doubt  by  the  possibility  of  the  outcomes  of  all  future  games.  In  Straus's  elaboration, 
we  can  substitute  for  the  compulsive  uncertainty  of  his  patients  the  perennial  insecurity  of  the 
gambler  posing  the  question  of  whether  or  not  he  is  elect-  'When  I  have  resolved  not  to  leave 
the  house  before  brushing  my  coat  twenty  times  from  top  to  bottom  and  twenty  times  from 
bottom  to  top,  why  should  it  just  be  twenty  times?  Why  not  thirty  or  fifty  times?  Why  not  two 
or  three  times  twenty  times?  And  did  I  do  it  exactly  twenty  times9  Did  I  make  a  mistake? 
Must  I  not  start  over  again  from  the  beginning?  The  guarantee  of  numbers  breaks  down  too, 
the  requirements  must  be  raised  repeatedly'  (Straus  1966,  p319).  The  ritual  that  will  restore 
order  for  the  compulsive  is  founded  on  grounds  as  unstable  as  that  of  the  ritual  engaged  in  to 
restore  order  for  the  gambler.  He  wins  and  knows  he  must  therefore  be  favoured.  But 
uncertainty  creeps  in  -  'Am  I  really  favoured?  '  -  so  he  plays  and  wins  again  and  again.  'But 
what  about  Now;  am  I  still  favoured  right  now?  Was  I  really  favoured  before?  Will  I  be 
favoured  again?...  and  what  about  next  time  ... 
?'  and  so  on.  In  this  way,  Reik's  patient  could 
never  be  certain  that  she  would  be  unequivocally  successful  in  whatever  project  her  game  was 
prophetic  of  If  she  asked  'Will  Franz  [her  husband]  get  a  job  within  the  next  yearT  and  was 
assured,  by  winning,  that  he  would,  she  would  worry  incessantly  'But  does  that  mean  the 
present  year)  As  measured  by  the  calendar?  Am  I  thinking  of  the  Gregorian  calendar?  There's 
a  Jewish  calendar  too.  And  what  about  the  Russian  calendar?  '  (Reik  195  1,  p  170).  The 1  ', 
motivation  of  the  gambler  is  not  then,  as  the  psychoanalysts  would  ha,,  -e  it,  a  masochistic 
compulsion  to  lose,  but  a  compulsion  to  question.  Such  compulsive  uncertaintv  can  be 
regarded  as  a  manifestation  of  the  compulsion  to  repeat,  a  tendency  which,  for  Freud  %kas 
more  powerful  than  -  and  hence  lay  beyond  -  the  pleasure  principle.  This  basic  and  phmal 
compulsion  (which  Freud  also  cal-Is  the  'compulsion  of  destiny')  is  derived  from  the 
conservative  nature  of  the  instincts  and  urges  the  endless  repetition  of  an  act  regardless  of  its 
outcome.  Repetition  is  here  justified  as  an  end  in  itself,  independent  of  outcome,  and  is 
responsible  for  the  exercise  of  a  degree  of  control  over  the  act  being  repeated.  Hence,  Freud 
writes,  'the  repetition  of  an  activity  or  event,  sometimes  experienced  as  possession  by  some 
daemonic  power,  in  the  obsessional  neuroses  or  in  the  play  of  children,  is  pursued  in  order  to 
facilitate  a  gradual  mastery  over  a  situation'  (Freud  1984,  p275-338).  For  the  gambler, 
similarly  possessed  by  a  compulsion  to  repeat,  mastery  is  concomitant  with  the  knowledge  of 
divine  assurance. 
In  Kierkegaard,  repetition  secures  more  than  mere  mastery  over  a  situation,  for,  as  a  basic 
category  of  existence,  it  has  the  power  to  transcend  the  confines  of  a  given  situation.  This 
transcendent  character  opposes  the  immanent  nature  of  modem  pHosophy,  for  repetition  'is 
and  remains  a  transcendence'  (Kierkegaard  1983,  p186).  In  this  lies  its  challenge,  and 
Kierkegaard  admits  he  is  not  equal  to  it:  'Then,  too,  repetition  is  too  transcendent  for  me.  I 
can  circumnavigate  myself  but  I  cannot  rise  above  myself  I  cannot  find  the  Archimedian 
point...  I  am  unable  to  make  a  refigious  movement;  it  is  contrary  to  my  nature'  (Kierkegaard 
1983,  p186,7).  It  is  not,  however,  contrary  to  the  gambler's  nature,  for  his  ever-repeated  play 
is  nothing  but  a  religious  movement,  a  continual  striving  for  transcendence.  Every  time  he  bets 
he  leaves  the  confines  of  everyday  existence  behind  and  reaches  for  that  'Archimedian  point' 
outside  himself  The  reward  is  great,  for  upon  reaching  that  point  the  gambler  achieves 
transcendence  and  a  momentary  glimpse  of  the  certainty  he  is  striving  for.  This  fleeting 
certainty  hes  at  the  heart  of  repetition,  for  as  Kierkegaard  tells  us,  in  its  continued  movement 
is  to  be  found  'the  bfissful  security  of  the  moment'  (Kierkegaard  1983,  p  13  2). $14 
Hence  the  gambler's  desire  to  pursue  play-in-itself  is  the  desire  to  forever  repeat  his  question 
and  forever  find  reassurance  -  the  transcendence  of  'bfissful  security'  in  the  ansAxer.  He 
cannot  stop,  because  to  stop  -  even  when  winning  -  allows  doubt  to  creep  In  "Ith  the  time  that 
passes  from  his  last  assurance.  Every  now  presents  fresh  doubt  -  e'very  potential  game  is 
therefore  a  game  he  must  play.  By  not  participating  in  a  game,  he  may  or  may  not  be 
favoured,  but  what  is  worse  is  that  he  wi.  11  not  know,  and  he  has  to  know,  so  he  has  to  play 
Mastery  for  the  child  is  the  equivalent  of  certainty  for  the  gambler;  neither  group  can  have 
'their  pleasurable  experiences  repeated  often  enough,  and  they  are  inexorable  in  their 
insistence  that  the  repetition  shall  be  an  identical  one'  (Freud  1984,  p307).  The  retrograde 
force  of  the  compulsion  to  repeat  can  be  seen  as  the  ultimate  quest  for  transcendence  through 
order  and  quiescence;  a  quest  somewhat  ironically  manifested  in  the  sometimes  desperate 
rituals  of  insecurity  engaged  in  by  the  neurotic  and  the  gambler.  The  latter's  need  to  know  ties 
him  to  the  order  of  a  forever-repeated  ritual  in  which  a  precarious  secunty  can  onN  be 
maintained  by  absolute  adherence  to  the  rules.  Like  the  compulsive,  to  transcend  the  confines 
of  the  immanent,  the  gambler  is  required  to  'subordinate  himself  utterly  and  slavishly  to  an 
impersonal  and  general  order  accepted  as  an  end  in  itself  (Cassirer  1953,  p319). I  I..; 
CONCLUSION 
This  thesis  has  presented  a  broad  perspective  on  the  social  and  historical  forms  of  gambling 
behaviour  in.  westem  society,  and  has  demonstrated  how  the  diverse  nature  of  the  acti%ity  can 
be  studied  from  variety  of  angles  in  order  to  shed  light  on  the  phenomenon  as  a  ýk  hole.  It  has 
been  shown  that  the  modem  gambling  economy  is  the  result  of  a  long  historical  development 
of  games  of  chance  in  a  dynan*  relation  with  society. 
Analysis  of  the  historically  contingent  conception  of  chance  and  of  the  historically  specific 
character  of  various  types  of  gambling  has  iflurninated  certain  aspects  of  the  form  and  content 
of  modem  gambling.  For  example,  the  attitude  of  the  seventeenth  century  anstocrat,  for 
whom  games  of  chance  were  a  symbolic  battleground  for  the  demonstration  of  status  and 
prestige,  is  evident  in  the  patrician  disregard  for  money  intrinsic  to  gambling  contests  todaý,, 
At  the  same  time,  the  'democratic'  style  of  play  introduced  in  the  nineteenth  century  is 
continued  in  the  modem  emphasis  on  participation-  the  desire  simply  to  stay  in  the  action  for 
as  long  as  possible.  Both  of  these  attitudes  are  contained  in  the  pursuit  of  play  as  a  thing-in- 
itself,  valuable  for  its  own  sake,  and  existing  outwith  the  realm  of  material  utility. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  stratification  of  games,  with  the  poor  historically  ranged  around 
lotteries,  and  horse  races  and  high  stakes  card-play  the  prerogative  of  the  upper  classes,  set 
the  parameters  for  the  modern  gambling  economy,  just  as  Reformation  and  Enlightenment 
criticism  of  these  activities  set  the  tone  for  contemporary  debate.  These  criticisms  were 
directed  at  chance  as  much  as  at  gambling,  for,  in  a  broadly  providential  worldview,  the 
notion  of  an  omniscient,  all-powerful  Deity  precluded  consideration  of  random  events. 3 
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Despite  these  historical  continuities,  it  has  been  argued  that  contempora  gamblin  rV 
nevertheless  shaped  by  its  own  configuration  of  forces  that  make  it  a  unique  form  of  social 
life.  In  particular,  commercial  forms  of  capitalist  enterprise  are  breaking  down  the  traditional 
stratification  of  gambling,  and,  to  some  extent,  homogenising  its  various  forms  They  haý  e 
also  proved  stronger  that  the  forces  of  moral  outrage.  Not  only  is  consideration  of  chance  no 
longer  deemed  sacrilegious,  but  no  sooner  had  it  been  granted  ontological  status  than  it  was 
embraced  by  capitalist  enterprise  and  sold  just  like  any  other  commodity. 
It  has  further  been  argued  that,  within  the  modem  gambling  sites  the  pursuit  of  games  of 
chance  is  experienced  as  a  unique  form  of  modem  life.  Submersion  in  an  environment  of 
chance  creates  a  peculiar  destructuration  of  the  perception  of  time,  space  and  causation,  and 
this  is  part  of  the  unique  appeal  of  the  games  themselves. 
Using  the  insights  of  pbenomenologists,  writers  and  gamblers,  the  essential  nature  of  this 
experience  has  been  characterised  as  the  pursuit  of  an  intense,  fleeting  thrill  and  the 
simultaneous  desire  for  order  and  certainty.  The  experiential  chaos  of  play  -  the  plunge  into 
chance  -  is  resolved  in  the  dynamic  of  gambling  itself,  whereby  the  gambling  encounter  acts  as 
a  symbolic  testing  of  fate.  It  is  here  that  the  essentially  religious  character  of  games  of  chance 
is  most  evident,  and  it  has  been  argued  that  the  game  can  be  regarded  as  a  modem  divinatory 
drama  whose  unfolding  is  interpreted  by  the  player  as  being  imbued  with  metaphysical 
meaning.  Playing  is  a  posing  of  the  question  'am  I  favoured?  ',  with  a  win  a  sign  of  divine 
assurance  and  a  loss  evidence  of  disfavour.  The  gambler  is  driven  to  continue  asking  his 
question;  when  losing,  in  the  hope  of  eliciting  a  more  favourable  response,  when  winning,  to 
assure  himself  that  his  favour  is  continued. 
This  dynan-fic  can  be  related  to  wider  social  movements,  for  it  has  been  argued  that  the 
evacuation  of  refigious  meaning  from  the  notion  of  chance  reflected  a  broader  erosion  of 
metaphysical  meaning  from  the  world,  as  the  latter  came  to  be  increasingly  interpreted 
according  to  the  principles  of  a  'meaningless'  secular  order.  In  this  way,  the  status  of  chance 
in  the  world  can  be  regarded  as  an  index  of  the  degree  of  ontological  security  in  modem  life. 11 
The  disparity  between  the  present  status  of  chance  and  all  of  its  pre"Oous  histoncal 
incarnations  is  most  evident  in  the  gambfing  arena,  for  here,  despite  its  ontologncal  status  in 
the  world  outside,  the  random  event  continues  to  exist  as  a  cypher  for  essentially  sacred 
meaning. 
in  an  era  of  ontological  insecurity,  the  need  for  meaningfiA  explanation  is  great.  The  piecemeal 
explanations  of  probability  theory  fail  to  satisfy  the  desire  for  total  explanation  and, 
particularly  in  the  vortex  of  uncertainty  of  the  gambling  arena,  another  level  of  explanation 
must  be  found.  By  renouncing  mechanical  causation  for  the  universalism  of  the  magical- 
religious  worldview,  the  gambler  realises  the  desire  to  transcend  particulansm.,  and  so  reveals 
a  fundamental  aspect  of  the  human  condition  that  is  the  'incessant  struggle  to  secure  a  grasp 
on  the  whole,  to  rise  above  particularity  and  tentativeness(Straus  1966,  p3  21). 
It  has  been  shown  that,  in  demanding  the  security  of  holistic  explanation,  the  gambler  creates  a 
coherent,  emotionally  meaningful  system  of  belief  in  which  the  concept  of  chance  is  sacrallsed, 
once  more  becoming  the  sign  of  some  transcendent  power.  In  this  system  chance  events  are 
imbued  with  significance,  and  become  meaningful  at  the  level  of  their  individual  occurrence. 
The  gambler  thus  infers  something  of  his  status  -  not  only  in  the  game,  but,  through  the 
dynamic  inter-relation  of  gambling  and  society,  also  in  the  wider  world  -  ftom  the  outcome  of 
individual  gambles.  The  order  and  harmony  that  emerges  out  of  the  chaos  of  chance  in  an 
insecure  world,  then,  is  of  a  sacred,  not  a  rational  kind. 
If  we  recall  Sartre's  statement  that  man  is  a  totality  and  revas  his  basic  nature  in  even  the 
most  insignificant  activities,  which  are  indicative  of  the  'reality  of  man  .  general  and  to  his 
condition'  (Sartre  1957,  p60),  then  we  can  go  on  to  decipher  those  activities  as  indicative,  not 
of  an  idle  pastime,  but  as  a  part  of  the  'bigger  picture'  of  human  reality. Gambling  is  such  an  activity,  and  in  the  actions  of  the  gambler  'Ae  can  perhaps  see.  in 
microcosm,  an  image  of  more  universal  human  concerns.  Within  these  worlds  of  chance,  the 
pursuit  of  play  reveals  a  fundamental  facet  of  human  existence-  its  status  as  homo  alewor. 
in  presenting  a  broad  image  of  the  gambler,,  this  thesis  has  estabfished  an  area  for  study  ký  hich 
did  not  previously  exist.  It  does  not  claim  to  be  exhaustive:  it  is  acknowledged  that  there  are 
many  ways  of  studying  gambling,  and  that  this  represents  only  one  possibility.  However.  by 
exploring  various  angles  and  raising  certain  issues  it  has  at  least  attempted  to  demarcate  an 
area  for  future  study. 
Each  Chapter  suggests  a  variety  of  possibilities  which  could  be  fi-uitfully  developed  in  many 
different  directions.  The  history  of  games  of  chance  and  their  relation  to  the  social  structure, 
the  existence  of  chance  throughout  history  and  in  everyday  fife,  the  inner  world  of  the  gambler 
and  its  concomitant  beliefs,  and  the  modem  arrangement  of  gambling  forms,  all  offer  %vide 
scope  for  further  research  in  a  fascinatingly  diverse  and  complex  field. 19 
Bibliography  of  Works  Cited 
Abt,  V.  Smith,  J.  F. 
and  Christiansen,  E.  M.  (1985) 
Abt5  V.  Smith,  J.  (1986) 
Allcock,  C.  (1985) 
Alvarez,  A.  (1991) 
Anderson,  G.  Brown,  RIF  (1987) 
Aristotle  (1977) 
Amold,  P.  (1993) 
Ashton,  J.  (1898) 
Auster,  P.  (1990) 
Balzac,  H.  (1976) 
Balzac,  H.  (1977) 
Bamhart,  R.  T.  (1983) 
Barthes,  R.  (1976) 
Bataille,  G.  (1985) 
The  Business  of  Risk: 
Commercial  Gambling  in  Mainstream  America 
University  Press  of  Kansas. 
Easy  money:  Gambling  in  America 
Research  Penn  State  Volume  7  No.  4. 
PSychiatry  and  Gambling, 
in  Caldwell  (ed)  (1985). 
The  Biggest  Game  in  Town, 
Oldcastle  Books-  England. 
Some  applications  of  reversal  theory  to  the 
explanation  of  gambling  and  gambling  addictions, 
Journal  of  Gambling  Behaviour  Volume  3  (3). 
Physics 
in  Classics  of  Western  Philosophy 
ed.  S.  M.  Cahn 
Hacklett  Publishing  Company  Inc-  Indianapolis 
The  Book  of  Games, 
Harnlyn:  The  Chancellor  Press. 
A  History  of  Gambling  in  England, 
London-  Duckworth. 
The  Music  of  Chance, 
Faber  and  Faber. 
Lost  Illusions; 
tr.  J.  J.  Hunt 
Penguin. 
The  Wild  Ass's  Skin. 
tr.  H.  J.  Hunt 
Penguin. 
Gamblers  of  YesterYear, 
Gamblers  Book  Club  Press:  Las  Vegas. 
Mythologies; 
tr.  A.  Lavers 
Paladin. 
r1sions  of  Excess 
tr.  A.  Stoekl,  C.  R.  Lovitt,  and  D.  M.  Leslie 
Manchester  University  Press. . 
")o 
Bataille,  G.  (1988)  The  Accursed,  Vhare  Volume 
tr.  R.  Hurley 
Zone  Books:  New  York. 
Bataille,  G.  (1992)  On  Nietzsche; 
tr.  B.  Boone 
The  Athlone  Press-  London. 
Baudelaire,  C.  (1970)  The  Generous  Gambler, 
tr.  M.  Hamburger,  in  Twenty  Prose  Poems 
San  Francisco-  City  Lights  Books. 
Baudelaire,  C.  (1982)  Les  Fleurs  du  Mail 
tr.  R.  Howard 
The  Harvester  Press  Limited. 
Beck,  U.  (1992)  Risk  Society; 
tr.  M.  Ritter 
London:  Sage. 
BellK  1  (1993)  The  Biggest  Crap  Game  in  the  World, 
Business  Life;  March 
Bellow,  S.  (1977)  Humholt's  Gift, 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin. 
Ben  arnin,  W.  (1977)  Illuminations- 
tr.  M.  Zohn 
Fontana-  Collins-  Glasgow. 
Ben  amin,  W.  (1979)  One  Way  Street, 
tr.  E.  Jephcott  and  K.  Shorter 
London  -  NLB. 
Benjamin,  W.  (1985)  Central  Park 
in  The  New  German  Critique,  No.  34. 
Benjamin,  W.  (1992)  Charles  Baudelaire:  A  Lyric  Poet  in  the  Era  of 
High  Capitalism; 
tr.  H.  Zohn 
London-  Verso. 
Bergler,  E.  (1970)  The  Psychology  of  Gamhling, 
International  Universities  Press,  Inc. 
Bergson,  H.  (1910)  Time  and  Free  Will, 
tr.  F.  L.  Pogson 
Macmdlan:  New  York  and  London. 
Bergson,  H.  (1911)  Matter  and  Memory, 
tr.  N.  M.  Paul  and  W.  S.  Palmer 
Macm1flan:  New  York  and  London. 
Ihe  Bible  (1985)  Authorised  Version 
Oxford  University  Press. 
Birren,  F.  (1961)  Colour,  Form  and  Space, 
New  York:  Rinehold. 2I 
Bloch,  1-1.  (1951)  The  sociology  of  gatnhfing. 
The  American  Joumal  of  Sociology  Volume  57 
No.  3. 
Boethius  (1991)  On  the  Consolation  of  Philosophy, 
tr.  R.  W.  Sharpies 
Warrainster*  Aris  and  Phillips. 
Bolen,  D.  (1976)  Gambling:  Historical  Highlights  and  Trends  and 
their  Iniplications  for  Contemporary  sociejy 
in  W.  R.  Eadington  (ed)  (1976). 
Borges,  1  (1985)  7'he  Lottery  of  Babylon, 
in  Labyrinths 
Penguin. 
Boyd,  D.  (1976)  Excitement:  The  Gambler's  Drug, 
in  Eadington  (ed)  (1976). 
Brenner,  S.  Brenner,  S  (1990)  Gambling  andSpeculation, 
Cambridge  Unýiversity  Press. 
Brown,  R.  I.  F.  (1987a)  Classical  and  operant  para&gms  in  the 
management  of  conWulsive  gamblers, 
Behavioural  Psychotherapy,  15. 
Brown,  R.  I.  F.  (1988)  Models  ofgambling  and  gambling  addictions  as 
perceptualfiftem, 
The  Journal  of  Gambling  Behaviour  Volume  31  ssue 
4. 
Brown,  R.  I.  F.  (1994)  Dissociation  Phenomena  Among  Ad&cted 
Gamblers, 
Paper  given  at  the  Ninth  Conference  on  Gambling 
and  Risk-Taking  Behaviour,  Las  Vegas,  June  1994. 
Buck-Morss,  S.  (1990)  The  Dialectics  of  Seeing, 
M.  I.  T.  Press.  -  Cambndge. 
Burke,  T.  (  194  1  English  Night  Life, 
London:  Batsford. 
Caillois,  R.  (1962)  Man,  Play  and  Games, 
London-  Thames  and  Hudson. 
Ihe  California  Dream  Book  V.  S  Publishing 
Caldwell,  G.  (1985)  Gambling  in  Australia, 
Sydney:  Croom  Helm. 
Calvino,  1.  (1974)  Invisible  Cities, 
tr.  W.  Weaver 
Pan  Books. 
Campbell,  C.  (1987)  The  Romantic  Ethic  and  theSpirit  of  Modern 
Consumerism, 
Basil-  Blackwell. 31  22 
Cardano,  G.  (1953)  Liber  de  Ludo  Alea-, 
tr.  S.  H.  Gould 
Princeton-  New  Jersey. 
Carlton,  P.  Manowitz,  P.  (1987)  PsYchologicalfactors  in  Merminana  of 
pathological  gambling, 
Journal  of  Gambling  Behaviour  (3) 
Cassirer,  E.  (1944)  An  Essay  on  Man, 
New  Haven-  Yale  University  Press. 
Cassirer,  E.  (1953)  The  Pkilosophy  of  Symbolic  Fortns,  -  Volume 
tr.  R.  Manheim 
New  Haven:  Oxford  University  Press. 
Chafetz,  H.  (1960)  Play  the  Devil  -A  History  of  Gambling  in  the  U.  S. 
From  1492  to  1955, 
New  York:  Bonanza  Books. 
Chaucer,  G.  (1966)  The  Canterbury  Tales, 
ed.  A.  C.  Cawley 
Dent-  London. 
Cicero  (197  1)  De  Divinatiore; 
tr.  W.  A.  Falconer 
Harvard  University  Pressý  London. 
Cicero  (1991)  On  Fate, 
tr.  R.  W.  Sharples 
Warminster.  Aris  and  PhillIps. 
Clayre,  A-  (1974)  Work  and  Play, 
London.  Weidenfeld. 
Cohen,  1  (1960)  ChanceSkill  and  Luck, 
Baltimore-  Penguin. 
Cohen,  1  (1972)  Psychological  Probability, 
London:  Allen  and  Unwin. 
Cohen,  S.  Taylor,  L.  (1978)  Escape  Attempts:  the  Theory  and  PMctice  of 
Resistance  to  Everyday  Life, 
Penguin. 
Comstock,  A  (196  1)  Traps  For  the  Young, 
Cambridge-  Belknap  Press. 
Cornish,  D.  (1978)  Gambling:  A  Review  of  the  Literature, 
fIMSO. 
Costa,  N.  (1988)  Automatic  Pleasures, 
Kevin  Francis. 
Cotton,  C.  (1674)  Conipleat  Gamester, 
London-  R.  Cutler. 
W.  J.  (1984)  Courtenay  Covenant  and  Causality  in  Medieval  Thought, 
,  London-  Vanorurn  Reprints. 12  1 
Crevelt,  D.  (1989)  Slot  MachineMania, 
Gollehon-  Michigan. 
Cryer,  F.  (1994)  Divination  in  Ancient  Israel  and  Its.  Near  Em-tern 
Environment, 
Sheffield-  JSOT  Press. 
Csikszentmihalyi,  M.  and  An  exploratory  model  of  play.  Bennett,  S  (1971)  American  Anthropologist  No.  73. 
Csikszentrnihalyi,  M.  (1975)  Play  and  intrinsic  rewards, 
Journal  of  Humanistic  Psychology  Volume  15  No.  3. 
Culin,  S.  (1896)  Chess  and  Playing  Cards, 
New  York-  Arno  Press. 
Culf,  A  (1994)  Smile  our  way,  Lady  Luck 
The  Guardian-,  October  31,1994 
Cunningham,  H.  (1980)  Leisure  in  the  Industrial  Revolution, 
London:  Croom  Helm. 
Custer,  R,  Milt,  H.  (1984)  When  Luck  Runs  Out, 
New  York:  Facts  on  File. 
Daston,  L.  (1988)  Classical  probability  in  the  Enlightenment, 
Princeton  University  Press. 
David,  F.  N.  (1969)  Games,  Gods  and  Gambling, 
London-  Griffin. 
Davidson,  H.  R.  (1993)  The  Lost  Beliefs  of  Northern  Europe, 
London-  Routledge. 
de  Jong,  A.  (1975)  Dostoevsky  and  the  Age  of  Intensity, 
London:  Secker  and  Warburg. 
De  Quevedo,  F.  (1973)  The  Swindler  in  TwoSpanish  Picaresque  Novels, 
tr.  M.  Alpert 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin. 
Debord,  G.  (1987)  Society  of  the  Spectacle, 
Rebel  Press. 
Deregulation  Committee  Ninth  Report  (1996)  HM  SO 
- 
Descartes,  R.  (1985) 
Devereaux,  E  (1949) 
Dickerson,  M.  (1985) 
Discourse  on  Method  and  the  Meditations, 
tr.  F.  E.  Sutcliffe 
Penguin. 
Gambling  and  the  IVocialStru  ctu  re, 
Harvard,  Doctoral  Dissertation 
The  Characteristics  of  the  Compulsive  Gambler: 
.4 
Rejection  of  a  Typology 
in  Caldwell  (ed)  (1985). . 
J.  )4 
Dixey,  R.  (1987)  It's  a  Great  Feeling  When  You  Ifin, 
in  Leisure  Studies  (6). 
Dostoevsky,  F.  (1914)  Letters-, 
tr.  E.  C.  Mayne 
London-  Chalto  and  Windus. 
Dostoevsky,  F.  (195  1)  Crime  and  Punishment, 
tr.  D.  Magarshack 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin. 
Dostoevsky,  F.  (1967)  The  Brothers  Karamazov, 
tr.  D.  Magarshack 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin. 
Dostoevsky,  F.  (1972)  The  Gambler; 
tr.  V.  Terras 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Dostoevsky,  F.  (1992)  The  Gambler, 
tr  J  Kentish 
Oxford  University  Press. 
Douglas,  M.  (1992)  Risk  and  Blame, 
London-  Routledge. 
Downes',  D.  M.  Davies,  B.  P.  Gambling,  Work  and  Leisure: 
David,  M.  E.  Stone,  P.  (1976)  A  Stu  dy  A  cross  Th  ree  A  reas 
London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul. 
Drake,  S.  Clayton,  H.  (1967)  'Policy  ý-  Poor  Man's  Roulette, 
in  Herman  (ed)  (1967). 
Dunkley,  1  (1985)  Gambling:  A  Social  and  Moral  Problem  in  France 
1685-1792, 
Oxford:  The  Voltaire  Foundation. 
Eadington,  W.  (ed)  (1988)  Gambling  Research:  Proceedings  of  the  7th 
International  Conference  on  Gambling  and  Risk- 
Taking  Volume  I 
University  of  Nevada:  Reno. 
Eadington,  W.  R.  (1988)  Econondc  perspechves  of  ganOting  behaviour, 
in  The  Journal  of  Gambling  Behaviour  Volume  3 
Issue  4. 
Eadington,  W.  R.  (ed)  (1976)  GanWing  and,,  Vociefy, 
Springfield,  Illinois. 
Charles  C  Thomas. 
Ekeland,  1.  (1991)  The  Broken  Dice  and  (*her  Mathematical  Taks  of 
Chance; 
tr.  C.  Volk 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Eliade,  M.  (1957)  The  Sacred  and  the  Profane, 
New  York-  Harcourt  Press. Elias,  N.  (1992)  Time:  An  Essay 
'  Oxford-  Blackwell. 
ý,  'ncyclqpedia  A  mericaw  (  1990)  Volume  5,  edited  by  Dileo,  W1 
Morehouse  R.  N.  and  Wolfson,  \1 
Grolier  Incorporated. 
F,  ncyclopedia  Britannica  (1992)  Volume  6, 
University  of  Chicago. 
Epicurus  (1977)  Letter  to  Menoceus  in  Classics  of  Western 
Philosophy 
ed  S.  M.  Cahn 
Hacklett  Publishing  Company  Inc-  Indianapolis. 
Evans-Pritchard,  E.  (1991)  FV11chcraft,  Magic  and  Oracles  among  the  Azande, 
Clarendon  Press:  Oxford. 
Ey,  H  (1978)  Consciousness; 
tr.  J.  H.  Floodstrom 
Bloomington.  Indiana  University  Press 
Ferguson,  H.  (1990)  The  Science  of  Pleasure, 
London-  Routledge. 
Ferguson,  H.  (1995)  Melancholy  and  the  Critique  of  ModernijCV, 
Routledge-  London. 
Feuerbach,  L.  (1957)  The  Essence  of  Christianity-, 
tr.  G.  Eliot 
New  York-  Harper  and  Row. 
Findlay,  1  (1986)  People  of  Chance:  Gambling  in  American  Socieiýy 
from  Jamestown  to  Las  Vegas, 
Oxford  University  Press. 
Fisher,  S.  (1993)  The  pull  of  thefruit  machine:  a  sociological 
typology  of  young  players, 
The  Sociological  Review  Volume  41  No.  3. 
Flaceliere,  R.  (1965)  Greek  Oracles; 
tr.  D.  Garman 
Elek  Books*  London. 
Foucault,  M.  (1985)  Madness  and  Ovilisation, 
tr.  R.  Howard, 
London:  Tavistock. 
France,  C.  (1974)  The  Gambling  Impulse, 
in  Halliday  and  Fuller  (  1974). 
Frank,  J.  Goldstein,  D. 
eds  (1987) 
Selected  Letters  of 
Fydor  Dostoevsky- 
tr.  A.  R.  MacAndrew 
New  Brunswick  and  London 
Press. 
Rutgars  UTilversity 
I 326 
Freestone,  F.  (1995)  A  SOcio-Economic  and  Political  History  of  Bingo. 
The  Licensed  Bingo  Industry  and  the  Growth  of  Ganting  in  Great  Britain, 
Unpublished  Draft  Manuscript. 
Freud,  S.  (1939)  The  Psychopathology  of  Everyday  Life-, 
tr.  A.  Brdl 
Hannondsworth-  Penguin. 
Freud,  S.  (1950)  DostoevsAy  and  Parricide, 
in  Collected  Papers  Volume  51 
ed  I  Strachey 
London:  Hogarth  Press. 
Freud,  S.  (1955)  The  Uncanny; 
tr.  I  Strachey 
in  The  Standard  Edition  of  the  Complete 
Psychological  Works  of  Freud;  Volume  17 
London:  Hogarth  Press 
Freud,  S.  (1984)  Beyond  the  Pleasure  PHnciple, 
tr.  I  Strachey 
in  the  Pelican  Freud  Library,  %loiume  II 
Penguin. 
Freud,  S.  (1985)  Totem  and  Taboo; 
tr  J.  Strachey  in  The  Pelican  Freud  Libraryl  Volume 
13 
Penguin 
Frisby,  D  (1985)  Fragments  of  Modernity; 
Oxford:  Polity  Press 
Fukuyw-na,  F.  (1992)  The  End  of  History, 
London.  Hamilton. 
Furnham,  A.  Lewis,  A.  (1983)  The  Economic  Mind, 
London:  Harvester  Press. 
Gadamer,  H.  (1975)  Truth  and  Method, 
tr.  G.  Barden  and  I  Cumming 
London.  -  Sheed  and  Ward. 
Gadboury,  A,  Ladoceur,  R  (1988)  Irrational  Thinking  and  Gambling, 
in  Eadington  (ed)  1988. 
Galdston,  1.  (1951)  The  Psychodynamics  of  the  Triad:  Alcoholism, 
Gambling  and  Superstition, 
Mental  Hygiene;  October. 
Galdston,  1.  (1967)  77te  Gambler  and  His  Love, 
in  Herman  (ed)  1967. 
Giddens,  A.  (1991)  Modernity  and  Self-Identity, 
Polity  Press. 
Gilovich,  T.  (1983)  Biased  evaluation  and  persistence  in  gambling, 
Journal  of  Personality  and  Social  Psychology  No  44 ,  27 
Girgenzer,  G.  Swifink,  Z.  The  Empire  of  Chance 
Porter,  T.  Daston,  L.  Cambfidge  University  Press.  Beatty,  I  Kruger,  L.  (1989) 
Gluckman,  M.  Gluckman,  M.  (1977)  On  Drama,  Games  and  AtWetic  Contests, 
in  Moore  and  Myerhoff,  eds  (1977). 
Goethe  (1840)  Theory  of  Colour, 
tr.  C.  L.  Eastlake 
London:  John  Murray. 
Goffinan,  1.  (1961)  Encounters, 
Bobbs-Merrfll. 
Goffman,  1.  (1963)  Behaviour  in  Public  Pf"es, 
Free  Press  of  Glencoe-  Collier-Mac  nillan  I  MI 
Goffinan,  1.  (1969a)  On  Face  Work, 
in  Where  the  Action  is-  Three  Essays, 
London-  Allen  Lane. 
Goffinan,  1.  (1969b)  H%ere  the  Action  Is, 
in  Where  the  Action  Is.  Three  Essays, 
London:  Allen  Lane. 
Gogol,  N.  (1926)  The  Gamblers;  in  The  Government  Inspector  and 
(Nher  Plays; 
tr.  C.  Gamett 
London-  Chatto  and  Windus. 
Goldstein,  L  Carlton,  P.  (1988)  Hemispheric  EEG  correlates  of  compulsive 
behaviour, 
Research  Commurncations  in  Psychology,  Psychiatry 
and  Behaviour  (13). 
Greenson,  R.  (1974)  On  Gambling, 
in  Halfiday  and  Fuller  (1974). 
Greenwood,  M.  (1970)  Medical  Statisticsfrom  Graunt  to  Farr, 
in  Pearson,  E.  S.  and  Kendall,  M.  G.  (eds)  (1970). 
Griffiths,  M.  D.  (1990a)  The  acquisition,  development  and  maintenance  of 
fruit  machines:  gambling  in  adolescents, 
Journal  of  Gambting  Studies  (6). 
Griffiths,,  M.  D.  (1993e)  Fruit  machine  gambling:  the  importance  of 
structural  characteristics, 
Journal  of  Gambling  Studies  (9). 
Griffiths,  M.  D.  (1994)  Tkefuture  ofgambling  in  the  technological 
revolution, 
Society  for  the  Study  of  Gambling  Newsletter 
No.  24. Griffiths,  M.  D.  (1994c)  The  role  of  cognitive  bias  and  skill  in  fruit 
machine  gambling, 
British  Journal  of  Psychology  (85). 
Griffiths,  M.  D.  (1995)  Adolescent  Gambling, 
London  and  New  York  -  Routledge. 
Griffiths,  M.  D.  Swiff,  H.  (1992)  The  use  of  light  and  colour  in  arcades, 
Society  for  the  Study  of  Gambling  Neývsletter 
No.  21. 
Guillaume,  A.  (1938)  Prophecy  and  Divination  Among  the  Hebre"  and  Other,,  Vemites, 
Hodder  and  Stoughton  Ltd-  London. 
The  Guardian  31  October  1994 
Ihe  Guardian  21  March  1995 
Ihe  Guardian:  22  March  1995 
The  Guardian  29  March  1995 
The  Guardian  5  June  1995 
The  Guar&an  22  August  1995 
Hacking,  1.  (1975)  The  Emergence  of  Pýobability, 
Cambridge  University  Press-  London. 
Hacking,  1.  (1990)  The  Taming  of  Chance, 
Cambridge  University  Press.  Cambridge. 
Halliday,  J.  Fuller,  P.  (eds)  The  PSychology  of  Gambling 
(1974)  Allen  Lane. 
Hargrave,  C.  (1996)  A  History  of  Playing  Cards, 
Dover:  New  York. 
Harmondsworth.  Penguin. 
Harfis,  E.  (1991)  Cosmos  and  Anthropos, 
Humanities  Press  International 
Harris,  M.  (1972)  Sport  in  Greece  and  Rome, 
London-  Thames  and  Hudson. 
Henstin,  J.  M.  (1967)  Craps  and  magic, 
American  Journal  of  Sociology  No.  73. 
Hesse,  H  (1975)  The  Glass  Bead  Game, 
tr.  R  and  C  Winston 
Penguin. 
Herman,  R.  (1976)  Gamblers  and  Gambling, 
Lexington:  Lexington  Books  Ltd- 
Herman,  R.  D.  (ed)  (1967)  Gambling, 
London-  Harper  and  Row. 29 
Hibbert,  C.  (1987)  The  English, 
London:  Grafton. 
Hoffman,  E.  T.  A.  (1963)  Gambler's  Luck, 
tr.  M.  Bullock 
Fredefick  Ungar  Publishing  Co  Ltd. 
Huizinga,  1  (1949)  Homo  Ludens, 
London-  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul. 
Hunter,  R-  (1995)  Lo",  stress  disorder, 
The  British  Medical  Journal 
No.  6983  Volume  3  10. 
Jacobs,  D.  (1988)  Evidencefor  a  common  dissociatile-like  reaction 
among  adificts, 
The  Journal  of  Gambling  Behaviour  VOILIme  4 
James,  H.  Weisheipt,  L  (1982)  The  Interpretation  of  Aristotle's  Physics  and  the 
Science  ofMotion, 
in  Kretzman  et  a].  (  19  8  2) 
Jensen,  A.  E.  (1963)  Myth  and  Cult  among  Primitive  Peoples, 
tr.  M.  T.  Choldin  and  W.  Weissleder, 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Jonson,  B.  (1987)  The  A  khemist 
(ed)  P  Bennet 
London  and  New  York:  Routledge 
Joseph  Rowntree  Foundation  Report  Winners  and  Losers:  The  Impact  of  the  National 
Lottery,  July  1995. 
Judges,  A.  V.  (ed)  (1965)  The  Elizabethan  Underworld, 
Routledge. 
Juvenal  (1988)  The  Siveen  Satires 
tr.  P.  Green 
Harmondsworthi  Penguin. 
Kahneman,  D.  Tversky,  A.  (1982)  77te  PSyckology  of  Nijýrences, 
Scientific  American.  January. 
Kaplan,  R.  (1988)  Gambling  among  lottely  PlaYers:  Before  and  after 
the  big  win, 
Journal  of  Gambling  Behaviour 
Volume  3  (4). 
Kavanagh,  T.  M.  (1993)  Enlightenment  and  the  Shadoui  of  Chance, 
The  John  Hopkins  University  Press-  Baltimore  and 
London. 
Kend",  M.  G  (1970)  The  Beginnings  of  a  Probability  Odculus, 
in  Pearson,  E.  S.  and  Kendall,  M.  G.  (eds)  (  1970) 
Kendall,  M.  G.  (1970)  A  Note  on  Playing  Cards, 
in  Pearson,  E.  S.  and  Kendall,  NI-G.  (eds)  (1970) Kierkegaard,  S.  (1983)  Repetition 
tr.  H.  V.  Hong  and  E.  H.  Hong 
Princeton  University  Press. 
Kirwan,  C.  (1989)  Augustine, 
London:  Routledge. 
Kirzner,  1.  (1985)  Discovery  and  the  Capitalist  Pýocess, 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Knight,  F.  (1921)  Risk,  Uncertainty  and  Pýqflt, 
Cambridge-  The  Riverside  Press. 
Koteliansky,  S.  S.  ed  (1923)  Dostoevsky:  Letters  and  Reminiscences, 
tr.  S.  Koteliansky 
London:  Chatto  and  Windus. 
Kotefiansky,  S.  S.  ed  (1962)  DostoevsAy  Portmyed  by  his  Wife, 
tr.  S.  Kotellansky 
London-  Routledge  and  Sons. 
Kretzmann,  N.  Kenny,  A,  The  Cambridge  History  of  Later 
J  Pinborg  (eds)  (1982)  Medieval  Philosophy, 
Cambridge  University  Press 
Ladoceur,  H.  (1995)  Paper  Presented  at  the  First  European  Conference  on 
Gambling;  Cambridge. 
Langer,  E.  (1975)  The  illusion  of  control, 
Journal  of  Personality  and  Social  Psychology  No.  32 
Laplace  (1830)  The  System  of  the  World  Volume  2, 
tr.  H.  H.  Harte 
Longman,  Rees,  Orme,  Brown  and  Green:  Dublin. 
Lash,  S.  Urry,  1  (1994)  Economies  of  Signs  and  Spare, 
London-  Sage. 
Leibniz,  G.  (1977)  Discourse  on  Metaphysics 
in  C7assics  of  Western  Phi1OsOPhY 
ed  S.  M.  Cahn 
Hacklett  Publishing  Company  Inc:  Indianapolis. 
Leiseur,  H.  (1984)  The  Chase, 
Cambridge:  Massachusetts. 
Levi-Strauss,  C.  (1989)  The  Savage  Afind, 
Weidenfeld  and  Nicolson-  London. 
Levy-Bruhl,  L.  (1936)  Mmitives  and  the  Supernatural, 
tr.  L.  A.  Clare 
London:  Men  and  UnvAn. 
Levy-Bruhl,  L.  (1966)  Primutive  Mentidity, 
tr.  L.  A.  CI  are 
Boston-  Beacon  Press 3n 
Li,  W.  and  Smith,  M.  (1976)  The  Prosperijýr  to  GamhIe:,  VomeVructuraj 
Determinants, 
in  Eadington  (ed)  (1976). 
Lindner,  R.  (1974)  The  PSychodaynamics  of  Gambling, 
in  Haffiday  and  Fuller  (1974), 
Loewe,  L.  Blacker,  C.  (1981)  Divination  and  Oracles, 
(eds)  London.  Allen  and  Unwin. 
Lowry,  R.  (1989)  The  Architecture  of  Chance, 
New  York-  Oxford  University  Press. 
Luhmann,  N.  (1993)  Risk:  A  Sociological  Theory, 
tr.  R.  Barnett 
Berlin:  Walter  de  Gruyler. 
Ihe  Alahabharala  (1975)  tr.  J.  A.  B.  von  Buiten, 
Chicago-  University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Marenbon,  1  (1983)  Early  Me&eval  Philosophy, 
London-  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul. 
Martinez,  T.  (1976)  Compulsive  Gambling  in  the  ConsciousAfood 
Perspective, 
in  Eadington  (ed)  (1976). 
Martinez,  T.  M.  M.  (1983)  The  GamblingScene, 
Springfield-  Illinois. 
Mauss  (1972)  A  General  Theory  of  Magicl 
tr.  R.  Brain 
London.  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul. 
Mauss,  M.  (1954)  The  Gift-, 
tr.  1.  Cunnison 
London-  Cohen  and  West. 
McKibbon,  N.  (1979)  Working  class  gamh1ing  in  Britain  1880-193  7, 
Past  and  Present  No-82. 
MeHor,  D.  (1971)  The  Matter  of  Chance, 
London-  Cambridge  University  Press. 
Merleau-Ponty,  M.  (198  1)  The  Phenomenology  of  Perception, 
tr.  C.  Srnith 
London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul. 
Minkowski,  E.  (1970)  Lived  I"Ime:  Phenomenological  and 
Psychopathological  Studies, 
Evanston:  Northwestern  UnIversity  Press, 
Nfitchell,  R.  J.  A  History  of  the  English 
Leys,  H.  D.  R.  (1950)  People, 
London.  Longmans  Green. 
Mtford,  N.  (1966)  The  Sun  King, 
London-  Book  Club  Associates. Monod,  J.  (1974)  Chance  and  Necessity:  An  Essiq  on  the  A'atural 
Pkilosophy  of  Modern  Biology-, 
tr.  A.  Wainhouse 
Collins-  Fontana  Books. 
Montesquieu,  C.  (1977)  Persian  Lefters; 
tr-  Cl  Betts 
Penguin. 
Moore,  S.  Myerhoff,  B.  (eds)  Secular  Ritual, 
(1977)  Assen-  Van  Gorcum. 
Ihe  National  Lottery  Magazine  Take  That  Ltd. 
Neu,  J.  (1991)  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Freud, 
Cambridge  UnIversity  Press. 
Nevifle,  M.  (1909)  Light  Come,  Light  Go, 
Macmillan  and  Co. 
Newman,  0.  (1972)  Gambling:  Hazard  and  Reward, 
Athlone  Press. 
Nietzsche,  F.  (1968)  Notes; 
in  The  Portable  Nietzsche, 
ed.  Kaufinan,  V 
New  York.  Viking  Press. 
Nietzsche,  F.  (1969)  Thus  Spoke  Zarathustra-, 
tr.  R.  J.  Hollingdale 
Penguin. 
Nietzsche,  F.  (1982)  Diqbreak; 
tr.  R.  J.  Hollingdale 
Cambridge  UlUversity  press. 
Northbrooke,  J.  (1843)  A  Treatise  Against  Dicing,  Dancing,  Plays  and 
Interludes, 
The  Shakespeare  Society-.  London. 
Northebrooke,  J.  (1843)  A  Treatise  Against  Dicing,  Dancing,  Plays  and 
Interludes, 
London-  The  Shakespeare  Society. 
Nussbaum,  H.  C.  (1986)  The  Fragility  of  Goodness:  Luck  and  Ethics  in 
Greek  Trage4,  and  Philosophy, 
Cambridge  University  Press. 
7he  Observer  25  June  1995 
Oldman,  D.  (1974)  Chance  and  skill:  A  study  of  roulette, 
Sociology  No-8. 
Olmsted,  C.  (1967)  Analysing  A  Pack  of  Gvds, 
in  Herman  (ed)  (1967). 
Onians,  R.  B.  (1988)  The  (higins  of  Eurppean  Thought, 
Cambridge  University  Press-  Cwnbridge. Ore,  0.  (1953) 
Orwell,  G  (1984) 
Otto,  R.  (1925) 
Oxford  English  Dictionary  (196  1) 
Parlett,  D.  (1979) 
Pascal,  B.  (1987) 
Me  Paston  Letters  (1983) 
Pearson,  E.  S.  Kendall,  M.  G. 
eds  (1970) 
Pepys,  S.  (1976) 
Pfefferkom,  K.  (1988) 
Piaget,  J.  (1977) 
Cardano:  The  GamhlingScholar, 
Pnnceton-  New  Jersey. 
Nineteen  EighiýV-Four 
Penguin 
The  Idea  of  the  Holy, 
London:  Oxford  University  Press. 
Volumes  2,3,5  and  8, 
Oxford:  Clarendon  Press. 
The  Penguin  Book  of  Card  Games 
Penguin 
Pensees; 
tr.  Al  Krailshetmer 
Penguin. 
ed  N.  Davis 
Oxford  UrIlversity  Press. 
Studies  in  the  History  of 
Statistics  and  Probability 
London:  Griffin. 
Dianfes,  Volume  9 
ed  by  Latham,  R.  C.  and  Mathews,  W. 
London:  G  Bell  and  Sons  Ltd. 
Novalis  -A  Romanfic's  Theoty  of  Language  and 
Poetry, 
Yale  University  Press,  New  Haven  and  I,  ondon. 
The  Child's  Conception  of  the  Worid, 
Paladin. 
Plaget,  I  (1977)  The  Child's  Conception  of  the  World, 
Paladin. 
Plato  (1934)  Lmm; 
tr.  A.  E.  Taylor 
London:  J.  M.  Dent  and  Sons  Ltd 
Plato  (1969)  IAMPS. 
tr.  A-E.  Taylor;  edited  by  E.  Harrulton  and  M. 
Caims; 
Bollingen  Series-  Princeton  University  Press. 
Plato  (1987)  Phaedo 
in  The  Dialogues  Of  PIaI0 
tr.  B.  J  owett 
Oxford  UnIversity  Press. 
Plato  (1987)  Ion 
in  The  Dialogues  of  Plato 
tr.  B  Jowett 
Oxford  Uruversity  Press Plato  (1987)  Phaedrus 
in  The  Dialogues  of  Hato, 
tr.  B.  Jowett 
Oxford  University  Press. 
Plato  (1987)  Statesman 
in  The  Dialogues  of  Plato 
tr.  B.  Jowett 
Oxford  University  Press 
Polo,  M.  (1958) 
Pope,  A.  (1963) 
Pratt,  M.  Maltzman,  1. 
Hauprich,  W.  Ziskind,  E.  (1982) 
Pushkin,  A.  (1962) 
Pushkin,  A.  (1983) 
Puzo,  M.  (1977) 
T.  (195  1) 
The  Travels, 
tr.  R.  Latham 
Penguin. 
An  Essay  on  Man 
in  The  Poems  of  Alexander  Pope 
ed.  J  Butt 
London-  Methuen. 
Electrodermal  activiV  of 
sociopaths  and  controls  in  the  presser  test, 
Psychology  (19). 
The  Queen  of  Spades  and  (hherStories, 
tr.  R.  Edmonds 
Penguin. 
Eugene  Onegin-, 
tr.  C.  Johnston 
Penguin. 
Inside  Las  Vegas, 
Charter.  -  New  York. 
Dogma  and  Compulsion:  PSychoanalyticStudies 
of  Religion  and  Myths, 
tr.  B.  Nfiall, 
New  York-  International  Universities  Press. 
Report  of  the  Gaming  Boardfor  Great  Britain  (1994/1995) 
HMSO. 
Richardson,  J.  (1980) 
Roberts,  J.  Arth,  M. 
Bush,  R.  (1959) 
Rosenthal,  R.  (1986) 
Rousseau,  J.  J.  (1967) 
Memoir  of  a  Gambler, 
London:  I  Cape. 
Games  in  culture 
Arnefican  Anthropologist  No.  6  1. 
The  pathological  gambler's  system  for  self- 
decepdon, 
Joumal  of  Gambling  Behaviour 
Volume  2  (2). 
The  Confessions, 
tr.  J.  H.  Cohen 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin. I) 
Royston,  R  (1970)  A  Note  on  the  Geographical  Presentation  of  Data. 
in  Pearson,  E.  S.  and  Kendall,  \1  G.  (eds)  (1970) 
Sartre,  J.  P.  (1957)  Existentialism  and  Human  Emotions. 
tr.  H.  E.  Barnes 
The  Wisdom  Library-  New  York. 
Scarne,  J.  (1974)  Scarne  on  Dice, 
Stackpole  Books. 
Schiller,  F  (1845)  Philosophical  and  A  esthefic  Letters  and  Essays. 
tr.  I  Weiss 
London:  Chapman 
Schimmel,  A.  (1993)  The  Mystery  of  Numbers, 
Oxford  University  Press. 
Schopenhauer,  A.  (1970)  Essays  and  Aphorisms 
tr.  R.  J.  Hollingdale 
Harmondsworth:  Penguin. 
Scott.,  D.  Venturi,  R.  (1972)  Learningfrom  Las  Vegas, 
Cambridge.  MIT  Press. 
Screech,  M.  (1980)  Ecstasy  and  the  Naise  of  Folly, 
London-  Duckworth. 
Seneca  (1986)  The  Apocolocyntosis-, 
tr.  J.  P.  Sullivan 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin. 
Sharples,  R.  W.  (1983)  Alexander  ofAphroifisias  on  Fate, 
London:  Duckworth. 
Sifakis,  C.  (1990)  The  Encyclopedia  of  Gambling, 
Facts  on  File.  New  York. 
Sirnmel,  G.  (1971  a)  The  Miser  and  the  Spendthrift, 
in  On  Indiiidual4  andSocial  Forms, 
Edited  by  D.  N.  Levine 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Sirnmel.,  G.  (1971b)  The  Adventurer, 
in  On  Individuality  and  Social  Forms 
Edited  by  D.  N  Levine 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Simmell  G.  (1971c)  The  Metropolis  and  Mental  Life, 
in  On  Indiiiduality  and  Social  Fornts, 
Edited  by  D.  N.  Levine 
University  of  Chicago  Press. 
Skolnick,  J.  (1980)  House  of  Cards, 
Boston-  Little,  Brown. 
Smith,  M.  (1993)  Changing  sociological  perspectives  on  chance, 
Sociology  Volume  27  No.  3. Spanier,  D.  (1987)  Eavy  Money:  Inside  the  Gamhler's,  tfind, 
London-  Abacus. 
Spanier,  D.  (1992)  All  Right,  OK  You  Win, 
Mandann. 
Spencer,  L.  (1985)  Allegory  in  the  world  of  the  commodity, 
The  New  German  Critique,  No.  34 
Spinoza,  B.  (1977)  Ethics 
in  Classics  of  Western  Philosophy 
ed  S.  M.  Cahn 
Hacklett  Pubfishing  Company  Inc-  Indianapolis. 
Stark,  G.  M.  Saunders',  D.  M.  Differential  aspects  of  red  Wookey,  P.  (1982)  and  blue  lighting  on  gambling 
behaviour, 
Current  Psychological  Research  (2). 
Steimnetz,  A.  (1870)  The  Gaming  Table:  Volume  11, 
Tinsley  Brothers-  London. 
Stone,  L.  (1967)  The  Crisis  of  the  Aristocracy,  1558-1641, 
London-  Oxford  UnIversity  Press. 
Storch,  A.  (1924)  The  Primitive  Archaic  Forms  of  Inner 
Experiences  of  Thought  in  Vchizophrenics, 
tr.  C.  Willard 
New  York  and  Washington-  Nervous  and  Mental 
Disease  Publishing  Company. 
Strange,  S.  (1986)  Casino  Capitalism, 
Oxford:  Black-well. 
Straus,  E.  (1966)  Phenomenological  Psychology-, 
tr.  E.  Eng 
London-  Tavistock. 
Strayer,  J.  R.  (1982)  A  Dictioniuy  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
New  York:  Scribner. 
Strickland,  L.  Lewickiý  R.  J.  Temporal  orientations  and 
Katz,  A.  (1966)  perceived  control  as  determinants  of  risk-taking, 
Journal  of  Experimental  and  Social  Psychology  (2) 
Suetonius  (1958)  The  Twelve  Caesars 
tr.  R.  Graves 
Penguin 
Sullivan,  G  (1972)  By  Chance  a  Winner 
New  York-  Dodd,  Mead. Tacitus,  C(  1982) 
Taylor,  E  (1913) 
Taylor,  E.  S  (1865) 
Tec,  N.  (1967) 
Trevelyan,  G,  M.  (1948) 
Tsukahara,,  T  and  Brurnin,  H.  (1976) 
Turgenev,  1.  (1970) 
Turner,  L.  and  Lash,  J  (1975) 
van  der  Leeuw,,  G.  (1967) 
Veblen,  T.  (1925) 
Vinson,  B.  (1988) 
Volberg,  R  and  Steadman,  H  (1988) 
Voltaire  (1979) 
Voltaire  0  990) 
von  Hagan,  V.  (1962) 
von  Neumann,  J.  and  Morgenstern, 
(1953) 
. 
The  Germania 
in  The  Agricola  and  the  Germania 
tr.  M.  Mattingly 
Harmondsworth-  Penguin 
Primitive  Culture.  Volume  I 
London.  J  MurTay 
The  History  of  Pfaying  Cards 
London 
Gambling  in  Sweden 
New  Jersey.  The  Bedminster  Press 
English  Social  History:  A  Survey  of  Six  Centuries, 
London:  Reprint  Society. 
Economic  Rationality,  PSychology  and  Decision 
Making  under  Uncertainty, 
in  W.  R.  Eadington  (ed)  (1976). 
Smoke; 
tr.  N.  Duddington 
Dent  London-  Everyman's  Library 
The  Golden  Hordes:  International  Tourism  and 
the  Pleasure  Periphery 
Londom  Constable 
Religion  in  Essence  and  Manifestation, 
Gloucester.  P.  Smith. 
The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class, 
London.  Allen  and  Unwin. 
Las  Vegas  Behind  the  Tables, 
Goflehon-  Michigan. 
Refining  prevalence  estimates  ofpathological 
gambling 
American  Joumal  of  Psychiatry 
Philosophical  Dictionary; 
tr.  T.  Besterman 
Penguin. 
Zadig 
in  Candide  and  Other  Stories, 
tr.  R.  Pearson 
Oxford  UnIversity  Press. 
The  Ancient  Sun-Kingdoms  of  the  Americas, 
London-  Thames  and  Hudson. 
Theory  of  Games  and  Economic 
Behaviour, 
London-  Oxford  Uruversity  Press. von  Renssalaer,  J.  K.  (1912)  Nophetical,  Educational  and  Phying  Car(& 
Londm  Hurst  and  Blackett. 
Wagenaar,  W  (1988)  Paradoxes  of  Gambling  Behaviour, 
London-  ErIbaum. 
Waldrop,  M.  (1992)  complexity, 
PengWn-  Viking. 
Walker,  H.  B.  (1992)  The  PSychology  of  Gambling, 
Pergamon  Press  Oxford. 
Wasiolek,  E.  (1972)  Introduction  to  Dostoevsky's  The  Gambler, 
University  of  Chicago  Press 
Weber,  A  (1990)  The  Pýotestant  Ethic  and  the  Spirit  of  Capitalism, 
tr.  T.  Parsons 
London:  Unwin  Hyman. 
Wolfe,  T.  (1981)  The  Kandy-Kolored  Tangerine  Flake  Streamline 
Baby 
Picador 
Yarwood,  D.  (1986)  Encyclopedia  of  Architecture, 
New  York:  Facts  on  File. 
Zohar,  D.  Marshall,  1.  (1993)  The  Quantum  Society, 
Bloomsbury. 
Zola,  1.  (1962)  Observations  on  Gambling  in  a  Lower  Class 
Setting, 
in  Herman  (ed)  (1967). 
GljkSGOW  uk 
uvr,  lTlzsrff 
oil 